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32 changes: 28 additions & 4 deletions packages/web/src/middleware/rateLimiter.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -18,10 +18,34 @@ export function rateLimiter(req, res, next) {
return next();
}

// Identity: prefer API key, fall back to IP
const identity = req.headers.authorization?.slice(7)?.trim()
|| req.ip
|| "unknown";
// Identity: a properly formed Bearer token, else the request IP. The
// recognition is EXACTLY apiKeyAuth's ("Bearer " prefix, case-sensitive,
// single space): anything looser re-opens the rotation bypass (e.g.
// "Bearer\t<rotating>" or "bearer <rotating>" are NOT Bearer for auth,
// so they must not mint limiter buckets either). Reproduced end-to-end
// in rate-limiter-behavior.test.js; remediation pinned in
// rate-limiter-identity.test.js.
//
// PRE-AUTHENTICATION ENDPOINTS are the exception: the limiter runs before
// authentication, so a syntactically valid Bearer token has NOT been
// validated at this point. On endpoints that authenticate by OTHER means
// (the login route validates the request-body password), an
// unauthenticated caller can rotate random Bearer values to mint a fresh
// bucket per password-guess. Those endpoints always key on the request
// IP — an unverified token must never become their throttle identity.
// The match tolerates trailing slashes and case because Express's default
// non-strict, case-insensitive-to-route routing serves those variants to
// the same handler; an exact-equality list would re-open the mint on
// '/api/auth/login/'.
const isPreAuthPath = (path) =>
typeof path === "string" && /^\/api\/auth\/login\/?$/i.test(path);

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[LOW] Hardcoded pre-auth path regex silently re-opens the bucket-mint bypass for any future public endpoint

The fix correctly special-cases /api/auth/login, but the mechanism is a string allowlist in the limiter that must be kept in lockstep with auth.js's set of unguarded routes. The bypass exists on ANY endpoint where an unauthenticated caller can reach real handler work while sending an arbitrary Bearer value (register, refresh, password-reset request, logout, etc.). If a new public route is added to auth.js and someone forgets to extend this regex, per-token bucket minting silently re-opens with no failing test to catch it, because the identity suite only pins the login path. Suggested hardening: export the public/pre-auth path list (or a shared matcher) from the auth module and have both apiKeyAuth's skip logic and the limiter consume the same source of truth, plus an identity-suite test that iterates that shared list so new entries are automatically covered.

const useIpIdentity = isPreAuthPath(req.path);

const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
const bearerToken = !useIpIdentity && typeof authHeader === "string" && authHeader.startsWith("Bearer ")
? authHeader.slice(7).trim()
: "";
const identity = bearerToken || req.ip || "unknown";

const key = `ratelimit:${identity}`;

Expand Down
68 changes: 17 additions & 51 deletions packages/web/tests/unit/rate-limiter-behavior.test.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -157,67 +157,33 @@ describe("rate limiter behavior (Unit C — existing semantics pinned)", () => {
});
});

describe("REPRODUCER (known defect, recorded not fixed): non-Bearer Authorization headers split rate buckets under session auth", () => {
// The limiter identity is `req.headers.authorization?.slice(7)?.trim() || req.ip`
// — the scheme is never checked. apiKeyAuth accepts a VALID SESSION COOKIE
// when the Authorization header is absent or not Bearer. Chained as in
// production (limiter before auth), a session-authenticated caller rotates
// arbitrary non-Bearer Authorization values to get a fresh bucket per
// request. This documents the bypass end-to-end with the REAL apiKeyAuth;
// the fix is a separate production decision per the #425 review.

describe('REPRODUCER HISTORY (bypass FIXED by rate-limiter-identity remediation on this branch)', () => {
// The original end-to-end reproducer (130 rotating Basic headers from one
// session, all passing, 130 distinct buckets) documented the identity
// defect that the Bearer-only derivation now closes. Full fixed-scenario
// coverage lives in rate-limiter-identity.test.js; here we assert the
// original attack no longer reproduces against the CURRENT middleware.
function buildApp() {
const app = express();
app.use(rateLimiter);
app.use(apiKeyAuth);
app.get("/api/anything", (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
app.get('/api/anything', (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
return app;
}

it("END-TO-END: 130 requests from ONE session, rotating Basic headers, all pass — the per-IP fallback they should have shared never applies", async () => {
it('the original rotation attack now throttles: 121st request is 429 on ONE shared bucket', async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
const sessionCookie = 'gitwire-session=valid-session';
let last = 200;
for (let i = 0; i < 130; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Authorization", `Basic rotating-value-${i}`) // arbitrary non-Bearer
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
.get('/api/anything')
.set('Authorization', "Basic rotating-value-" + i)
.set('Cookie', sessionCookie);
last = res.status;
if (res.status === 429) break;
}
// 130 DISTINCT buckets were created — one per rotated header value —
// while the SAME session authenticated every request. Without the
// rotating header, all 130 would share the IP bucket and the last 10
// would have been 429'd.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(130);
expect([...redisState.counts.values()].every((n) => n === 1)).toBe(true);
});

