Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub security advisories: open https://github.com/DavidGodefroid/lockssh/security/advisories/new (the "Report a vulnerability" button on the repository's Security tab).
Do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a suspected vulnerability.
Please include:
- the lockssh version (
lockssh version: the launcher's and the image's) and your OS; - the SSH server's version, if relevant;
- the steps or input needed to reproduce the issue, and its impact.
Never include real credentials or real personal data in a report.
You will get an acknowledgement within a week. Fixes are released as soon as possible, and the advisory is published with credit to the reporter unless you ask otherwise.
The threat model is in docs/security-model.md. Issues of interest include, among others:
- a way for a client (CLI or MCP) to run a command no allow rule of the approved policy matches without a human's decision where the profile's auto rules require one, to run a decided ticket twice or with another argv, or to loosen the policy without confirmation;
- an agent that reports running unconfined served by a profile without
unconfined = true; - an argv that the server's shell reads as more than one simple command (quoting), or any way to open a PTY, a shell, a forward or a subsystem;
- the SSH key, a passphrase or a password reaching the agent's side, argv, the environment, a file outside the console's home, a log, the socket or an error message;
- an unknown or changed host key accepted without the human;
- unmasked personal data or a secret in a result where a detector should apply;
- client- or server-controlled text that can spoof the console's approval screen.
Attacks that require running code as the same OS user as the console are out of scope, as documented in the threat model.
scripts/install.sh and lockssh update check the cosign signatures of
checksums.txt and of the image ghcr.io/davidgodefroid/lockssh:X.Y.Z
against the release workflow run for that tag, then pin the launcher to the
verified image digest, unless cosign is absent and LOCKSSH_SKIP_COSIGN=1
is set (then only the archive checksum is checked, and the image runs by
its tag). To check the image by hand:
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity 'https://github.com/DavidGodefroid/lockssh/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
ghcr.io/davidgodefroid/lockssh:X.Y.ZOnly the latest release receives security fixes.