AGENTS.md tells agents how to work in a project. I've drafted the complement for the question that comes before it: whether a given agent may operate in a directory at all. agentaccess.txt is a robots.txt-style access policy: per-agent groups, Allow/Disallow paths, evaluated by the harness before anything in the tree is read — including AGENTS.md itself. The files are deliberately disjoint: yours is instructions for the model, so it belongs in context; this one is instructions for the harness, so it must never enter model context — it gates the reading.
Two open issues here already name this gap from opposite sides. #33 asks which paths an otherwise-permitted tool must skip — agentaccess.txt is designed to compose with an ignore file, not replace it: access policy first, path exclusion within granted access second. And #228 lists the properties that make AGENTS.md unsafe as a policy file: chat prompts override it, a nested file displaces the root's rules, and a model reads it. This draft inverts the first and third by construction — enforcement sits in the harness, not the model. The second is genuinely open: whether a descendant file may loosen an ancestor's policy is one of the proposal's open questions, and #228's vendored-code scenario is the sharpest version of that risk.
My proposal presents AGENTS.md as its complement and I want that framing to be fair from your side; and one of its open questions is governance — standalone, or attached to an existing community such as this one (SPEC §11, Q8).
Draft 00, one author, no implementations. If this is out of scope for the tracker, close freely.
AGENTS.mdtells agents how to work in a project. I've drafted the complement for the question that comes before it: whether a given agent may operate in a directory at all.agentaccess.txtis a robots.txt-style access policy: per-agent groups, Allow/Disallow paths, evaluated by the harness before anything in the tree is read — includingAGENTS.mditself. The files are deliberately disjoint: yours is instructions for the model, so it belongs in context; this one is instructions for the harness, so it must never enter model context — it gates the reading.Two open issues here already name this gap from opposite sides. #33 asks which paths an otherwise-permitted tool must skip —
agentaccess.txtis designed to compose with an ignore file, not replace it: access policy first, path exclusion within granted access second. And #228 lists the properties that makeAGENTS.mdunsafe as a policy file: chat prompts override it, a nested file displaces the root's rules, and a model reads it. This draft inverts the first and third by construction — enforcement sits in the harness, not the model. The second is genuinely open: whether a descendant file may loosen an ancestor's policy is one of the proposal's open questions, and #228's vendored-code scenario is the sharpest version of that risk.My proposal presents
AGENTS.mdas its complement and I want that framing to be fair from your side; and one of its open questions is governance — standalone, or attached to an existing community such as this one (SPEC §11, Q8).Draft 00, one author, no implementations. If this is out of scope for the tracker, close freely.