main is the only supported ref. This is a research library with no release
cadence, so there is nothing to backport a fix into. A tagged release, when there is
one, carries a build provenance attestation (see ADR-0011); a fix still lands on main.
Open a private security advisory rather than a public issue. Please include the commit SHA, the input or configuration that triggers the problem, and the observed versus expected behaviour.
You should get an acknowledgement within a week. This is a solo-maintained repository, so a fix may take longer than a fixed SLA would imply; if the report is severe enough that you would rather not wait, say so in the advisory and it will be triaged first.
- Code execution or arbitrary file access through a documented input path.
- A parser that trusts attacker-controlled input --
read_euroc_imuand the trajectory readers accept external files, so a malformed one is in scope. - A measurement path that silently produces a plausible but wrong number. The project is an estimator whose output is evidence, so a silent numerical fault is treated as a correctness bug with security relevance, not a cosmetic one.
- An unfiltered third-party value in a generated result file.
- Failure of the estimator on an outage it is documented to fail at. Underconfident or overconfident behaviour under GNSS denial is the measured subject of the project, not a bug; the docs distinguish the two cases deliberately.
- Anything requiring an API key or credential that a user supplies themselves. The repository ships no credentials and asks for none.
-
.gitignorelists a local agent config file that can carry a provider API key. Do not remove that rule, and do not commit such a file under another name. -
CI runs with
contents: readat the top level. The only job granted more is CodeQL, which needssecurity-events: writeto upload its results. -
The Dockerfile base image is pinned by digest, and the release workflow attests the provenance of what it builds. Only its tag-only job has write permissions.
-
Third-party actions are pinned to full commit SHAs, with the release version in a trailing comment (
uses: owner/action@<sha> # v1.2.3). A tag can be moved; a SHA cannot. Dependabot updates the SHA and the comment together. -
Dependabot tracks both GitHub Actions and pip, so an action or dependency update arrives as a reviewable pull request rather than silently.
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CodeQL analyses Python on push, pull request, and weekly.
-
.github/workflows/security.ymlruns on every pull request, on pushes tomainand weekly:- a secret scan (
scripts/scan_secrets.py) of the tracked files and of every line ever added to any ref, with a rule for the shape of the provider key this project once leaked; - dependency review on pull requests, failing on a high-severity advisory;
pip-auditof the installed dependencies against the PyPI advisory database;- a CycloneDX SBOM of the runtime dependencies, kept as a workflow artifact.
The same scanner runs locally as a pre-commit hook and as
make secrets. It finds well-known credential shapes; it will miss an arbitrary high-entropy string, so it is a tripwire and not a replacement for keeping credentials out of the tree. - a secret scan (
A provider API key was committed in a documentation file in an early commit, as evidence in an audit. It was redacted the next day. The maintainer rotated the key before the history rewrite of 2026-10-19, and the rewrite removed the value from the branches of this repository. The secret scan now reports nothing in history, and its list of accepted findings is empty.
The rewrite cannot reach everything. GitHub keeps hidden pull-request refs and cached views of old commits until GitHub Support removes them. The key must therefore be treated as exposed. It was rotated, so the exposure is closed.