Conversation
Currently we have several lines of work:
- Integrating with the kernel tree and build system (Nick's & mine,
both uploaded as branches, based on `rustc`; and another one I have
been working on, based on `cargo`).
- Bindings and the first bits of functionality (Alex's & Geoffrey's,
based on `cargo`).
This patch effectively merges the work we have been doing and
integrates it in the latest mainline kernel tree.
This does *not* mean anything needs to stay as-is, but this gives us
a working, common base to work and experiment upon. Hopefully, it will
also attract external people to join!
As a summary, I added:
- `cargo` integration with the kernel `Makefile`s:
+ Virtual `cargo` workspace to have a single lock file and to share
deps between `cargo` jobs.
+ Picks the same optimization level as configured for C.
+ Verbose output on `V=1`.
+ A `cargoclean` target to clean all the Rust-related artifacts.
- Initial support for built-in modules (i.e. `Y` as well as `M`):
+ It is a hack, we need to implement a few things (see the `TODO`s),
but it is enough to start playing with things that depend on `MODULE`.
+ Passes `--cfg module` to built-in modules to be able to compile
conditionally inside Rust.
+ Increased `KSYM_NAME_LEN` length to avoid warnings due to Rust
long mangled symbols.
- Rust infrastructure in a new top level folder `rust/`:
+ A `kernel` package which contains the sources from Alex &
Geoffrey's work plus some changes:
* Adapted `build.rs`.
* Removed the `THIS_MODULE` emulation until it is implemented.
* Removed `Makefile` logic and the code that `cfg`-depended
on kernel version (no need in mainline).
* Moved the helpers to be triggered via normal compilation,
renamed them under `rust_*` and exported via
`EXPORT_SYMBOL` instead.
* Added a prelude.
+ A `shlex` package which serves as an example of an "inline"
dependency (i.e. package checked out copy to avoid the network)
- The example driver was setup at `drivers/char/rust_example/`.
- Misc
+ The beginning of `Documentation/rust/` with a quick start guide.
+ `MAINTAINERS` entry.
+ SPDXs for all files.
Other notes that aren't in `TODO`s:
- We could minimize the network requirements (use `bindgen` binary, use more
inline dependencies...), but it is not clear it would be a good idea for
the moment due to `core`/`alloc`/`compiler-builtins`.
- The intention of `rust/` is to have a place to put extra dependencies
and split the `kernel` package into several in the future if it grows.
It could resemble the usual kernel tree structure.
- With several drivers being built-in, `cargo` recompiles `kernel`
and triggers duplicate symbol errors when merging thin archives.
We need to make it only compile `kernel` once.
- When the above works, then `make`'s `-j` calling concurrent `cargo`s
(e.g. several drivers at the same time) should be OK, I think.
According to rust-lang/cargo#2486 it shouldn't
miscompile anything, but if they start locking on each other
we will have make jobs waiting that could have been doing something else.
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
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alex
left a comment
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I didn't review the code that was directly copied too much. And my Makefile skills are subpar -- I barely understand how this KBuild integration works! But overall this looks amazing, thanks for driving this forward.
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I'm not worried about credit at all. I'm so excited to see this moving forward! |
Yeah, I could have put an initial commit with just those files to make it show easier on GitHub's interface. Let me paste the manual diff here instead.
I don't think anybody understands it... ;) Later on we can ask Masahiro to give us a hand (e.g. to remove the hack I put there to make the distinction between built-in and module).
You're welcome! And thanks for taking a look so quickly :-) |
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@alex @geofft The manual diff between the original files and the new ones (minus the repetitive SPDX ones): |
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And the driver: |
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
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This is awesome! I'm going to try to split this out into patches mostly so it's easier for me to review and also because I suspect it'll be better for submission. There might also be some changes we can "upstream" into linux-kernel-module-rust. I had the Kbuild stuff on my mind because of fishinabarrel/linux-kernel-module-rust#266 - do your Kbudild rulesx make .cmd files for us? If so, I might try to roll this approach back into our out-of-tree Makefiles.... Agree re credit, I assume it'll be easy to stick some Co-authored-by lines or whatever, I don't really have a strong opinion about whose name is on it :) |
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You'll probably want to cherry-pick fishinabarrel/linux-kernel-module-rust@abc9791 which further reduces the need for nightly features. |
Thanks!
Please note that this repo/branch/commits is only meant for development within GitHub -- later I'll have to squash everything on my side and prepare the proper PR anyway (see #1). So all these dev-commits/messages/merges will go away.
Not much (I intentionally modified as few things as possible in your original files). In particular:
Things that I think you could pick, however, are:
I should have probably left the prelude and SPDX changes for another PR to make it even easier to diff; I wasn't consistent on the strategy there.
What I did is teach kbuild (in a hacky way at some points) how to handle our Rust stuff in a way that adding new Rust modules looks like any other C module and as easy to use as possible, i.e. you only need to write:
Yeah, exactly. |
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FWIW, I managed to emulate the #![feature(global_asm)]
global_asm!(
r#".section ".initcall6.init", "a"
__initcall_foo6:
.long foo - .
.previous
"#
);
#[no_mangle]
fn foo() -> i32 {
4
}Converting to a macro that's parameterized on the function name is left as an exercise to the reader :-) |
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
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I am starting to wonder whether trying to emulate all the C module support is too much duplication. Perhaps we should generate and compile a C file for each defined Rust module on the fly (without the module writer having to write anything different). Anyway, for the moment I added support to do conditional compilation on the kernel configuration variables (which is anyway good to have!) and used that to fully emulate the macro. That frees us from the |
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It has been a week so I am merging this so that we can start sending PRs etc. |
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Sorry, guys, I'm slammed at work. Hopefully I can help out more in the future; just excessively busy right now... :( |
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Is cargo pulling stuff from the network? Is there a way to make this work with only local crates, i.e. installed by the distro or pre-installed by the user prior to attempting to build the kernel? |
No worries!
Yeah, it does. For the moment, it is downloading them, although the versions are locked (i.e. no surprise updates, which means no unknown/arbitrary code downloaded when running
To recap the situation of the dependencies for everyone: we can make it work with local code (the
Another topic is avoiding the connections to crates.io and github.com. For that, we could propose to host mirrors at kernel.org. |
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For crate dependencies, we should vendor those into the kernel tree under a specific path, and then configure that path as a directory source, along with passing the appropriate cargo options to never touch the network. For bindgen/cbindgen, I'm wondering if we can get distributions to package it, and then just expect people to have it installed like cargo and rustc. |
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… On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 10:17 AM Josh Triplett ***@***.***> wrote:
For crate dependencies, we should vendor those into the kernel tree under
a specific path, and then configure that path as a directory registry,
along with passing the appropriate cargo options to never touch the network.
For bindgen/cbindgen, I'm wondering if we can get distributions to package
it, and then just expect people to have it installed like cargo and rustc.
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FD uses xyarray__entry that may return NULL if an index is out of
bounds. If NULL is returned then a segv happens as FD unconditionally
dereferences the pointer. This was happening in a case of with perf
iostat as shown below. The fix is to make FD an "int*" rather than an
int and handle the NULL case as either invalid input or a closed fd.
$ sudo gdb --args perf stat --iostat list
...
Breakpoint 1, perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50
50 {
(gdb) bt
#0 perf_evsel__alloc_fd (evsel=0x5555560951a0, ncpus=1, nthreads=1) at evsel.c:50
Rust-for-Linux#1 0x000055555585c188 in evsel__open_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x555556093410,
threads=0x555556086fb0, start_cpu=0, end_cpu=1) at util/evsel.c:1792
Rust-for-Linux#2 0x000055555585cfb2 in evsel__open (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpus=0x0, threads=0x555556086fb0)
at util/evsel.c:2045
Rust-for-Linux#3 0x000055555585d0db in evsel__open_per_thread (evsel=0x5555560951a0, threads=0x555556086fb0)
at util/evsel.c:2065
Rust-for-Linux#4 0x00005555558ece64 in create_perf_stat_counter (evsel=0x5555560951a0,
config=0x555555c34700 <stat_config>, target=0x555555c2f1c0 <target>, cpu=0) at util/stat.c:590
Rust-for-Linux#5 0x000055555578e927 in __run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0)
at builtin-stat.c:833
Rust-for-Linux#6 0x000055555578f3c6 in run_perf_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0, run_idx=0)
at builtin-stat.c:1048
Rust-for-Linux#7 0x0000555555792ee5 in cmd_stat (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at builtin-stat.c:2534
Rust-for-Linux#8 0x0000555555835ed3 in run_builtin (p=0x555555c3f540 <commands+288>, argc=3,
argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:313
Rust-for-Linux#9 0x0000555555836154 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:365
Rust-for-Linux#10 0x000055555583629f in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe2ec, argv=0x7fffffffe2e0) at perf.c:409
Rust-for-Linux#11 0x0000555555836692 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4a0) at perf.c:539
...
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Error:
The sys_perf_event_open() syscall returned with 22 (Invalid argument) for event (uncore_iio_0/event=0x83,umask=0x04,ch_mask=0xF,fc_mask=0x07/).
/bin/dmesg | grep -i perf may provide additional information.
