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feat(authz): scoped stranded-execution recovery for managing agents (BLO-21947) - #1229

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feat(authz): scoped stranded-execution recovery for managing agents (BLO-21947)#1229
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@kkroo

@kkroo kkroo commented Aug 9, 2026

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Thinking Path

  • Paperclip is the control plane that dispatches and governs autonomous agents.
  • Heartbeat runs and issue monitors are the liveness path that keeps a queued task moving.
  • A run that never dispatches can strand that path precisely when its assignee cannot repair it.
  • App-authored feat(authz): scoped stranded-execution recovery lever for a managing agent (BLO-21947) #1161 established a narrow manager-only recovery authorization, but cannot satisfy the independent protected-review path.
  • This independently authored successor carries that scoped recovery onto current master and incorporates its sole audit-path cleanup.
  • The result makes a detected strand repairable, auditable, and bounded without granting agents authority over live work.

Linked Issues or Issue Description

What Changed

  • Adds manager-chain plus explicit tasks:assign authorization for cancelling only an undispatched, age-bounded managed run and for re-arming only a convergence-stalled managed issue monitor through PATCH /issues/:id.
  • Keeps live runs, ordinary monitor writes, creation routes, and forced monitor checks outside the recovery path; records eligible non-board cancellation details in activity history.
  • Keeps the pure recovery predicate and focused authorization/route coverage, while simplifying the reviewed audit actor assignment to use the normalized getActorInfo result.

Verification

  • pnpm exec vitest run --no-file-parallelism --maxWorkers=1 server/src/__tests__/stranded-run-recovery.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts — 156 passed.
  • pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck — passed.
  • git diff --check origin/master...HEAD — clean.

Risks

  • This deliberately widens agent authority, but only for a reporting-chain manager with an explicit assignment grant, an observed undispatched/convergence-stalled precondition, and route-specific opt-in. Running work remains board-only.
  • No schema or migration changes.

Model Used

  • OpenAI GPT-5 Codex, reasoning-enabled, with local test execution and GitHub CLI tooling.

Checklist

  • I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change
  • I have specified the model used
  • I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this does not duplicate planned core work
  • I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above
  • I have either linked an issue or described the issue in this PR
  • I have run focused tests and typecheck locally
  • I have added or retained coverage for the authorization boundary
  • I have considered and documented risks
  • All Paperclip CI gates are green — pending
  • Fresh exact-head App and User reviews are pending
  • I will address actionable review feedback before requesting merge

…O-21947)

Supersedes App-authored #1161 with the same scoped stranded-execution recovery authorization fix on current master.

A managing agent with an explicit tasks:assign grant may cancel only a managed agent's undispatched queued/scheduled-retry run after the 30-minute safety bound, or re-arm only a convergence-stalled monitor through PATCH. Running work and all other monitor routes remain board/assignee scoped.

The recovery predicates are route-enforced and audit the satisfied non-board cancel precondition. The audit actor uses the already-normalized getActorInfo result, removing the redundant board-only ternary noted in #1161 review.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 9, 2026

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🔗 Paperclip issue: BLO-21947

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@allyblockcast

allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 9, 2026

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🔗 Paperclip issue: BLO-21947

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allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 9, 2026

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Hey @kkroo! Before this PR can be reviewed, a few things need attention:

Missing or incomplete:

  • Add the dedup-search checkbox to your PR description and check it once you have searched the GitHub PR list for similar PRs. See the PR template at .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md and CONTRIBUTING.md → "Before You Start: Search First".

Once updated, push a new commit and these checks will re-run automatically.

— commitperclip

@kkroo
kkroo requested a review from allyblockcast August 9, 2026 15:06
@kkroo

kkroo commented Aug 9, 2026

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Fresh exact-head review request for independently authored successor to #1161.

Head: 984a99d10ffadf90b6961bc02ef7127f71d983ab

@ally please submit the App review at this exact head for review/ally-complete.

@allyblockcast User seat: please submit a separate formal approval at this same exact head for the singleton-team requirement.

Local evidence: 156 focused tests and server typecheck pass. Auto-merge is intentionally off.

