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+# 100 — Release-safety audit of origin/main..origin/dev
+
+Unit: 260820_bug_pr_backlog_consolidation
+Range: `8e01dd4e8..a584890f8` — 87 commits, 22 merges, 108 changed files.
+Verification host: `ssh lidge:~/ci-wp3/opencodex`. Nothing heavy ran on the workstation.
+
+Most of this range landed hours earlier through an admin-override merge run, so it had never
+been read as one body of work. Five passes, each with its own evidence. A pass that says "looks
+fine" without its own artifact is not a pass.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**Ship-able after two fixes**, both of which are in this record with a RED-proven regression.
+Neither was found by per-PR CI, and one of them could not have been: it only exists when two
+independently-correct changes compose.
+
+## Pass 1 — security boundary (7 credential-touching PRs)
+
+| PR | Verdict |
+|---|---|
+| #2137 bearer admission | SAFE — narrows substitution. `admission.source === "bearer"` requires an exact match against `OPENCODEX_API_AUTH_TOKEN` or a configured key, so it is not caller-selectable by an unauthenticated party. |
+| #2147 xAI OAuth 401 replay | SAFE — refresh is pinned to the rejected snapshot's account, one replay (an `if`, not a loop), refreshed token never logged. |
+| #2149 OAuth commit ownership | SAFE — assertion runs under the lock with no `await` before persistence, fails closed, atomic 0600 rename. |
+| #2164 OpenCode Go quota | SAFE — the widened predicate still requires exact URL + adapter + key auth, and the fetch ignores the configured URL entirely in favor of a compile-time constant with `redirect: "error"`. |
+| #2166 shadow marker | **FINDING, FIXED** — see below. |
+| #2146 entitlement discovery | FINDING, recorded not fixed — see "Deliberately left". |
+| #2148 baseUrl override | FINDING, recorded not fixed — see "Deliberately left". |
+
+### FIXED — #2166: caller-controlled text reached a durable log
+
+The shadow-call intercept matches by **prefix**, so a caller can send `gpt-5.6-luna` plus
+arbitrary trailing text and still be intercepted. The whole raw string was recorded as
+`shadowCallRewrittenFrom`, which is persisted to `usage.jsonl` and served from `/api/logs`.
+
+The sanitizer on that path is not sufficient, for two independent reasons — both run against
+the shipped code, not reasoned about:
+
+```
+"gpt-5.6-luna\nBearer sk-abc123def456ghi789jkl"      -> "gpt-5.6-lunaBearer [REDACTED]"
+"gpt-5.6-luna\nAIzaSyA1B2C3D4E5F6G7H8I9J0K1L2M3N4O5P6" -> unchanged, key intact
+```
+
+1. Control characters are stripped **before** redaction, so the newline that separated marker
+   from credential is gone by the time the `Bearer` rule looks for a word boundary.
+2. The runtime redactor is a deny-list. An `AIza`-shaped Google key has no rule and survives.
+
+Fix (PR #2170): record the operator-configured prefix that matched, via
+`shadowSourceModelPrefix()`. The field can then only hold a value the operator configured.
+That removes the class instead of adding one more pattern to a deny-list — which matters,
+because the next unrecognized credential family would reopen a pattern-based fix.
+
+RED proof: reverting the two source files fails exactly the two new tests, 15 pass / 2 fail.
+
+## Pass 2 — cross-PR interaction
+
+The shared-contract map found six files touched by 2+ PRs. Three interactions were reproduced;
+two were already closed by the time of this audit, one was not.
+
+**Closed already, recorded for the history:** an admission bearer could escape through a
+custom-named canonical transport, because #2137 decided substitution from the provider NAME
+while the adapter recognized the same row by TRANSPORT. Two predicates answering one question.
+Fixed by #2169, verified present at the current `dev` tip.
+
+**FIXED here — `tool_search_call` got the wrong id namespace.** #2145 restores a lowered
+tool_search as `tool_search_call` with no id; #2142's universal backfill then names it. The
+backfill's prefix table had no entry for the type, so it produced `item_ocx_0`:
+
+```
+{"type":"tool_search_call",...}  -> id: "item_ocx_0"
+{"type":"function_call",...}     -> id: "fc_ocx_0"
+```
+
+Not cosmetic: `stripInvalidItemIds` deletes any id whose prefix does not match its type, and
+it lists `tsc_` as the only valid prefix for that type. The id survived the turn that created
+it and was silently dropped on the next one, leaving the client an item it could not correlate.
+`custom_tool_call` had the identical gap. Fix: PR #2173, with the superset invariant between
+the two tables written at the table.
+
+Both PRs' focused suites pass in isolation — neither composes restoration with backfill. This
+is the whole argument for a cross-PR pass existing.
