diff --git a/tools/spec-loop/.last-sync b/tools/spec-loop/.last-sync
index 4fb0724c7..90f78dfde 100644
--- a/tools/spec-loop/.last-sync
+++ b/tools/spec-loop/.last-sync
@@ -1 +1 @@
-43e4c6eeb6ba99a2ee1796f2a8ee712db1c31738
+ccb53a38843646e1d02f97b1a27253b82aa2675d
diff --git a/tools/spec-loop/specs/adapters.md b/tools/spec-loop/specs/adapters.md
index b8e35d43c..94a8b3d5f 100644
--- a/tools/spec-loop/specs/adapters.md
+++ b/tools/spec-loop/specs/adapters.md
@@ -37,7 +37,12 @@ by swapping the adapter, not the skill.
 ## Where it lives
 
 - `tools/gmail/` — private-mail read/draft (drafts to the outbox; never
-  sends).
+  sends). Skills draft through the `gmail-plaintext` MCP server's
+  `check_auth` / `create_draft` tools, which run outside the sandbox, never
+  by shelling out to `oauth-draft-create` or probing the token file: the
+  OAuth token under `~/.config/apache-magpie/` is not readable from
+  sandboxed Bash, and sandbox-lint refuses an `allowRead` grant for it
+  (#1681).
 - `tools/maildir/` — private-mail drafting to a local Maildir spool
   (`maildir-draft-create`, plus the read-only `maildir-draft-find` for the
   existing-draft check); an offline alternative to Gmail, selected per
@@ -70,7 +75,9 @@ by swapping the adapter, not the skill.
   Reads and writes keep each file's line endings (LF, CRLF or CR, and a
   missing final newline), so a field write changes no other byte on a Git
   checkout with `core.autocrlf` or an SVN one with `svn:eol-style`; a file
-  mixing line endings is refused. A test runs the body-field conformance
+  mixing line endings is refused. Report files and folders it creates are
+  `0600` and `0700`, readable by their owner only; it never changes the
+  mode of a file that already exists (#1700). A test runs the body-field conformance
   cases through the store on temporary Git and SVN storage and reads them
   back from a fresh checkout.
   `detect` reports `field_layout` (`default` or `custom`, with the field
@@ -95,7 +102,14 @@ by swapping the adapter, not the skill.
   confirmed host and refuses any write when the token was withheld.
   Body fields go through a byte-identical copy of github-body-field's
   parser, with wiki `h1.`–`h3.` headings outside closed code blocks read
-  as `### <Heading>`; `body` exports exactly those fields.
+  as `### <Heading>`; `body` exports exactly those fields. The CLI takes
+  an explicit `--deployment {server,cloud}`, which vetted-ops always
+  passes, so an inherited `JIRA_DEPLOYMENT` cannot switch a Server tracker
+  to Cloud endpoints (#1683).
+- Both tracker backends reach the `magpie-vetted-ops` plugin as generated
+  copies under `plugins/magpie-vetted-ops/tools/` (the plugin generator's
+  `copies` table), not symlinks out of the plugin root, so a
+  self-contained install (Codex, a plugin cache) carries them (#1683).
 - `tools/github/` — issues/PRs/labels read + write-back helpers.
   Sub-adapters: `tools/github-body-field/` (reads GitHub issue/PR body
   structured field sets on the body-field contract — every column-0
diff --git a/tools/spec-loop/specs/adoption-and-setup.md b/tools/spec-loop/specs/adoption-and-setup.md
index faa8d8818..647da5f09 100644
--- a/tools/spec-loop/specs/adoption-and-setup.md
+++ b/tools/spec-loop/specs/adoption-and-setup.md
@@ -728,6 +728,11 @@ committed version with drift detection.
     Checker verification during `config` and `upgrade` uses `--no-welcome`;
     unreadable optional guides do not suppress actual setup findings, and
     guide names cannot select Markdown files outside the shipped guides.
+38. A freshly scaffolded `project.md` carries `tracker.platform: TODO`, so
+    `setup config` asks for the security-tracker backend (`github`,
+    `jira` or `local-files`) on every first setup with a `security-*` skill
+    in scope; the Jira steps map labels to whitespace-free names and
+    require the backend's `doctor` to pass (#1683).
 
