From f33381ed06bbb5db45063d5113b0e6a94d96268d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2026 13:18:44 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?docs(audit):=20required=20PR=20reviews=20enable?= =?UTF-8?q?d=20=E2=80=94=20G-032/T-16=20closed,=20no=20self-merge?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Second admin account (tonibergholm-codento) added; main ruleset now requires 1 approval from a principal other than the last pusher, with stale-review dismissal and last-push approval. Verified live. - Closes the last non-deferred gap G-032/T-16 (was held only for lack of a second reviewer). Scorecard #4/#14 clear on next scan; only the optional badge (#16) remains open. - ACCESS.md: second admin/reviewer recorded. - opsec-baseline.md + vulnerability-response.md: ruleset now enforces distinct-reviewer approval repo-wide, not just for security fixes. - audit report Section 0 + fifth-round evidence delta updated. - Operational: nobody self-merges anymore; the two admins review each other's PRs. --- docs/agents/ACCESS.md | 5 +++-- docs/audit/gap-analysis-source.md | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/audit/ostif-best-practices-audit.md | 16 ++++++++++------ docs/security/opsec-baseline.md | 7 +++++-- docs/security/vulnerability-response.md | 10 ++++++---- 5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/agents/ACCESS.md b/docs/agents/ACCESS.md index b7fff3a6..b92ae734 100644 --- a/docs/agents/ACCESS.md +++ b/docs/agents/ACCESS.md @@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ it as the revocation checklist. Written as OSTIF-audit follow-up T-14 (G-012). | Privilege | Holder | Notes | |---|---|---| -| GitHub org owner (`git-agentic`) | Toni Bergholm | Org 2FA requirement **enforced** since 2026-07-18 (see [`opsec-baseline.md`](../security/opsec-baseline.md)). | -| Repo admin (`git-agentic/src-control`) | Toni Bergholm | Controls rulesets, security toggles, secrets. | +| GitHub org owner (`git-agentic`) | Toni Bergholm (`tonibergholm`) | Org 2FA requirement **enforced** since 2026-07-18 (see [`opsec-baseline.md`](../security/opsec-baseline.md)). | +| Repo admin (`git-agentic/src-control`) | `tonibergholm`, `tonibergholm-codento` | Both admin. Control rulesets, security toggles, secrets. | +| Reviewer (required PR approver) | `tonibergholm`, `tonibergholm-codento` | Since 2026-07-18 the `main` ruleset requires **1 approval** from a principal other than the last pusher, so the two accounts review each other's PRs (closes audit G-032). | | `git-agentic.com` DNS/registrar | Toni Bergholm | Out-of-repo credential. | | crates.io publish rights | — (N/A) | Workspace is `publish = false`; no crates.io tokens exist. Revisit at first release (audit T-24 trigger). | | Security-report handler | Toni Bergholm | Per [`vulnerability-response.md`](../security/vulnerability-response.md). | diff --git a/docs/audit/gap-analysis-source.md b/docs/audit/gap-analysis-source.md index a582588e..13a4d8b3 100644 --- a/docs/audit/gap-analysis-source.md +++ b/docs/audit/gap-analysis-source.md @@ -668,3 +668,27 @@ Two closing items are human/out-of-repo, not code: deploy `security.txt` to feed subscriptions listed in `docs/security/subscriptions.md` (G-024 tail). No gap was withdrawn; the gap set stands at 35 and the report's Section 0 carries the remediation status. + +## Fifth-round delta: required reviews enabled (2026-07-18) + +Later the same day the maintainer added a second admin account +(`tonibergholm-codento`) and tightened the `main` ruleset. Verified live via +`gh api repos/git-agentic/src-control/rulesets/18739705`: the `pull_request` +rule now has `required_approving_review_count: 1`, +`dismiss_stale_reviews_on_push: true`, and `require_last_push_approval: true`. + +- **GAP-032/T-16 is now fully closed.** It was the last non-deferred gap and + had been held only because a lone maintainer cannot approve their own PR; a + second reviewing principal now exists and approvals are required repo-wide. +- **Scorecard consequence:** `CodeReviewID` (#14) and `BranchProtectionID` + (#4) will improve/close on the next weekly scan (approvals now recorded; + the branch-protection warnings for require-approvers, stale-dismissal, and + last-push-approval are all now satisfied — `require_code_owner_review` + stays false, a minor residual). The only remaining open code-scanning + finding is the optional `CIIBestPracticesID` badge (#16). +- **Operational note:** no principal — human, automation, or agent — can + self-merge anymore; the two admin accounts review each other's PRs. + +Every non-deferred gap in the 35-gap set is now resolved. Remaining: the +Deferred tier T-22…T-25 (gated on a first