diff --git a/.agent/hooks.json b/.agent/hooks.json
index fe5fa23..268226e 100644
--- a/.agent/hooks.json
+++ b/.agent/hooks.json
@@ -14,6 +14,21 @@
       }
     ]
   },
+  "plan-guard": {
+    "enabled": true,
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "run_command",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "node hooks/plan-guard.mjs",
+            "timeout": 10
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  },
   "context-anchor": {
     "enabled": true,
     "PreInvocation": [
@@ -25,4 +40,3 @@
     ]
   }
 }
-
diff --git a/.agent/hooks/branch-guard.mjs b/.agent/hooks/branch-guard.mjs
index ddbea93..42ecf85 100755
--- a/.agent/hooks/branch-guard.mjs
+++ b/.agent/hooks/branch-guard.mjs
@@ -1,21 +1,20 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
-/**
- * ==============================================================================
- * Agentic Android Delivery Kernel — Native Branch Guard Hook (PreToolUse)
- * ==============================================================================
- * Intercepts write_to_file and replace_file_content tool calls.
- * Blocks modifications to repository source files if the current git branch
- * matches the default branch (e.g. main/master), enforcing Gate 1.4 and Rule 0.
- * ==============================================================================
- */
-
 import { execSync } from 'child_process';
 import fs from 'fs';
 import path from 'path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
+
+function getRepoRoot() {
+  try {
+    return execSync('git rev-parse --show-toplevel', { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
+  } catch {
+    return process.cwd();
+  }
+}
 
 function getBlockedBranches() {
   try {
-    const configPath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), 'kernel.config.json');
+    const configPath = path.resolve(getRepoRoot(), 'kernel.config.json');
     if (fs.existsSync(configPath)) {
       const cfg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8'));
       const def = cfg?.git?.defaultBranch || 'main';
@@ -25,54 +24,54 @@ function getBlockedBranches() {
   return ['main', 'master'];
 }
 
-let input = '';
-process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
-process.stdin.on('data', chunk => { input += chunk; });
+function isArtifactPath(targetFile, repoRoot) {
+  if (!targetFile || typeof targetFile !== 'string') return false;
+  const resolved = path.resolve(repoRoot, targetFile);
+  const rel = path.relative(repoRoot, resolved);
+  if (!rel.startsWith('..') && !path.isAbsolute(rel)) return false;
 
-process.stdin.on('end', () => {
-  try {
-    const payload = JSON.parse(input || '{}');
-    const toolCall = payload.toolCall || {};
-    const args = toolCall.args || {};
-    const targetFile = args.TargetFile || '';
+  return resolved.includes('/.gemini/antigravity/brain/') ||
+         resolved.includes('/.system_generated/') ||
+         Boolean(process.env.APP_DATA_DIR && resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(process.env.APP_DATA_DIR)));
+}
 
-    // Allow writes to Antigravity brain artifacts, system logs, or scratchpads
-    const isArtifact = targetFile.includes('/.gemini/antigravity/brain/') ||
-                       targetFile.includes('/.system_generated/') ||
-                       targetFile.endsWith('implementation_plan.md') ||
-                       targetFile.endsWith('walkthrough.md');
+function inspectFileWrite(targetFile, currentBranch, blockedBranches, repoRoot) {
+  if (isArtifactPath(targetFile, repoRoot)) return { allow: true };
 
-    if (isArtifact) {
-      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
-      process.exit(0);
-    }
+  if (blockedBranches.includes(currentBranch)) {
+    return {
+      allow: false,
+      reason: `[Rule 0 Violation S-04] Direct modification to '${targetFile}' on '${currentBranch}' is blocked. Cut a dedicated feature branch first.`
+    };
+  }
+  return { allow: true };
+}
 
-    // Determine current git branch
-    let currentBranch = '';
+const isMain = Boolean(process.argv[1] && fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === path.resolve(process.argv[1]));
+if (isMain) {
+  let input = '';
+  process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
+  process.stdin.on('data', chunk => { input += chunk; });
+  process.stdin.on('end', () => {
     try {
-      currentBranch = execSync('git branch --show-current', {
-        encoding: 'utf8',
-        stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore']
-      }).trim();
-    } catch {
-      currentBranch = '';
-    }
+      const payload = JSON.parse(input || '{}');