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00005555559b03ea in perf_evsel__close_fd_cpu (evsel=0x5555560951a0, cpu=1) at evsel.c:166
166 if (FD(evsel, cpu, thread) >= 0)
v3. fixes a bug in perf_evsel__run_ioctl where the sense of a branch was
backward.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210918054440.2350466-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net (v2) The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: 1) Move back the defrag users fields to the global netns_nf area. Kernel fails to boot if conntrack is builtin and kernel is booted with: nf_conntrack.enable_hooks=1. From Florian Westphal. 2) Rule event notification is missing relevant context such as the position handle and the NLM_F_APPEND flag. 3) Rule replacement is expanded to add + delete using the existing rule handle, reverse order of this operation so it makes sense from rule notification standpoint. 4) Propagate to userspace the NLM_F_CREATE and NLM_F_EXCL flags from the rule notification path. Patches Rust-for-Linux#2, Rust-for-Linux#3 and Rust-for-Linux#4 are used by 'nft monitor' and 'iptables-monitor' userspace utilities which are not correctly representing the following operations through netlink notifications: - rule insertions - rule addition/insertion from position handle - create table/chain/set/map/flowtable/... ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There is no devfreq on a3xx at the moment since gpu_busy is not implemented. This means that msm_devfreq_init() will return early and the entire devfreq setup is skipped. However, msm_devfreq_active() and msm_devfreq_idle() are still called unconditionally later, causing a NULL pointer dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 133 Comm: ring0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1 #4 Hardware name: Longcheer L8150 (DT) pc : mutex_lock_io+0x2bc/0x2f0 lr : msm_devfreq_active+0x3c/0xe0 [msm] Call trace: mutex_lock_io+0x2bc/0x2f0 msm_gpu_submit+0x164/0x180 [msm] msm_job_run+0x54/0xe0 [msm] drm_sched_main+0x2b0/0x4a0 [gpu_sched] kthread+0x154/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fix this by adding a check in msm_devfreq_active/idle() which ensures that devfreq was actually initialized earlier. Fixes: 9bc9557 ("drm/msm: Devfreq tuning") Reported-by: Nikita Travkin <nikita@trvn.ru> Tested-by: Nikita Travkin <nikita@trvn.ru> Signed-off-by: Stephan Gerhold <stephan@gerhold.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210913164556.16284-1-stephan@gerhold.net Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
[BUG] The following script can cause btrfs to crash: $ mount -o compress-force=lzo $DEV /mnt $ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/foo bs=4k count=1 $ sync The call trace looks like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe04b37fccce3b000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 164 Comm: kworker/u20:3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc7-custom+ #4 Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:__memcpy+0x12/0x20 Call Trace: lzo_compress_pages+0x236/0x540 [btrfs] btrfs_compress_pages+0xaa/0xf0 [btrfs] compress_file_range+0x431/0x8e0 [btrfs] async_cow_start+0x12/0x30 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0xf6/0x3e0 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x294/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 ---[ end trace 63c3c0f131e61982 ]--- [CAUSE] In lzo_compress_pages(), parameter @out_pages is not only an output parameter (for the number of compressed pages), but also an input parameter, as the upper limit of compressed pages we can utilize. In commit d408880 ("btrfs: subpage: make lzo_compress_pages() compatible"), the refactoring doesn't take @out_pages as an input, thus completely ignoring the limit. And for compress-force case, we could hit incompressible data that compressed size would go beyond the page limit, and cause the above crash. [FIX] Save @out_pages as @max_nr_page, and pass it to lzo_compress_pages(), and check if we're beyond the limit before accessing the pages. Note: this also fixes crash on 32bit architectures that was suspected to be caused by merge of btrfs patches to 5.16-rc1. Reported in https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211104115001.GU20319@twin.jikos.cz/ . Reported-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Fixes: d408880 ("btrfs: subpage: make lzo_compress_pages() compatible") Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by
leak sanitizer. An example of which is:
Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
Rust-for-Linux#1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803
Rust-for-Linux#2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952
Rust-for-Linux#3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968
Rust-for-Linux#4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119
Rust-for-Linux#5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182
Rust-for-Linux#6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236
Rust-for-Linux#7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315
Rust-for-Linux#8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473
Rust-for-Linux#9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510
Rust-for-Linux#10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590
Rust-for-Linux#11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183
Rust-for-Linux#12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244
Rust-for-Linux#13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323
Rust-for-Linux#14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341
Rust-for-Linux#15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390
Rust-for-Linux#16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420
...
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Line 1169 (#3) allocates a memory chunk for victim_name by kmalloc(), but when the function returns in line 1184 (#4) victim_name allocated by line 1169 (#3) is not freed, which will lead to a memory leak. There is a similar snippet of code in this function as allocating a memory chunk for victim_name in line 1104 (#1) as well as releasing the memory in line 1116 (#2). We should kfree() victim_name when the return value of backref_in_log() is less than zero and before the function returns in line 1184 (#4). 1057 static inline int __add_inode_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, 1058 struct btrfs_root *root, 1059 struct btrfs_path *path, 1060 struct btrfs_root *log_root, 1061 struct btrfs_inode *dir, 1062 struct btrfs_inode *inode, 1063 u64 inode_objectid, u64 parent_objectid, 1064 u64 ref_index, char *name, int namelen, 1065 int *search_done) 1066 { 1104 victim_name = kmalloc(victim_name_len, GFP_NOFS); // #1: kmalloc (victim_name-1) 1105 if (!victim_name) 1106 return -ENOMEM; 1112 ret = backref_in_log(log_root, &search_key, 1113 parent_objectid, victim_name, 1114 victim_name_len); 1115 if (ret < 0) { 1116 kfree(victim_name); // #2: kfree (victim_name-1) 1117 return ret; 1118 } else if (!ret) { 1169 victim_name = kmalloc(victim_name_len, GFP_NOFS); // #3: kmalloc (victim_name-2) 1170 if (!victim_name) 1171 return -ENOMEM; 1180 ret = backref_in_log(log_root, &search_key, 1181 parent_objectid, victim_name, 1182 victim_name_len); 1183 if (ret < 0) { 1184 return ret; // #4: missing kfree (victim_name-2) 1185 } else if (!ret) { 1241 return 0; 1242 } Fixes: d3316c8 ("btrfs: Properly handle backref_in_log retval") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021@163.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
The fixed commit attempts to close inject.output even if it was never opened e.g. $ perf record uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.002 MB perf.data (7 samples) ] $ perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Segmentation fault (core dumped) $ gdb --quiet perf Reading symbols from perf... (gdb) r inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Starting program: /home/ahunter/bin/perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007eff8afeef5b in _IO_new_fclose (fp=0x0) at iofclose.c:48 48 iofclose.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007eff8afeef5b in _IO_new_fclose (fp=0x0) at iofclose.c:48 #1 0x0000557fc7b74f92 in perf_data__close (data=data@entry=0x7ffcdafa6578) at util/data.c:376 #2 0x0000557fc7a6b807 in cmd_inject (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-inject.c:1085 #3 0x0000557fc7ac4783 in run_builtin (p=0x557fc8074878 <commands+600>, argc=4, argv=0x7ffcdafb6a60) at perf.c:313 #4 0x0000557fc7a25d5c in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:365 #5 run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:409 #6 main (argc=4, argv=0x7ffcdafb6a60) at perf.c:539 (gdb) Fixes: 02e6246 ("perf inject: Close inject.output on exit") Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213084829.114772-2-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
The fixed commit attempts to get the output file descriptor even if the file was never opened e.g. $ perf record uname Linux [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] [ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.002 MB perf.data (7 samples) ] $ perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Segmentation fault (core dumped) $ gdb --quiet perf Reading symbols from perf... (gdb) r inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run Starting program: /home/ahunter/bin/perf inject -i perf.data --vm-time-correlation=dry-run [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. __GI___fileno (fp=0x0) at fileno.c:35 35 fileno.c: No such file or directory. (gdb) bt #0 __GI___fileno (fp=0x0) at fileno.c:35 #1 0x00005621e48dd987 in perf_data__fd (data=0x7fff4c68bd08) at util/data.h:72 #2 perf_data__fd (data=0x7fff4c68bd08) at util/data.h:69 #3 cmd_inject (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at builtin-inject.c:1017 #4 0x00005621e4936783 in run_builtin (p=0x5621e4ee6878 <commands+600>, argc=4, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at perf.c:313 #5 0x00005621e4897d5c in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:365 #6 run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:409 #7 main (argc=4, argv=0x7fff4c69c1f0) at perf.c:539 (gdb) Fixes: 0ae0389 ("perf tools: Pass a fd to perf_file_header__read_pipe()") Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211213084829.114772-3-adrian.hunter@intel.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
arm32 uses software to simulate the instruction replaced
by kprobe. some instructions may be simulated by constructing
assembly functions. therefore, before executing instruction
simulation, it is necessary to construct assembly function
execution environment in C language through binding registers.
after kasan is enabled, the register binding relationship will
be destroyed, resulting in instruction simulation errors and
causing kernel panic.
the kprobe emulate instruction function is distributed in three
files: actions-common.c actions-arm.c actions-thumb.c, so disable
KASAN when compiling these files.
for example, use kprobe insert on cap_capable+20 after kasan
enabled, the cap_capable assembly code is as follows:
<cap_capable>:
e92d47f0 push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr}
e1a05000 mov r5, r0
e280006c add r0, r0, #108 ; 0x6c
e1a0400 mov r4, r1
e1a06002 mov r6, r2
e59fa090 ldr sl, [pc, #144] ;
ebfc7bf8 bl c03aa4b4 <__asan_load4>
e595706c ldr r7, [r5, #108] ; 0x6c
e2859014 add r9, r5, #20
......
