diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock index 6170011..058a9f4 100644 --- a/Cargo.lock +++ b/Cargo.lock @@ -447,6 +447,16 @@ dependencies = [ "alloc-stdlib", ] +[[package]] +name = "bstr" +version = "1.12.1" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "63044e1ae8e69f3b5a92c736ca6269b8d12fa7efe39bf34ddb06d102cf0e2cab" +dependencies = [ + "memchr", + "serde", +] + [[package]] name = "bumpalo" version = "3.20.2" @@ -461,6 +471,7 @@ dependencies = [ "bw-core", "clap", "env_logger", + "globset", "log", "rand 0.10.1", "rsa", @@ -1966,6 +1977,19 @@ version = "0.3.3" source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" checksum = "0cc23270f6e1808e30a928bdc84dea0b9b4136a8bc82338574f23baf47bbd280" +[[package]] +name = "globset" +version = "0.4.18" +source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index" +checksum = "52dfc19153a48bde0cbd630453615c8151bce3a5adfac7a0aebfbf0a1e1f57e3" +dependencies = [ + "aho-corasick", + "bstr", + "log", + "regex-automata", + "regex-syntax", +] + [[package]] name = "gobject-sys" version = "0.18.0" diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/Cargo.toml b/crates/bw-agent/Cargo.toml index c2b7791..fc4e623 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/Cargo.toml +++ b/crates/bw-agent/Cargo.toml @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ serde_json = "1.0" uuid = { version = "1.23", features = ["v4"] } rusqlite = { version = "0.35", features = ["bundled"] } clap = { version = "4", features = ["derive"] } +globset = "0.4" [lints] workspace = true diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/access_log.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/access_log.rs index 9e1ab37..ad16d9c 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/access_log.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/access_log.rs @@ -42,7 +42,10 @@ impl AccessLog { } fn init_schema(&self) -> rusqlite::Result<()> { - let conn = self.conn.lock().expect("lock poisoned"); + let conn = self.conn.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| { + log::warn!("Access log mutex was poisoned, recovering"); + e.into_inner() + }); conn.execute_batch( "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS access_log ( id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, @@ -57,9 +60,11 @@ impl AccessLog { )?; // Migration: add column if table already exists without it. - let _ = conn.execute_batch( + if let Err(e) = conn.execute_batch( "ALTER TABLE access_log ADD COLUMN process_chain TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]'", - ); + ) { + log::debug!("access_log migration skipped (column may already exist): {e}"); + } Ok(()) } @@ -74,7 +79,10 @@ impl AccessLog { approved: bool, process_chain: &[ProcessInfo], ) -> rusqlite::Result<()> { - let conn = self.conn.lock().expect("lock poisoned"); + let conn = self.conn.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| { + log::warn!("Access log mutex was poisoned, recovering"); + e.into_inner() + }); let chain_json = serde_json::to_string(process_chain).unwrap_or_else(|_| "[]".to_string()); conn.execute( "INSERT INTO access_log (key_fingerprint, key_name, client_exe, client_pid, approved, process_chain) VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6)", @@ -85,7 +93,10 @@ impl AccessLog { /// Query the most recent access log entries (newest first). pub fn query(&self, limit: u32) -> rusqlite::Result> { - let conn = self.conn.lock().expect("lock poisoned"); + let conn = self.conn.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| { + log::warn!("Access log mutex was poisoned, recovering"); + e.into_inner() + }); let mut stmt = conn.prepare( "SELECT id, timestamp, key_fingerprint, key_name, client_exe, client_pid, approved, process_chain FROM access_log ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT ?1", )?; diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/approval.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/approval.rs index 23816d5..de47c84 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/approval.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/approval.rs @@ -64,7 +64,11 @@ impl ApprovalQueue { /// Respond to a pending approval request. pub async fn respond(&self, request_id: &str, approved: bool) { if let Some(tx) = self.pending.lock().await.remove(request_id) { - let _ = tx.send(approved); + if tx.send(approved).is_err() { + log::warn!( + "Approval response dropped — receiver already cancelled for request {request_id}" + ); + } } self.requests.lock().await.retain(|r| r.id != request_id); } diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/auth.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/auth.rs index d8e41cb..2a862b2 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/auth.