๐ก๏ธ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] ๋ณด์ ๊ฐํ - HTML ๋ณด๊ณ ์์ Content Security Policy (CSP) ์ถ๊ฐ#59
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โฆL Reports Added a strict Content Security Policy meta tag to the standalone HTML diagnostic reports generated by `fast_mlsirm`. The policy (`default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';`) prevents arbitrary external scripts, inline scripts, and other potentially dangerous assets from executing, acting as a defense-in-depth measure against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
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Pull request overview
This PR hardens the standalone diagnostics HTML report output by adding a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce XSS risk as a defense-in-depth measure when rendering potentially untrusted/free-form text into the report.
Changes:
- Add a
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" ...>tag to the generated HTML report<head>to block all resource loads by default while permitting inline styles. - Document the CSP hardening in the Jules Sentinel security log.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| python/fast_mlsirm/report.py | Adds a strict CSP meta tag to the standalone HTML report header. |
| .jules/sentinel.md | Records the CSP hardening as a security learning/prevention entry. |
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Pull request overview
OpenCode exhausted the configured model pool without a usable current-head review conclusion. This is not approval evidence, so the PR is blocked until a source-backed review can establish approval sufficiency or identify concrete fixes.
Findings
1. HIGH .jules/sentinel.md:1 - OpenCode could not establish approval sufficiency
- Problem: every configured model path failed to produce a usable current-head control block.
- Root cause: model execution, timeout, export, normalization, or approval-gate validation did not complete after exponential retry across the configured model pool.
- Impact: approving from deterministic check state alone would miss PR-intent mismatches, missing files, edge-case bugs, robustness gaps, UX/DX regressions, security issues, and CodeGraph-backed base/head flow changes.
- Fix: rerun OpenCode after model availability recovers, or update the PR with the missing files, tests, docs, generated artifacts, and verification evidence needed for a source-backed review conclusion.
- Regression test: keep the approval gate posting REQUEST_CHANGES, not APPROVE or check-only failure, when no model produces a valid current-head review.
Summary
- Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
- Reason: coverage-evidence passed and peer GitHub Checks completed without failures, but no model produced a valid review control block.
- Deterministic evidence checked but not used for approval: current-head changed-file evidence (.jules/sentinel.md, python/fast_mlsirm/report.py); coverage-evidence result success; peer checks from statusCheckRollup excluding this OpenCode check.
- Model outcome: model_pool=exhausted; selected_model=none.
- Head SHA:
90b9a9a63f45372419b8c597cac7ce53601a7ccf - Workflow run: 28561445621
- Workflow attempt: 1
No PR approval was posted because model-output failure is not evidence that the PR has no blockers.
Changed-File Evidence Map
flowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Changed file (2 files)"]
S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (2 files)"]
R1 --> V1["required checks"]
| **Prevention:** | ||
| - Always add `allow_pickle=False` to `np.load` unless explicitly required and verified. | ||
| - Replace critical `assert` statements with `if` condition checks that raise appropriate runtime exceptions. | ||
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HIGH OpenCode could not establish approval sufficiency
- Problem: the model pool exhausted without a valid current-head review control block, so this changed line cannot be approved from deterministic check state alone.
- Impact: PR-intent mismatches, missing files, robustness bugs, UX/DX regressions, and CodeGraph-backed flow changes could be missed.
- Fix: rerun OpenCode after model availability recovers, or add the missing source/test/docs/generated verification evidence needed for a source-backed approval.
- Verification: rerun the OpenCode Review workflow and confirm it emits APPROVE or source-backed REQUEST_CHANGES for this head SHA.
OpenCode Review Overview
Pull request overviewOpenCode exhausted the configured model pool without a usable current-head review conclusion. This is not approval evidence, so the PR is blocked until a source-backed review can establish approval sufficiency or identify concrete fixes. Findings1. HIGH .jules/sentinel.md:1 - OpenCode could not establish approval sufficiency
Summary
No PR approval was posted because model-output failure is not evidence that the PR has no blockers. Changed-File Evidence Mapflowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Changed file (2 files)"]
S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (2 files)"]
R1 --> V1["required checks"]
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๐จ Severity: MEDIUM
๐ก Vulnerability: ์์ฑ๋ ์ ์ HTML ์ง๋จ ๋ณด๊ณ ์์ Content Security Policy (CSP)๊ฐ ์์ด, ๋ง์ฝ ๊ฒ์ฆ๋์ง ์์ ์ธ๋ถ ํ ์คํธ๋ ์ฌ์ฉ์ ๋ฐ์ดํฐ๊ฐ ๋ณด๊ณ ์์ ํฌํจ๋ ๊ฒฝ์ฐ XSS(๊ต์ฐจ ์ฌ์ดํธ ์คํฌ๋ฆฝํ ) ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์ ๋ ธ์ถ๋ ์ ์๋ ๋ฐฉ์ด-์ฌ์ธต(defense-in-depth) ๋ณด์ ์ทจ์ฝ์ ์ด ์์์ต๋๋ค.
SECURITY.mdํ์ผ์์๋ ํต์ ๋์ง ์์ ์์ ํ์ ํ ์คํธ๊ฐ ์ฝ์ ๋ ์ํ์ ๋ช ์ํ๊ณ ์์ต๋๋ค.๐ฏ Impact: ๊ณต๊ฒฉ์๊ฐ ์กฐ์๋ ๋ฐ์ดํฐ๋ฅผ ํตํด ์ ์ฑ ์คํฌ๋ฆฝํธ๋ฅผ ์ฝ์ ํ ๊ฒฝ์ฐ ๋ธ๋ผ์ฐ์ ์์ ์คํฌ๋ฆฝํธ๊ฐ ์คํ๋์ด ๋ฏผ๊ฐํ ๋ฐ์ดํฐ๊ฐ ์ ์ถ๋๊ฑฐ๋ ์ ์์ ์ธ ์์ ์ด ๋ฐฑ๊ทธ๋ผ์ด๋์์ ์คํ๋ ์ ์์ต๋๋ค.
๐ง Fix:
python/fast_mlsirm/report.py์_render_html๋ฉ์๋์<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';">ํ๊ทธ๋ฅผ ์ถ๊ฐํ์ฌ, ์ธ๋ถ ์คํฌ๋ฆฝํธ ํธ์ถ ๋ฐ ์ธ๋ผ์ธ ์คํฌ๋ฆฝํธ ์คํ์ ์์ ํ ์ฐจ๋จํ๊ณ , ์๊ฐ์ ํํ์ ํ์ํ ์ธ๋ผ์ธ ์คํ์ผ(_css())๋ง ํ์ฉํ๋๋ก ์กฐ์นํ์ต๋๋ค.โ Verification:
python -m pytest tests/๋ช ๋ น์ด๋ฅผ ํตํด ๊ธฐ์กด ๋ณด๊ณ ์ ๋ ๋๋ง ๋ก์ง์ ์ ์ ์๋์ ๊ฒ์ฆํ์์ผ๋ฉฐ ์ถ๊ฐ์ ์ผ๋ก ์์ ํ report.py์<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"๋ฌธ๊ตฌ๊ฐ ์ ์์ ์ผ๋ก ์ถ๊ฐ๋ ๊ฒ์ ํ์ธํ์ต๋๋ค.PR created automatically by Jules for task 18317213538185941508 started by @seonghobae