The emulate_ldr assembly code after enabling kasan is as follows:
c06f1384 <emulate_ldr>:
e92d47f0 push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, sl, lr}
e282803c add r8, r2, #60 ; 0x3c
e1a05000 mov r5, r0
e7e37855 ubfx r7, r5, #16, #4
e1a00008 mov r0, r8
e1a09001 mov r9, r1
e1a04002 mov r4, r2
ebf35462 bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e357000f cmp r7, #15
e7e36655 ubfx r6, r5, #12, #4
e205a00f and sl, r5, #15
0a000001 beq c06f13bc <emulate_ldr+0x38>
e0840107 add r0, r4, r7, lsl #2
ebf3545c bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e084010a add r0, r4, sl, lsl #2
ebf3545a bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e2890010 add r0, r9, #16
ebf35458 bl c03c6530 <__asan_load4>
e5990010 ldr r0, [r9, #16]
e12fff30 blx r0
e356000f cm r6, #15
1a000014 bne c06f1430 <emulate_ldr+0xac>
e1a06000 mov r6, r0
e2840040 add r0, r4, #64 ; 0x40
......
when running in emulate_ldr to simulate the ldr instruction, panic
occurred, and the log is as follows:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000090
pgd = ecb46400
[00000090] *pgd=2e0fa003, *pmd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 206 [#1] SMP ARM
PC is at cap_capable+0x14/0xb0
LR is at emulate_ldr+0x50/0xc0
psr: 600d0293 sp : ecd63af8 ip : 00000004 fp : c0a7c30c
r10: 00000000 r9 : c30897f4 r8 : ecd63cd4
r7 : 0000000f r6 : 0000000a r5 : e59fa090 r4 : ecd63c98
r3 : c06ae294 r2 : 00000000 r1 : b7611300 r0 : bf4ec008
Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 32c5387d Table: 2d546400 DAC: 55555555
Process bash (pid: 1643, stack limit = 0xecd60190)
(cap_capable) from (kprobe_handler+0x218/0x340)
(kprobe_handler) from (kprobe_trap_handler+0x24/0x48)
(kprobe_trap_handler) from (do_undefinstr+0x13c/0x364)
(do_undefinstr) from (__und_svc_finish+0x0/0x30)
(__und_svc_finish) from (cap_capable+0x18/0xb0)
(cap_capable) from (cap_vm_enough_memory+0x38/0x48)
(cap_vm_enough_memory) from
(security_vm_enough_memory_mm+0x48/0x6c)
(security_vm_enough_memory_mm) from
(copy_process.constprop.5+0x16b4/0x25c8)
(copy_process.constprop.5) from (_do_fork+0xe8/0x55c)
(_do_fork) from (SyS_clone+0x1c/0x24)
(SyS_clone) from (__sys_trace_return+0x0/0x10)
Code: 0050a0e1 6c0080e2 0140a0e1 0260a0e1 (f801f0e7)
Fixes: 35aa1df ("ARM kprobes: instruction single-stepping support")
Fixes: 4210157 ("ARM: 9017/2: Enable KASan for ARM")
Signed-off-by: huangshaobo <huangshaobo6@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Rolf Eike Beer reported the following bug: [1274934.746891] Bad Address (null pointer deref?): Code=15 (Data TLB miss fault) at addr 0000004140000018 [1274934.746891] CPU: 3 PID: 5549 Comm: cmake Not tainted 5.15.4-gentoo-parisc64 #4 [1274934.746891] Hardware name: 9000/785/C8000 [1274934.746891] [1274934.746891] YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI [1274934.746891] PSW: 00001000000001001111111000001110 Not tainted [1274934.746891] r00-03 000000ff0804fe0e 0000000040bc9bc0 00000000406760e4 0000004140000000 [1274934.746891] r04-07 0000000040b693c0 0000004140000000 000000004a2b08b0 0000000000000001 [1274934.746891] r08-11 0000000041f98810 0000000000000000 000000004a0a7000 0000000000000001 [1274934.746891] r12-15 0000000040bddbc0 0000000040c0cbc0 0000000040bddbc0 0000000040bddbc0 [1274934.746891] r16-19 0000000040bde3c0 0000000040bddbc0 0000000040bde3c0 0000000000000007 [1274934.746891] r20-23 0000000000000006 000000004a368950 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 [1274934.746891] r24-27 0000000000001fff 000000000800000e 000000004a1710f0 0000000040b693c0 [1274934.746891] r28-31 0000000000000001 0000000041f988b0 0000000041f98840 000000004a171118 [1274934.746891] sr00-03 00000000066e5800 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000066e5800 [1274934.746891] sr04-07 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [1274934.746891] [1274934.746891] IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000406760e8 00000000406760ec [1274934.746891] IIR: 48780030 ISR: 0000000000000000 IOR: 0000004140000018 [1274934.746891] CPU: 3 CR30: 00000040e3a9c000 CR31: ffffffffffffffff [1274934.746891] ORIG_R28: 0000000040acdd58 [1274934.746891] IAOQ[0]: sba_unmap_sg+0xb0/0x118 [1274934.746891] IAOQ[1]: sba_unmap_sg+0xb4/0x118 [1274934.746891] RP(r2): sba_unmap_sg+0xac/0x118 [1274934.746891] Backtrace: [1274934.746891] [<00000000402740cc>] dma_unmap_sg_attrs+0x6c/0x70 [1274934.746891] [<000000004074d6bc>] scsi_dma_unmap+0x54/0x60 [1274934.746891] [<00000000407a3488>] mptscsih_io_done+0x150/0xd70 [1274934.746891] [<0000000040798600>] mpt_interrupt+0x168/0xa68 [1274934.746891] [<0000000040255a48>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xc8/0x278 [1274934.746891] [<0000000040255c34>] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x3c/0xd8 [1274934.746891] [<000000004025ecb4>] handle_percpu_irq+0xb4/0xf0 [1274934.746891] [<00000000402548e0>] generic_handle_irq+0x50/0x70 [1274934.746891] [<000000004019a254>] call_on_stack+0x18/0x24 [1274934.746891] [1274934.746891] Kernel panic - not syncing: Bad Address (null pointer deref?) The bug is caused by overrunning the sglist and incorrectly testing sg_dma_len(sglist) before nents. Normally this doesn't cause a crash, but in this case sglist crossed a page boundary. This occurs in the following code: while (sg_dma_len(sglist) && nents--) { The fix is simply to test nents first and move the decrement of nents into the loop. Reported-by: Rolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@sf-tec.de> Signed-off-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
When cifs_get_root() fails during cifs_smb3_do_mount() we call deactivate_locked_super() which eventually will call delayed_free() which will free the context. In this situation we should not proceed to enter the out: section in cifs_smb3_do_mount() and free the same resources a second time. [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888364f4d110 by task swapper/1/0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G OE 5.17.0-rc3+ #4 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.0 12/17/2019 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] Call Trace: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] <IRQ> [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x78 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x24/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] kasan_report.cold+0x7d/0x117 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __asan_load8+0x86/0xa0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_cblist_dequeue+0x32/0x60 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core+0x547/0xca0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? call_rcu+0x3c0/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] ? lock_is_held_type+0xea/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] rcu_core_si+0xe/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x67b [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] __irq_exit_rcu+0x100/0x150 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:06 2022] sysvec_hyperv_stimer0+0x9d/0xc0 ... [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Freed by task 58179: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] ____kasan_slab_free+0x137/0x170 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb3/0x1d0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kfree+0xcd/0x520 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x149/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] Last potentially related work creation: [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb6/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] kasan_record_aux_stack_noalloc+0xb/0x10 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] call_rcu+0x76/0x3c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_umount+0xce/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_kill_sb+0xc8/0xe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] deactivate_locked_super+0x5d/0xd0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0xab9/0xbe0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] smb3_get_tree+0x1a0/0x2e0 [cifs] [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] vfs_get_tree+0x52/0x140 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] path_mount+0x635/0x10c0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] __x64_sys_mount+0x1bf/0x210 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0 [Thu Feb 10 12:59:07 2022] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Reported-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
I saw the below splatting after the host suspended and resumed. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2943 at kvm/arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5531 kvm_resume+0x2c/0x30 [kvm] CPU: 0 PID: 2943 Comm: step_after_susp Tainted: G W IOE 5.17.0-rc3+ #4 RIP: 0010:kvm_resume+0x2c/0x30 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> syscore_resume+0x90/0x340 suspend_devices_and_enter+0xaee/0xe90 pm_suspend.cold+0x36b/0x3c2 state_store+0x82/0xf0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b6/0x260 new_sync_write+0x258/0x370 vfs_write+0x33f/0x510 ksys_write+0xc9/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae lockdep_is_held() can return -1 when lockdep is disabled which triggers this warning. Let's use lockdep_assert_not_held() which can detect incorrect calls while holding a lock and it also avoids false negatives when lockdep is disabled. Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Message-Id: <1644920142-81249-1-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.17, take #4 - Correctly synchronise PMR and co on PSCI CPU_SUSPEND - Skip tests that depend on GICv3 when the HW isn't available
We've got a mess on our hands. 1. xfs_trans_commit() cannot cancel transactions because the mount is shut down - that causes dirty, aborted, unlogged log items to sit unpinned in memory and potentially get written to disk before the log is shut down. Hence xfs_trans_commit() can only abort transactions when xlog_is_shutdown() is true. 2. xfs_force_shutdown() is used in places to cause the current modification to be aborted via xfs_trans_commit() because it may be impractical or impossible to cancel the transaction directly, and hence xfs_trans_commit() must cancel transactions when xfs_is_shutdown() is true in this situation. But we can't do that because of #1. 3. Log IO errors cause log shutdowns by calling xfs_force_shutdown() to shut down the mount and then the log from log IO completion. 4. xfs_force_shutdown() can result in a log force being issued, which has to wait for log IO completion before it will mark the log as shut down. If #3 races with some other shutdown trigger that runs a log force, we rely on xfs_force_shutdown() silently ignoring #3 and avoiding shutting down the log until the failed log force completes. 5. To ensure #2 always works, we have to ensure that xfs_force_shutdown() does not return until the the log is shut down. But in the case of #4, this will result in a deadlock because the log Io completion will block waiting for a log force to complete which is blocked waiting for log IO to complete.... So the very first thing we have to do here to untangle this mess is dissociate log shutdown triggers from mount shutdowns. We already have xlog_forced_shutdown, which will atomically transistion to the log a shutdown state. Due to internal asserts it cannot be called multiple times, but was done simply because the only place that could call it was xfs_do_force_shutdown() (i.e. the mount shutdown!) and that could only call it once and once only. So the first thing we do is remove the asserts. We then convert all the internal log shutdown triggers to call xlog_force_shutdown() directly instead of xfs_force_shutdown(). This allows the log shutdown triggers to shut down the log without needing to care about mount based shutdown constraints. This means we shut down the log independently of the mount and the mount may not notice this until it's next attempt to read or modify metadata. At that point (e.g. xfs_trans_commit()) it will see that the log is shutdown, error out and shutdown the mount. To ensure that all the unmount behaviours and asserts track correctly as a result of a log shutdown, propagate the shutdown up to the mount if it is not already set. This keeps the mount and log state in sync, and saves a huge amount of hassle where code fails because of a log shutdown but only checks for mount shutdowns and hence ends up doing the wrong thing. Cleaning up that mess is an exercise for another day. This enables us to address the other problems noted above in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
