From 8d16f8d84e9494d992c4d550d92c363dfeb538c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 21:02:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[CRITICAL]?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20Fix=20timing=20attack=20in=20Bearer=20token=20validation?=
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Hashed both the provided token and the configured authentication tokens to a fixed length using SHA-256 before comparing them with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. This ensures true constant-time evaluation and prevents leaking the secret's length via timing differences.
---
 .jules/sentinel.md                         | 4 ++++
 src/cli/commands/serve.ts                  | 9 +++------
 tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts | 4 +++-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .jules/sentinel.md

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..777489c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2026-06-30 - Prevent Timing Attacks in Token Validation
+**Vulnerability:** Length checks before `crypto.timingSafeEqual` create a short-circuit fast path that leaks the secret's length via timing differences.
+**Learning:** Checking buffer lengths (`tokenBuffer.length === authTokenBuffer.length`) before calling `crypto.timingSafeEqual` defeats the purpose of constant-time evaluation.
+**Prevention:** Always hash both secrets to a fixed length (e.g., using `crypto.createHash('sha256')`) before comparison to ensure true constant-time evaluation.
diff --git a/src/cli/commands/serve.ts b/src/cli/commands/serve.ts
index 2c37293e..e20ec168 100644
--- a/src/cli/commands/serve.ts
+++ b/src/cli/commands/serve.ts
@@ -346,13 +346,10 @@ export async function handleServeCommand(_options: unknown, command: Command) {
 
           let isAuthenticated = false;
           if (scheme?.toLowerCase() === 'bearer' && token) {
-            const tokenBuffer = Buffer.from(token);
+            const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest();
             for (const authToken of authTokens) {
-              const authTokenBuffer = Buffer.from(authToken);
-              if (
-                tokenBuffer.length === authTokenBuffer.length &&
-                crypto.timingSafeEqual(tokenBuffer, authTokenBuffer)
-              ) {
+              const authTokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(authToken).digest();
+              if (crypto.timingSafeEqual(tokenHash, authTokenHash)) {
                 isAuthenticated = true;
                 break;
               }
diff --git a/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts b/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts
index 21905259..f1360d78 100644
--- a/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts
+++ b/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ describe('Prompt templates', () => {
 
     expect(planSystem).toContain('You are SalmonLoop.');
     expect(patchSystem).toContain('You are PATCH, a phase-native diff compiler.');
-    expect(autopilotSystem).toContain('You are a senior software engineer running in "autopilot" mode.');
+    expect(autopilotSystem).toContain(
+      'You are a senior software engineer running in "autopilot" mode.',
+    );
     expect(answerSystem).toContain('You are a coding assistant in "answer" mode.');
     expect(researchSystem).toContain('You are a research assistant.');
   });