diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/providers.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/providers.md
index e4c20b5fc4..427a8b1e3a 100644
--- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/providers.md
+++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/providers.md
@@ -143,7 +143,9 @@ so opencodex cannot pin or verify that peer. This is an explicit security limita
 Private/local destinations require `allowPrivateNetwork: true` and, when an outbound proxy is active,
 a matching `NO_PROXY` entry. Loopback is added automatically; list each LAN host explicitly because
 CIDR entries are not interpreted. The matcher supports exact hosts, domain suffixes, optional ports,
-bracketed IPv6, and `*`; for example, list `192.168.1.50` explicitly. Metadata and link-local
+bracketed IPv6, and `*`; for example, list `192.168.1.50` explicitly. Hostname answers that resolve
+only to Clash/Surge/Mihomo fake-IP space (`198.18.0.0/15`) are not treated as private destinations
+and keep using the outbound proxy. Metadata and link-local
 destinations stay blocked. Diagnostic
 requests reject redirects and report a credential-stripped target. Ordinary provider request redirect
 review remains separate from this diagnostic guard.
diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/configuration/providers.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/configuration/providers.md
index 1d2a8c10c9..c60d755934 100644
--- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/configuration/providers.md
+++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/zh-cn/reference/configuration/providers.md
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ API key 提供者可以持有字面量 key，或环境引用。OAuth 提供者
 
 当 `HTTP_PROXY`、`HTTPS_PROXY` 或 `ALL_PROXY` 生效时，这些操作会继续使用 Bun 的原生 fetch。URL 和字面量地址检查仍会执行，但最终路由、DNS 解析结果和对端由代理决定，因此 opencodex 无法固定或验证该对端。这是一个明确的安全限制。
 
-私有/本地目标需要 `allowPrivateNetwork: true`，并且在出站代理启用时，还需要匹配的 `NO_PROXY` 条目。回环地址会自动加入；每个 LAN 主机都必须显式列出，因为 CIDR 条目不会被解释。匹配器支持精确主机、域后缀、可选端口、带方括号的 IPv6 以及 `*`；例如，应显式列出 `192.168.1.50`。元数据和链路本地目标仍会被阻止。诊断请求会拒绝重定向，并报告一个已剥离凭据的目标。普通提供者请求的重定向审查仍然独立于这个诊断保护。
+私有/本地目标需要 `allowPrivateNetwork: true`，并且在出站代理启用时，还需要匹配的 `NO_PROXY` 条目。回环地址会自动加入；每个 LAN 主机都必须显式列出，因为 CIDR 条目不会被解释。匹配器支持精确主机、域后缀、可选端口、带方括号的 IPv6 以及 `*`；例如，应显式列出 `192.168.1.50`。主机名若只解析到 Clash/Surge/Mihomo fake-IP 网段（`198.18.0.0/15`），不会被当成私有目标，仍走出站代理。元数据和链路本地目标仍会被阻止。诊断请求会拒绝重定向，并报告一个已剥离凭据的目标。普通提供者请求的重定向审查仍然独立于这个诊断保护。
 
 ## Codex 账户池
 
diff --git a/src/lib/destination-policy.ts b/src/lib/destination-policy.ts
index af68907365..d1be4f4b29 100644
--- a/src/lib/destination-policy.ts
+++ b/src/lib/destination-policy.ts
@@ -108,6 +108,14 @@ function classifyIpv6(hostname: string): DestinationAssessment {
   return { kind: "private", detail: "non-global address" };
 }
 
+/** Clash / Surge / Mihomo fake-IP DNS uses IANA benchmark space 198.18.0.0/15. */
+export function isBenchmarkAddress(address: string): boolean {
+  const hostname = normalizeHostname(address);
+  if (isIP(hostname) !== 4) return false;
+  const assessment = classifyIpv4(hostname);
+  return assessment.kind === "private" && assessment.detail === "benchmark address";
+}
+
 function assessDestination(baseUrl: string): DestinationAssessment | null {
   try {
     const parsed = new URL(baseUrl.trim());
@@ -294,6 +302,13 @@ export async function resolvePublicAddresses(
     const ipKind = isIP(address) || (family === 4 || family === 6 ? family : 0);
     const assessment = ipKind === 4 ? classifyIpv4(address) : ipKind === 6 ? classifyIpv6(normalizeHostname(address)) : null;
     if (!assessment || assessment.kind !== "public") {
+      // Hostname → 198.18.0.0/15 is Clash/Surge/Mihomo fake-IP DNS, not a LAN
+      // provider. Accept it without allowPrivateNetwork and do not mark the
+      // destination private, so outbound can still take the HTTP(S)_PROXY path.
+      if (assessment?.detail === "benchmark address") {
+        validatedAddresses.push({ address, family: ipKind === 4 || ipKind === 6 ? ipKind : (family || 4) });
+        continue;
+      }
       const allowedPrivateAddress = privateNetworkAllowed
         && assessment
         && (assessment.kind === "loopback" || assessment.kind === "private");
diff --git a/src/lib/provider-outbound.ts b/src/lib/provider-outbound.ts
index 67b55b4706..ce3ee591bb 100644
--- a/src/lib/provider-outbound.ts
+++ b/src/lib/provider-outbound.ts
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import type { OcxProviderConfig } from "../types";
 import {
   assessUrlDestination,
   DestinationDnsResolutionError,
+  isBenchmarkAddress,
   providerAllowsPrivateNetwork,
   providerDestinationConfigError,
   resolvePublicAddresses,
@@ -160,7 +161,12 @@ async function providerOutboundRequest(
     warnProxyDnsDegradationOnce();
     return globalThis.fetch(url, { ...init, method, redirect: "manual" });
   }
-  if (proxyConfigured && !resolved.privateNetwork) {
+  const clashFakeIpOnly = resolved.addresses.length > 0
+    && resolved.addresses.every(address => isBenchmarkAddress(address.address));
+  // Clash fake-IP (198.18.0.0/15) is a local DNS artifact. Send it through the
+  // configured HTTP(S) proxy as a hostname CONNECT — the same path a public
+  // destination takes. Requiring NO_PROXY would pin-connect to the fake-IP.
+  if (proxyConfigured && (!resolved.privateNetwork || clashFakeIpOnly)) {
     warnProxyBoundaryOnce();
     return globalThis.fetch(url, { ...init, method, redirect: "manual" });
   }
diff --git a/structure/04_transports-and-sidecars.md b/structure/04_transports-and-sidecars.md
index 1db9a6fe1d..166ca72577 100644
--- a/structure/04_transports-and-sidecars.md
+++ b/structure/04_transports-and-sidecars.md
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ ALL_PROXY, and NO_PROXY semantics remain authoritative. The wrapper classifies s
 only a typed DNS-resolution failure degrades to proxy resolution; every literal, metadata, and
 resolved-address policy error still rejects. Proxy mode logs once that the proxy-selected peer
 cannot be pinned. Private destinations additionally require allowPrivateNetwork plus NO_PROXY.
+Hostname answers that are only Clash/Surge/Mihomo fake-IP space (198.18.0.0/15) are not treated as
+private destinations and stay on the proxy path.
 