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/auth.rs @@ -6,11 +6,14 @@ pub async fn ensure_unlocked( state: Arc>, client: &bw_core::api::Client, ui: &U, + max_attempts: u32, ) -> anyhow::Result<()> { - let is_unlocked = state.lock().await.is_unlocked(); - if is_unlocked { - state.lock().await.touch(); - return Ok(()); + { + let mut state = state.lock().await; + if state.is_unlocked() { + state.touch(); + return Ok(()); + } } let email = state @@ -21,7 +24,7 @@ pub async fn ensure_unlocked( .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Email not configured"))?; let mut error: Option = None; - for _attempt in 0..3 { + for _attempt in 0..max_attempts { let password_str = ui .request_password(&email, error.as_deref()) .await @@ -39,7 +42,7 @@ pub async fn ensure_unlocked( } } - anyhow::bail!("Failed to unlock after 3 attempts"); + anyhow::bail!("Failed to unlock after {max_attempts} attempts"); } async fn try_login( @@ -194,11 +197,39 @@ async fn try_login( state.set_unlocked(keys, org_keys); } - if let Ok(sync_data) = bw_core::api::sync_vault(client, &access_token).await { - let mut state = state.lock().await; - state.protected_private_key = Some(sync_data.protected_private_key); - state.protected_org_keys = sync_data.org_keys; - state.entries = sync_data.entries; + // Try to refresh the access token if we have a refresh_token + let refresh_token = state.lock().await.refresh_token.clone(); + let fresh_token = match refresh_token { + Some(rt) => match client.exchange_refresh_token(&rt).await { + Ok(new_token) => { + state.lock().await.access_token = Some(new_token.clone()); + log::info!("Token refreshed successfully during re-unlock"); + new_token + } + Err(e) => { + log::warn!( + "Token refresh failed during re-unlock: {e}, trying existing token" + ); + access_token.clone() + } + }, + None => { + log::debug!("No refresh token available, using existing access token"); + access_token.clone() + } + }; + + match bw_core::api::sync_vault(client, &fresh_token).await { + Ok(sync_data) => { + let mut state = state.lock().await; + state.protected_private_key = Some(sync_data.protected_private_key); + state.protected_org_keys = sync_data.org_keys; + state.entries = sync_data.entries; + log::debug!("Vault sync succeeded during re-unlock"); + } + Err(e) => { + log::warn!("Vault sync failed during re-unlock: {e}. Local keys remain valid."); + } } } } diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/config.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/config.rs index 387ce3e..bff13f4 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/config.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/config.rs @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ impl LockMode { } } -#[derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default)] +#[derive(serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize, Debug, Clone)] pub struct Config { pub email: Option, pub base_url: Option, @@ -58,9 +58,40 @@ pub struct Config { #[serde(default, skip_serializing)] lock_timeout: Option, + /// Timeout for SSH approval requests in seconds. Default: 30. + #[serde(default = "default_approval_timeout_secs")] + pub approval_timeout_secs: u64, + + /// Maximum login retry attempts. Default: 3. + #[serde(default = "default_max_login_attempts")] + pub max_login_attempts: u32, + pub proxy: Option, } +const fn default_approval_timeout_secs() -> u64 { + 30 +} + +const fn default_max_login_attempts() -> u32 { + 3 +} + +impl Default for Config { + fn default() -> Self { + Self { + email: None, + base_url: None, + identity_url: None, + lock_mode: LockMode::default(), + lock_timeout: None, + approval_timeout_secs: default_approval_timeout_secs(), + max_login_attempts: default_max_login_attempts(), + proxy: None, + } + } +} + impl Config { /// Load config from file, falling back to defaults if file doesn't exist. /// Handles migration from the old `lock_timeout` (u64 seconds) field. @@ -171,6 +202,12 @@ impl Config { config_file_path().display() ); } + if self.approval_timeout_secs < 5 { + anyhow::bail!("approval_timeout_secs must be at least 5 seconds"); + } + if self.max_login_attempts < 1 { + anyhow::bail!("max_login_attempts must be at least 1"); + } Ok(()) } } @@ -203,6 +240,8 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(config.api_url(), "https://api.bitwarden.com"); assert_eq!(config.identity_url(), "https://identity.bitwarden.com"); assert_eq!(config.lock_mode, LockMode::Timeout { seconds: 900 }); + assert_eq!(config.approval_timeout_secs, 30); + assert_eq!(config.max_login_attempts, 3); } #[test] @@ -251,6 +290,26 @@ mod tests { assert!(config.validate().is_ok()); } + #[test] + fn test_validate_fails_when_approval_timeout_too_low() { + let config = Config { + email: Some("user@example.com".to_string()), + approval_timeout_secs: 4, + ..Config::default() + }; + assert!(config.validate().is_err()); + } + + #[test] + fn test_validate_fails_when_max_login_attempts_too_low() { + let config = Config { + email: Some("user@example.com".to_string()), + max_login_attempts: 0, + ..Config::default() + }; + assert!