diff --git a/docs/ASI_MAPPING.md b/docs/ASI_MAPPING.md
index 28a844c..c0ca24d 100644
--- a/docs/ASI_MAPPING.md
+++ b/docs/ASI_MAPPING.md
@@ -17,17 +17,20 @@ REAP cites [OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026)](https://genai.owasp.or
 | `mcp-redirect-uri-laxity` | ASI03 | Broad redirect registration enables confused-deputy and code-interception attacks against the agent's identity. |
 | `mcp-session-id-entropy` | ASI03 | A guessable session ID lets an attacker assume another caller's identity directly. |
 | `mcp-host-header-validation` | ASI03 | DNS rebinding lets a web page reach an agent endpoint and act with the victim's network position. |
-| `transport-plaintext` | ASI04 | Agent traffic, tool arguments, and bearer tokens readable on the wire. |
-| `transport-downgrade` | ASI04 | A plaintext listener on the same host defeats the TLS the endpoint otherwise offers. |
+| `transport-plaintext` | ASI07 | Agent traffic, tool arguments, and bearer tokens readable on the wire: insecure communication on the agent's own channel. |
+| `transport-downgrade` | ASI07 | A plaintext listener on the same host defeats the TLS the endpoint otherwise offers. |
 | `tls-cert-health` | ASI09 | Certificate and cipher problems undermine the assurance the transport is supposed to provide. |
 | `http-cors-wildcard` | ASI03 | Permissive CORS lets an arbitrary web origin act as the agent from a victim's browser. |
-| `http-rate-limit-absence` | ASI06 | No advertised limiting means a caller can drive the agent (and everything downstream of it) without backpressure. |
+| `http-rate-limit-absence` | ASI08 | No advertised limiting means a caller can drive the agent (and everything downstream of it) without backpressure: a cascading-failure concern. |
+| `mcp-tmpl-high-risk-tool-names` (template) | ASI02, ASI05 | Tool names suggesting shell execution or raw filesystem access are the unexpected-code-execution case; the inventory itself is the tool-misuse reconnaissance step. |
 
-## Two corrections
+## Three corrections
 
-**`mcp-host-header-validation` cited ASI05 (Memory & Context Poisoning).** DNS rebinding has nothing to do with an agent's memory or context. It is an identity and privilege problem: the attacker borrows the victim's network position to reach an endpoint that trusts it. Now ASI03.
+**The reference table followed an earlier draft of the numbering.** `ASITitles` in `internal/report/report.go` carried pre-v1.0 titles for ASI04 to ASI09 (Insecure Inter-Agent Communication, Memory & Context Poisoning, Cascading Failures, Excessive Agency, Supply Chain & Dependency Risk, Observability & Auditability Gaps), and every `asi_refs` was coded against it. The table now matches the published v1.0 list and is pinned by `TestASITitles_MatchPublishedV1`; the codes below were renumbered to keep the meaning each check was given: `http-rate-limit-absence` ASI06 to ASI08, `transport-plaintext` and `transport-downgrade` ASI04 to ASI07, the high-risk-tool-names template ASI07 to ASI05. The four checks still citing ASI09 (Human-Agent Trust Exploitation in v1.0) record observability and disclosure facts that the draft filed under a category the final list dropped; they are left as they are pending a decision on whether to uncite them like `mcp-auth-posture`.
 
-**`http-rate-limit-absence` cited ASI08 (Supply Chain & Dependency Risk).** Missing rate-limit headers say nothing about dependencies. Unbounded call volume against an agent is a cascading-failure and availability concern. Now ASI06.
+**`mcp-host-header-validation` cited ASI05 (Memory & Context Poisoning in the draft numbering; ASI06 in v1.0).** DNS rebinding has nothing to do with an agent's memory or context. It is an identity and privilege problem: the attacker borrows the victim's network position to reach an endpoint that trusts it. Now ASI03.
+
+**`http-rate-limit-absence` cited ASI08 (Supply Chain & Dependency Risk in the draft numbering; ASI04 in v1.0).** Missing rate-limit headers say nothing about dependencies. Unbounded call volume against an agent is a cascading-failure and availability concern, which is ASI08 in v1.0.
 
