diff --git a/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/build_targetbridge_sender_app.sh b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/build_targetbridge_sender_app.sh
index ed579e7d..ef94da6d 100755
--- a/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/build_targetbridge_sender_app.sh
+++ b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/build_targetbridge_sender_app.sh
@@ -10,11 +10,25 @@ BUILD_DIR="${DERIVED_DATA_DIR}/Build/Products/${CONFIGURATION}"
 SOURCE_APP="${BUILD_DIR}/TargetBridge.app"
 DEST_DIR="${REPO_ROOT}/build"
 DEST_APP="${DEST_DIR}/TargetBridge.app"
+# Preserve the upstream disposable CI/development build when no signing setup
+# was requested. Once configured (or explicitly required), never fall back.
+SIGNING_CONFIG="${TARGETBRIDGE_SIGNING_CONFIG:-$HOME/Library/Application Support/TargetBridge/Build/sender-signing-identity.txt}"
+if [[ -n "${TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY:-}" ||
+      -n "${TARGETBRIDGE_SIGNING_CONFIG:-}" || -e "$SIGNING_CONFIG" ||
+      "${TARGETBRIDGE_REQUIRE_PERSISTENT_SIGNING:-0}" == 1 ]]; then
+  "$SCRIPT_DIR/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh" --check-identity
+else
+  echo "WARNING: unconfigured disposable build; this ad-hoc app is not an identity-preserving update." >&2
+  export TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=-
+  export TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=1
+fi
 
 cd "$ROOT"
 
 xcodegen generate
 
+# Package a standalone app, not Xcode's preview executor plus unsigned debug
+# dylibs. This also lets strict signing verify the same bundle on Xcode 16+.
 xcodebuild \
   -scheme TBDisplaySender \
   -configuration "$CONFIGURATION" \
@@ -22,15 +36,28 @@ xcodebuild \
   CODE_SIGN_IDENTITY="" \
   CODE_SIGNING_REQUIRED=NO \
   CODE_SIGNING_ALLOWED=NO \
+  ENABLE_DEBUG_DYLIB=NO \
   build
 
 mkdir -p "$DEST_DIR"
-rm -rf "$DEST_APP"
-ditto "$SOURCE_APP" "$DEST_APP"
+STAGING_DIR=$(mktemp -d "$DEST_DIR/.sender-signing.XXXXXX")
+STAGED_APP="$STAGING_DIR/TargetBridge.app"
+ditto "$SOURCE_APP" "$STAGED_APP"
 echo "Cleaning extended attributes..."
-xattr -cr "$DEST_APP" || true
+xattr -cr "$STAGED_APP"
 echo "Signing sender application..."
-codesign --force --deep --sign - "$DEST_APP" || true
+"$SCRIPT_DIR/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh" "$STAGED_APP"
+if [[ -e "$DEST_APP" ]]; then
+  # Retain the old artifact inside the staging directory for recovery.
+  mv "$DEST_APP" "$STAGING_DIR/Previous TargetBridge.app"
+fi
+if ! mv "$STAGED_APP" "$DEST_APP"; then
+  if [[ ! -e "$DEST_APP" && -e "$STAGING_DIR/Previous TargetBridge.app" ]]; then
+    mv "$STAGING_DIR/Previous TargetBridge.app" "$DEST_APP"
+  fi
+  echo "Could not activate the signed build; recovery files: $STAGING_DIR" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
 touch "$DEST_APP"
 
 echo "TargetBridge sender built: $DEST_APP"
diff --git a/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..88ea4f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+#!/bin/zsh
+set -euo pipefail
+
+fail() { print -u2 -- "Sender signing: $*"; exit 1; }
+APP="${1:-}"
+[[ -n "$APP" && $# -eq 1 ]] || fail "Usage: $0 TargetBridge.app | --check-identity"
+
+CONFIG="${TARGETBRIDGE_SIGNING_CONFIG:-$HOME/Library/Application Support/TargetBridge/Build/sender-signing-identity.txt}"
+IDENTITY="${TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY:-}"
+if [[ -z "$IDENTITY" && -f "$CONFIG" ]]; then
+    IDENTITY=$(<"$CONFIG")
+fi
+if [[ -z "$IDENTITY" ]]; then
+    fail "No persistent signing identity. Configure TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY or $CONFIG. See docs/Sender-Signing.md. Refusing an implicit ad-hoc build."
+fi
+if [[ "$IDENTITY" == - ]]; then
+    [[ "${TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC:-0}" == 1 ]] || fail "Ad-hoc signing requires TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=1; updates may lose privacy permissions."