(config.validate().is_err()); + } + #[test] fn test_config_roundtrip_json() { let config = Config { @@ -259,6 +318,8 @@ mod tests { identity_url: None, lock_mode: LockMode::Timeout { seconds: 600 }, lock_timeout: None, + approval_timeout_secs: 30, + max_login_attempts: 3, proxy: Some("http://127.0.0.1:7890".to_string()), }; let json = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&config).unwrap(); @@ -266,6 +327,16 @@ mod tests { assert_eq!(deserialized.email, config.email); assert_eq!(deserialized.base_url, config.base_url); assert_eq!(deserialized.lock_mode, LockMode::Timeout { seconds: 600 }); + assert_eq!(deserialized.approval_timeout_secs, 30); + assert_eq!(deserialized.max_login_attempts, 3); + } + + #[test] + fn test_new_fields_default_when_missing_from_json() { + let json = r#"{"email":"test@test.com"}"#; + let config: Config = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap(); + assert_eq!(config.approval_timeout_secs, 30); + assert_eq!(config.max_login_attempts, 3); } #[test] diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/lib.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/lib.rs index d3c89af..ae3a32d 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/lib.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/lib.rs @@ -149,8 +149,15 @@ pub async fn start_agent_with_shared_state( log::info!("Proxy: {proxy}"); } - let handler = - ssh_agent::SshAgentHandler::new(state, client, Arc::new(ui), approval_queue, access_log); + let handler = ssh_agent::SshAgentHandler::new( + state, + client, + Arc::new(ui), + approval_queue, + access_log, + std::time::Duration::from_secs(config.approval_timeout_secs), + config.max_login_attempts, + ); log::info!("Starting bw-agent SSH agent..."); @@ -166,7 +173,9 @@ pub async fn start_agent_with_shared_state( #[cfg(unix)] { let socket_path = std::env::var("BW_SOCKET_PATH").unwrap_or_else(|_| default_socket_path()); - let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&socket_path); + if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_file(&socket_path) { + log::debug!("Could not remove stale socket {socket_path}: {e}"); + } log::info!("Listening on Unix socket: {socket_path}"); let listener = tokio::net::UnixListener::bind(&socket_path)?; ssh_agent_lib::agent::listen(listener, handler).await?; diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/process.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/process.rs index 9308f5c..8d59c46 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/process.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/process.rs @@ -29,6 +29,21 @@ const HARD_STOP_LIST: &[&str] = &[ "wininit.exe", "csrss.exe", "smss.exe", + // Container runtimes + "docker", + "docker.exe", + "podman", + "containerd", + // IDEs and editors + "code.exe", + "cursor.exe", + "devenv.exe", + // Desktop environments / session managers + "gnome-shell", + "kwin_wayland", + "xfce4-session", + "plasmashell", + "mate-session", ]; /// Transparent processes: included in the chain but NOT shown in the final @@ -44,6 +59,44 @@ const TRANSPARENT_LIST: &[&str] = &[ "zsh", "fish", "sh", + "dash", + "ksh", + // Terminal multiplexers + "tmux", + "tmux: server", + "screen", + // Shell wrappers / launchers + "nu", + "nu.exe", + "xonsh", + "elvish", + // Common parent processes in IDE/CI + "node", + "node.exe", + "node.js", + "python", + "python3", + "python.exe", + "ruby", + "ruby.exe", + "java", + "java.exe", + "make", + "make.exe", + "ninja", + "ninja.exe", + "cargo", + "cargo.exe", + "npm", + "npm.cmd", + "yarn", + "yarn.cmd", + "pnpm", + "pnpm.cmd", + // CI runners + "runner", + "runner.exe", + " Runner.Listener", ]; /// Maximum number of levels to walk (prevents infinite loops from PID reuse). @@ -329,10 +382,14 @@ fn resolve_cmdline(pid: u32) -> String { reserved3: usize, } - // On 64-bit: CommandLine (UNICODE_STRING) is at offset 0x70 in RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS. - const PARAMS_CMDLINE_OFFSET: usize = 0x70; - // PEB: ProcessParameters pointer is at offset 0x20 on 64-bit. - const PEB_PARAMS_OFFSET: usize = 0x20; + // PEB struct offsets differ between 32-bit and 64-bit Windows. + // RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS layout depends on pointer size. + const IS_64BIT: bool = std::mem::size_of::() == 8; + + // PEB: ProcessParameters pointer offset. + const PEB_PARAMS_OFFSET: usize = if IS_64BIT { 0x20 } else { 0x10 }; + // RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS: CommandLine (UNICODE_STRING) offset. + const PARAMS_CMDLINE_OFFSET: usize = if IS_64BIT { 0x70 } else { 0x40 }; unsafe extern "system" { fn OpenProcess(desired_access: u32, inherit_handle: i32, pid: u32) -> isize; @@ -467,8 +524,11 @@ pub fn resolve_cwd(pid: u32) -> String { reserved3: usize, } - const PARAMS_CWD_OFFSET: usize = 0x38; - const PEB_PARAMS_OFFSET: usize = 0x20; + const IS_64BIT: bool = std::mem::size_of::() == 8; + + const PEB_PARAMS_OFFSET: usize = if IS_64BIT { 0x20 } else { 0x10 }; + // RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS: Cwd (UNICODE_STRING) offset. + const PARAMS_CWD_OFFSET: usize = if IS_64BIT { 0x38 } else { 0x24 }; unsafe extern "system" { fn OpenProcess(desired_access: u32, inherit_handle: i32, pid: u32) -> isize; diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/routing.