Bump sanitize-html from 2.13.0 to 2.18.0

[dependabot]

Bumps sanitize-html from 2.13.0 to 2.18.0.

Changelog

Sourced from sanitize-html's changelog.

2.18.0 (2026-09-30)

Adds

• Added a logger option: pass any console-shaped object, with debug, info, warn and error methods, and sanitize-html's own diagnostics are delivered to it rather than to the console, so an application with a logging pipeline of its own can route them. Missing methods, and no option at all, fall back to the console. Those messages also lost their decorative line breaks and warning icon, so each is now a single line of text; their wording is otherwise unchanged.

Fixes

• allowedSchemesByTag is now applied to srcset and imagesrcset URLs. Previously the per-tag lookup used the attribute name instead of the tag name, so these attributes always fell back to the global allowedSchemes and ignored a tag-specific scheme allowlist. Thanks to spokodev for the fix.
• Starting in version 2.17.6, sanitize-html began escaping any markup preserved inside a disallowed iframe tag, which was a change in behavior due to an upstream change in htmlparser2. This fix ensures such "fallback markup" is preserved without escaping, but also fully sanitized according to the same rules as the original input. Thanks to sumitjhacodes for the fix.

Security

• When meta was allowed together with its http-equiv and content attributes, the destination URL of a <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=..."> was never checked against allowedSchemes, because it is embedded in content rather than being an attribute of its own. So javascript:, data: and other disallowed destinations passed through. The refresh URL is now extracted the way browsers do it, allowing for the different spellings, separators, quoting and letter case of url=, and checked against allowedSchemes (or allowedSchemesByTag.meta). If it is rejected, or the content cannot be parsed as a refresh, the content attribute is removed. content on other meta elements is unchanged. The default configuration does not allow meta and was not affected (CWE-79, CWE-601, GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j).

  Thanks to adrbogacz for reporting the vulnerability.

• When noscript is listed in nonTextTags, the discarded region could end too early. Browsers with scripting enabled treat <noscript> content as raw text up to the first </noscript>, but the underlying parser treats it as markup, so an end tag for an enclosing element inside <noscript> closed it implicitly and the rest of its content was emitted as ordinary sanitized markup. The discard region now continues until the point where a browser would end the <noscript> element, while implied closes of other nonTextTags such as <option> behave as before (CWE-79, CWE-436, GHSA-x3q4-9hxx-gx8m).

  Thanks to joaquiniglesiaslug for reporting the vulnerability.

• The check that drops SVG animation elements (animate, animateColor, animateMotion, animateTransform, set) when they retarget a URL attribute such as href compared the full tag name, so a namespace-prefixed spelling like svg:animate was not recognized when such tags were allowed (for example with allowedTags: false). In XML serializations such as XHTML or standalone SVG, the prefixed element is a real animation element and could retarget a link to a javascript: URL after sanitization. The element and attributeName are now matched by their local names, ignoring any prefix (CWE-79, CWE-184, GHSA-374f-7chj-9948).

  Thanks to Kai Aizen (SnailSploit) for reporting the vulnerability.

2.17.7 (2026-08-13)

Security

• Fixed an XSS / URL scheme policy bypass affecting configurations that allow the SVG animation elements (animate, animateColor, animateMotion, animateTransform or set) together with attributeName and one of the animation value attributes. The default configuration was not affected, as these elements are not in the default allowedTags. apostrophecms was not affected. Thanks to koyokr for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability (GHSA-g8qq-57p8-ggw5).

2.17.6 (2026-07-10)

Fixes

• Allow transformTags to emit text when textFilter is set, even if the tag is initially empty. This is consistent with the documentation. Thanks to spokodev for the fix.

Security

• Fixed an XSS/allowlist bypass in which the contents of a raw-text element (textarea or xmp) nested inside an svg or math root were re-emitted without HTML-escaping. sanitize-html treated that content as inert raw text because htmlparser2 10.x classified raw-text elements by tag name and ignored the namespace, but a real HTML5 parser treats textarea/xmp as ordinary foreign elements inside SVG/MathML and re-parses their contents as live markup. As a result, markup and event-handler attributes that the allowlist never permitted (for example <svg><textarea><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>) could survive sanitization and execute in the browser. This is now fixed on two fronts: htmlparser2 was upgraded to 12.x, which is namespace-aware and parses textarea/xmp inside SVG/MathML as ordinary elements, so their non-allowlisted children (such as the injected img) are dropped by the allowlist instead of being preserved as raw text; and any raw-text content sanitize-html still emits for these tags (at HTML integration points such as foreignObject/mtext, or outside foreign content) is always HTML-escaped. The default configuration is not affected; the precondition is an allowedTags that includes svg or math together with textarea or xmp. Thanks to khoadb175 for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability.
• Fixed a mutation-XSS / allowedTags bypass affecting configurations that allow the textarea or xmp raw-text tags. htmlparser2 10.x did not recognize an end tag with a trailing solidus (e.g. </textarea/>) as closing the element, so it kept the following markup as raw text, but a spec-compliant browser treats </textarea/> as a valid close and parses that markup as a live element. Because raw-text content was re-emitted without escaping, a payload such as <textarea></textarea/><img src=x onerror=...> could smuggle non-allowlisted, executable markup through the sanitizer. The default configuration was not affected. This is now defended at two layers: htmlparser2 was upgraded to 12.x, whose tokenizer closes these end tags correctly, and the raw text sanitize-html emits for these tags is always escaped so no < can reopen a tag when the output is re-parsed (textarea, an RCDATA element whose entities htmlparser2 decodes, is escaped like normal text, while xmp, a raw-text element, has only its angle brackets escaped to avoid double-encoding already-encoded entities). Because htmlparser2 is ESM-only from version 11 onward, sanitize-html now requires Node.js >=22.12.0 (the first 22.x release in which require() of an ES module is available unflagged). Thanks to bibu123456 for reporting the vulnerability and Kayiz-PT for coordinating the disclosure (GHSA-jxwj-j7wr-gfrw).

2.17.5 (2026-06-10)

Security

... (truncated)

Commits

• 9500b8b Latest reconciliation Q3 2026 (#5635)
• 72f4531 Latest reconciliation q2 m3 2026 (#5555)
• 207846a ready for 4.32.0 release (#5513)
• f820033 Latest reconciliation q2 m2 (#5511)
• 2427508 release and changelog edits (#5465)
• 5a88e96 Latest security q2 (#5464)
• 958d162 merge main to latest (#5460)
• e9b0ab0 release only (changelogs formatted) (#5408)
• f03fa5b Latest security merge (#5407)
• 96cf174 For release only (#5381)
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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[TamimiGitHub]

@dependabot rebase

[TamimiGitHub]

@dependabot rebase

[TamimiGitHub]

Closing: Netlify build consistently fails with this sanitize-html upgrade. Will revisit when the build issue is resolved.

[dependabot]

OK, I won't notify you again about this release, but will get in touch when a new version is available. If you'd rather skip all updates until the next major or minor version, let me know by commenting @dependabot ignore this major version or @dependabot ignore this minor version.

If you change your mind, just re-open this PR and I'll resolve any conflicts on it.