Security: the assurance case - #18
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One page that argues, with its evidence, why the three guarantees the threat model states can be relied on: the requirements, the trust boundary, Saltzer and Schroeder's principles mapped to the design decisions that carry them, the implementation weaknesses the kernel counters and where a regression in each would be caught, the evidence, and what the argument does not cover. Every row cites the specification, the verify guarantee or the test suite that holds it; nothing on the page is a new claim. Signed-off-by: arpan <contact@arpanghoshal.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR adds a security assurance-case document and links it from the Architecture tab’s Security navigation group. The document defines requirements, trust boundaries, design principles, controls, evidence sources, and coverage limits. ChangesSecurity assurance case
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Other Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The published assurance case overstates two security guarantees. Correct the receipt-retention and verification-boundary limitations before merge so readers do not rely on unsupported assurance claims. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/security/assurance-case.mdx`:
- Line 19: Update the R3 integrity requirement and its evidence row to qualify
that the receipt chain detects edits, deletions, and reordering except deletion
of the log tail, which leaves no broken link in the remaining chain.
- Around line 91-92: Update the ctrlrun verify description in the assurance case
to state that it checks only kernel guarantees exercisable by the policy,
grants, and store backend in its scratch instance; identify adapter behavior
checks as belonging to the adapter conformance kit, and remove any implication
that ctrlrun verify covers adapter or gateway deployment boundaries.
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docs.jsondocs/security/assurance-case.mdx
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The red |
…nd does not exercise Two review findings folded in: R3 and the tampered-evidence row now say the chain detects an edit, a reordering or a deletion within the retained chain and cannot see an erased tail, as the receipt-chain page states; the verify bullet says it runs in a scratch store with fake executors and no network, and the closing section gives adapter behaviour to the conformance kit. Signed-off-by: arpan <contact@arpanghoshal.com>
…ease branch Main brought #1 (the Pythons CI tests, read rather than typed), #18 (the assurance case) and #21 (the README test and the badge generator). The readiness block conflicted on both sides' regenerations; regenerated once more against the kernel's release/0.10.0 and pasted fresh. Signed-off-by: arpan <contact@arpanghoshal.com>
`main` has been red since #18, #1 and #21 landed: three push runs failed in a row, all on `docs/security/assurance-case.mdx`. Every branch cut afterwards inherits it, this one included, so the release cannot go green without fixing it. Four are the page's, one is the list's. - **The description was 198 characters**, and the limit is 155 because that is where a search result truncates. Rewritten to say the same thing in one sentence. - **No `## Next`**, which every `.mdx` carries so a reader is never left at the bottom of a page with nowhere to go. Added, with four links. - **No link to Why and none to Get started.** Both are in that section now. - **`SEO.md` had no row.** The file is the plan, one row per page; a page with no row is a page nobody decided what it was for. Query and definitional sentence added beside the other `docs/security/` rows. - **1,816 words against a 900 budget.** `security/assurance-case` joins `LONG_FORM`, where `THREAT_MODEL`, `ARCHITECTURE`, `CLAIMS` and the OWASP pages already are. Cutting an assurance case to 900 words means dropping either a claim or the evidence under one, and a claim without its evidence is what the page exists to refuse. The reason is in the list beside the entry. Readiness regenerated after the merge: **6,066** tests, pasted into both homes.
What this changes
A new page,
docs/security/assurance-case.mdx, in the Security group after the threat model. It argues, with its evidence, why the three guarantees the threat model states can be relied on:Nothing on the page is a new claim: every row points at a specification section, a verify guarantee, a test suite or a workflow that already exists. This is the
assurance_casecriterion of the OpenSSF Best Practices silver level, and thehardeningandimplement_secure_designrows cite it.lint.py,links.pyandsnippets.pypass against the kernel'smain.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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