NTLM-Analyzer runs with high privileges: the agent as a Windows service under LocalSystem, the collector with the logon data of a whole domain. Reports about weaknesses in either are very welcome.
Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private reporting instead: Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository.
Helpful to include:
- the affected part (agent, collector, installer, dashboard) and version
- what an attacker needs beforehand (network access, a local account, ...)
- steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept
You will get an answer within a week. Fixes are released as a new version with the issue described in its release notes once an update is available.
Only the latest release receives fixes. The agent reports its version to the collector, and the dashboard's machine list shows which machines run an older one.
- All agents share one API key. Anyone with administrator rights on a machine running the agent can read that key and send data in the name of any machine. That is a known limit of the design, not a vulnerability. The same key also lets a sender report SPN lookup results, but the collector only accepts them for names it handed out itself.
- The SPN check reads Active Directory and never writes to it. The
setspncommands in the dashboard are suggestions for an admin; nothing runs them. - The collector's dashboard is meant for an internal network behind TLS and a
password (
--cert,--tlskey,--password).