From dba8ea46ca59de88bbd7ce85f4132f1736b08f03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: broisnees Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:08:40 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Let the DynamoDB console send the API calls it offers The console and the AI parse CreateTable, UpdateTable, UpdateTimeToLive, DeleteTable and BatchGetItem, but the request gate kept an older, shorter allowlist, so every one of them failed with "operation is not allowed", including the sidebar's drop table. The gate now derives from the same lists. Access levels and read-only mode still decide who may run writes. API calls an agent opens in the editor arrive pretty-printed. --- src-tauri/src/db/dynamodb.rs | 41 ++++++++++++++------------- src/lib/components/StudioShell.svelte | 3 +- src/lib/dynamo-json.js | 21 ++++++++++++++ src/lib/dynamo-json.test.js | 15 +++++++++- 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/src-tauri/src/db/dynamodb.rs b/src-tauri/src/db/dynamodb.rs index 36d9010f..d1c1b3d8 100644 --- a/src-tauri/src/db/dynamodb.rs +++ b/src-tauri/src/db/dynamodb.rs @@ -277,23 +277,14 @@ pub fn sign( // ── Requests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── -/// Operations the app may send. Anything else is refused, so the command -/// can't be used to reach other DynamoDB APIs (tables are not created or -/// dropped from here). -const ALLOWED_OPS: &[&str] = &[ - "ListTables", - "DescribeTable", - "DescribeTimeToLive", - "Scan", - "Query", - "GetItem", - "PutItem", - "UpdateItem", - "DeleteItem", - "BatchWriteItem", - "TransactWriteItems", - "ExecuteStatement", -]; +/// Operations the app may send: the API calls the console offers (see +/// [`parse_api_call`]) and PartiQL. Anything else is refused, so the command +/// can't reach other AWS APIs. Who may run which is decided before this, by +/// the access level (`mcp::access`) and the read-only switch. +fn op_allowed(op: &str) -> bool { + op == "ExecuteStatement" + || [API_READS, API_WRITES, API_SCHEMA, API_DANGEROUS].iter().any(|l| l.contains(&op)) +} fn client() -> &'static reqwest::Client { static C: OnceLock = OnceLock::new(); @@ -336,7 +327,7 @@ fn error_message(status: reqwest::StatusCode, body: &str) -> String { /// One DynamoDB API call. pub async fn request(cfg: &DynamoConfig, op: &str, body: &serde_json::Value) -> Result { - if !ALLOWED_OPS.contains(&op) { + if !op_allowed(op) { return Err(format!("DynamoDB operation \"{op}\" is not allowed")); } let region = resolve_region(cfg); @@ -717,6 +708,18 @@ pub fn shape_from_describe( #[cfg(test)] mod tests { + #[test] + fn every_console_api_call_can_be_sent() { + // The console parses these; the request gate must not refuse them. + for op in [super::API_READS, super::API_WRITES, super::API_SCHEMA, super::API_DANGEROUS].concat() { + let call = super::parse_api_call(&format!("{op} {{}}")).expect("parsed").expect("valid"); + assert!(super::op_allowed(&call.0), "{op} is parsed but refused"); + } + assert!(super::op_allowed("ExecuteStatement")); + assert!(!super::op_allowed("DeleteBackup")); + assert!(!super::op_allowed("CreateGlobalTable")); + } + use super::*; #[test] @@ -808,7 +811,7 @@ mod tests { session_token: None, endpoint: Some("http://127.0.0.1:1".into()), }; - assert!(request(&cfg, "DeleteTable", &serde_json::json!({})).await.unwrap_err().contains("not allowed")); + assert!(request(&cfg, "DeleteBackup", &serde_json::json!({})).await.unwrap_err().contains("not allowed")); } /// Against `dev/nosql` DynamoDB Local on port 8000: diff --git a/src/lib/components/StudioShell.svelte b/src/lib/components/StudioShell.svelte index 863b3fed..1803ebdd 100644 --- a/src/lib/components/StudioShell.svelte +++ b/src/lib/components/StudioShell.svelte @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@