+    print -u2 -- "WARNING: disposable ad-hoc development build; do not install over a persistent signed Sender."
+else
+    [[ "$IDENTITY" =~ '^[[:xdigit:]]{40}$' ]] || fail "Use the exact 40-character certificate fingerprint, not a display name"
+    IDENTITIES=$(/usr/bin/security find-identity -v -p codesigning)
+    [[ "${(U)IDENTITIES}" == *" ${(U)IDENTITY} "* ]] || fail "Configured certificate is not a valid code-signing identity in this user's Keychain. Unlock/configure it through macOS; no fallback is allowed."
+fi
+[[ "$APP" != --check-identity ]] || { print -- 'Signing identity preflight passed'; exit 0; }
+PLIST="$APP/Contents/Info.plist"
+[[ -f "$PLIST" && ! -L "$APP" ]] || fail "Expected a real application bundle"
+BUNDLE_ID=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Print :CFBundleIdentifier' "$PLIST")
+[[ "$BUNDLE_ID" == com.targetbridge.sender ]] || fail "Wrong bundle identifier: $BUNDLE_ID"
+
+# Use the system-generated designated requirement. Never weaken it to just a
+# bundle identifier: certificate-bound identity is what makes updates trustworthy.
+/usr/bin/codesign --force --sign "$IDENTITY" "$APP"
+/usr/bin/codesign --verify --deep --strict --all-architectures "$APP"
+DETAILS=$(/usr/bin/codesign -dv "$APP" 2>&1)
+if [[ "$IDENTITY" != - && "$DETAILS" == *"Signature=adhoc"* ]]; then
+    fail "A persistent signature was requested but the result is ad-hoc"
+fi
+/usr/bin/codesign -d -r- "$APP" 2>&1
+print -- "Sender signature verified: $APP"
diff --git a/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/test_sender_signing.sh b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/test_sender_signing.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..86567faa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/test_sender_signing.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/zsh
+set -euo pipefail
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+WORK=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/targetbridge-signing-test.XXXXXX")
+BASE="${1:?Usage: test_sender_signing.sh signed-TargetBridge.app}"
+SIGN="$SCRIPT_DIR/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh"
+VERIFY="$SCRIPT_DIR/verify_sender_update.sh"
+expect_reject() {
+    local title="$1"; shift
+    if "$@" >"$WORK/rejection.log" 2>&1; then
+        print -u2 -- "FAIL: accepted $title"; exit 1
+    fi
+    print -- "PASS: rejected $title"
+}
+ditto "$BASE" "$WORK/A.app"
+ditto "$BASE" "$WORK/B.app"
+# Changing a bundle resource changes the sealed CodeDirectory, reproducing the
+# identity risk without launching a capture process or requesting permissions.
+/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Set :CFBundleVersion 999999' "$WORK/B.app/Contents/Info.plist"
+zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/B.app"
+zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/A.app" "$WORK/B.app"
+HASH_A=$(/usr/bin/shasum -a 256 "$WORK/A.app/Contents/MacOS/TargetBridge")
+HASH_B=$(/usr/bin/shasum -a 256 "$WORK/B.app/Contents/MacOS/TargetBridge")
+[[ "${HASH_A%% *}" != "${HASH_B%% *}" ]] || { print -u2 'FAIL: fixtures have identical signed executables'; exit 1; }
+print -- 'PASS: different signed executable hashes, stable identity'
+expect_reject 'missing identity' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY= TARGETBRIDGE_SIGNING_CONFIG="$WORK/missing" zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/B.app"
+expect_reject 'unavailable identity' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/B.app"
+expect_reject 'implicit ad-hoc signing' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=- TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=0 zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/B.app"
+ditto "$WORK/B.app" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=- TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=1 zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+expect_reject 'ad-hoc update' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/A.app" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+expect_reject 'ad-hoc baseline' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/Adhoc.app" "$WORK/B.app"
+ditto "$WORK/B.app" "$WORK/WrongID.app"
+/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Set :CFBundleIdentifier com.targetbridge.receiver' "$WORK/WrongID.app/Contents/Info.plist"
+expect_reject 'wrong signing bundle ID' zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/WrongID.app"
+expect_reject 'wrong update bundle ID' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/A.app" "$WORK/WrongID.app"
+ditto "$WORK/B.app" "$WORK/Tampered.app"
+/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Set :CFBundleVersion 888888' "$WORK/Tampered.app/Contents/Info.plist"
+expect_reject 'tampered candidate' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/A.app" "$WORK/Tampered.app"
+expect_reject 'tampered installed baseline' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/Tampered.app" "$WORK/B.app"
+zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/A.app" "$WORK/B.app"
+print -- "All signing checks passed. Fixtures retained at $WORK; no installed app or TCC setting changed."
diff --git a/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/test_sender_signing_guards.sh b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/test_sender_signing_guards.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..6974d0b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/test_sender_signing_guards.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#!/bin/zsh
+# Negative-path checks that do not need a trusted signing certificate.