After rx/tx ring buffer size is changed, kernel panic occurs when it acts XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT. When tx/rx ring buffer size is changed(ethtool -G), sfc driver reallocates and reinitializes rx and tx queues and their buffer (tx_queue->buffer). But it misses reinitializing xdp queues(efx->xdp_tx_queues). So, while it is acting XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it uses the uninitialized tx_queue->buffer. A new function efx_set_xdp_channels() is separated from efx_set_channels() to handle only xdp queues. Splat looks like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002a #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#4] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc] CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G D 5.17.0+ #55 e8beeee8289528f11357029357cf Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80 RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e45c60 EFLAGS: 00010297 RIP: 0010:efx_tx_map_chunk+0x54/0x90 [sfc] RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea506895c0 RCX: ffffffffc0330870 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001139b10ce RDI: ffff92ea506895c0 RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001139b110d R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001139b10ce R15: ffff92ea506895c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121ec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Code: 48 8b 8d a8 01 00 00 48 8d 14 52 4c 8d 2c d0 44 89 e0 48 85 c9 74 0e 44 89 e2 4c 89 f6 48 80 CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 RSP: 0018:ffff92f121e85c60 EFLAGS: 00010297 PKRU: 55555554 RAX: 0000000000000040 RBX: ffff92ea50689700 RCX: ffffffffc0330870 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000001145a90ce RDI: ffff92ea50689700 RBP: ffffffffc0358a80 R08: 00000001145a910d R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff92ea414c0088 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 0000000000000018 R14: 00000001145a90ce R15: ffff92ea50689700 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92f121e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000002a CR3: 00000003e6810005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> efx_xdp_tx_buffers+0x12b/0x3d0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] __efx_rx_packet+0x5c3/0x930 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] efx_rx_packet+0x28c/0x2e0 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] efx_ef10_ev_process+0x5f8/0xf40 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] ? enqueue_task_fair+0x95/0x550 efx_poll+0xc4/0x360 [sfc 84c94b8e32d44d296c17e10a634d3ad454de4ba5] Fixes: 3990a8f ("sfc: allocate channels for XDP tx queues") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As guest_irq is coming from KVM_IRQFD API call, it may trigger crash in svm_update_pi_irte() due to out-of-bounds: crash> bt PID: 22218 TASK: ffff951a6ad74980 CPU: 73 COMMAND: "vcpu8" #0 [ffffb1ba6707fa40] machine_kexec at ffffffff8565b397 #1 [ffffb1ba6707fa90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff85788a6d #2 [ffffb1ba6707fb58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8578995d #3 [ffffb1ba6707fb70] oops_end at ffffffff85623c0d #4 [ffffb1ba6707fb90] no_context at ffffffff856692c9 #5 [ffffb1ba6707fbf8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff85f95b51 #6 [ffffb1ba6707fc50] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff86000ace [exception RIP: svm_update_pi_irte+227] RIP: ffffffffc0761b53 RSP: ffffb1ba6707fd08 RFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: ffffb1ba6707fd78 RBX: ffffb1ba66d91000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00003c803f63f1c0 RSI: 000000000000019a RDI: ffffb1ba66db2ab8 RBP: 000000000000019a R8: 0000000000000040 R9: ffff94ca41b82200 R10: ffffffffffffffcf R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffffffcf R15: 000000000000005f ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb1ba6707fdb8] kvm_irq_routing_update at ffffffffc09f19a1 [kvm] #8 [ffffb1ba6707fde0] kvm_set_irq_routing at ffffffffc09f2133 [kvm] #9 [ffffb1ba6707fe18] kvm_vm_ioctl at ffffffffc09ef544 [kvm] RIP: 00007f143c36488b RSP: 00007f143a4e04b8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f05780041d0 RCX: 00007f143c36488b RDX: 00007f05780041d0 RSI: 000000004008ae6a RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: 00000000000004e8 R8: 0000000000000008 R9: 00007f05780041e0 R10: 00007f0578004560 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000004e0 R13: 000000000000001a R14: 00007f1424001c60 R15: 00007f0578003bc0 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Vmx have been fix this in commit 3a8b067 (KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ), so we can just copy source from that to fix this. Co-developed-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <liu.yi24@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Message-Id: <20220309113025.44469-1-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There is possible circular locking dependency detected on event_mutex (see below logs). This is due to set fail safe mode is done at dp_panel_read_sink_caps() within event_mutex scope. To break this possible circular locking, this patch move setting fail safe mode out of event_mutex scope. [ 23.958078] ====================================================== [ 23.964430] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 23.970777] 5.17.0-rc2-lockdep-00088-g05241de1f69e #148 Not tainted [ 23.977219] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 23.983570] DrmThread/1574 is trying to acquire lock: [ 23.988763] ffffff808423aab0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: msm_dp_displ ay_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 23.997895] [ 23.997895] but task is already holding lock: [ 24.003895] ffffff808420b280 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lock_c rtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.012495] [ 24.012495] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 24.012495] [ 24.020886] [ 24.020886] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 24.028570] [ 24.028570] -> #5 (&kms->commit_lock[i]/1){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.035472] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.039695] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.044272] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.048222] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.053413] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.057452] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.062826] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.067403] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.072508] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.077086] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.081123] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.085602] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.090895] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.095294] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.100668] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.105242] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.109548] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.114381] el0t_32_sync+0x178 [ 24.118688] [ 24.118688] -> #4 (&kms->commit_lock[i]){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.125408] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.129628] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.134204] lock_crtcs+0x80/0x8c [ 24.138155] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x1e8/0x3d0 [ 24.143345] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.147382] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.152755] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.157323] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x68/0x90 [ 24.162869] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x394/0x648 [ 24.167535] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.172102] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.176135] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.180621] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.185904] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.190302] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.195673] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.200241] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.204544] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.209378] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 [ 24.213680] -> #3 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.220308] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.20+0xe8/0x878 [ 24.225951] ww_mutex_lock+0x60/0xd0 [ 24.230166] modeset_lock+0x190/0x19c [ 24.234467] drm_modeset_lock+0x34/0x54 [ 24.238953] drmm_mode_config_init+0x550/0x764 [ 24.244065] msm_drm_bind+0x170/0x59c [ 24.248374] try_to_bring_up_master+0x244/0x294 [ 24.253572] __component_add+0xf4/0x14c [ 24.258057] component_add+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.262273] dsi_dev_attach+0x2c/0x38 [ 24.266575] dsi_host_attach+0xc4/0x120 [ 24.271060] mipi_dsi_attach+0x34/0x48 [ 24.275456] devm_mipi_dsi_attach+0x28/0x68 [ 24.280298] ti_sn_bridge_probe+0x2b4/0x2dc [ 24.285137] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x78/0x90 [ 24.289893] really_probe+0x1e4/0x3d8 [ 24.294194] __driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x164 [ 24.299298] driver_probe_device+0x54/0xf8 [ 24.304043] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x118 [ 24.309145] bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd4 [ 24.313628] __device_attach+0xcc/0x158 [ 24.318112] device_initial_probe+0x24/0x30 [ 24.322954] bus_probe_device+0x38/0x9c [ 24.327439] deferred_probe_work_func+0xd4/0xf0 [ 24.332628] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.337289] process_scheduled_works+0x44/0x48 [ 24.342391] worker_thread+0x1e4/0x26c [ 24.346788] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.350470] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] [ 24.354683] -> #2 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 24.361489] drm_modeset_acquire_init+0xe4/0x138 [ 24.366777] drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x44/0x114 [ 24.372327] check_connector_changed+0xbc/0x198 [ 24.377517] drm_helper_hpd_irq_event+0xcc/0x11c [ 24.382804] dsi_hpd_worker+0x24/0x30 [ 24.387104] process_one_work+0x2f0/0x498 [ 24.391762] worker_thread+0x1d0/0x26c [ 24.396158] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.399840] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.404053] [ 24.404053] -> #1 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.411032] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.415247] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.419819] dp_panel_read_sink_caps+0x23c/0x26c [ 24.425108] dp_display_process_hpd_high+0x34/0xd4 [ 24.430570] dp_display_usbpd_configure_cb+0x30/0x3c [ 24.436205] hpd_event_thread+0x2ac/0x550 [ 24.440864] kthread+0xe4/0xf4 [ 24.444544] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 24.448757] [ 24.448757] -> #0 (&dp->event_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 24.455116] __lock_acquire+0xe2c/0x10d8 [ 24.459690] lock_acquire+0x1ac/0x2d0 [ 24.463988] __mutex_lock+0xc8/0x384 [ 24.468201] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x74 [ 24.472773] msm_dp_display_enable+0x58/0x164 [ 24.477789] dp_bridge_enable+0x24/0x30 [ 24.482273] drm_atomic_bridge_chain_enable+0x78/0x9c [ 24.488006] drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x1bc/0x244 [ 24.494801] msm_atomic_commit_tail+0x248/0x3d0 [ 24.499992] commit_tail+0x7c/0xfc [ 24.504031] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x158/0x15c [ 24.509404] drm_atomic_commit+0x60/0x74 [ 24.513976] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x6b0/0x908 [ 24.519079] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe8/0x168 [ 24.523650] drm_ioctl+0x320/0x370 [ 24.527689] drm_compat_ioctl+0x40/0xdc [ 24.532175] __arm64_compat_sys_ioctl+0xe0/0x150 [ 24.537463] invoke_syscall+0x80/0x114 [ 24.541861] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xc4/0xf8 [ 24.547235] do_el0_svc_compat+0x2c/0x54 [ 24.551806] el0_svc_compat+0x4c/0xe4 [ 24.556106] el0t_32_sync_handler+0xc4/0xf4 [ 24.560948] el0t_32_sync+0x174/0x178 Changes in v2: -- add circular lockiing trace Fixes: d4aca42 ("drm/msm/dp: always add fail-safe mode into connector mode list") Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/481396/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649451894-554-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
…tion During a scrub, or device replace, we can race with block group removal and allocation and trigger the following assertion failure: [7526.385524] assertion failed: cache->start == chunk_offset, in fs/btrfs/scrub.c:3817 [7526.387351] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [7526.387373] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3599! [7526.388001] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [7526.388970] CPU: 2 PID: 1158150 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8-btrfs-next-114 #4 [7526.390279] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [7526.392430] RIP: 0010:assertfail.constprop.0+0x18/0x1a [btrfs] [7526.393520] Code: f3 48 c7 c7 20 (...) [7526.396926] RSP: 0018:ffffb9154176bc40 EFLAGS: 00010246 [7526.397690] RAX: 0000000000000048 RBX: ffffa0db8a910000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [7526.398732] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff9d7239a2 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [7526.399766] RBP: ffffa0db8a911e10 R08: ffffffffa71a3ca0 R09: 0000000000000001 [7526.400793] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0db4b170800 [7526.401839] R13: 00000003494b0000 R14: ffffa0db7c55b488 R15: ffffa0db8b19a000 [7526.402874] FS: 00007f6c99c40640(0000) GS:ffffa0de6d200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [7526.404038] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [7526.405040] CR2: 00007f31b0882160 CR3: 000000014b38c004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 [7526.406112] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [7526.407148] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [7526.408169] Call Trace: [7526.408529] <TASK> [7526.408839] scrub_enumerate_chunks.cold+0x11/0x79 [btrfs] [7526.409690] ? do_wait_intr_irq+0xb0/0xb0 [7526.410276] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x226/0x620 [btrfs] [7526.410995] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [7526.411592] btrfs_ioctl+0x1ab5/0x36d0 [btrfs] [7526.412278] ? __fget_files+0xc9/0x1b0 [7526.412825] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [7526.413459] ? lock_release+0x155/0x4a0 [7526.414022] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [7526.414601] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [7526.415150] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [7526.415675] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [7526.416408] RIP: 0033:0x7f6c99d34397 [7526.416931] Code: 3c 1c e8 1c ff (...) [7526.419641] RSP: 002b:00007f6c99c3fca8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [7526.420735] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005624e1e007b0 RCX: 00007f6c99d34397 [7526.421779] RDX: 00005624e1e007b0 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003 [7526.422820] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007f6c99c40640 R09: 0000000000000000 [7526.423906] R10: 00007f6c99c40640 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff746755de [7526.424924] R13: 00007fff746755df R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007f6c99c40640 [7526.425950] </TASK> That assertion is relatively new, introduced with commit d04fbe1 ("btrfs: scrub: cleanup the argument list of scrub_chunk()"). The block group we get at scrub_enumerate_chunks() can actually have a start address that is smaller then the chunk offset we extracted from a device extent item we got from the commit root of the device tree. This is very rare, but it can happen due to a race with block group removal and allocation. For example, the following steps show how this can happen: 1) We are at transaction T, and we have the following blocks groups, sorted by their logical start address: [ bg A, start address A, length 1G (data) ] [ bg B, start address B, length 1G (data) ] (...) [ bg W, start address W, length 1G (data) ] --> logical address space hole of 256M, there used to be a 256M metadata block group here [ bg Y, start address Y, length 256M (metadata) ] --> Y matches W's end offset + 256M Block group Y is the block group with the highest logical address in the whole filesystem; 2) Block group Y is deleted and its extent mapping is removed by the call to remove_extent_mapping() made from btrfs_remove_block_group(). So after this point, the last element of the mapping red black tree, its rightmost node, is the mapping for block group W; 3) While still at transaction T, a new data block group is allocated, with a length of 1G. When creating the block group we do a call to find_next_chunk(), which returns the logical start address for the new block group. This calls returns X, which corresponds to the end offset of the last block group, the rightmost node in the mapping red black tree (fs_info->mapping_tree), plus one. So we get a new block group that starts at logical address X and with a length of 1G. It spans over the whole logical range of the old block group Y, that was previously removed in the same transaction. However the device extent allocated to block group X is not the same device extent that was used by block group Y, and it also does not overlap that extent, which must be always the case because we allocate extents by searching through the commit root of the device tree (otherwise it could corrupt a filesystem after a power failure or an unclean shutdown in general), so the extent allocator is behaving as expected; 4) We have a task running scrub, currently at scrub_enumerate_chunks(). There it searches for device extent items in the device tree, using its commit root. It finds a device extent item that was used by block group Y, and it extracts the value Y from that item into the local variable 'chunk_offset', using btrfs_dev_extent_chunk_offset(); It then calls btrfs_lookup_block_group() to find block group for the logical address Y - since there's currently no block group that starts at that logical address, it returns block group X, because its range contains Y. This results in triggering the assertion: ASSERT(cache->start == chunk_offset); right before calling scrub_chunk(), as cache->start is X and chunk_offset is Y. This is more likely to happen of filesystems not larger than 50G, because for these filesystems we use a 256M size for metadata block groups and a 1G size for data block groups, while for filesystems larger than 50G, we use a 1G size for both data and metadata block groups (except for zoned filesystems). It could also happen on any filesystem size due to the fact that system block groups are always smaller (32M) than both data and metadata block groups, but these are not frequently deleted, so much less likely to trigger the race. So make scrub skip any block group with a start offset that is less than the value we expect, as that means it's a new block group that was created in the current transaction. It's pointless to continue and try to scrub its extents, because scrub searches for extents using the commit root, so it won't find any. For a device replace, skip it as well for the same reasons, and we don't need to worry about the possibility of extents of the new block group not being to the new device, because we have the write duplication setup done through btrfs_map_block(). Fixes: d04fbe1 ("btrfs: scrub: cleanup the argument list of scrub_chunk()") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.17 Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted [__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system hang/crash. System message log shows the following: ======================================= [ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures. [ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)' [ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen) [ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports: 'need reset' [ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset' [ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow: [ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows: [ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset' [ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset() [ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing... [ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset --> driver unload Uninterruptible tasks ===================== crash> ps | grep UN 213 2 11 c000000004c89e00 UN 0.0 0 0 [eehd] 215 2 0 c000000004c80000 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/0:2] 2196 1 28 c000000004504f00 UN 0.1 15936 11136 wickedd 4287 1 9 c00000020d076800 UN 0.0 4032 3008 agetty 4289 1 20 c00000020d056680 UN 0.0 7232 3840 agetty 32423 2 26 c00000020038c580 UN 0.0 0 0 [kworker/26:3] 32871 4241 27 c0000002609ddd00 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd 32920 10130 16 c00000027284a100 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33092 32987 0 c000000205218b00 UN 0.1 48512 12608 sendmail 33154 4567 16 c000000260e51780 UN 0.1 48832 12864 pickup 33209 4241 36 c000000270cb6500 UN 0.1 18624 11712 sshd 33473 33283 0 c000000205211480 UN 0.1 48512 12672 sendmail 33531 4241 37 c00000023c902780 UN 0.1 18624 11648 sshd EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock =========================================================== crash> bt 213 PID: 213 TASK: c000000004c89e00 CPU: 11 COMMAND: "eehd" #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808 #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0 #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x] #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x] #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8 #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64 And the sleeping source code ============================ crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448 FILE: ../net/core/dev.c LINE: 6702 6697 { 6698 might_sleep(); 6699 set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6700 6701 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state)) * 6702 msleep(1); 6703 while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state)) 6704 msleep(1); 6705 6706 hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer); 6707 6708 clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state); 6709 } EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes the following call chains: bnx2x_io_error_detected() +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload() +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi() +-> __netif_napi_del() bnx2x_io_slot_reset() +-> bnx2x_netif_stop() +-> bnx2x_napi_disable() +->napi_disable() Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage, that is delete the NAPI after disabling it. Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised") Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
