diff --git a/src/tools/bash_write_guard.rs b/src/tools/bash_write_guard.rs
index 696dc692..c1bff07c 100644
--- a/src/tools/bash_write_guard.rs
+++ b/src/tools/bash_write_guard.rs
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 use std::path::Path;
 
+mod ansi_c_quoting;
 mod command_prefix;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -29,6 +30,16 @@ pub(super) fn confinement_rejection(
     root: &Path,
 ) -> Option<BashWriteConfinementRejection> {
     for target in write_targets(command) {
+        if target.operation == ansi_c_quoting::OPERATION {
+            return Some(BashWriteConfinementRejection {
+                reason: format!(
+                    "Bash command uses ANSI-C or locale quoting `{}`, whose expansion cannot be verified to remain in the Gate 1 workspace boundary; rewrite it with a literal escape (for example `printf 'a\\tb\\n'` or `grep -P '\\t'`)",
+                    target.path
+                ),
+                path: target.path,
+                operation: target.operation,
+            });
+        }
         if target.operation == command_prefix::UNVERIFIABLE_SPLIT_STRING_OPERATION {
             return Some(BashWriteConfinementRejection {
                 reason: format!(
@@ -116,6 +127,12 @@ fn path_matches(candidate: &Path, protected: &Path) -> bool {
 }
 
 fn write_targets(command: &str) -> Vec<WriteTarget> {
+    if let Some(kind) = ansi_c_quoting::outside_quotes(command) {
+        return vec![WriteTarget {
+            path: kind.introducer().to_string(),
+            operation: ansi_c_quoting::OPERATION.to_string(),
+        }];
+    }
     let Some(tokens) = shell_tokens(command) else {
         return Vec::new();
     };
@@ -984,4 +1001,58 @@ mod tests {
         );
         assert!(protected_path_mutation("env FOO=1 cargo test", &root, &protected).is_none());
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ansi_c_quoting_is_a_recognized_mutation() {
+        assert!(has_recognized_mutation("$'tee' a.txt"));
+        assert!(has_recognized_mutation("$\"tee\" a.txt"));
+        assert!(has_recognized_mutation("X=$'tee'"));
+        assert!(!has_recognized_mutation("echo \"$'x'\""));
+        assert!(!has_recognized_mutation("echo '$'"));
+        assert!(!has_recognized_mutation("echo \\$'x'"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ansi_c_quoting_write_targets_record_the_operation() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            write_target_pairs("$'tee' a.txt"),
+            expected_targets(&[("$'", ansi_c_quoting::OPERATION)])
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            write_target_pairs("$\"tee\" a.txt"),
+            expected_targets(&[("$\"", ansi_c_quoting::OPERATION)])
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ansi_c_quoting_confinement_rejection_table() {
+        let fixture = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let root = fixture.path().join("workspace");
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).unwrap();
+
+        for command in [
+            "$'tee' /tmp/f",
+            "env $'tee' /tmp/f",
+            "env $'-S' 'tee /tmp/f'",
+            "$\"tee\" /tmp/f",
+            "X=$'tee'",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                confinement_rejection(command, &root).is_some(),
+                "command must be rejected: {command}"
+            );
+        }
+
+        for command in [
+            "echo \"$'x'\"",
+            "echo '$'",
+            "echo \\$'x'",
+            "printf 'a\\tb\\n' > out.txt",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                confinement_rejection(command, &root).is_none(),
+                "command must stay allowed: {command}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }
diff --git a/src/tools/bash_write_guard/ansi_c_quoting.rs b/src/tools/bash_write_guard/ansi_c_quoting.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b040f4ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/tools/bash_write_guard/ansi_c_quoting.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+//! ANSI-C (`$'...'`) and locale (`$"..."`) quoting outside shell quotes
+//! (Issue #575).
+//!
+//! The write-target inspector's lexical analysis in the parent module does not
+//! know `$'...'` and `$"..."`: it keeps the `$` as an ordinary character and
+//! strips the following quotes as ordinary quotes, so `$'tee'` becomes the word
+//! `$tee` and the program, its prefixes, and its options are read wrong. The
+//! shell expands those forms before the program runs, and the expansion cannot
+//! be verified portably: the escape table differs between shell versions and
+//! `$"..."` depends on the locale. Every `$'` or `$"` that sits outside a shell
+//! quote is therefore refused as an unverifiable form.