+set -euo pipefail
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+WORK=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/targetbridge-signing-guards.XXXXXX")
+BASE="${1:?Usage: test_sender_signing_guards.sh TargetBridge.app}"
+SIGN="$SCRIPT_DIR/sign_targetbridge_sender_app.sh"
+VERIFY="$SCRIPT_DIR/verify_sender_update.sh"
+reject_with() {
+    local expected="$1"; shift
+    if "$@" >"$WORK/rejection.log" 2>&1; then
+        print -u2 -- "FAIL: unexpectedly accepted $expected"; exit 1
+    fi
+    /usr/bin/grep -Fq -- "$expected" "$WORK/rejection.log" || { /bin/cat "$WORK/rejection.log"; exit 1; }
+    print -- "PASS: $expected"
+}
+reject_with 'No persistent signing identity' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY= TARGETBRIDGE_SIGNING_CONFIG="$WORK/missing" zsh "$SIGN" --check-identity
+reject_with 'exact 40-character certificate fingerprint' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY='unverified display name' zsh "$SIGN" --check-identity
+reject_with 'not a valid code-signing identity' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 zsh "$SIGN" --check-identity
+reject_with 'Ad-hoc signing requires' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=- TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=0 zsh "$SIGN" --check-identity
+ditto "$BASE" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=- TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=1 zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+reject_with 'Ad-hoc identity cannot preserve' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/Adhoc.app" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Set :CFBundleIdentifier com.targetbridge.receiver' "$WORK/Adhoc.app/Contents/Info.plist"
+reject_with 'Wrong bundle identifier' env TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=- TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=1 zsh "$SIGN" "$WORK/Adhoc.app"
+reject_with 'Unexpected bundle ID' zsh "$VERIFY" "$WORK/Adhoc.app" "$BASE"
+print -- "7 negative checks passed. Persistent-signature and TCC migration tests still require a valid identity and human consent. Fixtures: $WORK"
diff --git a/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/verify_sender_update.sh b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/verify_sender_update.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..aa6bcd12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TargetBridge-Sender/scripts/verify_sender_update.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#!/bin/zsh
+set -euo pipefail
+fail() { print -u2 -- "Sender update rejected: $*"; exit 1; }
+[[ $# -eq 2 ]] || fail "Usage: $0 installed.app candidate.app"
+OLD="$1"
+NEW="$2"
+for APP in "$OLD" "$NEW"; do
+    [[ -f "$APP/Contents/Info.plist" && ! -L "$APP" ]] || fail "Invalid app: $APP"
+    ID=$(/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c 'Print :CFBundleIdentifier' "$APP/Contents/Info.plist")
+    [[ "$ID" == com.targetbridge.sender ]] || fail "Unexpected bundle ID: $ID"
+    /usr/bin/codesign --verify --deep --strict --all-architectures "$APP"
+    DETAILS=$(/usr/bin/codesign -dv "$APP" 2>&1)
+    [[ "$DETAILS" != *"Signature=adhoc"* ]] || fail "Ad-hoc identity cannot preserve update permissions. Migrate once to a persistent signer and reapprove in macOS."
+done
+REQUIREMENT=$(/usr/bin/codesign -d -r- "$OLD" 2>&1 | /usr/bin/sed -nE 's/^#? ?designated => //p')
+[[ -n "$REQUIREMENT" ]] || fail "Missing installed identity requirement"
+# '=' marks a literal requirement; without it codesign treats the text as a path.
+/usr/bin/codesign --verify --deep --strict --all-architectures -R "=$REQUIREMENT" "$NEW" || fail "Candidate does not satisfy the installed Sender identity"
+print -- "PASS: candidate satisfies the installed Sender identity on every architecture."
+print -- "This verifies signing continuity, not a TCC grant. Install at /Applications/TargetBridge.app without re-signing."
diff --git a/docs/Sender-Signing.md b/docs/Sender-Signing.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b0c275d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/Sender-Signing.md
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+# Stable Sender identity and privacy permissions
+
+macOS recognises updates by the app's code-signing designated requirement, not
+just its name or version. An ad-hoc signature binds that requirement to the
+binary's hashes. Rebuilding changes those hashes and can invalidate Screen
+Recording and Accessibility consent.