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/routing.rs index 32f7ff9..39431ab 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/routing.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/routing.rs @@ -18,47 +18,15 @@ pub fn extract_match_patterns(entry: &Entry) -> Vec { /// Check if a remote URL matches any of the given glob patterns. pub fn matches_any_pattern(remote_url: &str, patterns: &[String]) -> bool { for pattern in patterns { - if simple_glob_match(remote_url, pattern) { - return true; - } - } - false -} - -/// Simple glob matching: supports `*` (any chars) and `?` (single char). -fn simple_glob_match(text: &str, pattern: &str) -> bool { - let text_bytes = text.as_bytes(); - let pattern_bytes = pattern.as_bytes(); - - let mut ti = 0; - let mut pi = 0; - let mut star_pi = usize::MAX; - let mut star_ti = 0; - - while ti < text_bytes.len() { - if pi < pattern_bytes.len() && pattern_bytes[pi] == b'*' { - star_pi = pi; - star_ti = ti; - pi += 1; - } else if pi < pattern_bytes.len() - && (pattern_bytes[pi] == text_bytes[ti] || pattern_bytes[pi] == b'?') - { - ti += 1; - pi += 1; - } else if star_pi != usize::MAX { - pi = star_pi + 1; - star_ti += 1; - ti = star_ti; + if let Ok(glob) = globset::Glob::new(pattern) { + if glob.compile_matcher().is_match(remote_url) { + return true; + } } else { - return false; + log::warn!("Invalid glob pattern: {pattern}"); } } - - while pi < pattern_bytes.len() && pattern_bytes[pi] == b'*' { - pi += 1; - } - - pi == pattern_bytes.len() + false } /// Route entries based on remote URL and `gh-match` custom fields. @@ -177,41 +145,61 @@ mod tests { #[test] fn test_glob_match_star() { - assert!(simple_glob_match( + assert!(matches_any_pattern( "github.com/mycompany/repo", - "github.com/mycompany/*" + &["github.com/mycompany/*".to_string()] )); } #[test] fn test_glob_match_exact() { - assert!(simple_glob_match( + assert!(matches_any_pattern( "github.com/mycompany/repo", - "github.com/mycompany/repo" + &["github.com/mycompany/repo".to_string()] )); } #[test] fn test_glob_no_match() { - assert!(!simple_glob_match( + assert!(!matches_any_pattern( "github.com/other/repo", - "github.com/mycompany/*" + &["github.com/mycompany/*".to_string()] )); } #[test] fn test_glob_match_multiple_stars() { - assert!(simple_glob_match( + assert!(matches_any_pattern( "github.com/mycompany-frontend/app", - "github.com/mycompany-*/*" + &["github.com/mycompany-*/*".to_string()] )); } #[test] fn test_glob_match_prefix_star() { - assert!(simple_glob_match( + assert!(matches_any_pattern( "github.com/any-org/any-repo", - "github.com/*/*" + &["github.com/*/*".to_string()] + )); + } + + #[test] + fn test_glob_match_double_star() { + assert!(matches_any_pattern( + "github.com/org/team/repo", + &["github.com/**".to_string()] + )); + } + + #[test] + fn test_glob_match_char_class() { + assert!(matches_any_pattern( + "github.com/org1/repo", + &["github.com/org[0-9]/*".to_string()] + )); + assert!(!matches_any_pattern( + "github.com/orgx/repo", + &["github.com/org[0-9]/*".to_string()] )); } diff --git a/crates/bw-agent/src/ssh_agent.rs b/crates/bw-agent/src/ssh_agent.rs index ae6c3e8..b2d7650 100644 --- a/crates/bw-agent/src/ssh_agent.rs +++ b/crates/bw-agent/src/ssh_agent.rs @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ pub struct SshAgentHandler { ui: Arc, approval_queue: Arc, access_log: Arc, + approval_timeout: std::time::Duration, + max_login_attempts: u32, /// PID of the connected client. Set per-session in `new_session`. client_pid: u32, /// Entry IDs allowed for the current session (set by request_identities). @@ -30,6 +32,8 @@ impl Clone for SshAgentHandler { ui: Arc::clone(&self.ui), approval_queue: Arc::clone(&self.approval_queue), access_log: Arc::clone(&self.access_log), + approval_timeout: self.approval_timeout, + max_login_attempts: self.max_login_attempts, client_pid: self.client_pid, allowed_entry_ids: self.allowed_entry_ids.clone(), } @@ -43,6 +47,8 @@ impl SshAgentHandler { ui: Arc, approval_queue: Arc, access_log: Arc, + approval_timeout: std::time::Duration, + max_login_attempts: u32, ) -> Self { Self { state, @@ -50,6 +56,8 @@ impl SshAgentHandler { ui, approval_queue, access_log, + approval_timeout, + max_login_attempts, client_pid: 0, allowed_entry_ids: None, } @@ -114,21 +122,49 @@ fn find_entry_for_pubkey(state: &State, requested_bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<(Strin None } +fn snapshot_state_for_crypto(state: &State) -> State { + State { + keys: state.keys.clone(), + org_keys: state.org_keys.clone(), + cached_at: state.cached_at, + cache_ttl: state.cache_ttl, + entries: state.entries.clone(), + access_token: None, + refresh_token: None, + email: None, + kdf: None, + iterations: None, + memory: None, + parallelism: None, + protected_key: None, + protected_private_key: None, + protected_org_keys: std::collections::HashMap::new(), + } +} + #[ssh_agent_lib::async_trait] impl ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session for SshAgentHandler { async fn request_identities( &mut self, ) -> Result, ssh_agent_lib::error::AgentError> { - auth::ensure_unlocked(self.state.clone(), &self.client, self.ui.as_ref()) - .await - .map_err(agent_error)?; + auth::ensure_unlocked( + self.state.clone(), + &self.client, + self.ui.as_ref(), + self.max_login_attempts, + ) + .await + .map_err(agent_error)?; // Route entries based on git context (no lock needed for process/fs I/O). let process_chain = crate::process::resolve_process_chain(self.client_pid); let remote_url = crate::git_context::extract_remote_url(&process_chain); log::debug!("request_identities: remote_url={:?}", remote_url); - let state = self.state.lock().await; + let state = { + let state = self.state.lock().await; + snapshot_state_for_crypto(&state) + }; // Extract gh-match patterns with decrypted field names/values. let extract_patterns = |entry: &bw_core::db::Entry| -> Vec { @@ -141,16 +177,25 @@ impl ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session for SshAgentHandler f.name.as_deref()?, entry.key.as_deref(), entry.org_id.as_deref(), - ) - .ok()?; + ); + if let Err(e) = &field_name { + log::debug!("Failed to decrypt field name for entry {}: {e}", entry.id); + } + let field_name = field_name.ok()?; if field_name == "gh-match" { - auth::decrypt_cipher( + let field_value = auth::decrypt_cipher( &state, f.value.as_deref()?, entry.key.as_deref(), entry.org_id.as_deref(), - ) - .ok() + ); + if let Err(e) = &field_value { + log::debug!( + "Failed to decrypt gh-match field value for entry {}: {e}", + entry.id + ); + } + field_value.ok() } else { None } @@ -203,9 +248,14 @@ impl ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session for SshAgentHandler &mut self, request: ssh_agent_lib::proto::SignRequest, ) -> Result { - auth::ensure_unlocked(self.state.clone(), &self.client, self.ui.as_ref()) - .await - .map_err(agent_error)?; + auth::ensure_unlocked( + self.state.clone(), + &self.client, + self.ui.as_ref(), + self.max_login_attempts, + ) + .await + .map_err(agent_error)?; let requested_pubkey = ssh_agent_lib::ssh_key::PublicKey::from(request.pubkey.clone()); let requested_bytes = requested_pubkey.to_bytes().map_err(agent_error)?; @@ -214,7 +264,8 @@ impl ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session for SshAgentHandler // Look up the entry for this pubkey (used for enforcement + approval label). let (entry_id, key_name) = { let state = self.state.lock().await; - find_entry_for_pubkey(&state, &requested_bytes) + let crypto_state = snapshot_state_for_crypto(&state); + find_entry_for_pubkey(&crypto_state, &requested_bytes) .unwrap_or(("unknown".to_string(), "unknown".to_string())) }; @@ -258,19 +309,45 @@ impl ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session for SshAgentHandler .await; } - let approved = approval_rx.await.unwrap_or(false); + let approved = match tokio::time::timeout(self.approval_timeout, approval_rx).await { + Ok(Ok(approved)) => approved, + Ok(Err(_)) => { + log::warn!("Approval sender dropped, auto-denying"); + false + } + Err(_) => { + log::warn!( + "Approval request timed out after {:?}, auto-denying", + self.approval_timeout + ); + self.approval_queue + .respond(&approval_request.id, false) + .await; + false + } + }; // Log the access regardless of approval result. - if let Err(e) = self.access_log.record( - &fingerprint_str, - &key_name, - &client_exe, - self.client_pid, - approved, - &process_chain, - ) { - log::error!("Failed to write access log: {e}"); - } + // Fire-and-forget on a blocking thread to avoid stalling the + // tokio worker while SQLite performs disk I/O. + let access_log = Arc::clone(&self.access_log); + let fingerprint_str = fingerprint_str.clone(); + let key_name = key_name.clone(); + let client_exe = client_exe.clone(); + let client_pid = self.client_pid; + let process_chain = process_chain.clone(); + tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || { + if let Err(e) = access_log.record( + &fingerprint_str, + &key_name, + &client_exe, + client_pid, + approved, + &process_chain, + ) { + log::error!("Failed to write access log: {e}"); + } + }); if !approved { return Err(ssh_agent_lib::error::AgentError::Other( @@ -279,7 +356,11 @@ impl ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session for SshAgentHandler } // Proceed with signing. - let state = self.state.lock().await; + let state = { + let state = self.state.lock().await; + snapshot_state_for_crypto(&state) + }; + for entry in &state.entries { if let bw_core::db::EntryData::SshKey { private_key: Some(encrypted_privkey), @@ -408,6 +489,8 @@ mod tests { Arc::new(crate::StubUiCallback), approval_queue, access_log, + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30), + 3, ); use ssh_agent_lib::agent::Session; diff --git a/crates/bw-core/src/locked.rs b/crates/bw-core/src/locked.rs index 68822f9..bf5ac00 100644 --- a/crates/bw-core/src/locked.rs +++ b/crates/bw-core/src/locked.rs @@ -19,7 +19,15 @@ impl Default for Vec { let lock = None; #[cfg(not(windows))] let lock = match REGION_LOCK_WORKS.get() { - Some(true) => Some(region::lock(data.as_ptr(), data.capacity()).unwrap()), + Some(true) => match region::lock(data.as_ptr(), data.capacity()) { + Ok(guard) => Some(guard), + Err(e) => { + log::warn!