it("CONTROL: the SAME session WITHOUT the header trick throttles at 120/min on the shared IP bucket", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
for (let i = 0; i < 120; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
// The 121st request on the shared IP bucket is the exact boundary the
// rotation bypasses — pinned, not "somewhere within 130".
const boundary = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
expect(boundary.status).toBe(429);
});

it("MECHANISM: the limiter bucket key derives from the raw sliced header, scheme unchecked", async () => {
const a = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Basic value-1" }, ip: "10.9.9.9" });
const b = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Basic value-2" }, ip: "10.9.9.9" });
expect(a.passed).toBe(true);
expect(b.passed).toBe(true);
// Two buckets for one IP — the sliced values differ even though neither
// is a credential.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(2);
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("alue-1"); // slice(7) of "Basic value-1"
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("alue-2");
expect(last).toBe(429);
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1); // the IP bucket, not per-header buckets
});
});
230 changes: 230 additions & 0 deletions packages/web/tests/unit/rate-limiter-identity.test.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
// tests/unit/rate-limiter-identity.test.js
// Production remediation for the identity bypass reproduced in
// rate-limiter-behavior.test.js: limiter identity now recognizes ONLY a
// properly formed Bearer scheme; every other Authorization form (and its
// absence) falls back to the request IP — so rotating non-Bearer headers can
// no longer mint fresh buckets for a session-authenticated caller.
//
// The behavior pins (threshold, exclusions, fail-open) live in the behavior
// suite against the same middleware; this suite proves the identity contract
// change end-to-end and in the middleware directly.

import { jest } from "@jest/globals";

const redisState = { counts: new Map(), failWith: null };

jest.unstable_mockModule("../../src/lib/queue.js", () => ({
redis: {
incr: jest.fn(async (key) => {
if (redisState.failWith) throw redisState.failWith;
const next = (redisState.counts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1;
redisState.counts.set(key, next);
return next;
}),
pexpire: jest.fn(async () => 1),
get: jest.fn(async (key) => {
if (key.startsWith("gitwire:session:")) {
return key.endsWith(":valid-session") ? JSON.stringify({ principal: "session-user" }) : null;
}
return null;
}),
expire: jest.fn(async () => 1),
},
}));
jest.unstable_mockModule("../../src/lib/logger.js", () => ({
logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.unstable_mockModule("../../config/index.js", () => ({
config: { anthropic: { apiKey: "test" }, github: { appId: "1", privateKey: "k", clientId: "x", clientSecret: "x", webhookSecret: "s" }, server: { baseUrl: "x" } },
}));

process.env.API_KEY = "unit-test-api-key";

const { rateLimiter } = await import("../../src/middleware/rateLimiter.js");
const { apiKeyAuth } = await import("../../src/middleware/auth.js");

const express = (await import("express")).default;
const supertest = (await import("supertest")).default;

function buildApp() {
// Production mount order: limiter BEFORE authentication.
const app = express();
app.use(rateLimiter);
app.use(apiKeyAuth);
app.get("/api/anything", (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
return app;
}

beforeEach(() => {
redisState.counts.clear();
redisState.failWith = null;
jest.clearAllMocks();
});

describe("REMEDIATION: rotating non-Bearer headers can no longer split buckets", () => {
it("THE REPRODUCER SCENARIO, FIXED: 130 requests from one session with rotating Basic headers hit 429 at request 121", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
let last = 200;
for (let i = 0; i < 130; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Authorization", `Basic rotating-value-${i}`)
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
if (i < 120) {
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
last = res.status;
if (res.status === 429) break;
}
expect(last).toBe(429);
// ONE shared bucket (the request IP), not 130.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1);
expect([...redisState.counts.values()][0]).toBe(121);
});

it("header-absent session traffic shares the same IP bucket (unchanged semantics)", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
let saw429 = false;
for (let i = 0; i < 121; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app).get("/api/anything").set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
if (res.status === 429) { saw429 = true; break; }
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
expect(saw429).toBe(true);
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1);
});
});

describe('PRE-AUTH FIX: rotating invalid Bearer tokens on /api/auth/login shares ONE IP bucket', () => {
// The limiter runs before authentication, so it cannot know a Bearer token
// is invalid. The login route authenticates by request-body password — an
// unauthenticated caller rotating syntactically-valid-but-random Bearer
// values would otherwise mint a fresh bucket per password guess.
function buildLoginApp() {
const app = express();
app.use(rateLimiter);
app.use(express.json());
// Minimal login route mirroring auth.js: 401 on wrong password.
app.post('/api/auth/login', (req, res) => res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid password' }));
return app;
}

it('END-TO-END: 130 login attempts with ROTATING random Bearer tokens hit 429 at request 121 on ONE shared bucket', async () => {
const app = buildLoginApp();
let last = 200;
for (let i = 0; i < 130; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.post('/api/auth/login')
.set('Authorization', "Bearer random-guess-token-" + i)
.send({ password: 'wrong-' + i });
if (i < 120) {
expect(res.status).toBe(401); // still reaches the route and fails auth
}
last = res.status;
if (res.status === 429) break;
}
expect(last).toBe(429);
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1); // ONE shared IP bucket
expect([...redisState.counts.values()][0]).toBe(121);
});