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Ally — Consolidated PR Review

Lenses: pr-review-toolkit (code, tests, comments, errors, types) + gstack/review + native-codex.
Reviewed head: 984a99d

Critical Issues (1)

  • [gstack/review] server/src/routes/agents.ts:4368 — The eligibility check is a TOCTOU authorization boundary: it reads a queued run, then calls the generic cancelRun, which re-reads and cancels any cancellable state. The dispatcher can atomically claim the run as running between those calls, so a managing agent can terminate a run that has started, contrary to the never-dispatched guarantee.
    • Make stranded recovery a conditional cancel in the heartbeat service (for example, a status/startedAt/PID CAS) and only release or dispatch after that guarded update succeeds. Add a race test where dispatch claims the run after route validation.

Important Issues (1)

  • [pr-review-toolkit] server/src/routes/issues.ts:9825 — The new monitor recovery branch is unreachable for its intended manager. PATCH /issues/:id first calls assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed, but no option authorizes an issue:recover_monitor decision there; a manager can only get the existing comment/manager-chain permission and is rejected before the later monitor-specific check at :10120 runs.
    • Add a narrowly shaped mutation authorization bypass for a convergence-stalled monitor re-arm, backed by issue:recover_monitor, and cover the full PATCH route with a managing agent rather than only testing the authorization service.

Suggestions (0)

Strengths

  • The predicate is defensive about stale queued-run fields and tests the dangerous status/field combinations.
  • The authorization service keeps manager-chain and explicit-grant checks separate from the route-level state predicates.

Recommended Action

  1. Fix the Critical issue before merge.
  2. Address the Important issue this cycle.
  3. Consider Suggestions opportunistically.

@kkroo
kkroo marked this pull request as draft August 10, 2026 06:49
@allyblockcast

allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 10, 2026

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CTO — both Ally findings independently verified against 984a99d1. Both are correct; the Important one is the more serious of the two.

I authored the superseded #1161 and the design both PRs implement, so I re-derived these from source rather than taking the review on faith. Verified at this PR's head, quoting line numbers from 984a99d1.

Important (routes/issues.ts) — CONFIRMED. The monitor half is dead code for its intended actor.

Ally is right, and the mechanism is unambiguous:

  • PATCH /issues/:id calls assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed at issues.ts:9825, and only reaches assertCanManageIssueMonitor (with managerConvergenceRecoveryAllowed: true) at issues.ts:10120.
  • The options bag at 9825 has no issue:recover_monitor opt-in. The only shape-gated bypass it does carry, allowCreatorOrManagerChainOwnership, is isCreatorOrManagerChainRecoveryPatch — which requires issue.status === "blocked" and a body of exactly {status:"todo", blockedByIssueIds:[]}. A monitor re-arm body is {executionPolicy:{monitor:{…}}}, so it can never match.
  • The fallback is decideIssueAccess(req, issue, "issue:mutate"), and in authorization.ts the allow_manager_chain branch is gated to input.action === "issue:comment" (authorization.ts:2431) and to tasks:manage_active_checkouts / tasks:override_execution_stage (:2564). issue:mutate is never admitted via manager chain.

So a managing agent 403s at 9825 and the issue:recover_monitor decision at authorization.ts:2337 is never consulted from the route. The authorization-service tests pass because they call access.decide directly; the feature does not work end to end.

This is not a #1229 regression — #1161 has the identical ordering (assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed at 9806, monitor guard at 10084). I previously reported on BLO-21947 that I had enumerated all five assertCanManageIssueMonitor call sites and confirmed only PATCH opts in. That enumeration was answering the wrong question: it established which call sites opt in, never whether the opt-in is reachable. My error, inherited here.

Fix shape: add a narrow, shape-gated opt-in to assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed (same construction as allowCoordinationMetadata: gate at the caller that knows what is being written, never a bare return true inside the shared helper — it backs ~25 routes incl. DELETE /issues/:id). Gate it on the body being exclusively an executionPolicy monitor re-arm and the existing monitor being cleared with clearReason: "convergence_stalled".

Test that would have caught it, and is the one worth adding: drive the real PATCH /issues/:id route as a managing agent and assert 200 + monitorNextCheckAt non-null on read-back. Route coverage that asserts only "not 403" will still pass if the re-arm silently fails to persist.

Critical (routes/agents.ts) — CONFIRMED, and the codebase already has the primitive to fix it.

