ci: set least-privilege GITHUB_TOKEN permissions#12
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Add top-level `permissions: contents: read` to every workflow. Without it, jobs inherit the repo-default token scope (often read-write), so a malicious dependency executing during install/build/test on a push to the default branch would hold a write-capable token. Read-only by default denies that; the publish job keeps its own job-level `id-token: write` block (job-level permissions override the top-level default), so trusted-publishing is unaffected. Complements the SHA-pinning: pinning stops untrusted code from running; this limits what it can do if it runs anyway. Fork-PR tokens are already forced read-only by GitHub; this closes the push-triggered path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Least-privilege
GITHUB_TOKEN: adds top-levelpermissions: contents: readto every workflow.Jobs otherwise inherit the repo-default token scope (often read-write). A poisoned transitive dependency running during install/build/test on a push to the default branch would then hold a write-capable token (push commits, cut releases). Read-only by default denies that. Publish jobs keep their own job-level
id-token: write(job-level overrides the top-level default), so PyPI trusted publishing is unaffected.Defense-in-depth complement to the SHA-pinning: pinning stops untrusted code from running; this caps what it can do. Fork-PR tokens are already read-only by GitHub design — this closes the push-triggered path.
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