Report vulnerabilities privately to team@tsinbei.com. Include a description of the issue, affected code paths, and reproduction steps or a proof of concept if available.

Please do not open public issues for security problems. We will respond within 72 hours and credit reporters in the fix's changelog entry unless anonymity is requested.

This project is a clean-room reimplementation of publicly observed wire behavior for Sangfor remote-access VPNs (aTrust and Easy Connect). It contains no Sangfor SDK binaries, proprietary code, or credentials.

In scope:

• Anything in this repository (Dart, Kotlin, Swift, CI workflow).

Out of scope:

• Vulnerabilities in Sangfor server software (report to Sangfor).
• Vulnerabilities in dependencies (report upstream; we will track and bump versions).
• Active attacks against production VPN deployments you do not own or are not authorized to test.

Dependabot alerts are triaged before being dismissed, and a dismissal is recorded here with the reasoning that supports it. Re-open the assessment when the reason stops holding.

Dismissed 2026-10-02 as vulnerable code not in execute path:

All four are in CRL parsing or name-constraint checking. Neither is reachable from this workspace:

1. The 0.102 copy is here only as a dependency of rustls-rustcrypto 0.0.2-alpha, the pure-Rust provider sangfor-tls needs so the OHOS and Android cross-builds stay free of a C toolchain. rustls 0.23 resolves its own, already-patched rustls-webpki 0.103.x separately — which is why Cargo.lock carries two copies of the crate.
2. rustls-rustcrypto uses exactly one symbol from it: webpki::alg_id, imported in src/verify/{ecdsa,eddsa,rsa}.rs. That module is a table of pub const AlgorithmIdentifier values built with include_bytes!("data/alg-*.der") — DER-encoded OIDs resolved at compile time. It parses nothing at run time and never sees attacker-controlled input.
3. No certificate path validation runs through it. sangfor-tls installs its own ServerCertVerifier (sangfor-tls/src/trust.rs, PinVerifier, wired via .dangerous()), which pins the leaf certificate digest and deliberately ignores intermediates, the server name, OCSP and time: aTrust gateways advertise the identity of the leaf the node presents, and commonly present self-signed leaves with no chain at all. With no chain there are no name constraints to apply and no distribution point to fetch, so neither vulnerable code path is entered.
4. A search for crl, revocation and name_constraint across rust/ matches nothing outside this file.

There is no patched rustls-webpki 0.102.x — every fix landed in 0.103, which rustls-rustcrypto 0.0.2-alpha cannot accept — so there is no version Dependabot can propose. This resolves itself when RustCrypto/rustls-rustcrypto publishes a release from its current main, which has dropped the webpki dependency altogether and moved to the digest 0.11 generation. The same release unblocks the hmac 0.13 bump in PR #13, which would otherwise duplicate SHA-256/HMAC in a binary size-tuned for an iOS packet-tunnel extension.

Re-open this assessment if sangfor-tls ever validates a chain through rustls's WebPKI verifier, enables revocation checking, or if rustls-rustcrypto starts using webpki for anything beyond alg_id.