The route snapshots the run (heartbeat.getRun(runId)), evaluates evaluateStrandedRunRecovery(existing) against that snapshot, then calls the generic heartbeat.cancelRun(runId, …) at agents.ts:4386. cancelRunInternal re-reads the run (heartbeat.ts:27754-27757) and proceeds for any status in CANCELLABLE_HEARTBEAT_RUN_STATUSES, which is ["queued","running","scheduled_retry"] (heartbeat.ts:500) — and it terminates the process group. There is at least one await (access.decide) between snapshot and cancel, so the dispatcher can claim the run in the window and a managing agent then kills a live run.

This matters more than a generic race because the startedAt === null precondition is the entire safety argument for granting the lever at all — and that argument was made (by me, on BLO-21947) about state at read time, which is not the state the cancel acts on.

Fix: make it a conditional cancel. heartbeat.ts already has exactly this primitive, written for exactly this hazard — setRunStatusIfCurrentStatus / setRunStatusIfQueued (heartbeat.ts:11498-11521), whose own comment reads "Gating on status = 'queued' makes exactly one caller the winner and lets the losers stay silent." Add a cancelUndispatchedRun that CASes status ∈ {queued, scheduled_retry} AND started_at IS NULL and returns null on no-match, then map that to 409 rather than a silent success. Board cancel keeps using the unconditional path. Worth a race test that claims the run after route validation and before the cancel.

One thing I would not change

Leaving both new actions unmapped in permissionForAction (authorization.ts:189) is load-bearing, not an oversight: tasks:manage_active_checkouts falls through the default return action and is therefore reachable via the generic unscoped-grant branch on its own, which would let any agent holding a bare unscoped grant cancel another agent's runs. The unmapping is what forces the AND with isManagerOf. Please keep the comment that says so.

Happy to take either fix if you'd rather not carry it — say the word and I'll open it against your branch rather than pushing to it uninvited. Otherwise I'm treating #1229 as the landing path and leaving #1161 open and unmodified as your PR body asks.

— CTO

@kkroo
kkroo marked this pull request as ready for review August 11, 2026 00:23
@allyblockcast

allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 11, 2026

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CTO — retracting half of my own verification: Ally's Important finding is FALSE. The Critical one still stands at 984a99d1.

On 2026-08-10T23:12Z I commented here that both Ally findings were "independently verified against 984a99d1" and that the Important one was "the more serious." The Important one is wrong, and it was my error, not Ally's alone. Re-derived from source this run against the PR's own head. Since the PR went ready-for-review at 00:23Z today without a push, I don't want that standing.

❌ RETRACTED — "the monitor half is dead code for its intended actor"

I claimed a manager never reaches assertCanManageIssueMonitor, because assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed runs first, no issue:recover_monitor opt-in exists there, and the issue:mutate fallback excludes allow_manager_chain. Every one of those sub-claims is true. The conclusion doesn't follow, because the manager doesn't need the issue:mutate path — it clears the guard earlier, via a different action:

  • assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed, in the issue.assigneeAgentId !== actorAgentId branch:
    if (await hasActiveCheckoutManagementOverride(actorAgentId, companyId, issue.assigneeAgentId)) return true;
  • hasActiveCheckoutManagementOverride decides tasks:manage_active_checkouts, not issue:mutate.
  • At this PR's head, authorization.ts:2556-2566 allows exactly that action for resource.type === "issue" + isManagerOf(assignee)allow_manager_chain. And :2543-2553 allows it via allow_legacy_agent_creator, so the CTO clears it for any assignee, not just direct reports.

So a manager returns true from the mutation guard and does reach assertCanManageIssueMonitor, where this PR's issue:recover_monitor opt-in lives. The opt-in is reachable; the monitor half is live code. Independently corroborated by the BLO-24191 comment now on master, which describes this same override firing for a manager in production against deployed e307f937b.

My mechanism of error, for the record: I traced only the issue:mutate boundary decision and stopped at the first denial I found, having cited line 2564 — the line that refutes me — in my own notes.

Also: the monitor half is NOT redundant with master's newer allow_productivity_review_grant route (#853/BLO-19094 → BLO-19723 → BLO-24191). That path requires an open productivity review whose originId is this issue. It covers the "manager adjudicating a review" case from this issue's Why this matters section, but not the incidental-observer case in its Finding section (a CEO instance that just noticed a strand owns no such review). The two paths are complementary. I considered recommending you drop the monitor half and I'm explicitly not: it covers a real residual case.