+
+## Build and sign
+
+Use one persistent certificate and keep `com.targetbridge.sender` as the bundle
+identifier. Configure `TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY` with the certificate's
+fingerprint, or store that public fingerprint in:
+
+`~/Library/Application Support/TargetBridge/Build/sender-signing-identity.txt`
+
+The regular Sender build preserves upstream's disposable ad-hoc CI/development
+build when no signing configuration was requested, with a prominent warning.
+Set `TARGETBRIDGE_REQUIRE_PERSISTENT_SIGNING=1` to require an update-safe build
+even on an unconfigured machine. Configuring an identity or a configuration
+file also enables strict preflight: a missing/invalid configured identity never
+falls back to ad-hoc. Signing errors and verification failures are fatal.
+The build stages the candidate
+before replacing the previous build, so a missing/locked signing key leaves the
+previous artifact intact.
+
+The packaging build disables Xcode's debug-dylib/preview executor layout, so
+the standalone app can be strictly signed without unsigned preview dylibs.
+This does not change normal interactive builds in Xcode.
+
+For private local builds only, a persistent self-signed code-signing identity
+can be configured using Apple's Certificate Assistant in Keychain Access.
+Any change to its trust settings requires the Mac owner's explicit approval;
+limit trust to Code Signing. These build scripts never create/trust certificates,
+unlock a Keychain, export keys, or change TCC settings. Do not use an unrestricted
+trust-root setup. Verify the chosen fingerprint against the actual certificate.
+
+Keep the signing Keychain and always sign on that Mac, even when compilation
+happens elsewhere. Do not recreate the certificate for each build. A lost key
+requires an intentional identity migration and new consent. A local certificate
+is not a substitute for Developer ID and notarization for public distribution.
+
+For distribution, use Developer ID plus the required notarization workflow;
+these scripts alone do not implement notarization. Do not mix local and upstream signers if preserving existing consent
+is required. No Apple Developer membership is provisioned by these scripts.
+
+When using the signing helper directly, a disposable development build must opt in to both
+`TARGETBRIDGE_CODESIGN_IDENTITY=-` and `TARGETBRIDGE_ALLOW_ADHOC=1`. Never install
+it over a Sender that is already persistently signed.
+
+## Install/update gate
+
+Before replacing an installed, persistently signed Sender:
+
+```sh
+scripts/verify_sender_update.sh /Applications/TargetBridge.app ../build/TargetBridge.app
+```
+
+The check rejects ad-hoc signatures, broken bundles, wrong bundle IDs and a
+candidate that fails the installed app's designated requirement on any
+architecture. Never re-sign, modify Info.plist or otherwise change the bundle
+after that check. Preserve the signature with `ditto` and verify it again at the
+destination. Keep a recoverable backup outside Applications.
+
+An initial migration from an ad-hoc app intentionally fails this gate: it is an
+identity change, not a seamless update. Back up the installed app, replace it
+once with the persistently signed app at `/Applications/TargetBridge.app`, and
+approve Screen Recording and Accessibility there if macOS asks. Do not edit
+TCC databases, run blanket permission resets, or disable system protections.
+
+## Validation
+
+Test two builds with different executable contents signed with the same
+identity: both must pass signature verification and the second must satisfy the
+first's designated requirement. Test that an ad-hoc update, a different signer,
+wrong bundle ID and a tampered resource are rejected.
+
+`scripts/test_sender_signing.sh /path/to/signed/TargetBridge.app` covers signing
+continuity with a changed sealed bundle, missing/unavailable identities, explicit
+ad-hoc opt-in, bundle ID mismatch and tampering. Run it with a configured valid
+identity; a refusal at preflight is not a passing integration test. Also test a
+separate compiled revision and, when available, a second signer before release.
+
+Signing continuity is necessary, not proof that TCC granted permissions. The
+final acceptance test is a real A-to-B installed update after human consent on
+the Sender Mac, checking screen capture and receiver-controlled input without
+granting them again. macOS can still ask for consent after a reset, identity
+change, certificate loss, or OS privacy-policy change.
+
+References:
+- https://developer.apple.com/documentation/technotes/tn3127-inside-code-signing-requirements
+- https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2206/
+- https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/819406
+- https://support.apple.com/guide/keychain-access/kyca8916/mac