π‘οΈ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Add size safety limit for 3MF slice_info.config extraction - #128
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β¦ extraction Enforce a 10 MB safety limit check on slice_info.config within read_3mf_estimate to protect against memory exhaustion and Zip Bomb DoS when reading untrusted .3mf files. Add test_oversized_slice_info_falls_back_to_gcode in tests/test_slicer_estimate.py.
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π¨ Severity: MEDIUM
π‘ Vulnerability: Unbounded reading of Metadata/slice_info.config from .3mf files in read_3mf_estimate could consume arbitrary memory if an untrusted .3mf file contained a Zip Bomb or oversized XML payload.
π― Impact: Memory exhaustion or Denial of Service (DoS) when attempting to parse estimates from untrusted model archives.
π§ Fix: Enforced a 10 MB SLICE_INFO_READ_BYTES safety limit check on info.file_size and bounded the read stream before parsing XML.
β Verification: Added unit test test_oversized_slice_info_falls_back_to_gcode in tests/test_slicer_estimate.py and verified that all tests, linter, and layer boundary checks pass.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 6578569325633671747 started by @DLANSAMA