 ## Severity calibration
 
diff --git a/internal/probe/transport/checks.go b/internal/probe/transport/checks.go
index 1a1ac61..5dc12a4 100644
--- a/internal/probe/transport/checks.go
+++ b/internal/probe/transport/checks.go
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ func (p *plaintextProbe) Run(ctx context.Context, s probe.Session, r *report.Rep
 		Title:       "Agent endpoint served over plaintext HTTP",
 		Severity:    report.SeverityMedium,
 		Protocol:    "*",
-		ASI:         []string{"ASI04"},
+		ASI:         []string{"ASI07"},
 		Description: "Target URL uses http:// rather than https://. Tool calls, arguments, and any auth tokens are visible to on-path observers.",
 		Evidence:    map[string]any{"url": s.TargetURL()},
 		Remediation: "Serve agent endpoints over TLS only; redirect or refuse plaintext connections.",
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ func (p *downgradeProbe) Run(ctx context.Context, s probe.Session, r *report.Rep
 		Title:       "Endpoint also responds over plaintext HTTP",
 		Severity:    report.SeverityMedium,
 		Protocol:    "*",
-		ASI:         []string{"ASI04"},
+		ASI:         []string{"ASI07"},
 		Description: "The target host also accepted at least one plaintext HTTP path for agent traffic, which undermines TLS protections.",
 		Evidence:    map[string]any{"fallbacks": evidence},
 		Remediation: "Disable plaintext HTTP listeners for agent endpoints and accept traffic only over TLS.",
@@ -410,10 +410,9 @@ func (p *rateLimitProbe) Run(ctx context.Context, s probe.Session, r *report.Rep
 		Title:    "No standard rate-limit headers observed",
 		Severity: report.SeverityLow,
 		Protocol: "*",
-		// ASI06 (Cascading Failures) rather than ASI08 (Supply Chain), which
-		// this has nothing to do with. Missing rate limiting is a
-		// cascading-failure and availability concern.
-		ASI:         []string{"ASI06"},
+		// Missing rate limiting is a cascading-failure and availability
+		// concern: ASI08 (Cascading Failures) in the published v1.0 numbering.
+		ASI:         []string{"ASI08"},
 		Description: "The endpoint answered requests but sent no standard rate-limit response headers. This is a reconnaissance signal that the service may not be advertising rate limiting to clients; it is not proof that no limiting exists.",
 		Evidence:    map[string]any{"observations": observed},
 		Remediation: "Expose standard rate-limit headers such as Retry-After, RateLimit-Remaining, and RateLimit-Limit, or document the expected client behavior when limits are reached.",
diff --git a/internal/probe/transport/checks_test.go b/internal/probe/transport/checks_test.go
index 22cc80f..dd1e0a2 100644
--- a/internal/probe/transport/checks_test.go
+++ b/internal/probe/transport/checks_test.go
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ func TestRateLimitProbe(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("headers absent: reports at ASI06", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("headers absent: reports at ASI08", func(t *testing.T) {
 		srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 		}))
@@ -190,10 +190,10 @@ func TestRateLimitProbe(t *testing.T) {
 		if len(rep.Findings) != 1 {
 			t.Fatalf("expected 1 finding, got %v", rep.Findings)
 		}
-		// ASI08 (Supply Chain) was simply the wrong category for missing rate
-		// limiting; it is a cascading-failure concern.
-		if got := rep.Findings[0].ASI; len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "ASI06" {
-			t.Fatalf("expected ASI06, got %v", got)
+		// Missing rate limiting is a cascading-failure concern: ASI08 in the
+		// published v1.0 numbering (the draft table had it at ASI06).
+		if got := rep.Findings[0].ASI; len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "ASI08" {
+			t.Fatalf("expected ASI08, got %v", got)
 		}
 	})
 }
diff --git a/internal/report/report.go b/internal/report/report.go
index 901ab6e..767e797 100644
--- a/internal/report/report.go
+++ b/internal/report/report.go
@@ -544,15 +544,18 @@ func joinASITitled(refs []string) string {
 // Kept here so probes/templates can cite by code without hardcoding titles
 // everywhere, and so this list has exactly one place to update.
 var ASITitles = map[string]string{
+	// Published v1.0 numbering (December 2025). The previous table followed an
+	// earlier draft in which ASI04 to ASI09 carried different titles, and every
+	// probe's asi_refs was coded against that draft; see docs/ASI_MAPPING.md.
 	"ASI01": "Agent Goal Hijack",
-	"ASI02": "Tool Misuse & Exploitation",
-	"ASI03": "Agent Identity & Privilege Abuse",
-	"ASI04": "Insecure Inter-Agent Communication",
-	"ASI05": "Memory & Context Poisoning",
-	"ASI06": "Cascading Failures",
-	"ASI07": "Excessive Agency",
-	"ASI08": "Supply Chain & Dependency Risk",
-	"ASI09": "Observability & Auditability Gaps",
+	"ASI02": "Tool Misuse and Exploitation",
+	"ASI03": "Identity and Privilege Abuse",
+	"ASI04": "Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities",
+	"ASI05": "Unexpected Code Execution (RCE)",
+	"ASI06": "Memory & Context Poisoning",
+	"ASI07": "Insecure Inter-Agent Communication",
+	"ASI08": "Cascading Failures",
+	"ASI09": "Human-Agent Trust Exploitation",
 	"ASI10": "Rogue Agents",
 }
 