+      const targetFile = payload?.toolCall?.args?.TargetFile || '';
+      const repoRoot = getRepoRoot();
+      let currentBranch = '';
+      try {
+        currentBranch = execSync('git branch --show-current', { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
+      } catch {}
 
-    const blockedBranches = getBlockedBranches();
-    if (blockedBranches.includes(currentBranch)) {
-      const response = {
-        decision: 'deny',
-        reason: `[Rule 0 Violation] Direct modification to '${targetFile}' on branch '${currentBranch}' is strictly blocked.\n` +
-                `You must complete Phase 1 Inception, post the 4-Pillar Spec, obtain explicit written approval at Gate 1.4, ` +
-                `and cut a dedicated branch (<type>/issue-<id>-<slug>) before modifying repository files.`
-      };
-      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(response));
-      process.exit(0);
+      const res = inspectFileWrite(targetFile, currentBranch, getBlockedBranches(), repoRoot);
+      if (!res.allow) {
+        process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'deny', reason: res.reason }));
+        process.exit(0);
+      }
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
+    } catch {
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
     }
+  });
+}
 
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
-  } catch {
-    // Fail-safe to allow in case of unparseable payload
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
-  }
-});
+export { isArtifactPath, inspectFileWrite, getBlockedBranches, getRepoRoot };
diff --git a/.agent/hooks/plan-guard.mjs b/.agent/hooks/plan-guard.mjs
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..a04c3d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.agent/hooks/plan-guard.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+import { execSync } from 'child_process';
+import fs from 'fs';
+import path from 'path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';
+
+function getRepoRoot() {
+  try {
+    return execSync('git rev-parse --show-toplevel', { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
+  } catch {
+    return process.cwd();
+  }
+}
+
+function getBlockedBranches() {
+  try {
+    const configPath = path.resolve(getRepoRoot(), 'kernel.config.json');
+    if (fs.existsSync(configPath)) {
+      const cfg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8'));
+      const def = cfg?.git?.defaultBranch || 'main';
+      return [def, 'main', 'master'].filter((v, i, a) => a.indexOf(v) === i);
+    }
+  } catch {}
+  return ['main', 'master'];
+}
+
+function tokenize(cmd) {
+  return cmd.match(/(?:[^\s"']+|"[^"]*"|'[^']*')+/g) || [];
+}
+
+function inspectCommand(commandLine, currentBranch, blockedBranches) {
+  if (!commandLine || typeof commandLine !== 'string') return { allow: true };
+
+  // 1. Hook Path Tampering: Block overriding core.hooksPath or GIT_HOOKS_PATH
+  if (/-c\s*core\.hooksPath/i.test(commandLine) ||
+      /\bGIT_HOOKS_PATH\b/i.test(commandLine) ||
+      /\bcore\.hooksPath\s*=/i.test(commandLine)) {
+    return {
+      allow: false,
+      reason: "[Security Violation S-02] Tampering with 'core.hooksPath' is strictly prohibited. Pre-commit airbag cannot be deactivated."
+    };
+  }
+
+  const segments = commandLine.split(/(?:&&|\|\||[;\n|&])/).map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+
+  for (const segment of segments) {
+    const tokens = tokenize(segment);
+    let i = 0;
+    while (i < tokens.length && /^[a-zA-Z_]\w*=/.test(tokens[i])) i++;
+
+    if (i >= tokens.length || tokens[i] !== 'git') continue;
+    i++;
+
+    const flagsWithArg = new Set(['-C', '-c', '--git-dir', '--work-tree', '--namespace', '--super-prefix', '--exec-path', '--config-env']);
+    let subcommand = null;
+    let subArgs = [];
+
+    while (i < tokens.length) {
+      const t = tokens[i];
+      if (t.startsWith('--')) {
+        i += (!t.includes('=') && flagsWithArg.has(t)) ? 2 : 1;
+      } else if (t.startsWith('-')) {
+        i += flagsWithArg.has(t) ? 2 : 1;
+      } else {
+        subcommand = t;
+        subArgs = tokens.slice(i + 1);
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!subcommand) continue;
+
+    if (subcommand === 'commit') {
+      const hasNoVerify = subArgs.some(a => (!a.startsWith('"') && !a.startsWith("'")) && (a === '--no-verify' || /^-[a-zA-Z]*n[a-zA-Z]*$/.test(a)));
+      if (hasNoVerify) {
+        return {
+          allow: false,
+          reason: "[Airbag Bypass S-02] 'git commit' with '--no-verify' or '-n' is strictly prohibited. All commits must pass the airbag."
