Matched advisory candidates (shard 34)

advisories/BREW-imap-backup-CVE-2026-63435.json

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
+  "id": "BREW-imap-backup-CVE-2026-63435",
+  "published": "2026-09-03T09:13:37Z",
+  "modified": "2026-09-03T09:13:37Z",
+  "upstream": [
+    "GHSA-mvxr-6m87-mv2q",
+    "CVE-2026-63435"
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
+        "name": "imap-backup",
+        "purl": "pkg:brew/imap-backup"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "ecosystem_specific": {
+        "fix": null,
+        "range_state": "affected",
+        "upstream_fixed_in": "2.9.1",
+        "resource": "mail",
+        "resource_purl": "pkg:gem/mail@2.7.1"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "source": "matched",
+    "strategy": "registry",
+    "confidence": "high",
+    "upstream_evidence": [
+      {
+        "strategy": "registry",
+        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
+        "name": "mail",
+        "subject_version": "2.7.1",
+        "key": "pkg:gem/mail@2.7.1",
+        "resource": "mail"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "summary": "Mail: Email address spoofing via malformed RFC 2047 encoded-words",
+  "details": "## Summary\n\nMail::Utilities.q_value_decode and Mail::Utilities.b_value_decode decoded only the first RFC 2047 encoded-word in a string and used an overly greedy pattern to match the charset token. A crafted, malformed encoded-word embedded in an address display name or local part could cause the decoded output to differ from what a human reviewer or downstream parser would expect, allowing an attacker to spoof the apparent sender/recipient address.\n\n## Details\n\nBoth decoders used a single String#match against a pattern such as /\\=\\?(.+)?\\?[Qq]\\?(.*)\\?\\=/m. Two problems:\n\n1. Single match, dropped remainder. Only the first =?charset?Q?...?= (or ?B?) word was decoded. Any additional encoded-words or surrounding text were not handled consistently, so the decoded result could silently omit or alter parts of the input.\n2. Greedy charset capture. (.+)? is greedy and matches across ? delimiters, so a malformed word could span more of the string than a strict RFC 2047 parse would, changing the boundary between \"encoded\" and \"literal\" text.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications using mail to parse and display or authorize based on decoded header values (From, To, Reply-To, etc.) may present or act on an address different from the one a validator inspecting the raw header would see. Primary risk is spoofing / phishing and authorization-check bypass. No RCE.",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V3",
+      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail/security/advisories/GHSA-mvxr-6m87-mv2q"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "ADVISORY",
+      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63435"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail/pull/1664"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail/commit/f9d59c2e447af42e2c3dec5a56b1bb25c7292859"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/mikel/mail/releases/tag/2.9.1"
+    }
+  ]
+}