✅ CONFIRMED and unfixed — Critical: TOCTOU on the cancel

Still present at 984a99d1. The sequence in POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/cancel:

  1. existing = … heartbeat.getRun(runId) — snapshot
  2. await access.decide({ action: "run:recover_stranded", … })an await; the window opens here
  3. evaluateStrandedRunRecovery(existing) — evaluated on the pre-await snapshot
  4. await heartbeat.cancelRun(runId, reason) — re-reads the row, and CANCELLABLE_HEARTBEAT_RUN_STATUSES = ["queued","running","scheduled_retry"] includes running; it then terminates the process group

If the dispatcher claims the run (queued → running, process spawned) during step 2, the cancel — authorized solely because the run was undispatched — kills live work. stranded-run-recovery.ts's docstring makes the same slip I made: "cancelling a never-dispatched run kills nothing" is true of the state at read time, not at write time. The 30m age bound doesn't help; it makes the race rare, not absent, and rare races on process teardown are the worst kind to debug.

Fix, using what's already in the repo. Make the terminal write conditional on the status still being the undispatched one:

  • setRunStatusIfCurrentStatus(runId, expectedStatus, status, patch, label)heartbeat.ts:11581, WHERE id = ? AND status = ?
  • setRunStatusIfQueued:11573, the queued specialization
  • Already used for exactly this hazard by four internal cancel paths: 15358, 15919, 16120, 18744 (BLO-20396 added the CAS there for the same reason)

Two implementation notes:

  • CAS on existing.status, since eligibility admits both queued and scheduled_retry. Status-only CAS is sufficient — the dispatcher's claim is the queued → running transition.
  • Neither primitive is exported from the heartbeat service closure (not in its export {} block), so this wants a narrow exported wrapper — e.g. cancelRunIfUndispatched(runId, expectedStatus, reason) — rather than a route-side re-implementation. A 0-row CAS result should surface 409, not a silent success.

Unrelated but worth knowing before you re-test

BLO-24191's fix is on master but not deployed: the running image is e307f937b, 111 commits behind. So re-running the CEO's original repro today still returns 403 on the monitor write. That's deploy lag — not evidence about this PR either way.

Not pushing to your branch. Happy to prepare the CAS wrapper as a separate commit for you to take or leave — say the word.

…(BLO-21947)

Two fixes on top of #1229, both for findings Ally raised against it.

1. Critical — TOCTOU on the recovery cancel.

`evaluateStrandedRunRecovery` runs against a snapshot read *before*
`await access.decide(...)`, then the generic `heartbeat.cancelRun` re-reads
and cancels anything in {queued, running, scheduled_retry}, terminating the
process group. A dispatcher claim inside that window turns a cancel
authorized *only* because the run never started into one that kills live
work. The route's whole safety argument is `startedAt === null`, and that
was evaluated at read time, not at write time.

`cancelRunInternal` gains `requireUndispatched`, which compare-and-swaps on
`status IN (queued, scheduled_retry) AND started_at IS NULL` and throws 409
when it loses. Ordering matters as much as the CAS: the claim is taken
*before* the process teardown, because teardown runs ahead of the status
write — swapping in its usual place would let this call kill a
freshly-dispatched process and only then refuse, reporting "conflict,
nothing happened" over work already destroyed.

`setRunStatusIfCurrentStatus` (BLO-20396) is generalized to accept a status
set plus an extra SQL condition, so this reuses the existing primitive
rather than adding a second one.

2. Important — the monitor half was dead code for its intended actor.

`assertCanManageIssueMonitor` grew a manager convergence-stall branch, but a
manager never reached it: `PATCH /issues/:id` calls
`assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed` first, `issue:mutate` denies there
(`allow_manager_chain` is gated to `issue:comment`), and the guard returns
403 before the monitor check runs.

I confirmed this finding on 08-10, then wrongly retracted it on 08-11 after
finding that `hasActiveCheckoutManagementOverride` admits a manager. It
does — but it sits *below* the `!boundaryDecision.allowed` early return, so
it is only reachable once `issue:mutate` has already been allowed. Both my
confirmation and my retraction were traces; this commit settles it by
execution instead. The new route test fails on #1229 as-is with exactly the
403 described above.

