feat(runtime): enforce Gate-mediated ingress and add relay route#13
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Add Gate-mediation provenance enforcement so worker nodes only accept packets that were resolved and routed by the Gate, and reject external or peer traffic that targets a node directly. - transport: add RoutingProvenance.route_kind (external_ingress|gate_relay) with validation; reflect in contracts spec + JSON schema - runtime: add inbound_policy validators (validate_execute_ingress_packet, validate_relay_ingress_packet) and export them - runtime/app: enforce gate-only ingress on /v1/execute and add /v1/relay for Gate-authored relay dispatch - runtime/config: add enforce_gate_only_ingress + relay route toggles - runtime/execution: thread execution_mode through execution path - runtime/preflight + observability: align with new ingress posture - tests: gate-only ingress, relay route, and integration coverage for external-direct-blocked and gate-relay-allowed flows Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds a ChangesGate Ingress Enforcement and Relay Route
Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant ExternalClient
participant GateNode
participant NodeApp
participant validate_execute_ingress_packet
participant execute_transport_packet
rect rgba(255, 100, 100, 0.5)
Note over ExternalClient,NodeApp: Blocked: direct external ingress
ExternalClient->>NodeApp: POST /v1/execute (resolved_by_gate=False)
NodeApp->>validate_execute_ingress_packet: enforce_gate_only_ingress check
validate_execute_ingress_packet-->>NodeApp: raises ValueError (not from gate)
NodeApp-->>ExternalClient: failure TransportPacket (status=failed, error=ValueError)
end
rect rgba(100, 200, 100, 0.5)
Note over GateNode,NodeApp: Allowed: gate-mediated execute ingress
GateNode->>NodeApp: POST /v1/execute (route_kind=external_ingress, resolved_by_gate=True)
NodeApp->>validate_execute_ingress_packet: enforce_gate_only_ingress check
validate_execute_ingress_packet-->>NodeApp: ok
NodeApp->>execute_transport_packet: execution_mode="execute"
execute_transport_packet-->>NodeApp: response packet
NodeApp-->>GateNode: 200 success TransportPacket
end
rect rgba(100, 150, 255, 0.5)
Note over GateNode,NodeApp: Allowed: gate relay
GateNode->>NodeApp: POST /v1/relay (route_kind=gate_relay, resolved_by_gate=True)
NodeApp->>validate_execute_ingress_packet: validate_relay_ingress_packet check
validate_execute_ingress_packet-->>NodeApp: ok
NodeApp->>execute_transport_packet: execution_mode="relay"
execute_transport_packet-->>NodeApp: response packet
NodeApp-->>GateNode: 200 success TransportPacket
end
Estimated code review effort🎯 4 (Complex) | ⏱️ ~60 minutes Poem
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a new /v1/relay route and inbound policy validation to enforce gate-mediated routing and separate external ingress from internal relay traffic. Key changes include updates to the transport packet schema, configuration model, and the addition of robust integration tests. Feedback highlights a discrepancy between the updated action regex and the JSON schema, a security vulnerability where empty relay actions bypass validation, an unused execution_mode parameter, and a regression in JSON parsing error handling that could affect HTTP status codes and metrics.
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…ngress Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> # Conflicts: # src/constellation_node_sdk/runtime/app.py # src/constellation_node_sdk/runtime/config.py # src/constellation_node_sdk/runtime/execution.py # src/constellation_node_sdk/runtime/preflight.py # src/constellation_node_sdk/transport/models.py # tests/runtime/test_preflight.py
…/relay Post-merge cleanup after merging main into feat/gate-mediation-ingress: - relay(): add missing -> JSONResponse return type annotation - relay route: apply the same str()-cast + not-None guard on signing_private_key that main independently applied to /v1/execute (field is str | None; passing raw response_signing_key could be bytes) - ruff format pass on 4 files Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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…cute and /v1/relay The two route handlers were near-identical copies (packet parsing, route-aware signing/validation resolution, execute_transport_packet call, response/error handling), flagged by SonarCloud at 15.4% code duplication on new code (threshold 3%). Extracted the shared body into _handle_transport_request(), parameterized by execution_mode and a per-route ingress validator callback. Both routes are now thin wrappers. No behavior change; all 89 tests (83 unit + 6 integration) still pass. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
…tency, dead code) - Restore global-allowlist fallback for relay allowed_actions/allowed_packet_types (both in route validation and ingress policy call) so an empty relay_allowed_actions no longer disables action restrictions entirely (Gemini). - Add preflight check: enforce_gate_only_ingress=true now requires a verified signature on /v1/execute (and /v1/relay when enabled) outside dev_mode, since Gate-trust claims (source_node, provenance.resolved_by_gate) are otherwise caller-supplied and unauthenticated (Codex P1). - Fold execute_allowed_actions into idempotency-action validation (both the Pydantic model validator and run_preflight), so execute-only allowlists work without a legacy allowed_actions entry (Codex P2). - Restore explicit invalid_json request-parsing branch (400 + "invalid_json" metric status) that the _parse_transport_packet helper had silently dropped (Gemini). - Remove unused execution_mode parameter from execute_transport_packet (Gemini). - Sync stale regex comment in worker_node_template.py with the current action pattern (dots/underscores already allowed in schema + model) (Gemini/Codex). Note: the two "explicit vs implicit return" code-quality bot findings on the old execute/relay route bodies were already resolved by the earlier _handle_transport_request extraction (single try/except with a NoReturn raise_http_exception on every non-success path). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
…ngress Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> # Conflicts: # src/constellation_node_sdk/runtime/app.py
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1 participant
Summary
Adds Gate-mediation provenance enforcement to the node runtime so worker
nodes only accept packets resolved and routed by the Gate, and reject
external/peer traffic that targets a node directly. Also adds a Gate-authored
relay route. This is the SDK-side companion to the L9-Node-Template Gate
integration layer.
RoutingProvenance.route_kind(external_ingress|gate_relay) with validation; reflect inTRANSPORT_PACKET_SPEC.mdand the JSON schema (on top of the existing hardened schema).validate_execute_ingress_packetandvalidate_relay_ingress_packetGate-mediation validators, exported fromruntime.POST /v1/execute; addPOST /v1/relayfor Gate-authored relay dispatch.enforce_gate_only_ingress+ relay-route toggles.execution_modethrough the execution path.Test plan
python3 scripts/validate_contracts.py— all checks pass (schema parity + provenance enum constraints)PYTHONPATH=src pytest tests -q— 83 passedorigin/main; schema change is the minimalroute_kindaddition layered on the existing hardened schema (no revert of prior hardening)Made with Cursor
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
New Features
/v1/relayendpoint for gate-mediated packet routingroute_kindfield to distinguish between external client ingress and internal relay trafficImprovements