As reported by Alan, the CFI (Call Frame Information) in the VDSO time routines is incorrect since commit ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation."). DWARF has a concept called the CFA (Canonical Frame Address), which on powerpc is calculated as an offset from the stack pointer (r1). That means when the stack pointer is changed there must be a corresponding CFI directive to update the calculation of the CFA. The current code is missing those directives for the changes to r1, which prevents gdb from being able to generate a backtrace from inside VDSO functions, eg: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007fffffffd960 in ?? () #3 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 Backtrace stopped: frame did not save the PC Alan helpfully describes some rules for correctly maintaining the CFI information: 1) Every adjustment to the current frame address reg (ie. r1) must be described, and exactly at the instruction where r1 changes. Why? Because stack unwinding might want to access previous frames. 2) If a function changes LR or any non-volatile register, the save location for those regs must be given. The CFI can be at any instruction after the saves up to the point that the reg is changed. (Exception: LR save should be described before a bl. not after) 3) If asychronous unwind info is needed then restores of LR and non-volatile regs must also be described. The CFI can be at any instruction after the reg is restored up to the point where the save location is (potentially) trashed. Fix the inability to backtrace by adding CFI directives describing the changes to r1, ie. satisfying rule 1. Also change the information for LR to point to the copy saved on the stack, not the value in r0 that will be overwritten by the function call. Finally, add CFI directives describing the save/restore of r2. With the fix gdb can correctly back trace and navigate up and down the stack: Breakpoint 1, 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) up #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #5 0x00000001000054ac in main () (gdb) Initial frame selected; you cannot go up. (gdb) down #4 0x000000010000d180 in print_current_files () (gdb) #3 0x000000010000c8bc in print_long_format () (gdb) #2 0x0000000100015b60 in gettime () (gdb) #1 0x00007ffff7d8872c in clock_gettime@@GLIBC_2.17 () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) #0 0x00007ffff7f804dc in __kernel_clock_gettime () (gdb) Fixes: ce7d805 ("powerpc/vdso: Prepare for switching VDSO to generic C implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.11+ Reported-by: Alan Modra <amodra@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reviewed-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220502125010.1319370-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Do not allow to write timestamps on RX rings if PF is being configured. When PF is being configured RX rings can be freed or rebuilt. If at the same time timestamps are updated, the kernel will crash by dereferencing null RX ring pointer. PID: 1449 TASK: ff187d28ed658040 CPU: 34 COMMAND: "ice-ptp-0000:51" #0 [ff1966a94a713bb0] machine_kexec at ffffffff9d05a0be #1 [ff1966a94a713c08] __crash_kexec at ffffffff9d192e9d #2 [ff1966a94a713cd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff9d1941bd #3 [ff1966a94a713ce8] oops_end at ffffffff9d01bd54 #4 [ff1966a94a713d08] no_context at ffffffff9d06bda4 #5 [ff1966a94a713d60] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff9d06c10c #6 [ff1966a94a713da8] do_page_fault at ffffffff9d06cae4 #7 [ff1966a94a713de0] page_fault at ffffffff9da0107e [exception RIP: ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+91] RIP: ffffffffc076db8b RSP: ff1966a94a713e98 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 16e3db9c6b7ccae4 RBX: ff187d269dd3c180 RCX: ff187d269cd4d018 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ff187d269cfcc644 R8: ff187d339b9641b0 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff187d269cfcc648 R13: ffffffff9f128784 R14: ffffffff9d101b70 R15: ff187d269cfcc640 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ff1966a94a713ea0] ice_ptp_periodic_work at ffffffffc076dbef [ice] #9 [ff1966a94a713ee0] kthread_worker_fn at ffffffff9d101c1b #10 [ff1966a94a713f10] kthread at ffffffff9d101b4d #11 [ff1966a94a713f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff9da0023f Fixes: 77a7811 ("ice: enable receive hardware timestamping") Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com> Tested-by: Dave Cain <dcain@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gurucharan <gurucharanx.g@intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
This was missed in c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") and causes a panic when mounting with '-o trunkdiscovery': PID: 1604 TASK: ffff93dac3520000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffffb79140f738f8] machine_kexec at ffffffffaec64bee #1 [ffffb79140f73950] __crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda67fd #2 [ffffb79140f73a18] crash_kexec at ffffffffaeda76ed #3 [ffffb79140f73a30] oops_end at ffffffffaec2658d #4 [ffffb79140f73a50] general_protection at ffffffffaf60111e [exception RIP: nfs_fattr_init+0x5] RIP: ffffffffc0c18265 RSP: ffffb79140f73b08 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff93dac304a800 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffb79140f73bb0 RSI: ffff93dadc8cbb40 RDI: d03ee11cfaf6bd50 RBP: ffffb79140f73be8 R8: ffffffffc0691560 R9: 0000000000000006 R10: ffff93db3ffd3df8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff93dac4040000 R13: ffff93dac2848e00 R14: ffffb79140f73b60 R15: ffffb79140f73b30 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffb79140f73b08] _nfs41_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c73d53 [nfsv4] #6 [ffffb79140f73bf0] nfs4_proc_get_locations at ffffffffc0c83e90 [nfsv4] #7 [ffffb79140f73c60] nfs4_discover_trunking at ffffffffc0c83fb7 [nfsv4] #8 [ffffb79140f73cd8] nfs_probe_fsinfo at ffffffffc0c0f95f [nfs] #9 [ffffb79140f73da0] nfs_probe_server at ffffffffc0c1026a [nfs] RIP: 00007f6254fce26e RSP: 00007ffc69496ac8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6254fce26e RDX: 00005600220a82a0 RSI: 00005600220a64d0 RDI: 00005600220a6520 RBP: 00007ffc69496c50 R8: 00005600220a8710 R9: 003035322e323231 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc69496c50 R13: 00005600220a8440 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 0000560020650ef9 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Fixes: c3ed222 ("NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.") Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
…tion Each cset (css_set) is pinned by its tasks. When we're moving tasks around across csets for a migration, we need to hold the source and destination csets to ensure that they don't go away while we're moving tasks about. This is done by linking cset->mg_preload_node on either the mgctx->preloaded_src_csets or mgctx->preloaded_dst_csets list. Using the same cset->mg_preload_node for both the src and dst lists was deemed okay as a cset can't be both the source and destination at the same time. Unfortunately, this overloading becomes problematic when multiple tasks are involved in a migration and some of them are identity noop migrations while others are actually moving across cgroups. For example, this can happen with the following sequence on cgroup1: #1> mkdir -p /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b #2> echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs #3> RUN_A_COMMAND_WHICH_CREATES_MULTIPLE_THREADS & #4> PID=$! #5> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/b/tasks #6> echo $PID > /sys/fs/cgroup/misc/a/cgroup.procs the process including the group leader back into a. In this final migration, non-leader threads would be doing identity migration while the group leader is doing an actual one. After #3, let's say the whole process was in cset A, and that after #4, the leader moves to cset B. Then, during #6, the following happens: 1. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on B for the leader. 2. cgroup_migrate_add_src() is called on A for the other threads. 3. cgroup_migrate_prepare_dst() is called. It scans the src list. 4. It notices that B wants to migrate to A, so it tries to A to the dst list but realizes that its ->mg_preload_node is already busy. 5. and then it notices A wants to migrate to A as it's an identity migration, it culls it by list_del_init()'ing its ->mg_preload_node and putting references accordingly. 6. The rest of migration takes place with B on the src list but nothing on the dst list. This means that A isn't held while migration is in progress. If all tasks leave A before the migration finishes and the incoming task pins it, the cset will be destroyed leading to use-after-free. This is caused by overloading cset->mg_preload_node for both src and dst preload lists. We wanted to exclude the cset from the src list but ended up inadvertently excluding it from the dst list too. This patch fixes the issue by separating out cset->mg_preload_node into ->mg_src_preload_node and ->mg_dst_preload_node, so that the src and dst preloadings don't interfere with each other. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reported-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Reported-by: shisiyuan <shisiyuan19870131@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1654187688-27411-1-git-send-email-shisiyuan@xiaomi.com Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg33313.html Fixes: f817de9 ("cgroup: prepare migration path for unified hierarchy") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
…abled
It was brought up that on ARMv7, that because the FUNCTION_TRACER does not
use nops to keep function tracing disabled because of the use of a link
register, it does have some performance impact.
