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Self-Audit Log — Phase 1

A running record of the internal review performed while building Phase 1. This is not a substitute for an independent third-party audit (see COMPLIANCE.md residual items) — it documents what was checked, what was found, and how it was resolved.

Methodology

  • Every Anchor program is compile-checked (cargo check --workspace).
  • Every TS module has node:test coverage; the SDK has zero runtime deps.
  • The Xahau hook is compiled to wasm32 and its state layout/key derivation is asserted to match the SDK byte-for-byte.
  • Fund-safety paths in poi-escrow were reviewed line-by-line for: missing authorization, double-spend, re-entrancy, griefing/DoS, and arithmetic safety.

Findings

F-1 · Escrow vault griefing → permanently locked funds · Medium · FIXED

fulfill/slash/expire transferred the recorded bond.amount, then closed the vault. The vault is a public SPL account, so anyone could donate 1 token unit into it; the residual balance would make close_account revert, locking every resolution path and trapping the bond forever. Fix: drain the vault's actual balance (vault.amount) on every payout/return, guaranteeing a zero balance before close. programs/poi-escrow/src/lib.rs.

F-2 · Resolver omitted hook namespace_id → live reads fail · Medium · FIXED

XahauJsonRpcReader built a ledger_entry { hook_state } request without namespace_id, which Xahau requires for namespaced hook state. Live reputation reads would have returned nothing. Fix: XahauJsonRpcReader now takes a validated 32-byte namespaceId (default all-zero) and includes it in the request. packages/sdk/src/resolver.ts.

F-3 · SDK package missing its README · Low · FIXED

packages/sdk/package.json listed README.md in files but none existed — npm publish would have shipped a broken package page. Added packages/sdk/README.md.

Reviewed — no change required

  • Escrow authorization. fulfill/slash require the bond's recorded verifier to sign (has_one = verifier); expire is permissionless but can only send funds to the constrained broadcaster_ata. No theft vector.
  • Double-resolution. After a terminal state the vault is closed and state != Open, so a second call fails account validation and the NotOpen guard.
  • Gossip fee path. broadcast_intent validates treasury == config.treasury before the SOL transfer; the USDC bond is never touched on this layer.
  • Hook ↔ SDK parity. Key = SHA-512Half(DID); record = 32-byte BE score|fulfilled|failed|lastActive; lastActive stored as unix seconds on both sides. Asserted by resolver.test.js.
  • Relay back-pressure. Inbound is validated, de-duplicated by intentHash, TTL-evicted, and bounded by maxIntents; sender is never echoed.

Known limitations (documented, accepted for Phase 1)

  • Reputation magnitude. decodeReputation reads u64 fields into JS numbers; values above 2^53 lose precision. Reputation scores are small by construction; revisit with BigInt if score ceilings grow.
  • Bond account rent. Terminal bonds keep their Bond record (≈0.002 SOL rent locked) as an on-chain audit trail; only the vault rent is reclaimed. Closing the record is a future option if rent reclamation is preferred over the trail.
  • Hook loop guards. did_hook.c uses a small zeroing loop; the production hook-cleaner toolchain injects the required _g() guards at build.

Not covered here (require external work before mainnet)

Independent contract audit · ZK circuit formal verification · on-validator anchor test · legal/regulatory review · live testnet round-trip.