+        };
+      }
+
+      if (blockedBranches.includes(currentBranch)) {
+        return {
+          allow: false,
+          reason: `[Rule 0 Violation S-01] Direct 'git commit' on protected branch '${currentBranch}' is blocked. Cut a dedicated feature branch first.`
+        };
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (subcommand === 'push') {
+      if (subArgs.some(a => a === '--no-verify')) {
+        return { allow: false, reason: "[Airbag Bypass S-02] 'git push' with '--no-verify' is strictly prohibited." };
+      }
+
+      if (blockedBranches.includes(currentBranch)) {
+        return { allow: false, reason: `[Security Violation S-01] Direct 'git push' from protected branch '${currentBranch}' is strictly blocked.` };
+      }
+
+      const targetsBlocked = subArgs.some(a => {
+        const c = a.replace(/^['"]|['"]$/g, '');
+        return blockedBranches.includes(c) || c.endsWith(':main') || c.endsWith(':master') || c === 'origin/main' || c === 'origin/master';
+      });
+
+      if (targetsBlocked) {
+        return { allow: false, reason: "[Security Violation S-01] Direct 'git push' targeting protected branch 'main'/'master' is strictly prohibited." };
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (subcommand === 'merge' && blockedBranches.includes(currentBranch)) {
+      return { allow: false, reason: `[Rule 0 Violation S-01] Direct 'git merge' on protected branch '${currentBranch}' is blocked. Merge via PR at Gate 3.5.` };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { allow: true };
+}
+
+const isMain = Boolean(process.argv[1] && fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === path.resolve(process.argv[1]));
+if (isMain) {
+  let input = '';
+  process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
+  process.stdin.on('data', chunk => { input += chunk; });
+  process.stdin.on('end', () => {
+    try {
+      const payload = JSON.parse(input || '{}');
+      const commandLine = payload?.toolCall?.args?.CommandLine || payload?.toolCall?.args?.command || payload?.toolCall?.args?.Command || '';
+
+      let currentBranch = '';
+      try {
+        currentBranch = execSync('git branch --show-current', { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
+      } catch {}
+
+      const res = inspectCommand(commandLine, currentBranch, getBlockedBranches());
+      if (!res.allow) {
+        process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'deny', reason: res.reason }));
+        process.exit(0);
+      }
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
+    } catch {
+      process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'allow' }));
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+export { inspectCommand, tokenize, getBlockedBranches, getRepoRoot };
diff --git a/.agent/personas/p4-system-architect.md b/.agent/personas/p4-system-architect.md
index 0e4dcbb..1811707 100644
--- a/.agent/personas/p4-system-architect.md
+++ b/.agent/personas/p4-system-architect.md
@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@ tools:
     - find_by_name
     - grep_search
     - list_dir
-    - run_command (read-only verification: test scripts & rules)
     - GitHubMCP:add_issue_comment
   deny:
     - write_to_file
     - replace_file_content
+    - run_command
     - GitHubMCP:create_issue
     - GitHubMCP:create_pull_request
     - GitHubMCP:merge_pull_request
diff --git a/scripts/test-runtime-guardrails.mjs b/scripts/test-runtime-guardrails.mjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8070f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/test-runtime-guardrails.mjs
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * ==============================================================================
+ * Agentic Android Delivery Kernel — Runtime Guardrails Test Suite
+ * ==============================================================================
+ * Validates:
+ * 1. Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP): run_command restricted from P1-P4.
+ * 2. Plan Guard (plan-guard.mjs): command sanitization, airbag & branch protection.
+ * 3. Branch Guard (branch-guard.mjs): canonical artifact path hardening (S-04).