The start of functions when -pg is used to compile the kernel is:
push {lr}
bl 8010e7c0 <__gnu_mcount_nc>
When function tracing is tuned off, it becomes:
push {lr}
add sp, sp, #4
Which just puts the stack back to its normal location. But these two
instructions at the start of every function does incur some overhead.
Be more honest in the Kconfig FUNCTION_TRACER description and specify that
the overhead being in the noise was x86 specific, but other architectures
may vary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220705105416.GE5208@pengutronix.de/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220706161231.085a83da@gandalf.local.home
Reported-by: Sascha Hauer <sha@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
On powerpc, 'perf trace' is crashing with a SIGSEGV when trying to process a perf.data file created with 'perf trace record -p': #0 0x00000001225b8988 in syscall_arg__scnprintf_augmented_string <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1492 #1 syscall_arg__scnprintf_filename <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1492 #2 syscall_arg__scnprintf_filename <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1486 #3 0x00000001225bdd9c in syscall_arg_fmt__scnprintf_val <snip> at builtin-trace.c:1973 #4 syscall__scnprintf_args <snip> at builtin-trace.c:2041 #5 0x00000001225bff04 in trace__sys_enter <snip> at builtin-trace.c:2319 That points to the below code in tools/perf/builtin-trace.c: /* * If this is raw_syscalls.sys_enter, then it always comes with the 6 possible * arguments, even if the syscall being handled, say "openat", uses only 4 arguments * this breaks syscall__augmented_args() check for augmented args, as we calculate * syscall->args_size using each syscalls:sys_enter_NAME tracefs format file, * so when handling, say the openat syscall, we end up getting 6 args for the * raw_syscalls:sys_enter event, when we expected just 4, we end up mistakenly * thinking that the extra 2 u64 args are the augmented filename, so just check * here and avoid using augmented syscalls when the evsel is the raw_syscalls one. */ if (evsel != trace->syscalls.events.sys_enter) augmented_args = syscall__augmented_args(sc, sample, &augmented_args_size, trace->raw_augmented_syscalls_args_size); As the comment points out, we should not be trying to augment the args for raw_syscalls. However, when processing a perf.data file, we are not initializing those properly. Fix the same. Reported-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220707090900.572584-1-naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 Rust-for-Linux#1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 Rust-for-Linux#2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 Rust-for-Linux#3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 Rust-for-Linux#4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 Rust-for-Linux#5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 Rust-for-Linux#6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 Rust-for-Linux#7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 Rust-for-Linux#8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a NULL dereference of the struct bonding.rr_tx_counter member because
if a bond is initially created with an initial mode != zero (Round Robin)
the memory required for the counter is never created and when the mode is
changed there is never any attempt to verify the memory is allocated upon
switching modes.
This causes the following Oops on an aarch64 machine:
[ 334.686773] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff2c91ac905000
[ 334.694703] Mem abort info:
[ 334.697486] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 334.701234] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 334.706536] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 334.709579] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 334.712719] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 334.717586] Data abort info:
[ 334.720454] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 334.724288] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 334.727244] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000008044d662000
[ 334.733944] [ffff2c91ac905000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
[ 334.740734] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [Rust-for-Linux#1] SMP
[ 334.745602] Modules linked in: bonding tls veth rfkill sunrpc arm_spe_pmu vfat fat acpi_ipmi ipmi_ssif ixgbe igb i40e mdio ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler arm_cmn arm_dsu_pmu cppc_cpufreq acpi_tad fuse zram crct10dif_ce ast ghash_ce sbsa_gwdt nvme drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper nvme_core ttm xgene_hwmon
[ 334.772217] CPU: 7 PID: 2214 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4-00133-g64ae13ed4784 Rust-for-Linux#4
[ 334.779950] Hardware name: GIGABYTE R272-P31-00/MP32-AR1-00, BIOS F18v (SCP: 1.08.20211002) 12/01/2021
[ 334.789244] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 334.796196] pc : bond_rr_gen_slave_id+0x40/0x124 [bonding]
[ 334.801691] lr : bond_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get+0x38/0xdc [bonding]
[ 334.807962] sp : ffff8000221733e0
[ 334.811265] x29: ffff8000221733e0 x28: ffffdbac8572d198 x27: ffff80002217357c
[ 334.818392] x26: 000000000000002a x25: ffffdbacb33ee000 x24: ffff07ff980fa000
[ 334.825519] x23: ffffdbacb2e398ba x22: ffff07ff98102000 x21: ffff07ff981029c0
[ 334.832646] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff07ff981029c0 x18: 0000000000000014
[ 334.839773] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffdbacb1004364 x15: 0000aaaabe2f5a62
[ 334.846899] x14: ffff07ff8e55d968 x13: ffff07ff8e55db30 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 334.854026] x11: ffffdbacb21532e8 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffffdbac857178ec
[ 334.861153] x8 : ffff07ff9f6e5a28 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000007c2b3742
[ 334.868279] x5 : ffff2c91ac905000 x4 : ffff2c91ac905000 x3 : ffff07ff9f554400
[ 334.875406] x2 : ffff2c91ac905000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff07ff981029c0
[ 334.882532] Call trace:
[ 334.884967] bond_rr_gen_slave_id+0x40/0x124 [bonding]
[ 334.890109] bond_xmit_roundrobin_slave_get+0x38/0xdc [bonding]
[ 334.896033] __bond_start_xmit+0x128/0x3a0 [bonding]
[ 334.901001] bond_start_xmit+0x54/0xb0 [bonding]
[ 334.905622] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xb4/0x220
[ 334.909798] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1a0/0x720
[ 334.913799] arp_xmit+0x3c/0xbc
[ 334.916932] arp_send_dst+0x98/0xd0
[ 334.920410] arp_solicit+0xe8/0x230
[ 334.923888] neigh_probe+0x60/0xb0
[ 334.927279] __neigh_event_send+0x3b0/0x470
[ 334.931453] neigh_resolve_output+0x70/0x90
[ 334.935626] ip_finish_output2+0x158/0x514
[ 334.939714] __ip_finish_output+0xac/0x1a4
[ 334.943800] ip_finish_output+0x40/0xfc
[ 334.947626] ip_output+0xf8/0x1a4
[ 334.950931] ip_send_skb+0x5c/0x100
[ 334.954410] ip_push_pending_frames+0x3c/0x60
[ 334.958758] raw_sendmsg+0x458/0x6d0
[ 334.962325] inet_sendmsg+0x50/0x80
[ 334.965805] sock_sendmsg+0x60/0x6c
[ 334.969286] __sys_sendto+0xc8/0x134
[ 334.972853] __arm64_sys_sendto+0x34/0x4c
[ 334.976854] invoke_syscall+0x78/0x100
[ 334.980594] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x4c/0xf4
[ 334.985287] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x4c
[ 334.988591] el0_svc+0x34/0x10c
[ 334.991724] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x11c/0x150
[ 334.996072] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
[ 334.999726] Code: b9001062 f9403c02 d53cd044 8b040042 (b8210040)
[ 335.005810] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 335.010416] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 335.017279] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 335.021374] Kernel Offset: 0x5baca8eb0000 from 0xffff800008000000
[ 335.027456] PHYS_OFFSET: 0x80000000
[ 335.030932] CPU features: 0x0000,0085c029,19805c82
[ 335.035713] Memory Limit: none
[ 335.038756] Rebooting in 180 seconds..
The fix is to allocate the memory in bond_open() which is guaranteed
to be called before any packets are processed.