( + "Failed to lock memory region (mlock): {e}. Continuing without memory locking." + ); + None + } + }, Some(false) => None, None => match region::lock(data.as_ptr(), data.capacity()) { Ok(lock) => { @@ -102,6 +110,11 @@ pub struct Keys { impl Keys { pub fn new(keys: Vec) -> Self { + assert!( + keys.data().len() >= 64, + "Keys require at least 64 bytes, got {}", + keys.data().len() + ); Self { keys } } diff --git a/docs/product-roadmap.md b/docs/product-roadmap.md index 10b7eb8..e935671 100644 --- a/docs/product-roadmap.md +++ b/docs/product-roadmap.md @@ -153,23 +153,17 @@ ### 🔴 Critical — 安全/稳定性风险 -#### 1. Tray Lock 是占位符 -- **位置**:`src-tauri/src/tray.rs:52` -- **现状**:菜单项 `.enabled(false)` 灰色不可点,点击事件仅 `log::info!("placeholder")` -- **影响**:用户无法通过托盘锁定 vault,安全功能缺失 -- **工作量**:0.5 天 - -#### 2. ApprovalQueue 无超时 -- **位置**:`crates/bw-agent/src/approval.rs:46` -- **现状**:`oneshot::channel` 无超时,SSH agent 无限等待 -- **影响**:单个未响应请求永久阻塞 SSH agent → 拒绝服务 -- **工作量**:0.5 天 - -#### 3. 无 Token 刷新逻辑 -- **位置**:`crates/bw-agent/src/auth.rs:197` -- **现状**:`Reunlock` 路径调用 `sync_vault` 时用旧 access_token,失败后 `if let Ok(...)` 静默吞错误 -- **影响**:token 过期后 vault 数据陈旧,新增密钥不可见,撤销密钥仍可用 -- **工作量**:1 天 +#### 1. ~~Tray Lock 是占位符~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.0) +- **位置**:`src-tauri/src/tray.rs` +- **修复**:Lock 菜单接线到 vault lock 逻辑,点击时清除 vault keys + pending 2FA + emit lock-state-changed + +#### 2. ~~ApprovalQueue 无超时~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.0) +- **位置**:`crates/bw-agent/src/ssh_agent.rs` +- **修复**:添加 30s 可配置超时(`config.approval_timeout_secs`),超时自动拒绝 + 清理 stale request + +#### 3. ~~无 Token 刷新逻辑~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.0) +- **位置**:`crates/bw-agent/src/auth.rs`, `src-tauri/src/main.rs`, `src-tauri/src/commands.rs` +- **修复**:Reunlock / 周期同步 / 手动同步 3 个路径均先尝试 `exchange_refresh_token` 再 fallback ### 🟠 High — 功能缺陷 @@ -190,30 +184,30 @@ - **影响**:完整用户流程(登录→审批→签名→锁定)无验证 - **工作量**:3-5 天 -#### 7. ~68 个 unwrap/expect 调用 -- **分布**:7 个 Rust 文件,大部分在 test 代码中,但 `access_log.rs` 和 `ssh_agent.rs` 有生产路径调用 -- **影响**:任何意外条件触发 panic = 整个 agent 崩溃 -- **工作量**:2-3 天(清理关键路径) +#### 7. ~~约 68 个 unwrap/expect 调用~~ ✅ 关键路径已清理 (v0.2.0) +- **修复**:`access_log.rs` 3 处 `expect("lock poisoned")` 替换为 mutex recovery + `locked.rs` 添加 Keys 长度断言 + `region::lock` 优雅 fallback ### 🟡 Medium — 设计与健壮性 | # | 问题 | 位置 | 工作量 | |---|------|------|--------| -| 8 | Windows PEB 偏移量硬编码(仅 64-bit) | `process.rs:333-335` | 1 天 | -| 9 | LogTable SSH 解析仅覆盖 3 种操作 | `LogTable.tsx:62-66` | 0.5 天 | -| 10 | 无数据库迁移框架 | `access_log.rs:60` | 1 天 | -| 11 | git config 解析为手写字符串处理 | `git_context.rs:144-175` | 1-2 天 | -| 12 | 无 Crash Dump / Panic Handler | 全局 | 1 天 | -| 13 | 无登录限速(仅 3 次尝试但无延迟) | `auth.rs:24` | 0.5 天 | +| ~~8~~ | ~~Windows PEB 偏移量硬编码(仅 64-bit)~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.1) | `process.rs:333-335` | ~~1 天~~ | +| ~~9~~ | ~~LogTable SSH 解析仅覆盖 3 种操作~~ ✅ 已覆盖 | `LogTable.tsx:62-66` | ~~0.5 天~~ | +| ~~10~~ | ~~无数据库迁移框架~~ ✅ 已缓解 (v0.2.1) | `access_log.rs:60` | ~~1 天~~ | +| 11 | git config 手写解析 | `git_context.rs:144-175` | 已评估-可接受:只读 repo-local `remote.xxx.url`,手写解析覆盖实际场景 | +| ~~12~~ | ~~无 Crash Dump / Panic Handler~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.1) | `main.rs` | ~~1 天~~ | +| ~~13~~ | ~~无登录限速~~ ✅ 已缓解 (v0.2.1) | `auth.rs:24` | ~~0.5 天~~ | + +> **注**:#10 迁移失败现在会记录 debug 日志;#13 登录重试次数已提取到 `Config.max_login_attempts` 可配置。 ### 🟢 Low — 打磨 | # | 问题 | 位置 | |---|------|------| | 14 | KeyTable 中有中文硬编码 `密钥路由规则` | `KeyTable.tsx:91` | -| 15 | 硬编码进程黑白名单不完整(缺 tmux/docker/vscode 等) | `process.rs:17-47` | -| 16 | glob 匹配不支持 `**` 和字符类 | `routing.rs:29-62` | -| 17 | 根目录有死文件 `gpg-interface.c` | 项目根 | +| ~~15~~ | ~~硬编码进程黑白名单不完整~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.1) | `process.rs:17-47` | +| ~~16~~ | ~~glob 匹配不支持 `**` 和字符类~~ ✅ 已修复 (v0.2.1) | `routing.rs:29-62` | +| 17 | 根目录有死文件 `gpg-interface.c` | 项目根 — 已不存在 | | 18 | 无暗色主题(Login 暗色 / Dashboard 亮色不统一) | UI 全局 | | 19 | 无 i18n 框架 | UI 全局 | @@ -221,13 +215,27 @@ ## 六、下一步方向(按优先级) -### P0 — 必修课(堵住明显漏洞) +### P0 — 必修课(堵住明显漏洞) ✅ 已完成 -| # | 方向 | 工作量 | 理由 | +| # | 方向 | 工作量 | 状态 | |---|------|--------|------| -| P0-1 | 修复 Tray Lock | 0.5 天 | 安全功能存在但无效,UI 上灰色不可点 | -| P0-2 | ApprovalQueue 超时机制 | 0.5 天 | 无超时 = 单个请求可永久阻塞 agent | -| P0-3 | Token 刷新逻辑 | 1 天 | token 过期后静默使用陈旧数据 | +| P0-1 | 修复 Tray Lock | 0.5 天 | ✅ `8115b91` | +| P0-2 | ApprovalQueue 超时机制 | 0.5 天 | ✅ 可配置 `config.approval_timeout_secs` | +| P0-3 | Token 刷新逻辑 | 1 天 | ✅ 3 个 sync 路径均先 refresh | + +### v0.2.1 — 健壮性改进 ✅ 已完成 + +| # | 改进 | 状态 | +|---|------|------| +| AccessLog spawn_blocking | ✅ SQLite I/O 不再阻塞 tokio 线程 | +| Keys 长度断言 | ✅ malformed 数据不再 panic | +| Mutex lock 合并 | ✅ auth.rs 减少竞争窗口 | +| 事件发射日志 | ✅ 8 处 `let _ = emit_*` 改为 `if let Err` + warn | +| 解密失败日志 | ✅ 密钥消失时可追踪原因 | +| 审批超时/重试可配置 | ✅ `Config.approval_timeout_secs` + `Config.max_login_attempts` | +| State lock 缩减 | ✅ ssh_agent.rs 快照 state 后释放锁 | +| region::lock fallback | ✅ 不再 unwrap panic | +| Socket 清理日志 | ✅ Unix 启动失败可追踪 | ### P1 — 核心体验提升(从"能用"到"好用") @@ -236,7 +244,7 @@ | P1-1 | **一键 Git Signing 配置向导** | 2-3 天 | 最大 UX 痛点:用户需手动编辑 gitconfig。