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This is a sharp formulation of the hard problem. The goals (no unilateral theft, no silent timeout win for one side, pre-fiat verifiability of the lock + recovery path, and real wallet/privacy/duration constraints) are in tension for off-chain fiat, because the fiat leg is neither cryptographically observable nor atomically reversible. From the existing systems and the Pontmore research notes:
The strict “neither custodian nor adjudicator” goal appears to require an external assumption. The smallest practical ones that still satisfy the listed properties look like:
For Pontmore, the escrow-policy language sketched in the research notes (role + time conditions for settle/refund/split, plus the property checks for enforceability, no unilateral theft, and declared default) seems the right place to make these distinctions mechanical rather than implicit. A client could then refuse a coordination whose policy fails the checks, or require the user to acknowledge the residual trust assumption (“timeout burns both deposits,” “t-of-n resolvers can force settlement,” etc.). Lightning’s short hold horizons make long disputes awkward; on-chain, Cashu P2PK, or Ark-style locks give more room. Any design that claims to meet all four goals without an oracle, a resolver set, or mutual loss should include a concrete threat model and test vectors showing why the unresponsive or dishonest peer cannot force a favorable outcome. Curious whether the Bisq-style burn path or a minimal RRP + party-chosen threshold set is closer to the smallest assumption people would actually accept in a wallet. |
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Pontmore is an open, Nostr-native protocol for discovering Agents and coordinating economic activity through participant-signed, verifiable event chains. Its coordination layer can record who authorized an outcome; it cannot by itself make an escrow enforce that outcome.
This leaves a hard problem for peer-to-peer Bitcoin–fiat trades. The fiat payment happens outside the protocol, so cryptography cannot directly prove that a bank or mobile-money transfer arrived. With a Lightning hold invoice, the party controlling the preimage may be able to withhold it after receiving fiat, while the invoice eventually refunds the Bitcoin payer. A resolver's signed decision alone cannot change that lock.
Pontmore's resolver-recoverable preimage (RRP) draft explores giving a bound resolver the cryptographic ability to recover the preimage. That may make a ruling enforceable without giving the resolver custody, but it still relies on a third-party adjudicator and has unresolved security questions, including selective abort. It does not meet the stricter goal of a trade with neither a third-party custodian nor adjudicator.
Research challenge
Can two participants exchange Bitcoin for off-chain fiat with no trusted custodian or adjudicator, while ensuring that:
Please share protocol designs, relevant proofs or impossibility results, threat models, wallet experiments, and test vectors. If these goals cannot all be met together, what is the smallest trust, oracle, or incentive assumption required—and how should clients explain it?
Existing designs to learn from
These systems make different trust trade-offs; none is presented here as solving the complete no-custodian, no-adjudicator challenge.
Pontmore context
This is an open research question, not a proposed normative change to the current PIPs.
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