fix: Two factor auth for SAML - #42099
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🦋 Changeset detectedLatest commit: 8235842 The changes in this PR will be included in the next version bump. This PR includes changesets to release 5 packages
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| Layer / File(s) | Summary |
|---|---|
Credential token expiration contract packages/model-typings/src/models/ICredentialTokensModel.ts, packages/models/src/models/CredentialTokens.ts |
Adds extendExpirationById, which extends an unexpired credential token by two minutes. |
Two-factor requirement evaluation apps/meteor/server/lib/oauth/twoFactorAuth.ts |
Uses the TwoFactorUser type and returns false when OAuth two-factor authentication is disabled. |
SAML credential token lifecycle apps/meteor/server/lib/saml/loginHandler.ts, .changeset/warm-melons-serve.md |
The SAML handler extends the credential token when the authenticated user requires two-factor authentication and removes it otherwise. The changeset declares patch releases. |
Priority: ➖ Normal
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes
Change: Bug fix
Sequence Diagram(s)
sequenceDiagram
participant SAMLLoginHandler
participant TwoFactorAuth
participant CredentialTokens
SAMLLoginHandler->>SAMLLoginHandler: insertOrUpdateSAMLUser
SAMLLoginHandler->>TwoFactorAuth: getUserForCheck
SAMLLoginHandler->>TwoFactorAuth: doesUserRequire2FA
alt User requires 2FA
SAMLLoginHandler->>CredentialTokens: extendExpirationById
else User does not require 2FA
SAMLLoginHandler->>CredentialTokens: removeById
end
Suggested labels: type: bug, area: authentication
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 82358
SAML authentication now preserves a short-lived credential token only when 2FA is required and removes it otherwise; expired tokens cannot be extended, so no actionable merge-blocking risk remains.
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5
✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
| Check name | Status | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Docstring Coverage | ✅ Passed | No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 4… |
| Linked Issues check | ✅ Passed | Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. |
| Out of Scope Changes check | ✅ Passed | Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request. |
| Description Check | ✅ Passed | Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled. |
| Title check | ✅ Passed | The title clearly and concisely describes the main change: fixing two-factor authentication for SAML login. |
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All reported issues were addressed across 5 files
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In @.changeset/warm-melons-serve.md:
- Line 7: Update the changeset description to use the standard term “two-factor
authentication” and include “the” before “SAML authentication method.”
In `@packages/models/src/models/CredentialTokens.ts`:
- Line 40: Update the updateOne predicate in the credential token refresh method
to match both _id and expireAt greater than now, so already-expired tokens are
not extended; preserve the existing twoFAGrace expiration update for valid
tokens.
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📒 Files selected for processing (5)
.changeset/warm-melons-serve.mdapps/meteor/server/lib/oauth/twoFactorAuth.tsapps/meteor/server/lib/saml/loginHandler.tspackages/model-typings/src/models/ICredentialTokensModel.tspackages/models/src/models/CredentialTokens.ts
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🧠 Learnings (2)
📚 Learning: 2026-02-26T19:25:44.063Z
Learnt from: gabriellsh
Repo: RocketChat/Rocket.Chat PR: 38778
File: packages/ui-voip/src/providers/useMediaSession.ts:192-192
Timestamp: 2026-02-26T19:25:44.063Z
Learning: In this repository (RocketChat/Rocket.Chat), Biome lint rules are not used even if a biome.json exists. When reviewing TypeScript files (e.g., packages/ui-voip/src/providers/useMediaSession.ts), ensure lint suggestions do not reference Biome-specific rules. Rely on general ESLint/TypeScript lint rules and project conventions instead.
Applied to files:
apps/meteor/server/lib/saml/loginHandler.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-02-26T19:25:44.063Z
Learnt from: gabriellsh
Repo: RocketChat/Rocket.Chat PR: 38778
File: packages/ui-voip/src/providers/useMediaSession.ts:192-192
Timestamp: 2026-02-26T19:25:44.063Z
Learning: In the Rocket.Chat repository, do not reference Biome lint rules in code review feedback. Biome is not used even if biome.json exists; only reference Biome rules if there is explicit, project-wide usage documented. For TypeScript files, review lint implications without Biome guidance unless the project enables Biome rules.
Applied to files:
apps/meteor/server/lib/saml/loginHandler.ts
🪛 LanguageTool
.changeset/warm-melons-serve.md
[grammar] ~7-~7: Use a hyphen to join words.
Context: ...ocket.chat/meteor': patch --- Fixes two factor authentication for SAML authentic...