diff --git a/internal/report/report_test.go b/internal/report/report_test.go
index 1f50af8..f31153a 100644
--- a/internal/report/report_test.go
+++ b/internal/report/report_test.go
@@ -310,6 +310,35 @@ func TestASITitles_AllTenPresent(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestASITitles_MatchPublishedV1 pins the table to the published OWASP Top 10
+// for Agentic Applications 2026 v1.0. The table previously followed an earlier
+// draft whose ASI04 to ASI09 carried different titles, and every asi_refs in
+// the probes was coded against that draft, so a drift here silently mislabels
+// every finding. A title change in the standard must change this test on
+// purpose, not the table by accident.
+func TestASITitles_MatchPublishedV1(t *testing.T) {
+	want := map[string]string{
+		"ASI01": "Agent Goal Hijack",
+		"ASI02": "Tool Misuse and Exploitation",
+		"ASI03": "Identity and Privilege Abuse",
+		"ASI04": "Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities",
+		"ASI05": "Unexpected Code Execution (RCE)",
+		"ASI06": "Memory & Context Poisoning",
+		"ASI07": "Insecure Inter-Agent Communication",
+		"ASI08": "Cascading Failures",
+		"ASI09": "Human-Agent Trust Exploitation",
+		"ASI10": "Rogue Agents",
+	}
+	for id, title := range want {
+		if got := ASITitles[id]; got != title {
+			t.Errorf("%s: got %q, want %q (published v1.0)", id, got, title)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(ASITitles) != len(want) {
+		t.Errorf("ASITitles has %d entries, want %d", len(ASITitles), len(want))
+	}
+}
+
 func findingIDs(fs []Finding) []string {
 	out := make([]string, len(fs))
 	for i, f := range fs {
diff --git a/templates/mcp/high-risk-tool-names.json b/templates/mcp/high-risk-tool-names.json
index 36471ac..49a221d 100644
--- a/templates/mcp/high-risk-tool-names.json
+++ b/templates/mcp/high-risk-tool-names.json
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
   "info": {
     "title": "Tool list includes names suggesting code execution or filesystem access",
     "severity": "medium",
-    "asi_refs": ["ASI02", "ASI07"],
+    "asi_refs": ["ASI02", "ASI05"],
     "description": "The tool list (requested with credentials, if any were supplied) includes a tool name matching patterns associated with code-execution or raw-filesystem primitives. This is a triage signal for closer review; verify the tool's actual capabilities and authorization model.",
     "remediation": "Review tool capabilities in context. If the tool performs code execution or unrestricted filesystem access, scope it behind explicit, auditable authorization separate from general tool listing. Consider narrower alternatives.",
     "tags": ["tool-misuse", "excessive-agency"],