 ## Validation
 
diff --git a/tools/spec-loop/specs/agent-isolation-sandbox.md b/tools/spec-loop/specs/agent-isolation-sandbox.md
index 3a1ae4b44..7c7fbcacf 100644
--- a/tools/spec-loop/specs/agent-isolation-sandbox.md
+++ b/tools/spec-loop/specs/agent-isolation-sandbox.md
@@ -118,7 +118,14 @@ existing sandbox grants can widen the baseline. See `docs/adapters/gemini.md`.
   window exists, so the watcher's close signal only sets the flag
   `watch_for_stop` polls; Tk's own handler called `Tcl_Exit` inside the
   signal and could deadlock the window mid-redraw until force-quit, and a
-  regression test pins the ordering (#1376). The
+  regression test pins the ordering (#1376). Visibility never depends on
+  activation, which macOS 14 made cooperative: a watcher started in the
+  background can be refused it, so every window is ordered front with
+  `orderFrontRegardless` at a level above other windows and joins all Spaces
+  (including a full-screen terminal's), and activation is only asked for
+  with `activate`, falling back to the deprecated
+  `activateIgnoringOtherApps:`; a refusal costs the keyboard, not the
+  window (#1697). The
   git the agent runs reads the same global config, so the wrapper's
   two files are a `sandbox.filesystem.allowRead` grant of their own
   (nothing wider under `~/.claude/`), or every sandboxed signed commit
@@ -162,6 +169,15 @@ existing sandbox grants can widen the baseline. See `docs/adapters/gemini.md`.
   `git --no-pager commit`), never by a fixed argv slice, and
   `GuardContext.git_subcommand()` gives contributed guards the same
   resolution `gh_subcommand()` gives for `gh` (#1330).
+  Every guard first unwraps the prefix wrappers that run their argument,
+  `env` (its GNU / BSD options, clustered short flags and `NAME=value`
+  assignments, which still count as inline overrides) and `command -p`,
+  until none is left, so `env git commit …` reaches the same guards as
+  `git commit …`; `command -v` is a lookup and is left alone. A segment
+  nested past a generous depth limit, carrying an undocumented `env`
+  option or another `command` flag, is marked unparsed and refused, and
+  `env -S` is refused outright, because GNU env splits its string with
+  escapes `shlex` does not reproduce (#1691, #1694).
   Hooks invoke the engine as a bare `python3`; when that resolves to a
   pre-3.11 interpreter, the engine re-runs itself under the newest
   `python3.N` (3.11+) on `PATH`, and exits 1 with an actionable message
@@ -245,7 +261,13 @@ existing sandbox grants can widen the baseline. See `docs/adapters/gemini.md`.
   the framework checkout's settings (the `gh` read allows, the remaining
   exclusions, family-specific domains, personal tool paths), reconciled into
   each contributor's `.claude/settings.local.json`. `sandbox-lint` lints the
-  two merged and keeps every `deny` / `ask` in the floor.
+  two merged and keeps every `deny` / `ask` in the floor. Its workflow also
+  runs when `.claude/settings.local.json` changes and fails while that file
+  is tracked, since a committed copy would load for everyone and its
+  scalars override the floor's (#1692). sandbox-lint refuses
+  `~/.config/apache-magpie` in `allowRead`: the Gmail OAuth token there is
+  read only by the drafting MCP server outside the sandbox, and the
+  template no longer grants it or the Google API hosts (#1681).
 - `.gemini/settings.json` and `.gemini/policies/magpie.toml` — Magpie's Gemini profile: tool-sandboxing and an explicitly loaded User-tier approval policy.
   Scoped shell reads are allowed; other shell calls, native edits, and MCP calls ask; listed commands and credential paths deny.
   Credential-path denies name the canonical `grep_search`; the native probe verifies its `search_file_content` alias, canonical policy names, and search/multi-file/web/resource argument schemas against the loaded runtime.
diff --git a/tools/spec-loop/specs/vetted-command-surface.md b/tools/spec-loop/specs/vetted-command-surface.md
index 1ac1e9188..319670052 100644
--- a/tools/spec-loop/specs/vetted-command-surface.md
+++ b/tools/spec-loop/specs/vetted-command-surface.md
@@ -167,6 +167,15 @@ Every call spells the base `~/.claude/magpie/<tool>` (AGENTS.md golden rule):
 the agent-guard `vetted-ops-spelling` guard refuses an expanded home path,
 `$HOME/…` or a relative checkout path for `vetted-op`, `vetted-op-read`,
 `vetted-op-tracker` and `adversarial-review`, and names the `~` command.
+It accepts the `~` only bare and space-separated: a quoted or escaped `~`,
+a quote after it, or the `--project=~/…` form leaves it unexpanded, so uv
+gets a directory named `~` and the exclusion does not match. Because an
+exclusion matches a command line by its start, the right spelling behind
+`env` or `command` still runs sandboxed and is refused with the command to
+run instead. The eval wrapper gets the same treatment: any spelling of
+`magpie-run-evals.sh` other than the bare `~/.claude/scripts/…` path is
+refused (override `MAGPIE_ALLOW_SCRIPT_PATH=1`), because it would run in the
+sandbox and every eval case would error ungraded (#1691).
 It also refuses an absolute path inside the working tree, and reads `uv`'s
 options on either side of `run`. Under Codex it lets a `vetted-op-read`
 through from the exact root Codex's own hook substitutes for `~` (the