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16 changes: 12 additions & 4 deletions packages/web/src/middleware/rateLimiter.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -18,10 +18,18 @@ export function rateLimiter(req, res, next) {
return next();
}

// Identity: prefer API key, fall back to IP
const identity = req.headers.authorization?.slice(7)?.trim()
|| req.ip
|| "unknown";
// Identity: a properly formed Bearer token, else the request IP. The
// recognition is EXACTLY apiKeyAuth's ("Bearer " prefix, case-sensitive,
// single space): anything looser re-opens the rotation bypass (e.g.
// "Bearer\t<rotating>" or "bearer <rotating>" are NOT Bearer for auth,
// so they must not mint limiter buckets either). Reproduced end-to-end
// in rate-limiter-behavior.test.js; remediation pinned in
// rate-limiter-identity.test.js.
const authHeader = req.headers.authorization;
const bearerToken = typeof authHeader === "string" && authHeader.startsWith("Bearer ")
? authHeader.slice(7).trim()
Comment on lines +29 to +30

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P1 Badge Keep unauthenticated Bearer values in the IP bucket

When requests target a pre-authentication route such as POST /api/auth/login, a caller can attach a fresh Authorization: Bearer <random> value to every password guess. app.js mounts rateLimiter before authRouter (lines 84–87), while the login handler only validates the body password (routes/auth.js lines 41–48), so each unauthenticated token creates a new Redis bucket and bypasses the intended 120-request limit. Only authenticated API keys should receive token-specific buckets; anonymous and pre-authentication traffic must remain keyed by IP.

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: "";
const identity = bearerToken || req.ip || "unknown";

const key = `ratelimit:${identity}`;

Expand Down
68 changes: 17 additions & 51 deletions packages/web/tests/unit/rate-limiter-behavior.test.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -157,67 +157,33 @@ describe("rate limiter behavior (Unit C — existing semantics pinned)", () => {
});
});

describe("REPRODUCER (known defect, recorded not fixed): non-Bearer Authorization headers split rate buckets under session auth", () => {
// The limiter identity is `req.headers.authorization?.slice(7)?.trim() || req.ip`
// — the scheme is never checked. apiKeyAuth accepts a VALID SESSION COOKIE
// when the Authorization header is absent or not Bearer. Chained as in
// production (limiter before auth), a session-authenticated caller rotates
// arbitrary non-Bearer Authorization values to get a fresh bucket per
// request. This documents the bypass end-to-end with the REAL apiKeyAuth;
// the fix is a separate production decision per the #425 review.

describe('REPRODUCER HISTORY (bypass FIXED by rate-limiter-identity remediation on this branch)', () => {
// The original end-to-end reproducer (130 rotating Basic headers from one
// session, all passing, 130 distinct buckets) documented the identity
// defect that the Bearer-only derivation now closes. Full fixed-scenario
// coverage lives in rate-limiter-identity.test.js; here we assert the
// original attack no longer reproduces against the CURRENT middleware.
function buildApp() {
const app = express();
app.use(rateLimiter);
app.use(apiKeyAuth);
app.get("/api/anything", (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
app.get('/api/anything', (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
return app;
}

it("END-TO-END: 130 requests from ONE session, rotating Basic headers, all pass — the per-IP fallback they should have shared never applies", async () => {
it('the original rotation attack now throttles: 121st request is 429 on ONE shared bucket', async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
const sessionCookie = 'gitwire-session=valid-session';
let last = 200;
for (let i = 0; i < 130; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Authorization", `Basic rotating-value-${i}`) // arbitrary non-Bearer
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
.get('/api/anything')
.set('Authorization', "Basic rotating-value-" + i)
.set('Cookie', sessionCookie);
last = res.status;
if (res.status === 429) break;
}
// 130 DISTINCT buckets were created — one per rotated header value —
// while the SAME session authenticated every request. Without the
// rotating header, all 130 would share the IP bucket and the last 10
// would have been 429'd.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(130);
expect([...redisState.counts.values()].every((n) => n === 1)).toBe(true);
});

