From 2bc09ae5c78e750a8b1018734014e408d35f0a2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2026 11:56:42 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] docs(security): reconcile SECURITY.md with P32/P33; add safe harbor, bounty status, non-disclosure ask MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Executes T-8 (G-014/G-015/G-017/G-018/G-019) from the OSTIF audit (#76): - Reconcile stale pre-P32/P33 claims: protected paths are randomized- sealed since P33 (pre-P33 convergent content stays confirmable); sc+https:// and ssh:// are the confidential transports, with the plaintext --http warning scoped accordingly (TOFU caveat stated). - Note that GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled (the toggle was flipped as part of this audit round — the documented channel now actually works). - Add a good-faith-research safe-harbor statement (G-015). - State bug-bounty status explicitly: none at this time (G-017). - Ask reporters for confidentiality during the coordination window, mirroring the project's own 90-day commitment (G-018). --- SECURITY.md | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 49951196..df0a1f21 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -4,19 +4,33 @@ src-control is a **pre-1.0 (`0.1.0`)** system whose cryptography has **not had an independent security audit**. It implements real cryptographic features — -committed-secret envelope encryption, convergent-encryption protected paths, and -Ed25519 signed provenance — but they are MVP implementations reviewed only by the -project's own process. **Do not commit real production secrets to a src-control -repository yet**, and do not rely on it as your only line of defense for -confidential data. - -Known, deliberate boundaries you should understand before trusting anything to it -are consolidated in [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md). In brief: -convergent encryption for protected paths is **equality-confirmable** by design; -`sc serve --http` is **plaintext (no TLS)** and its bearer tokens cross the wire in -the clear; committed secrets injected by `sc run` live in an **authorized local -process context, not strong isolation**; and rotation/revocation cut off *future* -reads through the current registry but cannot erase ciphertext already in history. +committed-secret envelope encryption, encrypted protected paths, private +branches, Ed25519 signed provenance, and in-binary TLS — but they are MVP +implementations reviewed only by the project's own process. **Do not commit real +production secrets to a src-control repository yet**, and do not rely on it as +your only line of defense for confidential data. + +Known, deliberate boundaries you should understand before trusting anything to +it are consolidated in [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md). In brief: + +- **Protected paths use randomized sealing since P33** (fresh random DEK + + nonce per seal). Content sealed *before* P33 used convergent encryption and + remains **equality-confirmable forever** — rotation cannot erase ciphertext + already in history. +- **Two confidential transports ship:** `sc+https://` (in-binary TLS with + accept-new TOFU pinning; the *first* connection to a host is unverified by + construction, and `SC_HTTPS_FINGERPRINT` / `SC_HTTPS_STRICT=1` close that + window) and `ssh://`. Plain `sc serve --http` remains **plaintext** and its + bearer tokens cross the wire in the clear — use it only on loopback or behind + the documented stream-mode proxy setup; prefer `sc+https://` for any public + bind. +- Committed secrets injected by `sc run` live in an **authorized local process + context, not strong isolation** — same-user processes can observe the child + environment. +- **Rotation/revocation ≠ erasure.** They cut off *future* reads through the + current registry but cannot erase ciphertext already in history and copied to + other clones; real cutover of a leaked credential always means rotating the + underlying external credential too. ## Supported Versions @@ -35,7 +49,7 @@ them privately, either by: - **Email** to **toni@git-agentic.com**, or - GitHub's [private vulnerability reporting](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) - on this repository. + on this repository (enabled). Include as much of the following as is available: @@ -54,6 +68,26 @@ You can expect: **90 days** from accepted report to public disclosure, shorter if a fix lands sooner. +In return, we ask that you **hold the report in confidence** — please do not +share it with third parties or disclose it publicly until a fix has shipped or +the agreed disclosure date passes, whichever comes first. We will credit you in +the disclosure unless you prefer otherwise. + +## Safe harbor for good-faith research + +We will not pursue or support legal action against you for good-faith, +non-destructive security research on this project conducted within this policy: +testing against your own clones and deployments, no access to or exfiltration of +other people's data, no degradation of infrastructure you do not own, and +private reporting through the channels above. This is a statement of intent by +the maintainers, not a legal opinion; if you are unsure whether something is in +scope, ask first via the reporting channels. + +## Bug bounty + +There is **no bug bounty program** at this time — no monetary rewards are +offered. Reports are credited in the disclosure and in release notes. + Reports about the documented, deliberate boundaries above are welcome as hardening suggestions, but they are known limitations rather than vulnerabilities.