+ * ==============================================================================
+ */
+
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import fs from 'fs';
+import path from 'path';
+import { inspectCommand } from '../.agent/hooks/plan-guard.mjs';
+import { inspectFileWrite, isArtifactPath } from '../.agent/hooks/branch-guard.mjs';
+
+const repoRoot = path.resolve(process.cwd());
+const blockedBranches = ['main', 'master'];
+
+console.log('🧪 Starting Runtime Guardrails & PoLP Verification Suite...\n');
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 1. Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) Persona Audit
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+console.log('📋 1. Verifying Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) on Personas:');
+
+const personasDir = path.resolve(repoRoot, '.agent/personas');
+const personaFiles = [
+  'p1-product-planner.md',
+  'p2-design-lead.md',
+  'p3-privacy-data.md',
+  'p4-system-architect.md'
+];
+
+for (const pf of personaFiles) {
+  const content = fs.readFileSync(path.join(personasDir, pf), 'utf8');
+  const allowMatch = content.match(/allow:([\s\S]*?)deny:/);
+  const denyMatch = content.match(/deny:([\s\S]*?)contracts:/);
+
+  assert.ok(allowMatch, `${pf} must have an 'allow:' section`);
+  assert.ok(denyMatch, `${pf} must have a 'deny:' section`);
+
+  const allowedTools = allowMatch[1];
+  const deniedTools = denyMatch[1];
+
+  assert.ok(
+    !allowedTools.includes('run_command'),
+    `❌ PoLP Violation: ${pf} allows 'run_command'`
+  );
+  assert.ok(
+    deniedTools.includes('run_command'),
+    `❌ PoLP Violation: ${pf} must deny 'run_command'`
+  );
+  console.log(`  ✅ [OK] ${pf}: run_command revoked & denied`);
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 2. Plan Guard (plan-guard.mjs) Verification
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+console.log('\n🛡️ 2. Verifying Plan Guard (plan-guard.mjs) Runtime Rejections:');
+
+const testCasesPlanGuard = [
+  // Airbag Bypass Checks
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git commit with --no-verify',
+    cmd: 'git commit --no-verify -m "bypass"',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Airbag Bypass'
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git commit with -n flag',
+    cmd: 'git commit -n -m "bypass"',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Airbag Bypass'
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git commit with combined -nm flag',
+    cmd: 'git commit -nm "bypass"',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Airbag Bypass'
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git push with --no-verify',
+    cmd: 'git push --no-verify origin feat/issue-3-test',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Airbag Bypass'
+  },
+
+  // Hook Path Tampering Checks (S-02)
+  {
+    name: 'Reject inline -c core.hooksPath override',
+    cmd: 'git -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null commit -m "bypass"',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Tampering with \'core.hooksPath\''
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject GIT_HOOKS_PATH environment override',
+    cmd: 'GIT_HOOKS_PATH=/dev/null git commit -m "bypass"',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Tampering with \'core.hooksPath\''
+  },
+
+  // Protected Branch Commit Checks (S-01)
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git commit on main',
+    cmd: 'git commit -m "direct commit"',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Direct \'git commit\' on protected branch'
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject chained git add && git commit on main',
+    cmd: 'git add -A && git commit -m "chained bypass"',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Direct \'git commit\' on protected branch'
+  },
+
+  // Protected Branch Push Checks (S-01)
+  {
+    name: 'Reject direct git push while on main',
+    cmd: 'git push',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Direct \'git push\' from protected branch'
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git push targeting main from feature branch',
+    cmd: 'git push origin main',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Direct \'git push\' targeting protected branch'
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Reject git push targeting HEAD:main',
+    cmd: 'git push origin HEAD:main',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: false,
+    expectedErrorSubstring: 'Direct \'git push\' targeting protected branch'
+  },
+
+  // Permitted Commands
+  {
+    name: 'Allow ./gradlew testDebugUnitTest',
