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feat(web): ask the origin which renditions it holds; beacon claims are hints (#85) - #87
Since #77/#83 the web library took a beacon's https.renditions claim as a constraint on that origin: claims from several beacons were intersected, an origin whose claim left out the allowed renditions was skipped, and the session's levels were cut to the claim. Beacons come from any key (NFX-03), so a stranger could deny an origin, a network's own fallback origin included, or cut a level, just by naming it with a narrowing list. nutflix-pear#106 makes [] invalid at parse time, but a non-empty narrowing list (["360p"] for an origin that also serves 720p) still worked.
The fix: ask the origin, not the beacons
open() now asks the origin which allowed renditions it holds, once the hash list verifies (src/probe.ts, initProbe in src/lib.ts):
For each allowed rendition it fetches the media playlist (verified against the hash list, read up to its listed size) to learn the init's content name (NFX-05 §3), then sends a GET for that init.
It reads at most 64 KiB of the init, and none of an error body. No Range header, because Range is not CORS-safelisted in every browser, and a preflight would need the origin to answer OPTIONS, which NFX-05 §6 does not require. Cache mode is no-cache, so a copy cached in an earlier session cannot vouch for an origin that has since dropped the file. The answer is cached again, so hls.js reads it from the cache.
Probes run 6 at a time, at most 32 renditions (MAX_RENDITIONS), within 8 s per origin in all. They are aborted with the session's signal. A probe still running at the deadline counts as not held, and so does one never reached.
A rendition is held when its init answers 200 or 206. The session's levels are the allowed renditions the origin holds. An origin that holds none is skipped with an origin event that gives each rendition's answer (720p: HTTP 404; 360p: no answer within 8000 ms).
Only URLs the hash list names, right under <origin>/<root>/, are requested: the playlist by its sha256, and the init by a content name read from bytes that verified (^[0-9a-f]{64}\.[0-9A-Za-z]{1,8}$, and anchor.expected() must accept it).
Beacon claims (OriginSource.renditions, Endpoints.originSources) are hints only. An origin whose hint names an allowed rendition is tried before one whose hint does not, and the renditions it names are asked for first. A hint never removes an origin or a level. A narrowing claim reorders and nothing more. A widening or lying claim adds nothing, since the probe still decides.
The guarantee stays: no level is offered whose segments no source can deliver. Mesh peers add no level; HTTP from that origin is the fallback.
API
The API is source-compatible: no type or export changed shape. OpenCommon.renditions, Level.id, OriginSource, and Endpoints.originSources/availability are as before. src/api.ts and the README document the new meanings, and say plainly that OriginSource.renditions was a constraint before #85 and is a hint now. One behaviour a consumer may notice: renditions: [] on an OriginSource no longer skips that origin. It is tried last, and still asked. Each session also costs one playlist and one init request per allowed rendition. hls.js would fetch both anyway for the level it plays.
The beacon book (EndpointBook) is unchanged: claims about one origin are still intersected, now documented as a hint.
Test page
src/player.ts no longer turns beacon availability into renditions. When no seeder held every rendition, it passed the most-held ids as the allowed list, and a stranger's beacon could cut the levels that way too, racing the honest beacon. It now passes renditions only from &renditions=.
Tests
unit (unit.ts):
the probe runner: 200/206 held; 404, 500 and thrown errors not held; answer order; concurrency bounded at 2 and at the default 6; the deadline with a probe that ignores its signal, plus "not probed" for ids never reached; the probes' signals aborted; aborted by the caller and before start; no timer left behind; no unhandled rejection from a probe that rejects late; NaN concurrency; a 0 deadline offers nothing.
the GET: no Range, credentials omitted, no-cache; a small init read whole; an endless 200 (an origin without Range) cut at the cap and cancelled; a 404 body not read; 206; no body; a network failure; an abort mid-body.
initUrl: EXT-X-MAP, other attributes, CRLF, the first-segment fallback, neither.
hint ordering: originOrder and probeOrder, including the cap.
selectRenditions: a hostile narrowing hint is ignored; a hint cannot take away a wanted rendition; a widening hint cannot add a level; a claim of none is still asked; the caller's order is kept; a RangeError comes before any probe; 32 asked and the rest not offered.
the spec's hash list vector: its playlist names its init and verifies.
e2e (e2e.ts, Kata):
Hostile beacon. A third video in 720p+360p is served whole by an honest NFX-05 §6 origin behind TLS, and no honest beacon names that origin. A stranger's nfxd (another key) seeds the video in 360p only and names that origin with renditions: ["360p"]. By address, the page sees that claim as the origin's hint, offers 360p@360,720p@720, and plays. With &renditions=720p, it plays 720p from that origin rather than skipping it, and 720p segments are fetched.