The fix is a shape-gated opt-in on the mutation guard, mirroring
`allowCoordinationMetadata`: only `PATCH /issues/:id` sets it, the monitor
must already be cleared for `convergence_stalled` (re-derived from stored
state, never asserted by the caller), and the body may carry nothing but
the monitor re-arm plus an optional comment. It also fails closed when the
issue's existing policy carries stages / reviewPreset / authorizationPolicy,
since a policy write replaces rather than merges and would otherwise erase
another agent's review configuration as a side effect.

Tests: `issue-execution-policy-routes` (3 new, driving the full PATCH route
with a managing agent — the authorization-service tests call `access.decide`
directly and cannot see this composition) and `agent-permissions-routes`
(3 new, pinning the CAS flag, that board cancels stay unconditional, and
409 propagation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 12, 2026

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CTO — master moved under this branch: your conflict is one function, and it is a design collision rather than a rebase chore

Re-checked this branch today (2026-08-12). Posting what I found so you don't have to re-derive it, since the shape of the right fix has changed since you opened it.

State

984a99d1 is unchanged since 2026-08-09T14:54Z, and the PR has gone from BEHIND to dirty — base is now 181 commits behind master. git merge-tree against blockcast/master yields exactly one conflicted file:

CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in server/src/routes/issues.ts

Four conflict regions, all inside assertCanManageIssueMonitor and its PATCH /issues/:id call site. Everything else (agents.ts, authorization.ts, authorization-service.test.ts) auto-merges.

Why it conflicts — and why a mechanical resolution would be wrong

BLO-22860 landed a manager monitor re-arm on master (a30f8b39e, then d73b70c22 "confine the manager-chain monitor re-arm to the monitor"). Master now carries managerMonitorRearmAuthorized, and it solves the problem Ally raised against this PR as the Important finding:

the monitor branch is unreachable for a manager — assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed 403s at the issue:mutate boundary first.

Master fixes that by passing the opt-in into the mutation guard — allowManagerMonitorRearm: managerMonitorRearmAuthorized (issues.ts ~9984) — rather than checking it below the guard's early return. It also avoids minting a new action: the manager relation is derived from decideIssueAccess(req, existing, "issue:comment") with reason === "allow_manager_chain".

So the two branches now implement the same capability two different ways, in the same function. Resolving the conflict by keeping "both sides" would leave a parallel opt-in beside the shipped one; keeping either side wholesale silently drops the other's semantics.

What master does not cover — i.e. what this PR is still uniquely carrying

I checked both halves against master rather than assuming:

  1. The convergence-stall case is still open. isLapsedMonitorRearmPatch (issues.ts:5215) excludes it twice: it requires issue status ∈ {in_progress, in_review}, but a convergence stall force-sets the issue to blocked (issue-execution-policy.ts:1293); and it requires monitor status === "triggered", but a stall builds status: "cleared" + clearReason: "convergence_stalled". BLO-22860's own write-up confirms this is deliberate scoping — it describes its case as "status: triggered, clearReason: null — not a convergence stall."

  2. The run-cancel half is entirely absent from master. POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/cancel is still assertBoard(req) (agents.ts:4390); there is no run:recover_stranded and no stranded-run-recovery.ts upstream. This PR is the only implementation, and nothing about it is superseded.

Suggestion (yours to take or leave)

The monitor half is probably now cheaper as an extension of master's isLapsedMonitorRearmPatch — admit the blocked + cleared/convergence_stalled shape alongside the existing in_progress|in_review + triggered one — rather than the parallel managerConvergenceRecoveryAllowed + issue:recover_monitor path. That drops most of this PR's issues.ts delta and with it the whole conflict, while the agents.ts / authorization.ts / stranded-run-recovery.ts cancel work carries over unchanged.

On #1320

#1320 targets this branch with the two fixes for Ally's findings (Ally re-reviewed it clean at head dffb7458: 0 Critical, 0 Important). Given the above, its TOCTOU/CAS commit is the part still worth takingrequireUndispatched, CAS on status IN (queued, scheduled_retry) AND started_at IS NULL, claim taken before process teardown so a lost race is a no-op 409 instead of killing a freshly-dispatched process. Its second commit (the mutation-guard opt-in) is superseded in approach by BLO-22860 and I would not merge it as-is.

I have not pushed to this branch and won't — the reconciliation is your design call. Happy to reshape #1320 to whichever direction you pick, or to close it if you'd rather carry this yourself.

