From 2cb2acfcbf12315ad5de74fb1148f33776a01fa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Toni Bergholm Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 18:45:22 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] docs: bring README + THREAT-MODEL current for P34 (private branches) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The P34 merge updated CLAUDE.md/ARCHITECTURE/ROADMAP/ADR/THREAT-MODEL's private-branch section but left two count/coverage references stale: - README.md: "33 shipped phases" → 34; the third thesis pillar renamed to "Per-file and per-branch permissions" and now names private branches (Phase 34, sealed until publish); "(Phases 3-33)" → 3-34; demo count 25 → 26 (run_private_branch_demo.sh). - THREAT-MODEL.md: "read 40 ADRs" → 44 (there are now 44 ADRs). Docs only; no code change. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhadyW9scQL95h3ag9yySB --- README.md | 23 +++++++++++++---------- docs/THREAT-MODEL.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 1fb407b7..eb41d1aa 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ A next-generation version control system built around a snapshot-and-tag model (Jujutsu-inspired), with per-file permissions, native committed secrets, and -in-memory clones as the long-term thesis. Across 33 shipped phases, this +in-memory clones as the long-term thesis. Across 34 shipped phases, this repository now proves that thesis end to end: 1. **In-memory virtual worktrees** (the agent wedge) — fork N parallel worktrees @@ -11,17 +11,19 @@ repository now proves that thesis end to end: 2. **Native committed secrets** — env vars / keys committed into repo state, encrypted at rest and in transit, decrypted only in an authorized execution context. **Implemented (Phase 2).** -3. **Per-file permissions** — individual paths encrypted to a chosen set of - recipients (randomized sealing since Phase 33, with dual-read of older - convergent ciphertext), merged/replayed/revoked/rewrapped without ever - writing plaintext to the object store. **Implemented (Phase 7, hardened - through Phases 15-17 and 33.)** +3. **Per-file and per-branch permissions** — individual paths encrypted to a + chosen set of recipients (randomized sealing since Phase 33, with dual-read + of older convergent ciphertext), merged/replayed/revoked/rewrapped without + ever writing plaintext to the object store; and whole **private branches** + (Phase 34) whose commits, trees, file paths, and messages are all sealed — + opaque to non-recipients until an atomic `sc branch publish`. **Implemented + (Phase 7, hardened through Phases 15-17 and 33; per-branch in Phase 34.)** 4. **A full persistent collaborative VCS** on top of those three pillars: durable `.sc/` repos, branches, three-way merge, history editing (cherry-pick/rebase/amend/undo), durable multi-invocation agent sessions, signed commits with session-transcript provenance, sparse and partial checkouts, and local/ssh/HTTP+TLS/Git network transports. **Implemented - (Phases 3-33.)** + (Phases 3-34.)** The system builds on / interoperates with Git rather than replacing it: it imports an existing Git repo's `HEAD` in-process (via `gix`), exports history @@ -143,9 +145,10 @@ auto-merge, a commit-time secret scanner, secret/permission lifecycle (rotation, escrow, revocation tombstones, bulk rewrap), signed commits with sealed session-transcript provenance, sparse and partial checkouts, and local, ssh-native, sc-native HTTP/TLS (with bearer-token auth and listener resource -limits), and Git (including hosted GitHub) network transports. All 33 phases -are implemented and tested; `demo/` holds 25 independent end-to-end proofs, -one per major capability. Remaining follow-ons (transparent lazy-fetch, +limits), and Git (including hosted GitHub) network transports, plus private +branches sealed to a recipient set until publish. All 34 phases are +implemented and tested; `demo/` holds 26 independent end-to-end proofs, one +per major capability. Remaining follow-ons (transparent lazy-fetch, per-case gap-tolerant merge on partial clones, CA-path validation alongside TOFU pinning, rotate-for-paths, and similar hardening items) are tracked in [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md)'s Deferred section rather than being open MVP scope. diff --git a/docs/THREAT-MODEL.md b/docs/THREAT-MODEL.md index 928e5783..6f0688df 100644 --- a/docs/THREAT-MODEL.md +++ b/docs/THREAT-MODEL.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ This document consolidates, in one place, the **deliberate security boundaries** of src-control's cryptographic features — the things it does *not* defend against by design. They are drawn from the per-phase ADRs (linked below); this page exists so a newcomer evaluating whether to trust real data to the system does not -have to read 40 ADRs to find the caveats. +have to read 44 ADRs to find the caveats. > **Status: pre-1.0, not independently audited.** These are MVP implementations > reviewed by the project's own process only. Do not commit production secrets to