Fixes: 848ca91 ("net: bonding: Use per-cpu rr_tx_counter")
CC: Jussi Maki <joamaki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Toppins <jtoppins@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
When walking through an inode extents, the ext4_ext_binsearch_idx() function assumes that the extent header has been previously validated. However, there are no checks that verify that the number of entries (eh->eh_entries) is non-zero when depth is > 0. And this will lead to problems because the EXT_FIRST_INDEX() and EXT_LAST_INDEX() will return garbage and result in this: [ 135.245946] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 135.247579] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents.c:2258! [ 135.249045] invalid opcode: 0000 [Rust-for-Linux#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 135.250320] CPU: 2 PID: 238 Comm: tmp118 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ Rust-for-Linux#4 [ 135.252067] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 135.255065] RIP: 0010:ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xc20/0xcb0 [ 135.256475] Code: [ 135.261433] RSP: 0018:ffffc900005939f8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 135.262847] RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffffc90000593b70 RCX: 0000000000000023 [ 135.264765] RDX: ffff8880038e5f10 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff8880046e922c [ 135.266670] RBP: ffff8880046e9348 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888002ca580c [ 135.268576] R10: 0000000000002602 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000024 [ 135.270477] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000024 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 135.272394] FS: 00007fdabdc56740(0000) GS:ffff88807dd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 135.274510] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 135.276075] CR2: 00007ffc26bd4f00 CR3: 0000000006261004 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 [ 135.277952] Call Trace: [ 135.278635] <TASK> [ 135.279247] ? preempt_count_add+0x6d/0xa0 [ 135.280358] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x55/0xb0 [ 135.281612] ? _raw_read_unlock+0x18/0x30 [ 135.282704] ext4_map_blocks+0x294/0x5a0 [ 135.283745] ? xa_load+0x6f/0xa0 [ 135.284562] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x3d6/0x770 [ 135.285646] read_pages+0x67/0x1d0 [ 135.286492] ? folio_add_lru+0x51/0x80 [ 135.287441] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x124/0x170 [ 135.288510] filemap_get_pages+0x23d/0x5a0 [ 135.289457] ? path_openat+0xa72/0xdd0 [ 135.290332] filemap_read+0xbf/0x300 [ 135.291158] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x17/0x40 [ 135.292192] new_sync_read+0x103/0x170 [ 135.293014] vfs_read+0x15d/0x180 [ 135.293745] ksys_read+0xa1/0xe0 [ 135.294461] do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80 [ 135.295284] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 This patch simply adds an extra check in __ext4_ext_check(), verifying that eh_entries is not 0 when eh_depth is > 0. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215941 Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216283 Cc: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220822094235.2690-1-lhenriques@suse.de Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
…-bindings"
Conor Dooley <mail@conchuod.ie> says:
From: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
The device trees produced automatically for the virt and spike machines
fail dt-validate on several grounds. Some of these need to be fixed in
the linux kernel's dt-bindings, but others are caused by bugs in QEMU.
Patches been sent that fix the QEMU issues [0], but a couple of them
need to be fixed in the kernel's dt-bindings. The first patches add
compatibles for "riscv,{clint,plic}0" which are present in drivers and
the auto generated QEMU dtbs.
Thanks to Rob Herring for reporting these issues [1],
Conor.
To reproduce the errors:
./build/qemu-system-riscv64 -nographic -machine virt,dumpdtb=qemu.dtb
dt-validate -p /path/to/linux/kernel/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/processed-schema.json qemu.dtb
(The processed schema needs to be generated first)
0 - https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20220810184612.157317-1-mail@conchuod.ie/
1 - https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20220803170552.GA2250266-robh@kernel.org/
* fix-dt-validate:
dt-bindings: riscv: add new riscv,isa strings for emulators
dt-bindings: interrupt-controller: sifive,plic: add legacy riscv compatible
dt-bindings: timer: sifive,clint: add legacy riscv compatible
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823183319.3314940-1-mail@conchuod.ie
[Palmer: some cover letter pruning, and dropped Rust-for-Linux#4 as suggested.]
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
…ata and not linked with libtraceevent
When we have a perf.data file with tracepoints, such as:
# perf evlist -f
probe_perf:lzma_decompress_to_file
# Tip: use 'perf evlist --trace-fields' to show fields for tracepoint events
#
We end up segfaulting when using perf built with NO_LIBTRACEEVENT=1 by
trying to find an evsel with a NULL 'event_name' variable:
(gdb) run report --stdio -f
Starting program: /root/bin/perf report --stdio -f
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x000000000055219d in find_evsel (evlist=0xfda7b0, event_name=0x0) at util/sort.c:2830
warning: Source file is more recent than executable.
2830 if (event_name[0] == '%') {
Missing separate debuginfos, use: dnf debuginfo-install bzip2-libs-1.0.8-11.fc36.x86_64 cyrus-sasl-lib-2.1.27-18.fc36.x86_64 elfutils-debuginfod-client-0.188-3.fc36.x86_64 elfutils-libelf-0.188-3.fc36.x86_64 elfutils-libs-0.188-3.fc36.x86_64 glibc-2.35-20.fc36.x86_64 keyutils-libs-1.6.1-4.fc36.x86_64 krb5-libs-1.19.2-12.fc36.x86_64 libbrotli-1.0.9-7.fc36.x86_64 libcap-2.48-4.fc36.x86_64 libcom_err-1.46.5-2.fc36.x86_64 libcurl-7.82.0-12.fc36.x86_64 libevent-2.1.12-6.fc36.x86_64 libgcc-12.2.1-4.fc36.x86_64 libidn2-2.3.4-1.fc36.x86_64 libnghttp2-1.51.0-1.fc36.x86_64 libpsl-0.21.1-5.fc36.x86_64 libselinux-3.3-4.fc36.x86_64 libssh-0.9.6-4.fc36.x86_64 libstdc++-12.2.1-4.fc36.x86_64 libunistring-1.0-1.fc36.x86_64 libunwind-1.6.2-2.fc36.x86_64 libxcrypt-4.4.33-4.fc36.x86_64 libzstd-1.5.2-2.fc36.x86_64 numactl-libs-2.0.14-5.fc36.x86_64 opencsd-1.2.0-1.fc36.x86_64 openldap-2.6.3-1.fc36.x86_64 openssl-libs-3.0.5-2.fc36.x86_64 slang-2.3.2-11.fc36.x86_64 xz-libs-5.2.5-9.fc36.x86_64 zlib-1.2.11-33.fc36.x86_64
(gdb) bt
#0 0x000000000055219d in find_evsel (evlist=0xfda7b0, event_name=0x0) at util/sort.c:2830
#1 0x0000000000552416 in add_dynamic_entry (evlist=0xfda7b0, tok=0xffb6eb "trace", level=2) at util/sort.c:2976
#2 0x0000000000552d26 in sort_dimension__add (list=0xf93e00 <perf_hpp_list>, tok=0xffb6eb "trace", evlist=0xfda7b0, level=2) at util/sort.c:3193
#3 0x0000000000552e1c in setup_sort_list (list=0xf93e00 <perf_hpp_list>, str=0xffb6eb "trace", evlist=0xfda7b0) at util/sort.c:3227
#4 0x00000000005532fa in __setup_sorting (evlist=0xfda7b0) at util/sort.c:3381
#5 0x0000000000553cdc in setup_sorting (evlist=0xfda7b0) at util/sort.c:3608
#6 0x000000000042eb9f in cmd_report (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at builtin-report.c:1596
#7 0x00000000004aee7e in run_builtin (p=0xf64ca0 <commands+288>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at perf.c:330
#8 0x00000000004af0f2 in handle_internal_command (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at perf.c:384
#9 0x00000000004af241 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffe29c, argv=0x7fffffffe290) at perf.c:428
#10 0x00000000004af5fc in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe470) at perf.c:562
(gdb)
So check if we have tracepoint events in add_dynamic_entry() and bail
out instead:
# perf report --stdio -f
This perf binary isn't linked with libtraceevent, can't process probe_perf:lzma_decompress_to_file
Error:
Unknown --sort key: `trace'
#
Fixes: 378ef0f ("perf build: Use libtraceevent from the system")
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y7MDb7kRaHZB6APC@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Currently we have several lines of work:
rustc; and another one I have been working on, based oncargo).cargo).This patch effectively merges the work we have been doing and integrates it in the latest mainline kernel tree.
This does not mean anything needs to stay as-is, but this gives us a working, common base to work and experiment upon. Hopefully, it will also attract external people to join!
As a summary, I added:
cargointegration with the kernelMakefiles:cargoworkspace to have a single lock file and to share deps betweencargojobs.V=1.cargocleantarget to clean all the Rust-related artifacts.Initial support for built-in modules (i.e.
Yas well asM):TODOs), but it is enough to start playing with things that depend onMODULE.--cfg moduleto built-in modules to be able to compile conditionally inside Rust.KSYM_NAME_LENlength to avoid warnings due to Rust long mangled symbols.Rust infrastructure in a new top level folder
rust/:kernelpackage which contains the sources from Alex & Geoffrey's work plus some changes:build.rs.THIS_MODULEemulation until it is implemented.Makefilelogic and the code thatcfg-depended on kernel version (no need in mainline).rust_*and exported viaEXPORT_SYMBOLinstead.shlexpackage which serves as an example of an "inline" dependency (i.e. package checked out copy to avoid the network)The example driver was setup at
drivers/char/rust_example/.Misc
Documentation/rust/with a quick start guide.MAINTAINERSentry.Other notes that aren't in
TODOs:We could minimize the network requirements (use
bindgenbinary, use more inline dependencies...), but it is not clear it would be a good idea for the moment due tocore/alloc/compiler-builtins.The intention of
rust/is to have a place to put extra dependencies and split thekernelpackage into several in the future if it grows. It could resemble the usual kernel tree structure.With several drivers being built-in,
cargorecompileskerneland triggers duplicate symbol errors when merging thin archives. We need to make it only compilekernelonce.When the above works, then
make's-jcalling concurrentcargos (e.g. several drivers at the same time) should be OK, I think. According to Fix running Cargo concurrently rust-lang/cargo#2486 it shouldn't miscompile anything, but if they start locking on each other we will have make jobs waiting that could have been doing something else.Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com