A seeder that holds only 360p (nfxd --seed <a>#360p, origin 404 for 720p). By address, with no renditions asked for and with &renditions=720p,360p, and by origin and root without &renditions=, the page offers 360p alone and plays it. The request counts are exact, per session: one request for 720p's playlist (verified, to learn the init's name) and one for its init (the probe, which answers 404), and none for any 720p segment. &renditions=360p asks for nothing of 720p.
Kept: both levels are listed with their ids, on the honest origin. A bad &renditions= is refused before any probe; 4320p fetches only the hash list.
Results
Full Kata run of head 3083d27 (agentrun): all green. That head is eaec880 (the change) merged with deps/rustix-1.1.6 at 093f469 (#88).
Rust: fmt, clippy and tests of nfx-proto and nfx-wasm, plus nfx-wasm under node: all ok.
typecheck clean.
unit: 352/352.
e2ePASS:
720p of the 360p-only video, by address, two sessions: 4 requests in all (2 playlist, 2 init, each init a 404), 0 segments; 360p took 16 requests.
The same video by root without &renditions=: 360p offered alone, after 1 playlist and 1 init request for 720p.
Hostile beacon: hint ["360p"], levels 360p, 720p, playing, 0 rejected. With &renditions=720p: 720p played, 8 segments.
e2e:mesh, e2e:nostr, e2e:nostr-node: PASS.
Library tar sha256 at 3083d27: 1f72fc23b064ccf13dae87f325d9b91af0670713f66ecede5955b3cea56a5203. It reproduced twice in the VM and is byte-identical to eaec880's, since the lockfile merge touches neither the WASM nor the JS.
The same full run on eaec880 alone was green too. GitHub: nat, coverage, rust-forward and zizmor pass. check failed at eaec880 only on cargo deny RUSTSEC-2026-0486 (rustix 1.1.5), which is why #88 is merged in. lock fails at 3083d27 exactly as it does on #88's own head: that cargo update also moved errno, rustls-platform-verifier and winapi-util to windows-sys 0.52, which changes the money crates' closure. That is #88's to fix, and this branch takes it from there.
…e hints (#85)
Since #77/#83 the library took a beacon's `https.renditions` claim as a
constraint on its origin: claims were intersected, an origin whose claim left
out the allowed renditions was skipped, and the session's levels were cut to the
claim. Beacons come from any key, so a stranger could deny an origin, or cut a
level, by naming it with a narrowing list.
open() now asks the origin. Once the hash list verifies, it fetches each
allowed rendition's media playlist (verified against the hash list), and sends a
GET for the init it names (NFX-05 §3), reading at most 64 KiB, with no Range
header (not CORS-safelisted everywhere) and cache mode no-cache. Probes run 6 at
a time, at most 32 renditions, within 8 s per origin in all, and are aborted
with the session's signal. A rendition is held when its init answers 200 or 206;
an origin that holds none of the allowed renditions is skipped with an `origin`
event giving each answer. The guarantee stays: no level is offered whose
segments no source can deliver.
OriginSource.renditions (and Endpoints.originSources) are hints only: an origin
whose hint names an allowed rendition is tried first, and the renditions it
names are asked for first. They never remove an origin or a level. The public
API is unchanged in shape; api.ts and the README document the new meaning.
The test page no longer turns beacon availability into `renditions` (that let a
beacon cut the levels too). Unit tests cover the probe runner (bounds,
deadline, aborts, no unhandled rejections, no timer left), the byte-capped GET
(no Range, endless and error bodies), the init URI, hint ordering, and a
hostile hint being ignored. e2e adds a stranger's nfxd that names an honest
origin with renditions ["360p"]: the page still offers 720p and plays it when
asked; and for the 360p-only seeder, exactly one 720p playlist and one 720p
init request per session, never a 720p segment.
