Let any AI agent investigate your logs: counts, patterns and traces come back
with emails, IPs and secrets masked, and a value in clear waits for you.
An agent (here Claude Code, left) and lox run (right, outside the agent): free calls come back masked, an unmask waits for you.
Quick start · How it works · Docs · Lock Family · locklog.dev
locklog is a Lock of the Lock Family, harness security for AI agents. A console held by a human reads your logs; the agent asks over MCP and gets masked, bounded, typed answers: counts, patterns, traces, lines around a hit.
Note
Pre-release (0.x releases). The console is started by lox run only,
from lockhub v0.10.0. See the install status.
- Masked before the model. Emails, IPs, card numbers, national ids and
the other values locklog detects become pseudonyms
(
⟦email:7F3KQ2M9ZD4X⟧); secrets become⟦secret⟧. - The agent never holds the logs. It never reads files, the Docker socket or a backend's credentials: the console does, in its own account and container.
- Approval outside the agent. Reads within budgets are free. A scan
beyond a budget or a value in clear is a ticket that waits for you in
lox run, and unmask is off by default on production. - Read-only. No write path to any log or backend, and every call is audited without the clear values locklog masks.
brew trust davidgodefroid/tap
brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamilyThat installs the Lock Family, locklog included. For locklog alone:
brew install davidgodefroid/tap/locklog davidgodefroid/tap/lox cosign
(lox add locklog and lox run need lox v0.12.0 or later), or the signed
install script, which installs the launcher:
curl -fsSL https://locklog.dev/install.sh | shA Linux host with the logs, Docker ≥ 19.03 and
cosign
v2.5.0 or later (lox add and lox run verify every image with it).
Status, the script read first, and production placement:
docs/install.md.
On a non-production profile first (a host agent runs on your own account, where it could still read the logs directly):
-
In your project, add the lock.
lox addbuilds a profile from the logs this host has (never a secret), wires your agent and checks the setup:cd ~/projects/shop lox add locklog
-
In a terminal of its own, outside any agent, keep
lox runopen. It starts the console, and every ticket shows up there:lox run
-
Start your agent in the project (
claude,codex,gemini, …) and ask: "when did the 502s start?"
lox add wires Claude Code; for another agent (Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI,
or one installed later), run locklog init <agent> (claude, codex,
cursor, gemini). On production, run the agent
in lea or in its own container
(docs/setup.md). The console
serves only agents that run confined, unless a non-production profile sets
unconfined = true
(docs/security-model.md).
|
🕶️ Masked by construction |
🔎 Investigation tools, not a query language |
|
⚖️ Free within budgets, approved beyond |
📚 Your sources |
More: the highlights in full and a comparison.
host (you)
lox run (lockhub): the hub and the decisions, in a terminal of its own
└─ console container uid 10051, no capability, read-only root,
read-only binds of the approved log directories,
pseudonym keys, index and audit in its own volume
agent (lea, your own container, or the host for the trial)
MCP server `locklog mcp` → the console's socket (peer uid checked by the kernel)
- The console reads the approved sources, and only those.
- Each call gets a byte plan from the time range and trusted selectors only; admission and stopping points never depend on what matched.
- Every record is masked first; then the agent's predicates run on the masked view.
- The answer leaves capped, as JSON under an "untrusted content" header.
Reads within budgets are free and audited. A scan beyond a budget, an
unmask or an approved lookup is a ticket at lox run; a profile's auto
rules (auto, ask, deny) decide which lox run may approve alone, and
the default asks you. The full layout, the decision table, the sources and
the masking benchmark: docs/architecture.md.
- The console is the enforcement point. It alone reads logs, holds credentials and pseudonym keys, and decides what leaves.
- OS separation. Only the clients group, the image's
agentand the uids you list reach the socket, never root; no Docker socket in any locklog container. - Approvals bound to the plan. Single use; an unmask re-reads the record and is refused if anything moved. Secrets are never unmasked.
- Preconditions. The agent must not reach the logs another way (P1),
agents of one uid are one trust domain (P2), and only the console holds
backend read credentials (P3).
locklog doctorchecks the usual ways P1 fails. - Known limits. locklog masks what it detects: person names (unless opted in), usernames in free text, postal addresses, private IPs and business ids are not. Pseudonymised data is still personal data under the GDPR.
Threat model, invariants, what is not masked and retention: docs/security-model.md. A company bounds every profile of a machine with the Lock Family's managed configuration (locklog's keys).
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| docs/install.md | status, Homebrew, install.sh, the host-agent trial, production placement |
| docs/setup.md | the launcher verbs: profile add, init <agent>, doctor, the own-container recipe |
| docs/usage.md | the profile file, the managed configuration, the agent's tools, budgets, lox run and its auto rules, the console, tickets |
| docs/architecture.md | process layout, the life of a call, who decides what, sources, masking benchmark |
| docs/security-model.md | what locklog protects and enforces, preconditions, masking pipeline, what is not masked, retention |
| docs/sources.md | journald, Docker and Podman: what the spikes measured |
| docs/loki.md | Loki 3's detected_level, a test Loki with past data |
| docs/performance.md | backend and masking throughput, and the defaults derived |
| docs/recipes/holmesgpt.md | HolmesGPT with locklog, in its own container |
| CHANGELOG.md | what changed, release by release |
The site, locklog.dev, is built from site/.
The demo is generated by python3 scripts/brand/demo.py > site/assets/demo.svg.
| Repo | What it does |
|---|---|
| lockfamily | The family site (lockfamily.dev) and the one-line installer. |
| locksql | SQL databases: the agent queries, PII comes back masked; connections and writes wait for you. |
| lockmq | RabbitMQ: masked queue inspection; connections, peeks and unmasked reads wait for you. |
| lockfile | Files (S3, SFTP, disk): the agent asks yes/no questions about files it never reads. |
| lockhttp | Outbound HTTP(S): reads of trusted hosts pass; anything that sends data or reaches an unknown host waits for you. |
| locklog | Logs: masked, bounded log search; the agent reads the logs, not the people in them. |
| lockssh | Commands over SSH: allow-listed commands run at once, the rest waits for you; the key never leaves the console. |
| lockhub | The approval hub and its lox CLI: lox run approves outside the agent's harness and never sees values in clear. |
| lockkit | The shared Go core of every Lock: console, policies, masking, signed tickets, audit, MCP. |
| lea | Runs many agents in containers, wired to the Locks. |
- Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md. Build with
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build ./cmd/locklog(Go 1.26+). - Security: report a vulnerability privately, see SECURITY.md.
- License: Apache License 2.0, see LICENSE and NOTICE.