+//!
+//! Quote handling mirrors the parent module's lexer (outside, `'...'`, `"..."`,
+//! and `\` escaping), so a `$'` or `$"` inside a quote, after a backslash, or a
+//! lone `$` stays allowed. The scan runs over the whole command before the
+//! lexer so a mis-read `$'\''` cannot hide the commands that follow it.
+
+/// Operation recorded for a command that spells `$'` or `$"` outside a shell
+/// quote, whose expansion cannot be verified.
+pub(super) const OPERATION: &str = "ANSI-C / locale quoting";
+
+/// The quoting introducer found outside a shell quote.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub(super) enum Kind {
+    /// ANSI-C quoting, `$'...'`.
+    AnsiC,
+    /// Locale translation quoting, `$"..."`.
+    Locale,
+}
+
+impl Kind {
+    /// The two-character introducer as it appears in the command.
+    pub(super) fn introducer(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Kind::AnsiC => "$'",
+            Kind::Locale => "$\"",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Returns the first `$'` / `$"` introducer that sits outside a shell quote.
+pub(super) fn outside_quotes(command: &str) -> Option<Kind> {
+    let mut chars = command.chars().peekable();
+    let mut single_quoted = false;
+    let mut double_quoted = false;
+    while let Some(ch) = chars.next() {
+        if single_quoted {
+            if ch == '\'' {
+                single_quoted = false;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if double_quoted {
+            match ch {
+                '"' => double_quoted = false,
+                '\\' => {
+                    chars.next();
+                }
+                _ => {}
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        match ch {
+            '\'' => single_quoted = true,
+            '"' => double_quoted = true,
+            '\\' => {
+                chars.next();
+            }
+            '$' => match chars.peek() {
+                Some('\'') => return Some(Kind::AnsiC),
+                Some('"') => return Some(Kind::Locale),
+                _ => {}
+            },
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ansi_c_quoting_outside_quotes_detection_table() {
+        let cases: &[(&str, Option<Kind>)] = &[
+            ("$'tee' /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("env $'tee' /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("env $'-S' 'tee /tmp/f'", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("$'\\x74ee' /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("$'t\\145e' /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("x$'tee' /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("echo $'\\'' ; tee /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("echo $'\\''\ntee sub/link/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("$'\\cX' /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("$''tee /tmp/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("printf $'a\\'b' > sub/link/f", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("X=$'tee'", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("cat $'.env'", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("$\"tee\" /tmp/f", Some(Kind::Locale)),
+            ("$\"\"tee /tmp/f", Some(Kind::Locale)),
+            // A closed quote must be seen as closed, so the `$'` after it is
+            // outside; an escaped `"` inside a double quote must not close it.
+            ("echo 'a' $'tee'", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("echo \"x\" $'tee'", Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            (r#"echo "a\"" $'tee'"#, Some(Kind::AnsiC)),
+            ("echo \"$'x'\"", None),
+            ("echo \"$\\'x'\"", None),
+            ("echo '$'", None),
+            ("echo 'a$'", None),
+            ("echo 'a' 'b'", None),
+            ("echo \\$'x'", None),
+            ("echo \"$\"", None),
+            ("printf '%s\\n' x", None),
+            ("printf 'a\\tb\\n'", None),
+            ("cargo test", None),
+            ("$", None),
+            ("", None),
+        ];
+        for (command, expected) in cases {
+            assert_eq!(outside_quotes(command), *expected, "command: {command}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ansi_c_quoting_kind_reports_its_introducer() {
+        assert_eq!(Kind::AnsiC.introducer(), "$'");
+        assert_eq!(Kind::Locale.introducer(), "$\"");
+    }
+}
diff --git a/tests/issue575_bash_ansi_c_quoting.rs b/tests/issue575_bash_ansi_c_quoting.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c53abe8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/issue575_bash_ansi_c_quoting.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+#![cfg(unix)]
+
+//! Issue #575: the Bash write-target guard's lexical analysis does not know
+//! ANSI-C quoting (`$'...'`) or locale quoting (`$"..."`). It leaves the `$` as
+//! an ordinary character and strips the following quotes as ordinary quotes, so
+//! `$'tee'` becomes the word `$tee` and the program, its prefixes, and its
+//! options are read wrong. The shell expands those forms before running, so
+//! every command that spells `$'` or `$"` outside a shell quote is refused as an
+//! unverifiable form. Every test name contains `ansi_c_quoting` so the
+//! mutation-test filter selects these tests together with the unit tests in
+//! `bash_write_guard/ansi_c_quoting.rs`.