+    cmd: './gradlew testDebugUnitTest',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow ./scripts/quality-check.sh',
+    cmd: './scripts/quality-check.sh',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow git status on any branch',
+    cmd: 'git status',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow git log -n 5 (flag -n on log is not commit)',
+    cmd: 'git log -n 5',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow normal git commit on feature branch',
+    cmd: 'git commit -m "feat(security): valid commit"',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow normal git push of feature branch',
+    cmd: 'git push origin feat/issue-3-test',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-test',
+    expectAllow: true
+  }
+];
+
+for (const tc of testCasesPlanGuard) {
+  const result = inspectCommand(tc.cmd, tc.branch, blockedBranches);
+  assert.equal(
+    result.allow,
+    tc.expectAllow,
+    `❌ Assertion failed for '${tc.name}': expected allow=${tc.expectAllow}, got allow=${result.allow} (reason: ${result.reason})`
+  );
+  if (!tc.expectAllow && tc.expectedErrorSubstring) {
+    assert.ok(
+      result.reason && result.reason.includes(tc.expectedErrorSubstring),
+      `❌ Expected error substring '${tc.expectedErrorSubstring}', got '${result.reason}'`
+    );
+  }
+  console.log(`  ✅ [OK] ${tc.name}`);
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// 3. Branch Guard (branch-guard.mjs) Path Hardening Verification (S-04)
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+console.log('\n🔒 3. Verifying Branch Guard (branch-guard.mjs) Path Hardening:');
+
+const testCasesBranchGuard = [
+  // S-04 Escape Hatch Exploits: Must be DENIED
+  {
+    name: 'Deny write to repo file named app/src/main/implementation_plan.md on main',
+    file: 'app/src/main/implementation_plan.md',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Deny write to repo file named scripts/walkthrough.md on main',
+    file: 'scripts/walkthrough.md',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Deny write to repo root implementation_plan.md on main',
+    file: 'implementation_plan.md',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Deny write to source file app/src/main/java/MainActivity.kt on main',
+    file: 'app/src/main/java/MainActivity.kt',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: false
+  },
+
+  // Legitimate External Brain Artifacts: Must be ALLOWED on any branch
+  {
+    name: 'Allow external brain artifact implementation_plan.md',
+    file: '/Users/nicolasvd/.gemini/antigravity/brain/616e7271-ff38-4732-aead-b484ba0ee39d/implementation_plan.md',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow external brain artifact walkthrough.md',
+    file: '/Users/nicolasvd/.gemini/antigravity/brain/616e7271-ff38-4732-aead-b484ba0ee39d/walkthrough.md',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Allow external system_generated step output',
+    file: '/Users/nicolasvd/.gemini/antigravity/brain/616e7271-ff38-4732-aead-b484ba0ee39d/.system_generated/steps/1/output.txt',
+    branch: 'main',
+    expectAllow: true
+  },
+
+  // Feature Branch Writes: Must be ALLOWED
+  {
+    name: 'Allow source file write on dedicated feature branch',
+    file: 'app/src/main/java/MainActivity.kt',
+    branch: 'feat/issue-3-shell-execution-guardrails',
+    expectAllow: true
+  }
+];
+
+for (const tc of testCasesBranchGuard) {
+  const result = inspectFileWrite(tc.file, tc.branch, blockedBranches, repoRoot);
+  assert.equal(
+    result.allow,
+    tc.expectAllow,
+    `❌ Assertion failed for '${tc.name}': expected allow=${tc.expectAllow}, got allow=${result.allow} (reason: ${result.reason})`
+  );
+  console.log(`  ✅ [OK] ${tc.name}`);
+}
+
+console.log('\n🎉 ALL RUNTIME GUARDRAILS, PoLP & PATH HARDENING TESTS PASSED 100%!');
diff --git a/scripts/validate-docs.sh b/scripts/validate-docs.sh
index 56a240c..884b284 100755
--- a/scripts/validate-docs.sh
+++ b/scripts/validate-docs.sh
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ check_executable ".agent/hooks/pre-commit-airbag.sh" "Hook Pré-Commit Airbag"
 check_executable ".agent/hooks/post-merge-dual-sync.sh" "Hook Post-Merge Dual-Sync"
 check_file ".agent/hooks.json" "Déclaration Native des Hooks Antigravity" 1000
 check_executable ".agent/hooks/branch-guard.mjs" "Hook Branch-Guard PreToolUse" 3000
+check_executable ".agent/hooks/plan-guard.mjs" "Hook Plan-Guard PreToolUse" 5500
 check_executable ".agent/hooks/pre-invocation-anchor.sh" "Hook Context-Anchor PreInvocation" 1000
 check_executable ".agent/hooks/post-checkout" "Hook Post-Checkout Issue Progress Sync" 2000