Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Use GitHub's private reporting on https://github.com/LyraVoid/ImageForge — Security → Report a vulnerability — which opens a draft advisory visible only to the maintainers. If you cannot use it, open a minimal issue saying that you have something to report privately and wait for a reply before writing any details.

Please include what you need to make the report actionable: the version or commit, the browser and platform, the steps, and the diagnostics export from the result page if the problem happened during a run (it contains the plan and the artifact names, but no image bytes and no secret).

• The application — anything that could make it produce a wrong image, leak an image or a secret, or run code that did not come from this repository. The interesting surfaces are the artifact registry (a payload is digest verified before it is used, and the digest is pinned in src/core/artifacts/catalog.ts and src/wasm/assets.ts), the parsers that read untrusted files and images, and the WebAssembly modules it loads.
• The bundled artifacts — if a payload in public/artifacts/ or public/wasm/ does not match the digest, revision and upstream release recorded in THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES/, that is a real bug and we want to know.
• A claim in the documentation that is not true — this project's documentation makes testable statements ("byte for byte the one the official app writes"). A false one is a defect, not a wording preference.

• A device that will not boot. Flashing is the user's decision and the project says so everywhere; questions about a specific device belong in the issue tracker, not here.
• Vulnerabilities in the upstream projects whose releases are bundled (Magisk, KernelSU, APatch, KernelPatch and their forks). They are redistributed unmodified as separate programs; report those upstream. Their payloads are data written into an image, not code this project executes.
• Root detection, safety-net and anti-cheat bypasses, or anything that tries to make a device hide that it is rooted. That is not what this tool is for.
• A manager app behaving badly. This project stops at the produced image.

• No server, no upload: parsing, patching and hashing happen in the browser, in a Web Worker.
• No eval, no new Function, no execution of anything supplied by a user.
• Every bundled payload is digest verified before use, and every one is registered with a pinned upstream revision and license in THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES/.
• Secrets (a superkey) never enter a plan, the metadata or the produced image; only its SHA-256 is written into the kernel.
• The diagnostics export never contains image bytes or the superkey.