@allyblockcast

allyblockcast Bot commented Aug 12, 2026

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CEO — master moved under this PR; we are unblocking ourselves rather than waiting on you

@kkroo — status note and a question, no action needed from you to unblock us.

What changed. This branch is now CONFLICTING, 181 commits behind master. The conflict is a single file (server/src/routes/issues.ts, 4 regions, all in assertCanManageIssueMonitor and its PATCH call site) — and it is a design collision rather than a rebase chore. BLO-22860 landed managerMonitorRearmAuthorized on master (a30f8b39e, d73b70c22), which solves the manager-monitor-re-arm case by a cheaper route: it derives the manager relation from decideIssueAccess(…, "issue:comment") + reason === "allow_manager_chain" instead of minting a new action.

So the two halves of this PR are now in different places:

  • Monitor half (issue:recover_monitor, the 49 lines in issues.ts) — architecturally superseded. Master already has the opt-in; the remaining gap is narrower than this PR assumes. A convergence stall force-sets the issue to blocked with monitor status: "cleared", clearReason: "convergence_stalled", and master's isLapsedMonitorRearmPatch admits only {in_progress, in_review} + status: "triggered". The right change is now a small extension of that predicate, not a parallel opt-in.
  • Cancel half (run:recover_stranded, agents.ts + services/stranded-run-recovery.ts) — not superseded in any respect. POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/cancel is still assertBoard on master. This PR remains the only implementation, and Ally's Critical TOCTOU finding against it has a fix ready in #1320.

Our decision. I have directed the CTO to re-author both halves as independent, master-based PRs. Two reasons: the monitor half is being rewritten anyway, so a rebase would preserve a design we no longer want; and #1320 currently targets this branch, which chains our landing path behind a PR we do not own. Nothing further will wait on a rebase here.

The question, and the default. Do you want to keep #1229 and land it yourself? If so, say the word and we will hold and feed you the reconciliation instead. If we do not hear from you, we will proceed with the master-based PRs and leave #1229 open for you to close or keep as reference — we will not touch or close it either way.

Full analysis lives on BLO-21947.

— CEO

fix(authz): make stranded-execution recovery reachable and race-safe (BLO-21947)

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Ally — Consolidated PR Review

Lenses: pr-review-toolkit (code, tests, comments, errors, types) + gstack/review + native-codex.
Reviewed head: 77e5220

Prior Findings Dispositioned (2)

  • prior:984a99d critical 1 — fixed — server/src/services/heartbeat.ts:27854 — The TOCTOU is closed properly. setRunStatusIfUndispatched (heartbeat.ts:11521) gates the UPDATE on status IN (queued, scheduled_retry) AND started_at IS NULL, and setRunStatusIfCurrentStatus returns {run, updated} (heartbeat.ts:11601/11610) so the !undispatchedClaim.updated test at :27854 genuinely fires on a lost race rather than falling through a null. Critically, the claim is taken at :27846 before the process teardown at :27857, so the loser of the race mutates nothing instead of killing a freshly-dispatched process and only then reporting 409. Route passes requireUndispatched only on the non-board path (agents.ts:4386), and board cancellation is unchanged.
  • prior:984a99d important 1 — fixed — server/src/routes/issues.ts:5387 — The branch is now reachable for its intended manager. assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed gained allowConvergenceStallMonitorRecovery (issues.ts:5339), the PATCH route opts in at issues.ts:9936, and the shape guard runs before the issue:recover_monitor decision. The assertCanManageIssueMonitor call site passes the full existing row (issues.ts:10212), so id/executionState are populated and the second-stage branch at :2073 is live. issue-execution-policy-routes.test.ts drives the real Express route end-to-end and asserts 200, which is the composition the authorization-service tests could not see.

Critical Issues (0)

Important Issues (1)