Fixes#85
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Walkthrough
The player now treats beacon rendition claims as ordering hints. It probes allowed renditions at each origin and builds session levels from renditions whose verified playlists and init files receive accepted responses.
Changes: Origin rendition probing
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Rendition ordering and level data web/player/src/levels.ts, web/player/unit.ts
Hash-list renditions now include validated playlist sizes. Beacon hints order origin and rendition probes without excluding entries. Session rendition selection can use probe results to filter levels.
Bounded probes and verified fetches web/player/src/probe.ts, web/player/src/verify.ts, web/player/unit.ts
Probe helpers apply concurrency, timeout, and response-size limits. They identify playlist init URLs, record probe outcomes, and select held allowed renditions. Verification supports bounded fetches of hash-listed content. Unit tests cover probe behavior and limits.
Origin selection and player integration web/player/src/api.ts, web/player/src/lib.ts, web/player/src/player.ts, web/player/src/resolve.ts, web/player/README.md
open() orders origins using hints and selects the first origin that answers for an allowed rendition. Address-based playback no longer uses beacon availability to filter renditions. API and README descriptions reflect the probe-based selection behavior.
End-to-end origin and beacon cases web/player/e2e.ts
End-to-end tests add a full-content TLS origin and a hostile-beacon case. The tests check that the hostile claim does not remove an available rendition and that probing requests its playlist and init file without requesting its segments when it is not selected.
sequenceDiagram
participant PlayerPage
participant open
participant Anchor
participant Origin
participant Session
PlayerPage->>open: Pass allowed renditions and origin hints
open->>Anchor: Load and verify hash list
Anchor->>Origin: Request hash list
Origin-->>Anchor: Return hash list
open->>Origin: Request rendition playlist and init file
Origin-->>open: Return probe responses
open->>Session: Set levels from held allowed renditions
Loading
Merge Risk: Low · up to 7f545
Merge Risk:🔵 Low · up to 7f545
Playback now asks each origin which renditions it holds instead of trusting beacon claims, so a hostile or mistaken claim can no longer hide a working origin. One test the linked issue explicitly asks for is missing: an end-to-end case where a hostile beacon claims no renditions. The unit tests cover that path, so the risk is low. Adding the e2e case before merge would close the gap.
Security architecture risk: Minimal · up to eaec8
The change reduces the authority of untrusted beacon claims while preserving verification of playback content. The inspected design adds bounded, cancellable requests without establishing a new material security or failure-containment risk.
Retained concerns
No architecture-level concerns identified.
Security review details
Security Blast Radius
inferred — The added network work is exercised by the initiating browser session against its candidate origins, without cookies or other fetch credentials on the probe path. Its principal added exposure is bounded request fan-out and startup work; the inspected path does not acquire server-side or cross-tenant authority.
Security Findings and Attack Paths
inferred — Hint independence is not absolute under bounded scheduling. Verified hash lists may contain more than 32 renditions, and hint ordering precedes the cap; the shared deadline can also leave later candidates unprobed. A beacon can therefore still influence which levels are offered in those cases. The base directly removed levels using the same claims, so this is residual influence rather than an introduced or worsened attack capability.
Trust Boundaries and Controls
observed — The new request construction is anchored to verified metadata: playlist bytes undergo hash and playlist-URI validation before extraction, and the initial init URL must remain beneath the selected origin/root, match the strict content-name format, and name a hash present in the list. These checks constrain playlist-derived request targets without treating a successful status as authenticated media.
Hardening Proposals
proposed — If strict independence from beacon hints is required, separate candidate truncation from hint ordering and define a scheduling policy that prevents hint-prioritized requests from exhausting the entire deadline. Otherwise, describe hint neutrality as conditional on the probe budget.