advisories/BREW-pnpm@9-CVE-2026-82392.json

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
+  "id": "BREW-pnpm@9-CVE-2026-82392",
+  "published": "2026-09-03T09:52:47Z",
+  "modified": "2026-09-03T09:52:47Z",
+  "upstream": [
+    "GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5",
+    "CVE-2026-82392"
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
+        "name": "pnpm@9",
+        "purl": "pkg:brew/pnpm%409"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "ecosystem_specific": {
+        "fix": null,
+        "range_state": "affected",
+        "upstream_fixed_in": "10.34.5"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "source": "matched",
+    "strategy": "registry",
+    "confidence": "high",
+    "upstream_evidence": [
+      {
+        "strategy": "registry",
+        "ecosystem": "npm",
+        "name": "pnpm",
+        "subject_version": "9.15.9",
+        "key": "pkg:npm/pnpm@9.15.9"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "summary": "pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph",
+  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe virtual store linker constructs package installation directories using `path.join(modules, pkgName)` where `pkgName` is extracted from lockfile `packages` keys via `dp.parse(depPath).name` without validation. A crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` with traversal sequences in depPath keys (e.g., `../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0`) causes package content to be written to arbitrary filesystem paths during `pnpm install`.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv — the `safeJoinModulesDir` containment helper was applied to the hoisted linker and `symlinkDependency` but NOT to the virtual store linker's `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`dp.parse()` at `pnpm11/deps/path/src/index.ts:135` extracts the package name as:\n```typescript\nconst name = dependencyPath.substring(0, sepIndex)\n```\n\nThis is a raw substring operation with zero validation that `name` is a valid npm package name. A depPath of `../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0` yields `name = '../../../tmp/pwned'`.\n\n### Vulnerable Code Path\n\n1. `pnpm-lock.yaml` → `lockfile.packages['../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0']` (attacker-controlled lockfile key)\n2. `nameVerFromPkgSnapshot(depPath, pkgSnapshot)` at `lockfile/utils/src/nameVerFromPkgSnapshot.ts:16` → calls `dp.parse(depPath)` → returns `{ name: '../../../../../../../tmp/pwned' }`\n3. `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:232` → `modules = path.join(dirInVirtualStore, 'node_modules')`\n4. `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` → `dir = path.join(modules, pkgName)` → resolves to `/tmp/pwned` (ESCAPES virtual store)\n5. `storeController.importPackage(depNode.dir, ...)` → writes package content to the traversed path\n\n### Why Existing Defenses Don't Catch It\n\n- **`depPathToFilename()`** — replaces `/` with `+` for the `dirInVirtualStore` path, but `pkgName` comes SEPARATELY from `dp.parse()` and is NOT passed through this function\n- **`verifyLockfileResolutions()`** — validates dependency map keys (aliases) via `isValidDependencyAlias()`, but never validates the depPath keys themselves\n- **Lockfile parser** — `yaml.load(lockfileRawContent)` with no schema validation on `packages` keys\n- **`importPackage()`** — accepts `targetDir` and passes it directly to `cafsStore.importPackage(targetDir, ...)` with zero containment check\n- **Integrity verification** — requires a real fetchable package but does not validate the destination path\n\n### Escalation to RCE (non-default config)\n\nWhen `dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true` is configured (or the traversal package name is in the explicit `allowBuilds` list), the same traversed path is used in the rebuild phase at `after-install/src/index.ts:402,470`. The attacker's `postinstall` script then executes with the victim's shell access. Under default config, `allowBuild` returns false for unknown packages, limiting impact to arbitrary file write.\n\n### Also Affected (PnP linker)\n\nWhen `nodeLinker: pnp` is configured, `lockfileToPackageRegistry()` at `lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110` uses the same unvalidated `dp.parse().name` in `packageLocation` construction, allowing the `.pnp.cjs` resolver map to point outside the virtual store. This is a lower-impact variant (PnP is not the default linker).\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can commit a crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` to a repository (or supply one via a malicious package) can cause arbitrary file writes on the machine of any user who runs `pnpm install`. Written content is the actual package files from a real npm package (attacker controls which package and which destination).\n\nTargets for arbitrary file write include:\n- `.git/hooks/pre-commit` — code execution on next git operation\n- `~/.local/bin/` — binary hijacking\n- Project source files — supply chain injection\n\n## Reproduction\n\nCraft a `pnpm-lock.yaml`:\n```yaml\nlockfileVersion: '9.0'\npackages:\n  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0:\n    resolution: {integrity: sha512-<real-package-integrity>}\n    engines: {node: '>=14'}\nsnapshots:\n  ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0: {}\nimporters:\n  .:\n    dependencies:\n      legitimate-name:\n        specifier: ^1.0.0\n        version: ../../../../../../../tmp/pwned@1.0.0\n```\n\nRun `pnpm install` — package content is written to `/tmp/pwned/` instead of the virtual store.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply `safeJoinModulesDir` (or equivalent validation) at:\n- `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` — `path.join(modules, pkgName)`\n- `after-install/src/index.ts:402` — `path.join(pkgModulesDir(depPath), pkgInfo.name)`\n- `lockfile/to-pnp/src/index.ts:105-110` — PnP `packageLocation`\n\nAlternatively, validate depPath keys during lockfile parsing to reject any that don't produce valid npm package names via `dp.parse()`.\n\n## Relationship to GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv\n\nGHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv fixed the hoisted linker path (`lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222`) by adding `safeJoinModulesDir`. The same fix was NOT applied to the virtual store linker, which uses the identical `dp.parse().name → path.join()` pattern at `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`.",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V3",
+      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L"
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "ADVISORY",
+      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82392"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12890"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/78e29fe5583a1e5d69ea05e414eff310f78d5ed9"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.11.0"
+    }
+  ]
+}