distribution channel) and the two +human/out-of-repo tails (`security.txt` deploy, subscription confirmation). diff --git a/docs/audit/ostif-best-practices-audit.md b/docs/audit/ostif-best-practices-audit.md index 703a1cd5..35d5c4ac 100644 --- a/docs/audit/ostif-best-practices-audit.md +++ b/docs/audit/ostif-best-practices-audit.md @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: "Gap Analysis: src-control vs OSTIF Security Best Practices Guide" comparison_direction: "src-control repository (current state) -> OSTIF/Least Authority Security Best Practices Guide (desired state)" scope: "The whole repository (code, CI, docs, GitHub configuration via live API) compared against all six OSTIF practice areas; the guide's missing 08-what-next.md chapter and the external git-agentic.com website were excluded." generated: "2026-07-18" -updated: "2026-07-18 — fourth round: Now + Soon tiers remediated (PRs #76–#87); code-scanning down from 17 open alerts to 3, all tracing to one deferred item (required human approvals) plus an optional badge" +updated: "2026-07-18 — fifth round: second maintainer + required PR approvals enabled, closing G-032/T-16; code-scanning now 1 open alert (the optional OpenSSF badge). Every non-deferred gap is resolved." generated_by: "han:gap-analysis" sections_included: - executive_summary @@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ Every gap has a stable ID. Sections 3–5 reference those IDs. The full evidence > This section was added after the gap analysis was acted on. Sections 1–5 below describe the repository **as first audited**; this section records what has since been fixed. Where they differ, this section is current. -**Both actionable tiers of the work plan are done.** The Now tier (T-1…T-9, T-26) and the Soon tier (T-10…T-21) all shipped across pull requests #76–#87, plus repository-settings changes and an organization-wide two-factor-authentication requirement. Only the **Deferred tier (T-22…T-25)** remains — OSS-Fuzz enrollment, reproducible builds, a release pipeline with supply-chain attestations, and a hardening guide for people who run the server component — and every one of those is deliberately parked behind a trigger that hasn't happened yet: the project still distributes nothing for a consumer to verify. +**Both actionable tiers of the work plan are done, and the one item that had been deferred for lack of a second reviewer is now also closed.** The Now tier (T-1…T-9, T-26) and the Soon tier (T-10…T-21) all shipped across pull requests #76–#87, plus repository-settings changes, an organization-wide two-factor-authentication requirement, and — as of later on 2026-07-18 — a second maintainer and required pull-request approvals (closing G-032/T-16). Only the **Deferred tier (T-22…T-25)** remains — OSS-Fuzz enrollment, reproducible builds, a release pipeline with supply-chain attestations, and a hardening guide for people who run the server component — and every one of those is deliberately parked behind a trigger that hasn't happened yet: the project still distributes nothing for a consumer to verify. -**The independent security scorecard tells the story in numbers: 17 open findings became 3.** +**The independent security scorecard tells the story in numbers: 17 open findings became 3, and after required reviews were enabled only 1 remains — the optional badge.** | Scorecard finding (first run) | Now/Soon fix | Status | |---|---|---| @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ Every gap has a stable ID. Sections 3–5 reference those IDs. The full evidence The **automated code analysis is fully clean** — zero open findings — and now covers the desktop application's language as well as the core (T-3). -**The 3 remaining findings are not new gaps and not oversights — they are one already-tracked deferred item plus one optional extra:** +**Update (2026-07-18, later the same day): the two review-related findings are now resolved.** A second maintainer account was added, and the trunk protection was set to require **1 approval** from someone other than the last pusher, with stale approvals dismissed on push and last-push approval required. That closes gap G-032 / todo T-16 — it was the only remaining non-deferred gap — and the two Scorecard findings it drove (required review approvals, and branch-protection completeness) clear on the next weekly scan. Nobody self-merges now; the two admin accounts review each other's pull requests. -- **Two findings (required review approvals, and branch-protection completeness) share a single root cause: review approvals are set to zero.