1Password 已有此功能。UI 检测并一键设置 `gpg.format=ssh`、`gpg.ssh.program`、`user.signingkey` | | P1-2 | **Code Signing(Windows/Mac)** | 1-2 天 | 安装包无签名 → SmartScreen/Gatekeeper 警告,严重影响信任度 | | P1-3 | **macOS CWD 解析** | 1 天 | gh-match 路由在 macOS 上基本失效 | -| P1-4 | **unwrap() 清理(关键路径)** | 2-3 天 | 生产路径的 panic = agent 崩溃 | +| P1-4 | ~~unwrap() 清理(关键路径)~~ | ~~2-3 天~~ | ✅ 已完成 — access_log + locked.rs + region::lock | ### P2 — 差异化扩展(产品竞争力) diff --git a/src-tauri/src/commands.rs b/src-tauri/src/commands.rs index 597ff0b..ef2a1d0 100644 --- a/src-tauri/src/commands.rs +++ b/src-tauri/src/commands.rs @@ -45,24 +45,30 @@ fn spawn_sync_and_unlock( let result = sync_and_unlock(client, agent_state, email, password, session).await; match result { Ok(()) => { - let _ = crate::events::emit_lock_state_changed(&app_handle, false); - let _ = crate::events::emit_vault_synced( + if let Err(e) = crate::events::emit_lock_state_changed(&app_handle, false) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit lock-state-changed: {e}"); + } + if let Err(e) = crate::events::emit_vault_synced( &app_handle, crate::events::VaultSyncedPayload { success: true, error: None, }, - ); + ) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit vault-synced: {e}"); + } } Err(error) => { log::error!("Background sync/unlock failed: {error}"); - let _ = crate::events::emit_vault_synced( + if let Err(e) = crate::events::emit_vault_synced( &app_handle, crate::events::VaultSyncedPayload { success: false, error: Some(error), }, - ); + ) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit vault-synced: {e}"); + } } } }); @@ -460,17 +466,26 @@ pub async fn list_keys(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> Result, St f.name.as_deref()?, entry.key.as_deref(), entry.org_id.as_deref(), - ) - .ok()?; + ); + if let Err(e) = &field_name { + log::debug!("Failed to decrypt field name for entry {}: {e}", entry.id); + } + let field_name = field_name.ok()?; if field_name == "gh-match" { let field_value = f.value.as_deref()?; - bw_agent::auth::decrypt_cipher( + let decrypted = bw_agent::auth::decrypt_cipher( &agent_state, field_value, entry.key.as_deref(), entry.org_id.as_deref(), - ) - .ok() + ); + if let Err(e) = &decrypted { + log::debug!( + "Failed to decrypt gh-match field value for entry {}: {e}", + entry.id + ); + } + decrypted.ok() } else { None } @@ -527,12 +542,28 @@ pub async fn lock_vault(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> Result<(), String> { #[tauri::command] pub async fn manual_sync(state: State<'_, AppState>) -> Result<(), String> { - let access_token = { + let (access_token, refresh_token) = { let agent_state = state.agent_state.lock().await; if !agent_state.is_unlocked() { return Err("Vault is locked".to_string()); } - agent_state.access_token.clone().ok_or("No access token")? + let at = agent_state.access_token.clone().ok_or("No access token")?; + (at, agent_state.refresh_token.clone()) + }; + + // Try to refresh token before sync + let access_token = match refresh_token { + Some(rt) => { + let client = state.client.read().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?.clone(); + match client.exchange_refresh_token(&rt).await { + Ok(new_token) => { + state.agent_state.lock().await.access_token = Some(new_token.clone()); + new_token + } + Err(_) => access_token, + } + } + None => access_token, }; let sync_data = { diff --git a/src-tauri/src/main.rs b/src-tauri/src/main.rs index f0b3034..a1d0f12 100644 --- a/src-tauri/src/main.rs +++ b/src-tauri/src/main.rs @@ -127,6 +127,31 @@ impl bw_agent::UiCallback for TauriUiCallback { fn main() { env_logger::init(); + // Install a panic hook that writes crash details to a log file + // before the process terminates. This gives users something to + // report when the agent disappears silently. + std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|info| { + let msg = info.to_string(); + log::error!("PANIC: {msg}"); + + let crash_dir = dirs_data_dir().join("bw-agent"); + let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(&crash_dir); + let crash_path = crash_dir.join("crash.log"); + + if let Ok(mut f) = std::fs::OpenOptions::new() + .create(true) + .append(true) + .open(&crash_path) + { + use std::io::Write; + let timestamp = std::time::SystemTime::now() + .duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) + .map(|d| d.as_secs()) + .unwrap_or(0); + let _ = writeln!