advisories/BREW-pnpm@9-CVE-2026-82393.json

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
+  "id": "BREW-pnpm@9-CVE-2026-82393",
+  "published": "2026-09-03T09:52:47Z",
+  "modified": "2026-09-03T09:52:47Z",
+  "upstream": [
+    "GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m",
+    "CVE-2026-82393"
+  ],
+  "affected": [
+    {
+      "package": {
+        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
+        "name": "pnpm@9",
+        "purl": "pkg:brew/pnpm%409"
+      },
+      "ranges": [
+        {
+          "type": "ECOSYSTEM",
+          "events": [
+            {
+              "introduced": "0"
+            }
+          ]
+        }
+      ],
+      "ecosystem_specific": {
+        "fix": null,
+        "range_state": "affected",
+        "upstream_fixed_in": "10.34.5"
+      }
+    }
+  ],
+  "database_specific": {
+    "source": "matched",
+    "strategy": "registry",
+    "confidence": "high",
+    "upstream_evidence": [
+      {
+        "strategy": "registry",
+        "ecosystem": "npm",
+        "name": "pnpm",
+        "subject_version": "9.15.9",
+        "key": "pkg:npm/pnpm@9.15.9"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "summary": "pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install",
+  "details": "## Summary\nWhen resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved **manifest `name`** as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose `package.json` `name` is a scoped path traversal (`@x/../../…/<abs path>`) is therefore extracted **outside `node_modules`**, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can **overwrite existing files** there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → **code execution** (e.g. `~/.zshrc`, `.git/hooks/pre-commit`, another package's code). Occurs during `pnpm install` **even with `--ignore-scripts`** (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.\n\nSame class as the just-patched **GHSA-hwx4** (transitive-dependency *alias* traversal) and **GHSA-v23m** (`stage download` manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved **name**.\n\n## Root cause\n- The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw `path.join(modules, <resolved name>)` in `installing/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706`, `installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614`, and `deps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233` — **without** the `safeJoinModulesDir` guard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (`installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222`). The store location is `node_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>`, so a traversal `<name>` escapes.\n- The only resolve-time name gate (`resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753`) rejects only *unscoped* names containing `/`, so a **scoped** `@x/../..` passes.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\nSelf-contained PoC (real `pnpm@11.9.0`; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):\n```\nnpm i pnpm@11.9.0\n# host a tarball whose package.json name = \"@x/\"+\"../\".repeat(25)+\"<abs>/OUTSIDE\"; victim depends on the http URL\npnpm install --ignore-scripts\n```\nConfirmed output (`repro/poc.mjs`, exit 0):\n```\nescape dir is outside the project        : true\nnew file implanted outside node_modules  : true\npre-existing file OVERWRITTEN            : true\n*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***\n```\n\n## Remediation\nRoute the isolated-linker import-target joins (`resolvePeers.ts:706`, `deps-resolver/index.ts:614`, `lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233`) through `safeJoinModulesDir` (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce `validate-npm-package-name` on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at `pickPackage.ts:753`) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.",
+  "severity": [
+    {
+      "type": "CVSS_V3",
+      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"
+    }
+  ],
+  "references": [
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "ADVISORY",
+      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82393"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12872"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/pull/12890"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/51300fd41c5e4c8f47635108e373cc3d1f324fa7"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/78e29fe5583a1e5d69ea05e414eff310f78d5ed9"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "PACKAGE",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.34.5"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "WEB",
+      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v11.11.0"
+    }
+  ]
+}

advisories/BREW-psutils-CVE-2023-36464.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema_version": "1.7.3",
   "id": "BREW-psutils-CVE-2023-36464",
   "published": "2026-08-13T17:29:24Z",
-  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:29:24Z",
+  "modified": "2026-09-03T09:55:21Z",
   "upstream": [
     "GHSA-4vvm-4w3v-6mr8",
     "CVE-2023-36464",
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
         "range_state": "fixed",
         "upstream_fixed_in": "3.9.0",
         "resource": "pypdf",
-        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0"
+        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2"
       }
     }
   ],
@@ -47,16 +47,16 @@
         "strategy": "registry",
         "ecosystem": "PyPI",
         "name": "pypdf",
-        "subject_version": "6.15.0",
-        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0",
+        "subject_version": "6.16.2",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2",
         "resource": "pypdf"
       },
       {
         "strategy": "registry",
         "ecosystem": "PyPI",
         "name": "pypdf",
-        "subject_version": "6.15.0",
-        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0",
+        "subject_version": "6.16.2",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2",
         "resource": "pypdf"
       }
     ]

advisories/BREW-psutils-CVE-2023-46250.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema_version": "1.7.3",
   "id": "BREW-psutils-CVE-2023-46250",
   "published": "2026-08-13T17:29:24Z",
-  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:29:24Z",
+  "modified": "2026-09-03T09:55:21Z",
   "upstream": [
     "GHSA-wjcc-cq79-p63f",
     "CVE-2023-46250",
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
         "range_state": "fixed",
         "upstream_fixed_in": "3.17.0",
         "resource": "pypdf",
-        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0"
+        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2"
       }
     }
   ],
@@ -46,16 +46,16 @@
         "strategy": "registry",
         "ecosystem": "PyPI",
         "name": "pypdf",
-        "subject_version": "6.15.0",
-        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0",
+        "subject_version": "6.16.2",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2",
         "resource": "pypdf"
       },
       {
         "strategy": "registry",
         "ecosystem": "PyPI",
         "name": "pypdf",
-        "subject_version": "6.15.0",
-        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0",
+        "subject_version": "6.16.2",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2",
         "resource": "pypdf"
       }
     ]

advisories/BREW-psutils-CVE-2025-55197.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema_version": "1.7.3",
   "id": "BREW-psutils-CVE-2025-55197",
   "published": "2026-08-13T17:29:24Z",
-  "modified": "2026-08-13T17:29:24Z",
+  "modified": "2026-09-03T09:55:21Z",
   "upstream": [
     "GHSA-7hfw-26vp-jp8m",
     "CVE-2025-55197",
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
         "range_state": "fixed",
         "upstream_fixed_in": "6.0.0",
         "resource": "pypdf",
-        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0"
+        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2"
       }
     }
   ],
@@ -46,16 +46,16 @@
         "strategy": "registry",
         "ecosystem": "PyPI",
         "name": "pypdf",
-        "subject_version": "6.15.0",
-        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0",
+        "subject_version": "6.16.2",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2",
         "resource": "pypdf"
       },
       {
         "strategy": "registry",
         "ecosystem": "PyPI",
         "name": "pypdf",
-        "subject_version": "6.15.0",
-        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.15.0",
+        "subject_version": "6.16.2",
+        "key": "pkg:pypi/pypdf@6.16.2",
         "resource": "pypdf"
       }
     ]