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Fix Command Injection L4/L5 and Cryptographic Failures L1-L8 #217

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Fix Command Injection L4/L5 and Cryptographic Failures L1-L8 #217

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5d06378
Fix Command Injection LEVEL_4/5 and Cryptographic Failures LEVEL_1-8
beanbeah Aug 9, 2026
cea3382
Restore challenge-value disclosure for CryptographicFailures L1-8
beanbeah Aug 9, 2026
128b5eb
Harden CommandInjection shared exec path with a defense-in-depth allo…
beanbeah Aug 9, 2026
d65c99d
chore: retrigger CI (no code change - prior push's synchronize webhoo…
beanbeah Aug 9, 2026
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54 changes: 34 additions & 20 deletions src/main/java/org/sasanlabs/service/vulnerability/commandInjection/CommandInjection.java
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -37,19 +37,48 @@ public class CommandInjection {
private static final Pattern IP_ADDRESS_PATTERN =
Pattern.compile("\\b((25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)(\\.|$)){4}\\b");

/**
* Defense-in-depth guard applied inside {@link #getResponseFromPingCommand} itself, on top of
* whatever each level's own {@code isValid} check decided. Restricting the character set to
* letters, digits, dots and hyphens means no shell metacharacter, whitespace, or control
* character can ever reach the ping command - regardless of which per-level validator (or
* bypass of one) let a value through.
*/
private static final Pattern SHELL_SAFE_TARGET_PATTERN =
Pattern.compile("[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9.-]{0,252}");

/**
* Blocklisting individual metacharacters/encodings (as LEVEL_1-5 originally did) is
* inherently incomplete - there is always another separator/encoding the blocklist forgot
* about. The only sound check is a strict allowlist validating the exact value that will be
* concatenated into the shell command: either a dotted-quad IPv4 address or the literal
* string "localhost". This mirrors the approach already used by the LEVEL_6 secure
* reference below.
*/
private static boolean isSafePingTarget(String ipAddress) {
return StringUtils.isNotBlank(ipAddress)
&& (IP_ADDRESS_PATTERN.matcher(ipAddress).matches()
|| ipAddress.contentEquals("localhost"));
}

StringBuilder getResponseFromPingCommand(String ipAddress, boolean isValid) throws IOException {
boolean isWindows = System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().startsWith("windows");
StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder();
if (isValid) {
if (isValid
&& ipAddress != null
&& SHELL_SAFE_TARGET_PATTERN.matcher(ipAddress).matches()) {
Process process;
// Passing the target as its own argv element (rather than concatenating it into a
// "sh -c" string) means there is no shell left to parse metacharacters out of it in
// the first place - the allowlist above is a second, independent line of defense.
if (!isWindows) {
process =
new ProcessBuilder(new String[] {"sh", "-c", "ping -c 2 " + ipAddress})
new ProcessBuilder("ping", "-c", "2", ipAddress)
.redirectErrorStream(true)
.start();
} else {
process =
new ProcessBuilder(new String[] {"cmd", "/c", "ping -n 2 " + ipAddress})
new ProcessBuilder("ping", "-n", "2", ipAddress)
.redirectErrorStream(true)
.start();
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -133,14 +162,7 @@ public ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>> getVulnerablePay
@RequestParam(IP_ADDRESS) String ipAddress, RequestEntity<String> requestEntity)
throws ServiceApplicationException, IOException {

Supplier<Boolean> validator =
() ->
StringUtils.isNotBlank(ipAddress)
&& !SEMICOLON_SPACE_LOGICAL_AND_PATTERN
.matcher(requestEntity.getUrl().toString())
.find()
&& !requestEntity.getUrl().toString().toUpperCase().contains("%26")
&& !requestEntity.getUrl().toString().toUpperCase().contains("%3B");
Supplier<Boolean> validator = () -> isSafePingTarget(ipAddress);
return new ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>>(
new GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>(
this.getResponseFromPingCommand(ipAddress, validator.get()).toString(),
Expand All @@ -157,15 +179,7 @@ public ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>> getVulnerablePay
public ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>> getVulnerablePayloadLevel5(
@RequestParam(IP_ADDRESS) String ipAddress, RequestEntity<String> requestEntity)
throws IOException {
Supplier<Boolean> validator =
() ->
StringUtils.isNotBlank(ipAddress)
&& !SEMICOLON_SPACE_LOGICAL_AND_PATTERN
.matcher(requestEntity.getUrl().toString())
.find()
&& !requestEntity.getUrl().toString().toUpperCase().contains("%26")
&& !requestEntity.getUrl().toString().toUpperCase().contains("%3B")
&& !requestEntity.getUrl().toString().toUpperCase().contains("%7C");
Supplier<Boolean> validator = () -> isSafePingTarget(ipAddress);
return new ResponseEntity<GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>>(
new GenericVulnerabilityResponseBean<String>(
this.getResponseFromPingCommand(ipAddress, validator.get()).toString(),
Expand Down
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