https://clawhub.ai/xrow/gitlab-agent/security-audit
SkillSpector tells me:
The skill uses persuasive language to normalize trust and then escalates to autonomous irreversible external actions, including clone, push, and merge request creation without confirmation. This is dangerous because it conditions the agent to bypass caution exactly where authenticated external side effects occur, increasing the likelihood of unauthorized or harmful repository operations.
The fact:
The agent is isolated from Humans and Prod. Can`t break only his stuff. Is that bad?
https://clawhub.ai/xrow/gitlab-agent/security-audit
SkillSpector tells me:
The skill uses persuasive language to normalize trust and then escalates to autonomous irreversible external actions, including clone, push, and merge request creation without confirmation. This is dangerous because it conditions the agent to bypass caution exactly where authenticated external side effects occur, increasing the likelihood of unauthorized or harmful repository operations.
The fact:
The agent is isolated from Humans and Prod. Can`t break only his stuff. Is that bad?