it("CONTROL: the SAME session WITHOUT the header trick throttles at 120/min on the shared IP bucket", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
for (let i = 0; i < 120; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
// The 121st request on the shared IP bucket is the exact boundary the
// rotation bypasses — pinned, not "somewhere within 130".
const boundary = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
expect(boundary.status).toBe(429);
});

it("MECHANISM: the limiter bucket key derives from the raw sliced header, scheme unchecked", async () => {
const a = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Basic value-1" }, ip: "10.9.9.9" });
const b = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Basic value-2" }, ip: "10.9.9.9" });
expect(a.passed).toBe(true);
expect(b.passed).toBe(true);
// Two buckets for one IP — the sliced values differ even though neither
// is a credential.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(2);
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("alue-1"); // slice(7) of "Basic value-1"
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("alue-2");
expect(last).toBe(429);
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1); // the IP bucket, not per-header buckets
});
});
155 changes: 155 additions & 0 deletions packages/web/tests/unit/rate-limiter-identity.test.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
// tests/unit/rate-limiter-identity.test.js
// Production remediation for the identity bypass reproduced in
// rate-limiter-behavior.test.js: limiter identity now recognizes ONLY a
// properly formed Bearer scheme; every other Authorization form (and its
// absence) falls back to the request IP — so rotating non-Bearer headers can
// no longer mint fresh buckets for a session-authenticated caller.
//
// The behavior pins (threshold, exclusions, fail-open) live in the behavior
// suite against the same middleware; this suite proves the identity contract
// change end-to-end and in the middleware directly.

import { jest } from "@jest/globals";

const redisState = { counts: new Map(), failWith: null };

jest.unstable_mockModule("../../src/lib/queue.js", () => ({
redis: {
incr: jest.fn(async (key) => {
if (redisState.failWith) throw redisState.failWith;
const next = (redisState.counts.get(key) ?? 0) + 1;
redisState.counts.set(key, next);
return next;
}),
pexpire: jest.fn(async () => 1),
get: jest.fn(async (key) => {
if (key.startsWith("gitwire:session:")) {
return key.endsWith(":valid-session") ? JSON.stringify({ principal: "session-user" }) : null;
}
return null;
}),
expire: jest.fn(async () => 1),
},
}));
jest.unstable_mockModule("../../src/lib/logger.js", () => ({
logger: { info: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), error: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() },
}));
jest.unstable_mockModule("../../config/index.js", () => ({
config: { anthropic: { apiKey: "test" }, github: { appId: "1", privateKey: "k", clientId: "x", clientSecret: "x", webhookSecret: "s" }, server: { baseUrl: "x" } },
}));

process.env.API_KEY = "unit-test-api-key";

const { rateLimiter } = await import("../../src/middleware/rateLimiter.js");
const { apiKeyAuth } = await import("../../src/middleware/auth.js");

const express = (await import("express")).default;
const supertest = (await import("supertest")).default;

function buildApp() {
// Production mount order: limiter BEFORE authentication.
const app = express();
app.use(rateLimiter);
app.use(apiKeyAuth);
app.get("/api/anything", (req, res) => res.json({ ok: true }));
return app;
}

beforeEach(() => {
redisState.counts.clear();
redisState.failWith = null;
jest.clearAllMocks();
});

describe("REMEDIATION: rotating non-Bearer headers can no longer split buckets", () => {
it("THE REPRODUCER SCENARIO, FIXED: 130 requests from one session with rotating Basic headers hit 429 at request 121", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
let last = 200;
for (let i = 0; i < 130; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app)
.get("/api/anything")
.set("Authorization", `Basic rotating-value-${i}`)
.set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
if (i < 120) {
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
last = res.status;
if (res.status === 429) break;
}
expect(last).toBe(429);
// ONE shared bucket (the request IP), not 130.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1);
expect([...redisState.counts.values()][0]).toBe(121);
});