Pre-merge checks: 3 · 1
Failed checks: 1 warning
Check name
Status
Explanation
Resolution
Linked Issues check
[#85] The implementation meets the core requirement. Beacon renditions claims are hints (originOrder, probeOrder, mayServe in levels.ts). open() probes each allowed rendition's init (`prob…
Add an e2e case in web/player/e2e.ts in which a hostile beacon from a non-honest key names the honest origin with renditions: []. Assert that the origin is still tried and that its held renditions are offered. If the beacon parser rejec…
Passed checks: 3 passed
Check name
Status
Explanation
Title check
The title names the main change: open() now asks each origin which renditions it holds (probing), and beacon rendition claims become ordering hints rather than constraints. The raw summary and objecti…
Out of Scope Changes check
All changed areas trace to #85 or support its implementation. probe.ts holds the probing logic. levels.ts adds playlistSize and the hint-ordering functions. verify.ts adds fetchChecked and w…
Description Check
Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Full details: Title check
Explanation
The title names the main change: open() now asks each origin which renditions it holds (probing), and beacon rendition claims become ordering hints rather than constraints. The raw summary and objectives both confirm this is the central change, with probe.ts, lib.ts, api.ts, levels.ts and tests all implementing it. The title uses a conventional feat(web) prefix and is specific. The issue reference (#85) differs from the PR number (#87) in the objectives, which is a metadata inconsistency but does not affect whether the title describes the changeset.
Full details: Out of Scope Changes check
Explanation
All changed areas trace to #85 or support its implementation. probe.ts holds the probing logic. levels.ts adds playlistSize and the hint-ordering functions. verify.ts adds fetchChecked and widens Anchor.check to accept Uint8Array, which the probe's byte-capped reads need. lib.ts and resolve.ts wire the probe and update docs. player.ts stops deriving renditions from beacon availability. That derivation let a stranger's beacon cut levels, so this change is part of the same fix. api.ts and the README document the new hint semantics. The e2e TLS certificate caching and separate browser contexts support the e2e scenarios. No unrelated behaviour change was identified in the summary. The file contents were not read beyond the summary, so this verdict relies on the summary.
Full details: Linked Issues check
Explanation
[#85] The implementation meets the core requirement. Beacon renditions claims are hints (originOrder, probeOrder, mayServe in levels.ts). open() probes each allowed rendition's init (probe.ts, initProbe in lib.ts) before offering levels. A claim of none is still asked (unit test). The 'never a level no source can deliver' guarantee holds, because levels are the probed held renditions. The 'Done when' criterion, however, names an e2e case with a hostile beacon that sets renditions: []. The e2e scenario in e2e.ts uses renditions: ["360p"] instead. No e2e case with [] exists in the PR. The [] case is covered only at unit level for OriginSource, not through a beacon in the e2e run. The PR description also states that nutflix-pear#106 rejects [] at parse time. The PR does not show whether a beacon carrying [] can reach the page, so the stated e2e criterion is not demonstrated as written.
Resolution
Add an e2e case in web/player/e2e.ts in which a hostile beacon from a non-honest key names the honest origin with renditions: []. Assert that the origin is still tried and that its held renditions are offered. If the beacon parser rejects [] before it reaches the library, state that in the PR and in #85, and agree with the issue author on an equivalent criterion. Then update the 'Done when' evidence to match.
Finishing Touches
Generate unit tests (beta)
Commit to this branch
Create a new PR
Autofix · Keep fixing CodeRabbit findings and required CI, and resolving merge conflicts
RUSTSEC-2026-0486 (published 2026-11-16) marks rustix 1.1.5 unsound: its xattr functions mark unwritten
bytes initialized when given a zero-length buffer. nfx reaches rustix through iroh-blobs > reflink-copy
and never calls the xattr functions, but cargo deny fails every CI check on the advisory. Fixed in 1.1.6.
crates/desktop/Cargo.lock also gains cipher 0.5.2 and inout 0.2.6: nfx-proto has needed them since #75
(chacha20 0.10 for NIP-44), and the desktop workspace's lock had not been refreshed. No manifest changes;
the money crates' locked closure (crates/ci/locked-compiled.txt) has no rustix and is unchanged.
The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.
Actionable comments posted: 1
Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
Prompt to fix all issues
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @web/player/e2e.ts:
- Line 336: Add a separate signed hostile-beacon fixture alongside `stranger`
with `renditions: []` for `whole.url`. Extend the address-based playback
assertions to verify the origin is discovered, both renditions are offered, and
an explicit `720p` request plays; retain the existing nonempty-claim case.