 Both paths reject redirects and expose only credential-stripped final-address guidance. This phase
 does not cover ordinary requests, streaming, retries, or per-hop redirect review on those paths.
diff --git a/tests/destination-policy-resolved.test.ts b/tests/destination-policy-resolved.test.ts
index 2ae103c135..92f69291cd 100644
--- a/tests/destination-policy-resolved.test.ts
+++ b/tests/destination-policy-resolved.test.ts
@@ -200,4 +200,28 @@ describe("resolvePublicAddresses — caller-specific diagnostics", () => {
     expect(resolved.privateNetwork).toBe(true);
     expect(resolved.addresses).toEqual([{ address: "192.168.1.50", family: 4 }]);
   });
+
+  test("hostname Clash fake-IP answers are accepted without marking the destination private", async () => {
+    lookupMock.mockResolvedValueOnce([{ address: "198.18.56.214", family: 4 }]);
+
+    const resolved = await resolvePublicAddresses(
+      "https://www.packyapi.com/v1/models",
+      { context: "provider URL" },
+    );
+
+    expect(resolved.privateNetwork).toBe(false);
+    expect(resolved.addresses).toEqual([{ address: "198.18.56.214", family: 4 }]);
+  });
+
+  test("hostname Clash fake-IP mixed with RFC1918 still requires the private-network opt-in", async () => {
+    lookupMock.mockResolvedValueOnce([
+      { address: "198.18.56.214", family: 4 },
+      { address: "10.0.0.5", family: 4 },
+    ]);
+
+    await expect(resolvePublicAddresses(
+      "https://rebind.example.com/v1/models",
+      { context: "provider URL" },
+    )).rejects.toThrow("private-network address (10.0.0.5)");
+  });
 });
diff --git a/tests/provider-outbound.test.ts b/tests/provider-outbound.test.ts
index 8f5e944f24..c09575a90f 100644
--- a/tests/provider-outbound.test.ts
+++ b/tests/provider-outbound.test.ts
@@ -97,6 +97,45 @@ describe("provider outbound GET transport", () => {
     expect(captured.address).toBeUndefined();
   });
 
+  test("Clash fake-IP behind a configured proxy uses hostname CONNECT instead of NO_PROXY", async () => {
+    const proxyUrl = "http://127.0.0.1:9";
+    process.env.HTTPS_PROXY = proxyUrl;
+    process.env.https_proxy = proxyUrl;
+    process.env.NO_PROXY = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1,[::1]";
+    process.env.no_proxy = "localhost,127.0.0.1,::1,[::1]";
+    const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+    const fetchMock = mock(async (url: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      expect(String(url)).toBe("https://www.packyapi.com/v1/models");
+      expect(init?.redirect).toBe("manual");
+      return new Response('{"data":[{"id":"gpt-5.5"}]}', {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+      });
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+    globalThis.fetch = fetchMock;
+    try {
+      const { providerOutboundGet } = await import("../src/lib/provider-outbound");
+      const { dependencies, captured } = directDependencies(new Response(null, { status: 500 }), {
+        privateNetwork: true,
+        address: "198.18.56.214",
+      });
+
+      const response = await providerOutboundGet(
+        "packy",
+        { baseUrl: "https://www.packyapi.com/v1", allowPrivateNetwork: true },
+        "https://www.packyapi.com/v1/models",
+        {},
+        dependencies,
+      );
+
+      expect(await response.json()).toEqual({ data: [{ id: "gpt-5.5" }] });
+      expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(captured.address).toBeUndefined();
+    } finally {
+      globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+    }
+  });
+
   test("built-in ollama admits loopback discovery without an explicit allowPrivateNetwork flag (#758)", async () => {
     for (const key of proxyKeys) delete process.env[key];
     const { providerOutboundGet } = await import("../src/lib/provider-outbound");