** This is gap G-032 / todo T-16 in the plan, and it is deliberately held: under the hosting platform's rules a lone maintainer cannot approve their own change, so requiring approvals needs a second reviewer to exist first. Note the branch-protection finding already *improved* once merge-gating on passing checks landed (T-9); the rest of it unlocks together the day a second reviewer is added and approvals can be required. -- **One finding is an optional best-practices badge**, now showing "in progress." Completing it is nice-to-have, not a gap the guide requires. +**That leaves one open code-scanning finding, and it is optional:** + +- **An optional best-practices badge**, now showing "in progress." Completing it is nice-to-have, not a gap the guide requires. + +*(For the audit trail: these findings originally shared the root cause "review approvals set to zero," which was deliberately held because a lone maintainer cannot approve their own change under the platform's rules. Adding a second reviewer removed that blocker. The branch-protection finding had already improved once merge-gating on passing checks landed via T-9.)* **Two closing items still need a human and cannot be done from the repository:** deploying the machine-readable security-contact file to the project website (`/.well-known/security.txt`), and the maintainer personally confirming the security-feed subscriptions the documentation now lists. Both are noted in Section 5. @@ -717,6 +720,7 @@ The prioritized work plan, consolidated by the project-manager synthesis from th 5. **The two corrected over-credits** (dead private-reporting channel; CI runs-but-does-not-gate) are already reflected in Section 1 of this report. 6. **(Third round) The Scorecard `VulnerabilitiesID` alert (#18) will not close by fixing anything** — 17 of its 18 advisories are documented accepted risks and the 18th becomes one via T-26; its OSV check does not honor cargo-audit ignores, so expect to dismiss it with a comment pointing at `audit.yml`'s removal gates (or live with a standing 0-score on that check until the GTK4 migration). 7. **(Third round) Do not treat the same-day scorecard PRs (#74/#75) as closing T-1's intent** — the forcing function only works if someone actually triages what it surfaces; 17 alerts are open and this report's todo mapping is the triage. +8. **(Fifth round) Required approvals are now on — no self-merge.** Every PR needs 1 approval from a principal other than the last pusher, with last-push approval; the two admin accounts (`tonibergholm`, `tonibergholm-codento`) review each other's work. Automation and agents cannot merge their own PRs. This closed G-032/T-16. --- diff --git a/docs/security/opsec-baseline.md b/docs/security/opsec-baseline.md index 0cea3540..cf49f053 100644 --- a/docs/security/opsec-baseline.md +++ b/docs/security/opsec-baseline.md @@ -17,8 +17,11 @@ T-20 (G-025). `checks: write` + `issues: write` to the job level). - **Third-party actions are SHA-pinned** with a version comment; Dependabot maintains the pins (audit T-2). New actions enter SHA-pinned or not at all. -- **Merges to `main` are ruleset-gated**: PR required, four required status - checks, up-to-date branch, no force-push/deletion, no bypass actors. +- **Merges to `main` are ruleset-gated**: PR required, **1 required approval** + from a principal other than the last pusher (since 2026-07-18), stale + approvals dismissed on push, last-push approval required, four required + status checks, up-to-date branch, no force-push/deletion, no bypass actors. + Nobody self-merges — the two admin accounts review each other's PRs. ## Accounts and devices diff --git a/docs/security/vulnerability-response.md b/docs/security/vulnerability-response.md index 7fd16bfd..179464b8 100644 --- a/docs/security/vulnerability-response.md +++ b/docs/security/vulnerability-response.md @@ -38,10 +38,12 @@ class of work that must never enter that pipeline: A security-fix PR requires **a human review distinct from the author** before merge, regardless of who or what authored it. Agent-authored security fixes are -never merged on the strength of another agent's approval (audit G-032). For -other (non-security) changes the standing CI gates apply; this stricter rule is -scoped to security fixes until a second reviewing principal exists to enforce -it repo-wide. +never merged on the strength of another agent's approval (audit G-032). Since +2026-07-18 the `main` ruleset enforces this repo-wide for **all** PRs — 1 +required approval from a principal other than the last pusher, with stale +approvals dismissed on push and last-push approval required — so a security fix +gets the same distinct-reviewer gate as any other change, plus the human-author +requirement above for agent-authored fixes. ## Steps on receipt