0.2.2 alpha

README.md

@@ -58,10 +58,13 @@ agsec install claude-code     # activate the firewall
 Done. Every tool call is now checked against your policies. Out of the box, the following are blocked:
 
 - `rm`, `rm -rf`, `rmdir` — destructive deletes
-- Writes to `.env`, `.env.*`, secrets files
-- `git push --force` — force pushes
-- `DROP TABLE`, `DELETE FROM` without WHERE — destructive SQL
-- Reads of `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws`, `~/.gnupg` — credential directories
+- Reads and writes to `.env`, credentials, SSH keys, cloud credentials
+- `git push --force`, `git reset --hard` — destructive git
+- `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`, `ALTER DROP` — DDL commands
+- `DELETE FROM`, `UPDATE SET`, `INSERT INTO` — DML commands
+- `sqlite3 audit.db`, `psql audit.db` — audit database tampering
+- `chmod 777`, `mkfs`, `dd`, `shred` — destructive filesystem ops
+- Direct push to `main`, `master`, `production` branches
 
 ---
 
@@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ agsec audit --stats           # see what would have been blocked
 agsec enforce                 # start blocking when ready
 ```
 
-Observe mode gives you a full audit trail of every action your agent attempted — with zero disruption to your workflow. See the blast radius before you enforce it.
+Observe mode gives you a full audit trail of every action your agent attempted — with zero disruption to your workflow. See the blast radius before you enforce it. Every action is logged with its actual outcome, so `agsec analyze` accurately shows what got through vs what would have been blocked.
 
 ---
 
@@ -110,7 +113,7 @@ statements:
     actions: ["bash.execute"]
 ```
 
-Three effects: `allow`, `deny`, `review` (human-in-the-loop pause). Deny always wins — same evaluation logic as AWS IAM. Layered policy evaluation (project + agent layers) where each layer is a gate. Supports 14 condition operators: `==`, `!=`, `>`, `<`, `>=`, `<=`, `in`, `not_in`, `contains`, `starts_with`, `ends_with`, `regex`, `exists`, `not_exists`.
+Three effects: `allow`, `deny`, `review` (human-in-the-loop pause). Deny always wins — same evaluation logic as AWS IAM. Layered policy evaluation (project + agent layers) where each layer is a gate. 21 built-in threat patterns for blast radius analysis. Supports 14 condition operators: `==`, `!=`, `>`, `<`, `>=`, `<=`, `in`, `not_in`, `contains`, `starts_with`, `ends_with`, `regex`, `exists`, `not_exists`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -182,6 +185,8 @@ agsec validate                # check for errors
 
 agsec audit [--stats]         # view action log
 agsec analyze [--hours N]     # threat analysis with blast radius
+agsec analyze --all           # full activity report (every action)
+agsec status                  # firewall status at a glance
 agsec observe                 # switch to observe mode
 agsec enforce                 # switch to enforce mode
 

agsec/__init__.py

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+__version__ = "0.2.2"
+
 from .audit import AuditStore
 from .control import ControlLayer
 from .guard import guard

agsec/audit/store.py

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None):
 
         self.conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
         self._init_db()
+        self._auto_prune()
 
     def __enter__(self):
         return self
@@ -60,15 +61,25 @@ def _init_db(self) -> None:
                 policy_status TEXT NOT NULL,
                 policy_reason TEXT,
                 context TEXT,
-                error TEXT
+                error TEXT,
+                outcome TEXT
             )
         """)
+        self.conn.execute("""
+            CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_executions_timestamp
+            ON executions(timestamp)
+        """)
+        # Migrate existing databases that don't have the outcome column
+        try:
+            self.conn.execute("SELECT outcome FROM executions LIMIT 1")
+        except sqlite3.OperationalError:
+            self.conn.execute("ALTER TABLE executions ADD COLUMN outcome TEXT")
         self.conn.commit()
 
-    def log_execution(self, execution: ActionExecutionResult, context: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, error: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
+    def log_execution(self, execution: ActionExecutionResult, context: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None, error: Optional[str] = None, outcome: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
         self.conn.execute("""
-            INSERT INTO executions (timestamp, action, params, result, policy_status, policy_reason, context, error)
-            VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+            INSERT INTO executions (timestamp, action, params, result, policy_status, policy_reason, context, error, outcome)
+            VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
         """, (
             datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
             execution.action,
@@ -77,7 +88,8 @@ def log_execution(self, execution: ActionExecutionResult, context: Optional[Dict
             execution.policy.status.value,
             execution.policy.reason,
             json.dumps(context, default=str) if context else None,
-            error
+            error,
+            outcome,
         ))
         self.conn.commit()
 
@@ -127,6 +139,30 @@ def get_executions_since(
         rows = self.conn.execute(query, params).fetchall()
         return [dict(row) for row in rows]
 
+    def prune(self, days: int = 7) -> int:
+        """Delete audit records older than N days. Returns count deleted."""
+        cutoff = (datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(days=days)).isoformat()
+        cursor = self.conn.execute("DELETE FROM executions WHERE timestamp < ?", (cutoff,))
+        self.conn.commit()
+        return cursor.rowcount
+
+    def clear(self) -> int:
+        """Delete ALL audit records. Returns count deleted."""
+        cursor = self.conn.execute("DELETE FROM executions")
+        self.conn.commit()
+        return cursor.rowcount
+
+    def _auto_prune(self) -> None:
+        """Auto-prune if AGSEC_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS is set."""
+        retention = os.environ.get("AGSEC_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS")
+        if retention is not None:
+            try:
+                days = int(retention)
+                if days > 0:
+                    self.prune(days=days)
+            except ValueError:
+                pass
+
     def export_to_json(self, file_path: str) -> None:
         executions = self.get_executions(limit=10000)
         # Write with restricted permissions