handraise is pre-1.0. Only the latest 0.x release receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.x (latest) | ✅ |
| older 0.x | ❌ |
Please report vulnerabilities privately. Open a private security advisory on GitHub for this repository (Security → Advisories → "Report a vulnerability"). Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.
We aim to acknowledge a report within a few working days and to keep you updated as we work on a fix. Please give us a reasonable window to release a patch before any public disclosure.
handraise hands control of a running Solari cloud browser to a human for a short assist (2FA, CAPTCHA, a manual step) and then returns control to the agent. Keep the following in mind when assessing risk:
- The handoff URL is a bearer link. Anyone who holds the URL can drive the session for its lifetime. Treat it like a password: send it over a trusted channel, and expect it to expire.
- The agent role is secret-protected. The credentials that let the agent act are never embedded in the handoff link and are not exposed to the human operator.
- The link is not arbitrary browser access. It grants interaction with the specific handed-off session only — not a general-purpose remote browser or access to unrelated pages, tabs, or origins.
In-scope reports include: leakage of agent secrets, a handoff link granting more than the intended session, a session that does not expire or revoke as documented, and injection or interception in the relay path. Out of scope: issues that require already holding a valid, unexpired handoff link (that is the bearer model working as designed).