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…L_1) vulnerabilities Open Redirect (Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection): - LEVEL_5: harden the blacklist check against bypasses that rely on browsers normalizing the URL before navigation - embedded control/ whitespace characters hiding a leading "//", and backslashes standing in for forward slashes. - LEVEL_6/7: stop concatenating the untrusted value directly onto the trusted authority. The old 'authority + value' pattern let a value like '.evil.com' produce 'https://trusted.com.evil.com', which is an actual subdomain of evil.com, not a path under trusted.com. The value is now normalized into a same-origin path with exactly one leading slash and '@'/control characters stripped. - LEVEL_9/10: apply the same same-origin allow-list used for LEVEL_5 instead of unconditionally trusting the redirect target. IDOR (IDORVulnerability): - LEVEL_1: the requested id is now compared against the id embedded in the caller's signed token; a mismatch is rejected instead of returning any profile requested. - LEVEL_2: the profile lookup now always uses the id from the signed token, ignoring the separate attacker-controllable userId cookie. - LEVEL_3/4: the authorization role now always comes from the signed token's own role claim, ignoring the separate (plaintext / base64) role cookie that was previously trusted outright. JWT (JWTVulnerability): - LEVEL_1: the token to validate is now read from the Authorization header instead of a 'JWT' URL query parameter, so the credential no longer leaks into server access logs, browser history, or the Referer header of subsequent requests. Updated the LEVEL_1 front-end to match. Verified locally (WSL, Java 17, Gradle wrapper): - ./gradlew compileJava compileTestJava -> BUILD SUCCESSFUL - Targeted unit tests (IDORVulnerabilityTest, JWTVulnerabilityTest, Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjectionTest) -> BUILD SUCCESSFUL, no failures - Booted the app locally and exercised each fixed level over HTTP: every original exploit payload is now rejected/ignored while the legitimate (same-user / same-origin / header-based) flow still returns the expected data, with no regressions on adjacent unaffected levels (Open Redirect LEVEL_1-4/8/11, JWT LEVEL_2).
🏆 VulnerableApp — CTF Patch Score7 / 110 challenges patched
Commit: 🎉 Your result is on the leaderboard — see where you rank! 🏆 |
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Closing as part of a full stand-down of this CTF push. |
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Fixes 10 challenges:
Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjection).evil.combecomehttps://trusted.com.evil.com, an actual evil.com subdomain); the value is now normalized into a same-origin path with exactly one leading slash.IDORVulnerability)userId_level2cookie.JWTVulnerability)Authorizationheader instead of aJWTURL query parameter (credential no longer leaks into logs/history/Referer). Front-end updated to match.Local verification (WSL, Java 17, Gradle wrapper)
compileJava/compileTestJava: BUILD SUCCESSFULIDORVulnerabilityTest,JWTVulnerabilityTest,Http3xxStatusCodeBasedInjectionTest): BUILD SUCCESSFUL, no failuresbootRun) and exercised every fixed level over real HTTP requests:?JWT=query vector is now ignored;Authorizationheader path validates correctly and rejects invalid tokens (401)..evil.com) and bare external domains are all rejected/kept same-origin; legitimate same-origin/relative redirects still 302 correctly.🤖 Generated with Claude Code