| Version | Supported | Network |
|---|---|---|
main |
✅ | Sepolia + Base Sepolia + Solana Devnet |
| 0.1.x | ✅ | Testnet |
| < 0.1 | ❌ | — |
Mainnet (Base L2 + Solana mainnet-beta) is not yet deployed; see docs/launch-readiness.md for the gating checklist.
We take the security of the LOAR protocol seriously. If you believe you have found a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly.
DO NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
- Email: Send a detailed report to security@loar.fun
- Subject line:
[SECURITY] Brief description of the issue - Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact assessment
- Suggested fix (if any)
| Stage | Timeline |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | Within 48 hours |
| Initial assessment | Within 5 business days |
| Resolution target | Within 30 days for critical issues |
| Public disclosure | After fix is deployed + 30-day grace period |
We offer rewards for responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities based on severity:
| Severity | Reward Range | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $5,000 – $25,000 | Loss of funds, unauthorized minting, governance bypass, private key exposure |
| High | $2,000 – $5,000 | Unauthorized state changes, access control bypass, reentrancy in fund-handling contracts |
| Medium | $500 – $2,000 | DoS on critical paths, information disclosure, front-running vulnerabilities |
| Low | $100 – $500 | Non-critical DoS, incorrect event emission, gas optimization in critical paths |
In scope:
- EVM smart contracts in
apps/contracts/src/(69 contracts, including UUPS singletons + Beacon NFT proxies) - Anchor / Solana programs in
apps/programs/programs/(16 programs on devnet — universe, episode, payment, canon_market, licensing, staking, subscription, credit_manager, collab_manager, split_router, rights, fee_locker, bonding_curve, remix_fees, premium_actions) - Cross-chain bridge (custodial v1 + Wormhole NTT v2) — caps, idempotency, reconciliation
- Server-side authentication and authorization (
apps/server/src/) - SIWE session management + Circle DCW signing path (KMS-backed)
- BYOK provider keys store (
apps/server/src/services/provider-keys/) — encryption, key isolation, dispatcher routing - Payment and credit handling logic (reserve / reconcile primitives in
services/credit-reservation/) - Storage upload and retrieval paths (Pinata, Lighthouse, Firebase fallback) + CSAM moderation gate
- Cross-contract interactions and upgrade paths
- Outbound webhook HMAC signing
- MCP server tool surface (
apps/mcp/) — scope gates, rate limits
Out of scope:
- Third-party dependencies (report upstream)
- Issues requiring physical access
- Social engineering attacks
- Known issues listed in our audit findings (see
docs/audit-fix-tracker.md) - Frontend-only cosmetic issues
- Testnet deployments (unless the bug would affect mainnet)
- Issues reachable only with a stolen/compromised Circle DCW master key (assumed compromised = recovery scenario, not vuln)
- First reporter of a unique vulnerability
- Must not exploit the vulnerability beyond proof-of-concept
- Must not access or modify other users' data
- Must comply with applicable laws
- Must not be a current or recent (< 6 months) team member
We will not pursue legal action against researchers who:
- Act in good faith and follow this policy
- Avoid privacy violations, data destruction, and service disruption
- Report findings promptly and do not publicly disclose before resolution
- Do not exploit findings for personal gain beyond the bounty program
Our protocol uses:
- OpenZeppelin 5.0.2 upgradeable contracts (UUPS pattern for singletons, Beacon proxies for per-universe NFTs)
- Single EOA ownership (testnet) — Gnosis Safe multisig + TimelockController planned before mainnet (GOV-01 in the audit-fix tracker)
- Per-universe TimelockController governance (24h delay) for universe-level proposals
- Pull-payment pattern in PaymentRouter
- Custom errors over
requirestrings on 13+ low-churn contracts (gas + clearer revert reasons) - Storage-layout baselines committed at
apps/contracts/storage-layouts/baseline/; CI diffs every PR
Critical areas of interest (EVM):
- UUPS upgrade authorization paths
- TimelockController role management + factory-admin handoff
- PaymentRouter fee calculations and fund routing
- CreditManager balance manipulation
- Cross-contract call chains (RightsRegistry → PaymentRouter → Treasury)
- Voting and snapshot mechanisms in CanonMarketplace
- LaunchpadStaking reward accounting (sandwich resistance)
- ContentLicensing rights-check on bounty award path
Critical areas of interest (Solana):
- Anchor account validation + PDA seed integrity (especially
premium_actions, formerlyloar_burner— devnet program ID is preserved across the rename) - Custodial bridge
lock/mintpaths — per-tx caps, per-user caps, idempotency keys, balance prechecks - Cross-chain attestation Ed25519 verification (
/api/solana/attestation/key) - Squads multisig propose / approve / execute flow
- Token-2022
lock_loar_mintone-way mint disable - Reserve / reconcile credit accounting in
credit_managerparity with the EVM CreditManager
- Audit Fix Tracker — 157 findings across 9 review passes
- Bug Bounty (extended) — scope details, payout matrix, triage SLA
- External Audit Engagement — Code4rena/Sherlock playbook
- Security Audit Response 2026-04-22 — disposition of Lane 1–4 findings
- Launch Readiness Scorecard — operational + legal gates before mainnet