---
Failed pre-merge checks:
- Linked Issues check:
Add an e2e case in `web/player/e2e.ts` in which a hostile beacon from a
non-honest key names the honest origin with `renditions: []`. Assert that the
origin is still tried and that its held renditions are offered. If the beacon
parser rejects `[]` before it reaches the library, state that in the PR and in
#85, and agree with the issue author on an equivalent criterion. Then update the
'Done when' evidence to match.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
review. Visit https://docs.coderabbit.ai/cli?utm_source=ghpr
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Files selected for processing: 10
web/player/README.md
web/player/e2e.ts
web/player/src/api.ts
web/player/src/levels.ts
web/player/src/lib.ts
web/player/src/player.ts
web/player/src/probe.ts
web/player/src/resolve.ts
web/player/src/verify.ts
web/player/unit.ts
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The ci run failed in the check job’s check step; the lock job passed.
Root cause:cargo-deny rejects rustix 1.1.5 under RUSTSEC-2026-0486, an unsoundness advisory for extended-attribute functions that can mark unwritten bytes as initialized when given a zero-length buffer. It is pulled in through rustix → reflink-copy 0.1.30 → iroh-blobs 0.103.1 → nfx-node → nfxd.
Solution: Upgrade to >=1.1.6 (try cargo update -p rustix)
advisories FAILED, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok
Process completed with exit code 1.
Smallest fix: upgrade rustix to 1.1.6 or newer by running cargo update -p rustix in crates/, then commit the updated crates/Cargo.lock. The duplicate-crate diagnostics are warnings, not the cause of this failure.
The check job failed in its check step because cargo-deny flags rustix 1.1.5 as unsound under RUSTSEC-2026-0486 https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0486. The dependency path is nfxd → nfx-node → iroh-blobs 0.103.1 → reflink-copy 0.1.30 → rustix 1.1.5.
Evidence from the log (crates/Cargo.lock:343):
error[unsound]: xattr functions mark unwritten bytes as initialized when given a zero-length buffer
343 │ rustix 1.1.5 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index
├ ID: RUSTSEC-2026-0486
├ Solution: Upgrade to >=1.1.6 (try `cargo update -p rustix`)
advisories FAILED, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok
##[error]Process completed with exit code 1.
Smallest fix: run cargo update -p rustix in crates/ and commit the updated crates/Cargo.lock, ensuring rustix is at least 1.1.6. The duplicate-crate messages are warnings and do not cause this failure.
…2), so the money crates' closure is unchanged
cargo update -p rustix --precise 1.1.6 had moved rustix's windows-sys to 0.52.0, which brought windows-sys 0.52 and
windows-targets 0.52.6 into what the money crates are built from, and the lock job refused it. Both locks are
validated with cargo metadata --locked --offline.
…sktop lock's missing cipher/inout)
093f469 still left errno 0.3.14, rustls-platform-verifier 0.7.0 and winapi-util 0.1.11 on windows-sys 0.52.0 (moved
by the same cargo update), so the money crates' closure still differed. Now crates/Cargo.lock differs from main in
rustix's version and checksum only, and crates/desktop/Cargo.lock adds cipher 0.5.2 and inout 0.2.6 and the same
rustix bump, with no windows-sys line changed. Both validated with cargo metadata --locked --offline.
Root cause: the rustix 1.1.6 lock update inherited from #88 changes the money crates’ resolved Windows dependency closure (crates/Cargo.lock:4220-4229), but crates/ci/locked-compiled.txt still has the old money-dep pins. The closure now adds windows-sys 0.52.0, windows-targets 0.52.6, and eight architecture-specific windows_* 0.52.6 packages alongside windows-sys 0.61.2; this is deterministic pin drift, not a web-origin test failure or flaky infrastructure.
The lock log reports:
locked paths: 44 guarded files and sections match their pins
locked paths: what the money crates are built from differs from its pins:
+ money-dep windows-sys 0.52.0 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index ...
+ money-dep windows-sys 0.61.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index ...
+ money-dep windows-targets 0.52.6 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index ...
##[error]Process completed with exit code 1.
Before reaching the same mismatch, check reports advisories ok, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok, and all three WASM suites pass.
Smallest fix: after reviewing the added Windows-only transitive dependencies, regenerate crates/ci/locked-compiled.txt against this branch’s crates/Cargo.lock and commit the refreshed money-dep entries. If the extra 0.52.0 family is not intended, instead regenerate the lock minimally so the previous money-crate closure is restored; no change to the web/origin source is indicated by these logs.