+
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+use commandagent::tools::bash::path_confinement_rejection;
+
+struct Fixture {
+    _dir: tempfile::TempDir,
+    root: PathBuf,
+}
+
+/// A workspace with an escaping `sub/link` symlink, an inside `a.txt`, and an
+/// inside secret file.
+fn fixture() -> Fixture {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let root = dir.path().join("ws");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("sub")).unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(root.join("a.txt"), "x").unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(root.join(".env"), "workspace-secret").unwrap();
+    let outside = dir.path().join("outside");
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&outside).unwrap();
+    std::fs::write(outside.join("secret"), "outside-secret").unwrap();
+    std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&outside, root.join("sub/link")).unwrap();
+    let root = root.canonicalize().unwrap();
+    Fixture { _dir: dir, root }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ansi_c_quoting_rejects_program_and_option_spellings() {
+    let fixture = fixture();
+    let root = &fixture.root;
+    let cases = [
+        // The problem table from the issue body: the program, a prefix, and an
+        // option are spelled with ANSI-C / locale quoting.
+        "$'tee' /tmp/f",
+        "env $'tee' /tmp/f",
+        "env $'-S' 'tee /tmp/f'",
+        "$'\\x74ee' /tmp/f",
+        "$'t\\145e' /tmp/f",
+        "$\"tee\" /tmp/f",
+        "x$'tee' /tmp/f",
+        "cat $'.env'",
+        "cat $'sub/link/secret'",
+        // The same spellings through an escaping symlink.
+        "$'tee' sub/link/f",
+        "env $'-C' sub tee link/f",
+        "cp $'-t' sub/link a.txt",
+        // A mis-read quote that would hide everything after it.
+        "echo $'\\'' ; tee /tmp/f",
+        // More program, option, and assignment spellings.
+        "$'\\cX' /tmp/f",
+        "$''tee /tmp/f",
+        "$\"\"tee /tmp/f",
+        "$'sudo' tee /tmp/f",
+        "$'rm' -rf sub/link/x",
+        "echo $'\\''\ntee sub/link/f",
+        "printf $'a\\'b' > sub/link/f",
+        "X=$'tee'",
+    ];
+    for command in cases {
+        assert!(
+            path_confinement_rejection(command, root).is_some(),
+            "expected rejection: {command}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ansi_c_quoting_keeps_quoted_escaped_and_plain_forms_allowed() {
+    let fixture = fixture();
+    let root = &fixture.root;
+    let cases = [
+        // The `$'` / `$"` introducer is not expanded inside a quote, after a
+        // backslash, or as a lone `$`.
+        "echo \"$'x'\"",
+        "echo '$'",
+        "echo \\$'x'",
+        "echo \"$\"",
+        // Ordinary single-quoted escapes stay usable.
+        "printf '%s\\n' x > out.txt",
+        "printf 'a\\tb\\n' > out.txt",
+        // Everyday verification commands.
+        "cargo test",
+        "cargo fmt --all -- --check",
+        "cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings",
+        "npm test",
+        "npm run build",
+        "python3 -m pytest",
+        "timeout 600 cargo test",
+    ];
+    for command in cases {
+        assert!(
+            path_confinement_rejection(command, root).is_none(),
+            "expected allow: {command}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn ansi_c_quoting_rejection_names_the_ansi_c_operation() {
+    let fixture = fixture();
+    let rejection =
+        path_confinement_rejection("$'tee' /tmp/f", &fixture.root).expect("expected rejection");
+    assert_eq!(rejection.operation, "ANSI-C / locale quoting");
+}