Route-Level Cryptographic Verification for GitHub Webhooks#22
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shouryaawr wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Route-Level Cryptographic Verification for GitHub Webhooks#22shouryaawr wants to merge 1 commit into
shouryaawr wants to merge 1 commit into
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Hi, @MabudAlam ,This security fix injects reusable fastapi dependencies into BugViper's unauthenticated webhook endpoints (/onComment and /marketplace) to verify the authenticity of inbound traffic directly at the route level.
The validation layer reads the raw request body bytes via await request.body()—safely utilizing fastapi's internal caching so downstream handlers can re-read the payload seamlessly—and extracts the X-Hub-Signature-256 header. It computes a local HMAC-SHA256 digest using the server's environment secrets and uses hmac.compare_digest to mitigate side-channel timing attacks. If the signature header is missing, malformed, or fails to match the computed digest, the dependency raises an immediate 403 forbidden exception. This strictly prevents unauthorized or spoofed webhook deliveries from triggering repository ingestions or agent reviews, which naturally insulates downstream cloud run and cloud tasks allocations from malicious resource exhaustion.
Can you please review my work.
Closes #21