+
+**No interaction found**, each with its reason: #2160 static headers × #2148 overrides (neither
+overridden provider has static headers); #2160 × #2164 (opencode-go owns no static headers);
+#2166 log field × #2147 tier writers (independent fields, no last-writer overwrite); #2151 ×
+#2165 (request construction vs request-local parseStream state, no shared lifecycle); #2138 ×
+#2145 (canonical-forward vs noncanonical, activation sets do not intersect); #2149 × #2147
+(both account- and generation-guarded).
+
+## Pass 3 — default-install wire/behavior regression
+
+**PASS.** Byte-identical on both revisions for: OpenAI-compatible key provider, direct Anthropic
+key provider, Google AI Studio, plain native Chat, unsupported caller `service_tier`, caller
+reasoning `high`. Verified by SHA-256 over the built request.
+
+Six differences found, every one attributed to an intending PR: AgentRouter framing (#2162,
+exact-host gated — a non-AgentRouter Anthropic request is byte-identical), `opencode-free`
+static headers (#2160, the only registry row with them), `service_tier: priority` on an exact
+Fast-capable model (#2151), `prompt_cache_retention` removal on canonical GPT-5.6 (#2138),
+tool_search lowering on noncanonical upstreams (#2145), xAI OAuth Responses routing (#2147).
+
+`shadowCallRewrittenFrom` appears in `usage.jsonl` only when the explicitly-enabled shadow gate
+matches; an ordinary request writes the same key set as before.
+
+## Pass 4 — repository invariants
+
+All green on `ssh lidge`: `tests/core-lab-boundary.test.ts` + `tests/repo-hygiene.test.ts`
+24 pass / 0 fail; `bun run privacy:scan` passed; `bun x tsc --noEmit` exit 0; no `160000`
+gitlink in the tree; no `src/lab/` file changed in the range and every protected core path
+stayed transitively Lab-free.
+
+## Pass 5 — release mechanics
+
+Version line `2.27.0` on both `main` and `dev` — coherent, and this campaign did not move it.
+No half-finished migration found. No behavior observed that depends on a particular branch
+being checked out.
+
+## Deliberately left — not fixed, recorded with the reason
+
+**#2146 — entitlement discovery uses more accounts than the request needs.** An authenticated
+`/v1/models`, or any account-gated request, enumerates main plus every pool row with a
+syntactically valid id and queries each one's credential concurrently. A request bound to
+account B can therefore cause account A's token to be refreshed, persisted, and sent to ChatGPT
+discovery. Paused and needs-reauth accounts are not excluded.
+
+Each token stays paired with its own `chatgptAccountId`, so this is not credential
+misbinding, and no token reaches a log or the cache (only model sets and SHA-256 fingerprints).
+It is excessive credential use with a cross-account side effect. Narrowing the candidate set to
+the accounts a request actually needs is a product decision about what `/v1/models` is meant
+to enumerate — that is a NEEDS_HUMAN call, not something to infer from the code.
+
+**#2148 — an old config silently activates on upgrade.** `allowBaseUrlOverride` is registry-only
+and never persisted, and the router honors any already-saved resolved `baseUrl` the moment the
+flag appears. Reproduced:
+
+```
+routedProviderConfig("anthropic",          {baseUrl:"https://relay.example.com/v1"})  -> honored
+routedProviderConfig("google-antigravity", {baseUrl:"https://relay.example.com/v1"})  -> honored
+```
+
+So a custom URL that older releases accepted and ignored starts receiving the OAuth bearer
+after upgrade, with no consent step. The transport gate does hold: public cleartext HTTP is
+refused for these providers, and URL userinfo is rejected at config validation.
+
+Scope, measured rather than assumed: this range newly opts in exactly **two** providers
+(`anthropic`, `google-antigravity`). Thirteen others already had the flag on `main`, so the
+upgrade-activation shape is pre-existing behavior, not introduced here. Whether it needs a
+persisted consent marker or a release note is a product decision.
+
+**link-local / unspecified addresses under `allowPrivateNetwork`.** `https://169.254.1.1` and
+`https://0.0.0.0` are permitted when the flag is set, which reads oddly against the policy
+comment. Confirmed **pre-existing**: the classification and the waiver are both unchanged in
+this range. Recorded so it is not rediscovered as new, but it is not this release's regression.
+
+## Fixes pushed
+
+| Finding | PR | RED proof |
+|---|---|---|
+| #2166 caller-controlled marker reaches usage.jsonl and /api/logs | #2170 | 15 pass / 2 fail with the fix reverted |
+| tool_search_call / custom_tool_call id namespace | #2173 | 20 pass / 2 fail with the fix reverted |
+
+Full suite at the tip carrying both: **13717 pass / 15 skip / 0 fail** across 866 files;
+typecheck exit 0; privacy scan passed. All on `ssh lidge`.
+