Root cause: the rustix 1.1.6 lock update inherited from #88 changes the money crates’ resolved Windows dependency closure (crates/Cargo.lock:4218-4229), while crates/ci/locked-compiled.txt still pins the previous closure. This is deterministic dependency-pin drift, not a failing web/WASM test or flaky infrastructure.
The log reports:
locked paths: 44 guarded files and sections match their pins
locked paths: what the money crates are built from differs from its pins:
+ money-dep windows-sys 0.52.0 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index ...
+ money-dep windows-sys 0.61.2 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index ...
+ money-dep windows-targets 0.52.6 registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index ...
##[error]Process completed with exit code 1.
The new closure adds windows-sys 0.52.0, windows-targets 0.52.6, and the architecture-specific windows_* 0.52.6 packages; the existing windows-sys 0.61.2 entry also gains Win32_System_* features. Its previous feature pin is visible at crates/ci/locked-compiled.txt:108. Before reaching the same mismatch, check passes the other checks, including the visible WASM suites.
Smallest fix: if the added Windows-only transitive dependencies are intended, review them and regenerate/commit the money-dep entries in crates/ci/locked-compiled.txt using the repository’s manual re-pin process. Otherwise, minimally regenerate crates/Cargo.lock to restore the previous money-crate closure; no web/origin source change is indicated by these logs.
…e hints (#85) (#87)
Since #77/#83 the library took a beacon's `https.renditions` claim as a
constraint on its origin: claims were intersected, an origin whose claim left
out the allowed renditions was skipped, and the session's levels were cut to the
claim. Beacons come from any key, so a stranger could deny an origin, or cut a
level, by naming it with a narrowing list.
open() now asks the origin. Once the hash list verifies, it fetches each
allowed rendition's media playlist (verified against the hash list), and sends a
GET for the init it names (NFX-05 §3), reading at most 64 KiB, with no Range
header (not CORS-safelisted everywhere) and cache mode no-cache. Probes run 6 at
a time, at most 32 renditions, within 8 s per origin in all, and are aborted
with the session's signal. A rendition is held when its init answers 200 or 206;
an origin that holds none of the allowed renditions is skipped with an `origin`
event giving each answer. The guarantee stays: no level is offered whose
segments no source can deliver.
OriginSource.renditions (and Endpoints.originSources) are hints only: an origin
whose hint names an allowed rendition is tried first, and the renditions it
names are asked for first. They never remove an origin or a level. The public
API is unchanged in shape; api.ts and the README document the new meaning.
The test page no longer turns beacon availability into `renditions` (that let a
beacon cut the levels too). Unit tests cover the probe runner (bounds,
deadline, aborts, no unhandled rejections, no timer left), the byte-capped GET
(no Range, endless and error bodies), the init URI, hint ordering, and a
hostile hint being ignored. e2e adds a stranger's nfxd that names an honest
origin with renditions ["360p"]: the page still offers 720p and plays it when
asked; and for the 360p-only seeder, exactly one 720p playlist and one 720p
init request per session, never a 720p segment.
Fixes#85
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size/XLLines changed by this pull request: XL (sovtechpro[bot])
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Fixes #85
Problem
Since #77/#83 the web library took a beacon's
https.renditionsclaim as a constraint on that origin: claims from several beacons were intersected, an origin whose claim left out the allowed renditions was skipped, and the session's levels were cut to the claim. Beacons come from any key (NFX-03), so a stranger could deny an origin, a network's own fallback origin included, or cut a level, just by naming it with a narrowing list. nutflix-pear#106 makes[]invalid at parse time, but a non-empty narrowing list (["360p"]for an origin that also serves 720p) still worked.The fix: ask the origin, not the beacons
open()now asks the origin which allowed renditions it holds, once the hash list verifies (src/probe.ts,initProbeinsrc/lib.ts):GETfor that init.Rangeheader, becauseRangeis not CORS-safelisted in every browser, and a preflight would need the origin to answerOPTIONS, which NFX-05 §6 does not require. Cache mode isno-cache, so a copy cached in an earlier session cannot vouch for an origin that has since dropped the file. The answer is cached again, so hls.js reads it from the cache.MAX_RENDITIONS), within 8 s per origin in all. They are aborted with the session'ssignal. A probe still running at the deadline counts as not held, and so does one never reached.200or206. The session's levels are the allowed renditions the origin holds. An origin that holds none is skipped with anoriginevent that gives each rendition's answer (720p: HTTP 404; 360p: no answer within 8000 ms).<origin>/<root>/, are requested: the playlist by its sha256, and the init by a content name read from bytes that verified (^[0-9a-f]{64}\.[0-9A-Za-z]{1,8}$, andanchor.expected()must accept it).Beacon claims (
OriginSource.renditions,Endpoints.originSources) are hints only. An origin whose hint names an allowed rendition is tried before one whose hint does not, and the renditions it names are asked for first. A hint never removes an origin or a level. A narrowing claim reorders and nothing more. A widening or lying claim adds nothing, since the probe still decides.The guarantee stays: no level is offered whose segments no source can deliver. Mesh peers add no level; HTTP from that origin is the fallback.