it('login attempts WITHOUT Bearer headers share the same single bucket (unchanged semantics)', async () => {
const app = buildLoginApp();
let saw429 = false;
for (let i = 0; i < 121; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.post('/api/auth/login')
.send({ password: 'wrong' });
if (res.status === 429) { saw429 = true; break; }
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
}
expect(saw429).toBe(true);
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1);
});

it('TRAILING-SLASH and case variants of the login path are ALSO IP-keyed (no mint on /api/auth/login/)', async () => {
const app = buildLoginApp();
const variants = ["/api/auth/login/", "/API/AUTH/LOGIN", "/api/auth/Login/"];
for (const path of variants) {
redisState.counts.clear();
await supertest(app)
.post(path)
.set("Authorization", "Bearer slash-variant-token")
.send({ password: "wrong" });
// Whatever the route did with the variant (401 or 404), the limiter
// bucket must be the IP — never the token.
const keys = [...redisState.counts.keys()];
expect(keys.length).toBe(1);
expect(keys[0]).not.toContain("slash-variant-token");
}
});

it('NON-login /api paths still derive identity from a well-formed Bearer token', async () => {
const app = buildLoginApp();
app.get('/api/anything', (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
const res = await supertest(app)
.get('/api/anything')
.set('Authorization', 'Bearer some-token');
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join('|')).toContain('some-token');
});
});

describe("identity derivation contract (middleware-level)", () => {
function runMiddleware({ headers = {}, ip } = {}) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const req = { path: "/api/anything", headers, ip, get: (h) => headers[h.toLowerCase()] };
const res = {
statusCode: 200,
headers: {},
setHeader(k, v) { this.headers[k] = v; },
status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
json(body) { this.body = body; resolve({ res, passed: false }); return this; },
};
rateLimiter(req, res, () => resolve({ res, passed: true }));
});
}

it('a well-formed case-sensitive "Bearer " scheme token IS the identity (exactly apiKeyAuth recognition)', async () => {
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-one" }, ip: "10.0.0.1" });
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-two" }, ip: "10.0.0.1" });
// Two distinct buckets for two distinct tokens from one IP.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(2);
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("key-one");
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("key-two");
// A LOWERCASE scheme is not Bearer for apiKeyAuth (starts-with "Bearer "),
// so it must not be Bearer for the limiter either — it falls to the IP.
redisState.counts.clear();

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[LOW] 'Exactly apiKeyAuth recognition' parity is asserted in comments but never pinned; suite itself hedges on the scheme regex

The whole security argument rests on the limiter's startsWith("Bearer ") matching apiKeyAuth's scheme recognition exactly, yet no test drives a token through the REAL apiKeyAuth to confirm agreement on the malformed variants. Worse, the identity suite's own it.each comment is self-contradictory: "Bearer\tgap-token" // malformed: tab not matched by \\s+? (regex ^Bearer\\s+ — tab IS \\s; assert below) — acknowledging that IF auth.js uses /^Bearer\s+/, tab-separated headers WOULD authenticate while the limiter IP-keys them, making the 'exactly apiKeyAuth' invariant comment in rateLimiter.js false. The failure direction is safe (under-keying to the shared IP bucket, no bypass), which is why this is not a bug, but the invariant is load-bearing and should be pinned: add one end-to-end case per malformed variant (lowercase scheme, tab separator, empty token) through the real apiKeyAuth asserting both the auth outcome and the limiter bucket key agree.

await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "bearer key-lower" }, ip: "10.0.0.2" });
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()]).toEqual(["ratelimit:10.0.0.2"]);
});

it.each([
["Basic value-1"],
["basic value-2"],
["Bearer"], // malformed: no token after scheme
["Bearer "], // malformed: whitespace only
["Bearer\tgap-token"], // malformed: tab not matched by \\s+? (regex ^Bearer\\s+ — tab IS \\s; assert below)
[""], // empty header value
])("non-Bearer or malformed header %j falls back to the IP bucket", async (authorization) => {
redisState.counts.clear();
const first = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization }, ip: "10.1.1.1" });
expect(first.passed).toBe(true);
// Whatever the header said, the bucket is the IP.
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()]).toEqual(["ratelimit:10.1.1.1"]);
});

it("Bearer-key separation still works at the threshold: key A saturates, key B unaffected, IP unaffected", async () => {
for (let i = 0; i < 120; i += 1) {
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-sat" }, ip: "10.2.2.2" });
}
const saturated = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-sat" }, ip: "10.2.2.2" });
expect(saturated.passed).toBe(false);
const otherKey = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-other" }, ip: "10.2.2.2" });
expect(otherKey.passed).toBe(true);
const plainIp = await runMiddleware({ ip: "10.2.2.2" });
expect(plainIp.passed).toBe(true);
});
});
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