diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md index 49951196..df0a1f21 100644 --- a/SECURITY.md +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -4,19 +4,33 @@ src-control is a **pre-1.0 (`0.1.0`)** system whose cryptography has **not had an independent security audit**. It implements real cryptographic features — -committed-secret envelope encryption, convergent-encryption protected paths, and -Ed25519 signed provenance — but they are MVP implementations reviewed only by the -project's own process. **Do not commit real production secrets to a src-control -repository yet**, and do not rely on it as your only line of defense for -confidential data. - -Known, deliberate boundaries you should understand before trusting anything to it -are consolidated in [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md). In brief: -convergent encryption for protected paths is **equality-confirmable** by design; -`sc serve --http` is **plaintext (no TLS)** and its bearer tokens cross the wire in -the clear; committed secrets injected by `sc run` live in an **authorized local -process context, not strong isolation**; and rotation/revocation cut off *future* -reads through the current registry but cannot erase ciphertext already in history. +committed-secret envelope encryption, encrypted protected paths, private +branches, Ed25519 signed provenance, and in-binary TLS — but they are MVP +implementations reviewed only by the project's own process. **Do not commit real +production secrets to a src-control repository yet**, and do not rely on it as +your only line of defense for confidential data. + +Known, deliberate boundaries you should understand before trusting anything to +it are consolidated in [`docs/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/THREAT-MODEL.md). In brief: + +- **Protected paths use randomized sealing since P33** (fresh random DEK + + nonce per seal). Content sealed *before* P33 used convergent encryption and + remains **equality-confirmable forever** — rotation cannot erase ciphertext + already in history. +- **Two confidential transports ship:** `sc+https://` (in-binary TLS with + accept-new TOFU pinning; the *first* connection to a host is unverified by + construction, and `SC_HTTPS_FINGERPRINT` / `SC_HTTPS_STRICT=1` close that + window) and `ssh://`. Plain `sc serve --http` remains **plaintext** and its + bearer tokens cross the wire in the clear — use it only on loopback or behind + the documented stream-mode proxy setup; prefer `sc+https://` for any public + bind. +- Committed secrets injected by `sc run` live in an **authorized local process + context, not strong isolation** — same-user processes can observe the child + environment. +- **Rotation/revocation ≠ erasure.** They cut off *future* reads through the + current registry but cannot erase ciphertext already in history and copied to + other clones; real cutover of a leaked credential always means rotating the + underlying external credential too. ## Supported Versions @@ -35,7 +49,7 @@ them privately, either by: - **Email** to **toni@git-agentic.com**, or - GitHub's [private vulnerability reporting](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) - on this repository. + on this repository (enabled). Include as much of the following as is available: @@ -54,6 +68,26 @@ You can expect: **90 days** from accepted report to public disclosure, shorter if a fix lands sooner. +In return, we ask that you **hold the report in confidence** — please do not +share it with third parties or disclose it publicly until a fix has shipped or +the agreed disclosure date passes, whichever comes first. We will credit you in +the disclosure unless you prefer otherwise. + +## Safe harbor for good-faith research + +We will not pursue or support legal action against you for good-faith, +non-destructive security research on this project conducted within this policy: +testing against your own clones and deployments, no access to or exfiltration of +other people's data, no degradation of infrastructure you do not own, and +private reporting through the channels above. This is a statement of intent by +the maintainers, not a legal opinion; if you are unsure whether something is in +scope, ask first via the reporting channels. + +## Bug bounty + +There is **no bug bounty program** at this time — no monetary rewards are +offered. Reports are credited in the disclosure and in release notes. + Reports about the documented, deliberate boundaries above are welcome as hardening suggestions, but they are known limitations rather than vulnerabilities.