(QB_NEW_EN_HYPHEN)
🔇 Additional comments (3)
packages/model-typings/src/models/ICredentialTokensModel.ts (1)
8-8: LGTM!apps/meteor/server/lib/oauth/twoFactorAuth.ts (1)
3-3: LGTM!Also applies to: 18-18, 22-22
apps/meteor/server/lib/saml/loginHandler.ts (1)
5-5: LGTM!Also applies to: 8-8, 47-52
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| const user = await getUserForCheck(updatedUser.userId); | ||
| if (user && doesUserRequire2FA(user)) { | ||
| await CredentialTokens.extendExpirationById(loginRequest.credentialToken); | ||
| } else { | ||
| await CredentialTokens.removeById(loginRequest.credentialToken); | ||
| } |
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The SAML login handler fails to invalidate the SAML credential token under two scenarios: when an exception is thrown during the login process (no cleanup in the catch block), and when a user with 2FA enabled successfully completes authentication (the token is extended instead of removed). This allows an attacker who intercepts the credential token to replay the authentication flow and potentially gain unauthorized access.
Steps to Reproduce
- A user with 2FA enabled logs in via SAML.
- The SAML IdP redirects the user back with a credentialToken.
- The client sends a login request with the credentialToken.
- The server sees that the user requires 2FA, extends the token's expiration, and prompts for 2FA.
- The user provides the correct 2FA code, and the client sends the second login request with the same credentialToken and the 2FA code.
- The login succeeds, but because doesUserRequire2FA still returns true, the server extends the token's expiration again instead of deleting it.
- An attacker who has intercepted the credentialToken can now send a login request using the same token and successfully authenticate (subject to 2FA if they can bypass or obtain the code, but bypassing the first factor entirely).
Fix with AI
A security vulnerability was found by Hacktron.
File: apps/meteor/server/lib/saml/loginHandler.ts
Lines: 47-52
Severity: high
Vulnerability: SAML Credential Token Not Invalidated on Failed Login or Successful 2FA Logins (Replay/Credential Reuse)
Description:
The SAML login handler fails to invalidate the SAML credential token under two scenarios: when an exception is thrown during the login process (no cleanup in the catch block), and when a user with 2FA enabled successfully completes authentication (the token is extended instead of removed). This allows an attacker who intercepts the credential token to replay the authentication flow and potentially gain unauthorized access.
Proof of Concept:
**Steps to Reproduce**
1. A user with 2FA enabled logs in via SAML.
2. The SAML IdP redirects the user back with a credentialToken.
3. The client sends a login request with the credentialToken.
4. The server sees that the user requires 2FA, extends the token's expiration, and prompts for 2FA.
5. The user provides the correct 2FA code, and the client sends the second login request with the same credentialToken and the 2FA code.
6. The login succeeds, but because doesUserRequire2FA still returns true, the server extends the token's expiration again instead of deleting it.
7. An attacker who has intercepted the credentialToken can now send a login request using the same token and successfully authenticate (subject to 2FA if they can bypass or obtain the code, but bypassing the first factor entirely).
Affected Code:
const user = await getUserForCheck(updatedUser.userId);
if (user && doesUserRequire2FA(user)) {
await CredentialTokens.extendExpirationById(loginRequest.credentialToken);
} else {
await CredentialTokens.removeById(loginRequest.credentialToken);
}
Acceptance criteria:
- Acceptance is defined by the **actual reported behavior**, not by tests passing.
- Reproduce the issue, or narrow the exact code path that produces it, *before* changing code. State what you confirmed.
- Fix the underlying cause. Mitigations that paper over the reported behavior do not count as a fix.
- Add a regression test that fails on the unpatched code and passes on the fix. If a regression test is genuinely impractical (e.g. race condition, infra-level issue), say so and explain why.
- Existing tests passing is **not** the bar. Do not declare done on tests-pass theatre.
Only change what is necessary to fix this vulnerability. Do not refactor adjacent code or modify unrelated files.
Triage: Reply !fp <reason> (false positive), !valid (confirmed), !accepted_risk <reason>, or !fixed (resolved). Any other reply is saved as a triage note.
Reason is optional but improves future scans — e.g. !fp internal endpoint, not user-facing.
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## develop #42099 +/- ##
===========================================
- Coverage 69.61% 69.60% -0.02%
===========================================
Files 4306 4306
Lines 172193 172269 +76
Branches 31258 31305 +47
===========================================
+ Hits 119868 119902 +34
- Misses 47130 47171 +41
- Partials 5195 5196 +1
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1 participant
Proposed changes (including videos or screenshots)
A recent security hotfix broke two factor auth for SAML by removing the credential token as soon as the user was authenticated. This broke 2FA flow because after the user submits the totp code, the system still requires the credential token which was earlier removed.
This PR fixes 2FA flow by implementing a check, if the user requires 2FA or not.
Issue(s)
Steps to test or reproduce
Further comments
https://rocketchat.atlassian.net/browse/CORE-2690
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