it("header-absent session traffic shares the same IP bucket (unchanged semantics)", async () => {
const app = buildApp();
const sessionCookie = "gitwire-session=valid-session";
let saw429 = false;
for (let i = 0; i < 121; i += 1) {
const res = await supertest(app).get("/api/anything").set("Cookie", sessionCookie);
if (res.status === 429) { saw429 = true; break; }
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
}
expect(saw429).toBe(true);
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(1);
});
});

describe("identity derivation contract (middleware-level)", () => {
function runMiddleware({ headers = {}, ip } = {}) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const req = { path: "/api/anything", headers, ip, get: (h) => headers[h.toLowerCase()] };
const res = {
statusCode: 200,
headers: {},
setHeader(k, v) { this.headers[k] = v; },
status(code) { this.statusCode = code; return this; },
json(body) { this.body = body; resolve({ res, passed: false }); return this; },
};

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[LOW] Identity-suite test title and stale comment contradict the (correct) case-sensitive assertions

In rate-limiter-identity.test.js, the test titled "a well-formed Bearer token IS the identity (case-insensitive scheme)" asserts the opposite of its title: it explicitly verifies that lowercase "bearer key-lower" falls back to the IP bucket (i.e., scheme matching is case-sensitive). Since exact recognition is the load-bearing contract of this PR, a title claiming "case-insensitive" could mislead future maintainers into believing lowercase-Bearer forms mint token buckets — precisely the residual vector this remediation closes. Relatedly, the it.each comment for "Bearer\tgap-token" ("tab not matched by \s+? (regex ^Bearer\s+ — tab IS \s; assert below)") references the abandoned draft regex and is self-contradictory; the assertions themselves are correct against the shipped startsWith("Bearer ") logic. Suggested fix: retitle to e.g. "a well-formed Bearer token IS the identity (scheme matching is case-sensitive)" and replace the stale comment with "tab after scheme is not matched by startsWith("Bearer ")". Documentation-only; no runtime impact.

rateLimiter(req, res, () => resolve({ res, passed: true }));
});
}

it("a well-formed Bearer token IS the identity (case-insensitive scheme)", async () => {
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-one" }, ip: "10.0.0.1" });
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-two" }, ip: "10.0.0.1" });
// Two distinct buckets for two distinct tokens from one IP.
expect(redisState.counts.size).toBe(2);
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("key-one");
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()].join("|")).toContain("key-two");
// A LOWERCASE scheme is not Bearer for apiKeyAuth (starts-with "Bearer "),
// so it must not be Bearer for the limiter either — it falls to the IP.
redisState.counts.clear();
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "bearer key-lower" }, ip: "10.0.0.2" });
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()]).toEqual(["ratelimit:10.0.0.2"]);
});

it.each([
["Basic value-1"],
["basic value-2"],
["Bearer"], // malformed: no token after scheme
["Bearer "], // malformed: whitespace only
["Bearer\tgap-token"], // malformed: tab not matched by \\s+? (regex ^Bearer\\s+ — tab IS \\s; assert below)
[""], // empty header value
])("non-Bearer or malformed header %j falls back to the IP bucket", async (authorization) => {
redisState.counts.clear();
const first = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization }, ip: "10.1.1.1" });
expect(first.passed).toBe(true);
// Whatever the header said, the bucket is the IP.
expect([...redisState.counts.keys()]).toEqual(["ratelimit:10.1.1.1"]);
});

it("Bearer-key separation still works at the threshold: key A saturates, key B unaffected, IP unaffected", async () => {
for (let i = 0; i < 120; i += 1) {
await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-sat" }, ip: "10.2.2.2" });
}
const saturated = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-sat" }, ip: "10.2.2.2" });
expect(saturated.passed).toBe(false);
const otherKey = await runMiddleware({ headers: { authorization: "Bearer key-other" }, ip: "10.2.2.2" });
expect(otherKey.passed).toBe(true);
const plainIp = await runMiddleware({ ip: "10.2.2.2" });
expect(plainIp.passed).toBe(true);
});
});
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