API
The API is source-compatible: no type or export changed shape.
OpenCommon.renditions,Level.id,OriginSource, andEndpoints.originSources/availabilityare as before.src/api.tsand the README document the new meanings, and say plainly thatOriginSource.renditionswas a constraint before #85 and is a hint now. One behaviour a consumer may notice:renditions: []on anOriginSourceno longer skips that origin. It is tried last, and still asked. Each session also costs one playlist and one init request per allowed rendition. hls.js would fetch both anyway for the level it plays.The beacon book (
EndpointBook) is unchanged: claims about one origin are still intersected, now documented as a hint.Test page
src/player.tsno longer turns beaconavailabilityintorenditions. When no seeder held every rendition, it passed the most-held ids as the allowed list, and a stranger's beacon could cut the levels that way too, racing the honest beacon. It now passesrenditionsonly from&renditions=.Tests
unit.ts):Range, credentials omitted,no-cache; a small init read whole; an endless 200 (an origin without Range) cut at the cap and cancelled; a 404 body not read; 206; no body; a network failure; an abort mid-body.initUrl: EXT-X-MAP, other attributes, CRLF, the first-segment fallback, neither.originOrderandprobeOrder, including the cap.selectRenditions: a hostile narrowing hint is ignored; a hint cannot take away a wanted rendition; a widening hint cannot add a level; a claim of none is still asked; the caller's order is kept; aRangeErrorcomes before any probe; 32 asked and the rest not offered.e2e.ts, Kata):nfxd(another key) seeds the video in 360p only and names that origin withrenditions: ["360p"]. By address, the page sees that claim as the origin's hint, offers360p@360,720p@720, and plays. With&renditions=720p, it plays 720p from that origin rather than skipping it, and 720p segments are fetched.nfxd --seed <a>#360p, origin 404 for 720p). By address, with no renditions asked for and with&renditions=720p,360p, and by origin and root without&renditions=, the page offers 360p alone and plays it. The request counts are exact, per session: one request for 720p's playlist (verified, to learn the init's name) and one for its init (the probe, which answers 404), and none for any 720p segment.&renditions=360pasks for nothing of 720p.&renditions=is refused before any probe;4320pfetches only the hash list.Results
Full Kata run of head
3083d27(agentrun): all green. That head iseaec880(the change) merged withdeps/rustix-1.1.6at093f469(#88).unit: 352/352.e2ePASS:&renditions=: 360p offered alone, after 1 playlist and 1 init request for 720p.["360p"], levels360p, 720p, playing, 0 rejected. With&renditions=720p: 720p played, 8 segments.e2e:mesh,e2e:nostr,e2e:nostr-node: PASS.3083d27:1f72fc23b064ccf13dae87f325d9b91af0670713f66ecede5955b3cea56a5203. It reproduced twice in the VM and is byte-identical toeaec880's, since the lockfile merge touches neither the WASM nor the JS.The same full run on
eaec880alone was green too. GitHub:nat,coverage,rust-forwardandzizmorpass.checkfailed ateaec880only oncargo denyRUSTSEC-2026-0486 (rustix 1.1.5), which is why #88 is merged in.lockfails at3083d27exactly as it does on #88's own head: thatcargo updatealso moved errno, rustls-platform-verifier and winapi-util to windows-sys 0.52, which changes the money crates' closure. That is #88's to fix, and this branch takes it from there.Merge pick: squash (one commit).