Skip to content

Security: EcosystemNetwork/loar

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Version Supported Network
main ✅ Sepolia + Base Sepolia + Solana Devnet
0.1.x ✅ Testnet
< 0.1 ❌ —

Mainnet (Base L2 + Solana mainnet-beta) is not yet deployed; see docs/launch-readiness.md for the gating checklist.

Reporting a Vulnerability

We take the security of the LOAR protocol seriously. If you believe you have found a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly.

How to Report

DO NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

  1. Email: Send a detailed report to security@loar.fun
  2. Subject line: [SECURITY] Brief description of the issue
  3. Include:
    • Description of the vulnerability
    • Steps to reproduce
    • Potential impact assessment
    • Suggested fix (if any)

Response Timeline

Stage Timeline
Acknowledgment Within 48 hours
Initial assessment Within 5 business days
Resolution target Within 30 days for critical issues
Public disclosure After fix is deployed + 30-day grace period

Bug Bounty Program

We offer rewards for responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities based on severity:

Severity Reward Range Examples
Critical $5,000 – $25,000 Loss of funds, unauthorized minting, governance bypass, private key exposure
High $2,000 – $5,000 Unauthorized state changes, access control bypass, reentrancy in fund-handling contracts
Medium $500 – $2,000 DoS on critical paths, information disclosure, front-running vulnerabilities
Low $100 – $500 Non-critical DoS, incorrect event emission, gas optimization in critical paths

Scope

In scope:

  • EVM smart contracts in apps/contracts/src/ (69 contracts, including UUPS singletons + Beacon NFT proxies)
  • Anchor / Solana programs in apps/programs/programs/ (16 programs on devnet — universe, episode, payment, canon_market, licensing, staking, subscription, credit_manager, collab_manager, split_router, rights, fee_locker, bonding_curve, remix_fees, premium_actions)
  • Cross-chain bridge (custodial v1 + Wormhole NTT v2) — caps, idempotency, reconciliation
  • Server-side authentication and authorization (apps/server/src/)
  • SIWE session management + Circle DCW signing path (KMS-backed)
  • BYOK provider keys store (apps/server/src/services/provider-keys/) — encryption, key isolation, dispatcher routing
  • Payment and credit handling logic (reserve / reconcile primitives in services/credit-reservation/)
  • Storage upload and retrieval paths (Pinata, Lighthouse, Firebase fallback) + CSAM moderation gate
  • Cross-contract interactions and upgrade paths
  • Outbound webhook HMAC signing
  • MCP server tool surface (apps/mcp/) — scope gates, rate limits

Out of scope:

  • Third-party dependencies (report upstream)
  • Issues requiring physical access
  • Social engineering attacks
  • Known issues listed in our audit findings (see docs/audit-fix-tracker.md)
  • Frontend-only cosmetic issues
  • Testnet deployments (unless the bug would affect mainnet)
  • Issues reachable only with a stolen/compromised Circle DCW master key (assumed compromised = recovery scenario, not vuln)

Eligibility

  • First reporter of a unique vulnerability
  • Must not exploit the vulnerability beyond proof-of-concept
  • Must not access or modify other users' data
  • Must comply with applicable laws
  • Must not be a current or recent (< 6 months) team member

Safe Harbor

We will not pursue legal action against researchers who:

  • Act in good faith and follow this policy
  • Avoid privacy violations, data destruction, and service disruption
  • Report findings promptly and do not publicly disclose before resolution
  • Do not exploit findings for personal gain beyond the bounty program

Smart Contract Specifics

Our protocol uses:

  • OpenZeppelin 5.0.2 upgradeable contracts (UUPS pattern for singletons, Beacon proxies for per-universe NFTs)
  • Single EOA ownership (testnet) — Gnosis Safe multisig + TimelockController planned before mainnet (GOV-01 in the audit-fix tracker)
  • Per-universe TimelockController governance (24h delay) for universe-level proposals
  • Pull-payment pattern in PaymentRouter
  • Custom errors over require strings on 13+ low-churn contracts (gas + clearer revert reasons)
  • Storage-layout baselines committed at apps/contracts/storage-layouts/baseline/; CI diffs every PR

Critical areas of interest (EVM):

  • UUPS upgrade authorization paths
  • TimelockController role management + factory-admin handoff
  • PaymentRouter fee calculations and fund routing
  • CreditManager balance manipulation
  • Cross-contract call chains (RightsRegistry → PaymentRouter → Treasury)
  • Voting and snapshot mechanisms in CanonMarketplace
  • LaunchpadStaking reward accounting (sandwich resistance)
  • ContentLicensing rights-check on bounty award path

Critical areas of interest (Solana):

  • Anchor account validation + PDA seed integrity (especially premium_actions, formerly loar_burner — devnet program ID is preserved across the rename)
  • Custodial bridge lock / mint paths — per-tx caps, per-user caps, idempotency keys, balance prechecks
  • Cross-chain attestation Ed25519 verification (/api/solana/attestation/key)
  • Squads multisig propose / approve / execute flow
  • Token-2022 lock_loar_mint one-way mint disable
  • Reserve / reconcile credit accounting in credit_manager parity with the EVM CreditManager

Related docs

There aren't any published security advisories