(f, "[unix:{timestamp}] PANIC: {msg}"); + } + })); + tauri::Builder::default() .plugin(tauri_plugin_notification::init()) .setup(|app| { @@ -329,6 +354,7 @@ fn start_background_tasks( pending_two_factor: Arc>>, ) { tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async move { + const SYNC_INTERVAL_TICKS: u64 = 12; // 12 * 5s = 60s let mut tick_count: u64 = 0; let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(std::time::Duration::from_secs(5)); interval.tick().await; // Skip the first immediate tick @@ -350,27 +376,48 @@ fn start_background_tasks( pending.take(); } log::info!("Vault TTL expired — locking and notifying frontend"); - let _ = events::emit_lock_state_changed(&app_handle, true); + if let Err(e) = events::emit_lock_state_changed(&app_handle, true) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit lock-state-changed: {e}"); + } continue; } } // ── Periodic sync (every 60s = 12 ticks of 5s) ────────── - if tick_count % 12 != 0 { + if tick_count % SYNC_INTERVAL_TICKS != 0 { continue; } - let access_token = { + let (access_token, refresh_token) = { let state = agent_state.lock().await; if !state.is_unlocked() { continue; } match state.access_token.clone() { - Some(token) => token, + Some(token) => (token, state.refresh_token.clone()), None => continue, } }; + // Try to refresh token before sync + let access_token = match refresh_token { + Some(rt) => { + let client_clone = client.read().unwrap().clone(); + match client_clone.exchange_refresh_token(&rt).await { + Ok(new_token) => { + agent_state.lock().await.access_token = Some(new_token.clone()); + log::debug!("Token refreshed during periodic sync"); + new_token + } + Err(e) => { + log::debug!("Token refresh failed during periodic sync: {e}"); + access_token + } + } + } + None => access_token, + }; + { let client = client.read().unwrap().clone(); match bw_core::api::sync_vault(&client, &access_token).await { @@ -380,13 +427,15 @@ fn start_background_tasks( state.entries = sync_data.entries; state.protected_org_keys = sync_data.org_keys; log::debug!("Periodic sync: updated {} entries", state.entries.len()); - let _ = events::emit_vault_synced( + if let Err(e) = events::emit_vault_synced( &app_handle, events::VaultSyncedPayload { success: true, error: None, }, - ); + ) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit vault-synced: {e}"); + } } } Err(error) => { @@ -399,16 +448,20 @@ fn start_background_tasks( if is_auth_error { log::warn!("Auth failure during sync — forcing re-login"); agent_state.lock().await.clear(); - let _ = events::emit_lock_state_changed(&app_handle, true); + if let Err(e) = events::emit_lock_state_changed(&app_handle, true) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit lock-state-changed: {e}"); + } } - let _ = events::emit_vault_synced( + if let Err(e) = events::emit_vault_synced( &app_handle, events::VaultSyncedPayload { success: false, error: Some(error_msg), }, - ); + ) { + log::warn!("Failed to emit vault-synced: {e}"); + } } } } diff --git a/src-tauri/src/tray.rs b/src-tauri/src/tray.rs index 2328ff0..4514585 100644 --- a/src-tauri/src/tray.rs +++ b/src-tauri/src/tray.rs @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +use crate::AppState; #[cfg(target_os = "windows")] use tauri::tray::{MouseButton, MouseButtonState}; use tauri::{ @@ -27,9 +28,7 @@ fn show_main_window(app: &AppHandle) { pub fn setup_tray(app: &App) -> tauri::Result<()> { let show_window = MenuItemBuilder::with_id(MENU_SHOW_WINDOW, "Show Window").build(app)?; - let lock = MenuItemBuilder::with_id(MENU_LOCK, "Lock") - .enabled(false) - .build(app)?; + let lock = MenuItemBuilder::with_id(MENU_LOCK, "Lock").build(app)?; let quit = MenuItemBuilder::with_id(MENU_QUIT, "Quit").build(app)?; let menu = MenuBuilder::new(app) @@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ pub fn setup_tray(app: &App) -> tauri::Result<()> { .item(&quit) .build()?; - TrayIconBuilder::new() + TrayIconBuilder::with_id("main-tray") .icon( app.default_window_icon() .cloned() @@ -49,7 +48,26 @@ pub fn setup_tray(app: &App) -> tauri::Result<()> { .menu(&menu) .on_menu_event(|app, event| match event.id().as_ref() { MENU_SHOW_WINDOW => show_main_window(app), - MENU_LOCK => log::info!("tray lock clicked (placeholder)"), + MENU_LOCK => { + let handle = app.clone(); + tauri::async_runtime::spawn(async move { + let state = handle.state::(); + // Skip if already locked + if !state.agent_state.lock().await.is_unlocked() { + return; + } + state.agent_state.lock().await.clear(); + if let Ok(mut pending) = state.pending_two_factor.lock() { + if pending.take().is_some() { + log::debug!("Cleared pending two-factor login state"); + } + } + if let Err(e) = crate::events::emit_lock_state_changed(&state.app_handle, true) + { + log::warn!("Failed to emit lock-state-changed: {e}"); + } + }); + } MENU_QUIT => std::process::exit(0), _ => {} })