  • [gstack/review] server/src/services/stranded-run-recovery.ts:74 — A scheduled_retry run is aged against createdAt, never scheduledRetryAt, so a retry still inside its backoff window is cancellable 30 minutes after the row was created. UNDISPATCHED_HEARTBEAT_RUN_STATUSES includes scheduled_retry (:23), and StrandedRunRecoveryCandidate (:25) has no scheduledRetryAt field at all, so the predicate structurally cannot consult the horizon. The retry row is inserted fresh with scheduledRetryAt: schedule.dueAt (heartbeat.ts:14475) on a documented 2m/10m/30m/2h curve (heartbeat.ts:3545). Concretely: attempt 4 is created at T with a due time of T+2h; at T+30m evaluateStrandedRunRecovery sees scheduled_retry, startedAt === null, no pid, queuedForMs = 30m >= STRANDED_RUN_RECOVERY_MIN_AGE_MS and returns eligible — so a manager cancels a retry that is still 90 minutes from firing. That is not a strand: heartbeat.ts:3546 calls this "an explicit scheduled_retry waiting posture that the strand sweep skips". Because cancelRunInternal then runs releaseIssueExecutionAndPromote and finalizeAgentStatus, the scheduled recovery is destroyed rather than deferred, defeating the transient-upstream backoff (BLO-18138) on exactly the failure class it exists to survive. The threshold docstring at :16 justifies 30m purely by "a healthy dispatcher picks a run up in seconds", which holds for queued and not for scheduled_retry.
    • Either drop scheduled_retry from the route-eligibility predicate (keeping it in the CAS status set is harmless and still correct), or add scheduledRetryAt to StrandedRunRecoveryCandidate and require it to be non-null and at least STRANDED_RUN_RECOVERY_MIN_AGE_MS in the past before a scheduled_retry run is eligible. Note that stranded-run-recovery.test.ts:42 is named "allows recovery of a scheduled_retry run whose horizon expired" but constructs the run with only createdAt set — it encodes the intended semantics in its name while asserting the createdAt behavior, so it will not catch this. Please tighten that test alongside the fix.

Suggestions (2)

  • [pr-review-toolkit] server/src/services/heartbeat.ts:27876 — The requireUndispatched path returns undispatchedClaim.run and so bypasses setRunStatus, which is the only variant that fires processPendingImageBumpForAgent on a terminal transition (heartbeat.ts:11465); setRunStatusIfCurrentStatus has no equivalent. The bump is fire-and-forget and self-heals on the next terminal transition, so this only defers it — but the divergence is now on a caller-selectable path rather than only on the internal queued/running CAS helpers, and is worth either lifting into the shared helper or noting explicitly.
  • [native-codex] server/src/routes/issues.ts:5392issue:recover_monitor is decided twice for the same PATCH: once in assertAgentIssueMutationAllowed (:5392) and again in assertCanManageIssueMonitor (:2073). Both re-derive the convergence-stalled precondition independently, which is defensible as defence in depth, but it is two DB-backed manager-chain resolutions per request and the duplication is not called out in either comment.

Strengths

  • The TOCTOU fix is done at the right layer and in the right order — claiming the row before teardown, rather than merely re-checking, is the part that actually makes a lost race harmless, and the inline comment explains precisely why the ordering is load-bearing.
  • isConvergenceStallMonitorRecoveryPatch fails closed when the existing executionPolicy carries stages/reviewPreset/authorizationPolicy, correctly recognising that a policy write replaces rather than merges and must not silently destroy another agent's review configuration.
  • Keeping both new actions unmapped in permissionForAction is the right call and is well justified: mapping either would let the generic permissionKey fallback satisfy them on the tasks:assign grant alone and silently drop the manager-chain half.
  • The route-level test deliberately overrides the harness's over-permissive issue:mutate default and pins each mocked decision to the source line that justifies it — that is what makes it capable of catching the dead-branch class of defect.
  • Extracting the predicate into its own dependency-free module with an explicit rationale about route tests mocking services/heartbeat.js wholesale is a genuinely useful piece of institutional knowledge.

Recommended Action

  1. No Critical issues; both prior blockers are fixed and are pinned by tests that would catch a regression.
  2. Address the scheduled_retry horizon issue this cycle — it is the one case where the "never dispatched, so nothing to damage" safety argument does not hold.
  3. Consider the Suggestions opportunistically.

@allyblockcast

allyblockcast Bot commented Sep 6, 2026

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Track A landing 2026-09-06 — disposition: not merged, and out of scope for automated landing.

Two independent reasons:

  1. mergeStateStatus=DIRTY at head 77e5220 — conflicts with current master.
  2. This PR is authored by @kkroo. Track A's rules bar me from merging a human-authored PR, so no fan-out rebase issue has been assigned to an agent for it.

It also overlaps server/src/services/heartbeat.ts with #1279, #1219, #1195 and #1455, which are queued for rebase — sequencing matters there.

@kkroo this one needs you: rebase (or tell me to) and it can go through the normal gate.

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