LockHTTP is the proxy every outbound HTTP(S) request of an AI agent goes through. It runs in Docker: its policy console runs in a container of its own, under a separate account, which the agent cannot reach, and the human approves held requests on lockhub. A flaw in either is a security issue.
Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub security advisories: open https://github.com/DavidGodefroid/lockhttp/security/advisories/new (the "Report a vulnerability" button on the repository's Security tab).
Do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a suspected vulnerability.
Please include:
- the lockhttp version (
lockhttp version: the launcher's and the image's) and your OS and Docker version; - how the agent reaches the gate (container, HTTP client), if relevant;
- the steps or input needed to reproduce the issue, and its impact.
Never include real credentials, tokens, cookies or real personal data in a report.
You will get an acknowledgement within a week. Fixes are released as soon as possible, and the advisory is published with credit to the reporter unless you ask otherwise.
Issues of interest include, among others:
- a way for an agent to send a request out without going through the gate, or past the gate without the human's approval where the policy requires it;
- a request that sends data or triggers an action but is classified as a read, or a host that is treated as trusted when it is not;
- a way for an agent to loosen the policy without the human's confirmation, or to reach the console or its socket;
- a secret reaching argv, the environment, a file, a log, the socket or an error message;
- agent- or server-controlled text that can spoof the approval screen of a hub ticket (the request the gate shows on a lockhub facade) or the console's policy review;
- a decision that is not traced, or traced to the wrong container, agent or session.
Attacks that require running code as the console's OS account are out of scope.
No external review of lockhttp has been done yet. Reports of a review (scope, version or commit reviewed, method, findings, and what was not covered) are welcome in a public issue or a pull request, once any vulnerability found has been reported privately as above.
Each release's checksums.txt covers its archives, and is signed keylessly
by .github/workflows/release.yml run for the release's tag. Check the
signature against that workflow and a version tag, not any
workflow of the repository, then the file you downloaded against
checksums.txt:
cosign verify-blob --bundle checksums.txt.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/DavidGodefroid/lockhttp/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/tags/v[0-9]' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
sha256sum -c --ignore-missing checksums.txtThe launcher's lockhttp update runs a stricter check, with
--certificate-identity naming the workflow run for the very tag it
installs, and refuses to update without cosign (LOCKHTTP_SKIP_COSIGN=1
is its explicit way past it when cosign is not installed).
The release image, ghcr.io/davidgodefroid/lockhttp:X.Y.Z (amd64 and
arm64, one manifest), is signed with cosign, keylessly and by digest, by the
same workflow run for the release's tag. Lock Family's installer and
lockhttp update verify it and write its digest into the launcher
(image_digest=); the brew formula writes the digest the tap verified with
cosign when it was bumped. The launcher runs the image by that digest,
never by its tag. By hand:
cosign verify ghcr.io/davidgodefroid/lockhttp:X.Y.Z \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/DavidGodefroid/lockhttp/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/tags/v[0-9]' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.comThe docker-manifest-digest it prints is the digest to run
(ghcr.io/davidgodefroid/lockhttp@sha256:...), and the one lea pins for the
gate and the signer. With LOCKHTTP_SKIP_COSIGN=1 the image is not verified
and the launcher runs it by its tag.
The actions the workflows run are pinned to full commit SHAs, and the release job pins the versions of GoReleaser, cosign and syft.
Release tags are signed with a key published on the maintainer's GitHub profile (https://github.com/DavidGodefroid.gpg, or the SSH signing keys), and a tag can be checked before you build from it:
git verify-tag vX.Y.ZOnly the latest release receives security fixes. Before v1.0.0, a minor version may still change the policy format.