voltage-verify is a verifier. The bugs that matter are the ones that make it accept evidence it should reject: a signature check that can be skipped, a commitment that can be recomputed without the hardware noticing, a policy claim that is read but not enforced, a collateral document accepted without its signature.

Write to contact@voltagegpu.com with the subject voltage-verify security. Include the bundle or the minimal input that triggers the behaviour, the version (voltage-verify --version) and what you expected. You will get a human answer within two working days, a fix or a documented limitation within thirty, and credit in the changelog if you want it.

Please do not open a public issue for a bypass before it is fixed.

In scope: everything under src/voltage_verify, the bundle format, the documented checks in docs/WHAT_IT_PROVES.md.

Out of scope: the security of Intel TDX or NVIDIA confidential computing themselves, the availability of Intel's PCS or NVIDIA's NRAS, and the attest command running on a machine that is already compromised at the hypervisor level (that is what the hardware proofs detect).

• Intel SGX Root CA, by SHA-256 fingerprint, shipped in the package (src/voltage_verify/data/intel_sgx_root_ca.pem).
• NVIDIA NRAS issuer https://nras.attestation.nvidia.com and its JWKS, fetched over TLS or embedded in the bundle at attestation time.
• Accepted JWT algorithms: ES384 and ES256 only. none, HMAC and RSA are rejected.