Any MCP client. lockssh init wires Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Gemini CLI. An agent talks to the console through the MCP server (lockssh mcp, five tools) or the lockssh CLI; every client command takes --json.
Any MCP client, run confined (in a container, as lea runs agents): the console refuses an agent that does not report running confined, unless a non-production profile sets unconfined = true. lockssh init wires Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Gemini CLI. An agent talks to the console through the MCP server (lockssh mcp, five tools) or the lockssh CLI; every client command takes --json.
No. The agent sends an argv, and the console quotes every argument: ;, |, &&, $(...) and backquotes reach the program as plain text. Globs in allow rules never match an option or a .. segment. No shell, no climbing, no options.
No. The agent sends an argv, and the console quotes every argument: ;, |, &&, $(...) and backquotes reach the program as plain text. Globs in allow rules never match an option you did not write or a .. segment. No shell, no climbing, no options.
Cards, emails, IBANs, public IP addresses, phone numbers and secrets become keyed pseudonyms, stable for one console run. Person names, postal addresses and free text are not: prefer commands whose output you know. What is not masked.
+Cards, emails, IBANs, public IP addresses and phone numbers become keyed pseudonyms, stable for one console run; secrets become ⟦secret⟧. Person names, postal addresses and free text are not: prefer commands whose output you know. What is not masked.
v0.3.0 is released, and its launcher installs with install.sh. The console runs under lox run only, which takes lockhub’s lox v0.11.0 or later. It installs with Homebrew too: brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamily installs it with lox. Where things stand.
v0.3.0 is released, and its launcher installs with install.sh. The console runs under lox run only, which takes lockhub’s lox v0.12.0 or later. It installs with Homebrew too: brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamily installs it with lox. Where things stand.
The console runs it in an SSH session of its own, as exec followed by the quoted argv: no PTY, no stdin, no forwarding, bounded in time and output.
The output is masked, then returned with the exit status (or the signal, or timed_out), the truncation flags, the duration and the count of masked values by kind. The request goes to the audit.
The first request of each SSH session, and the first after the policy changed, also waits for a connect ticket. The first one of each console run is always yours.
+The first request of each SSH login (the console’s connection, a reconnection), and the first after the policy changed, also waits for a connect ticket. With the default connect = "ask", the first one of each console run is always yours.
An allow rule is an argv pattern, its tokens separated by spaces. The first token, the program, is always literal, and never a shell builtin or keyword. A token is an exact argument, a glob for one argument (* and ? never match /), or a last ** for the remaining arguments.
A glob never matches an argument that starts with - or + (unless the glob itself starts so), and never covers a . or .. segment.
A glob never matches an argument that starts with - or + (unless the glob itself starts so, or follows a literal --; the policy review warns on both), and never covers a . or .. segment.
no rule matches, exec = false | refused, E_NOT_ALLOWED; nothing runs | none |
no rule matches, exec = true | a ticket you decide (risk write, prod-write on production) | exec (ask); never auto on production |
the output in clear (unmask) | only once you switched it on in the console; then a ticket | unmask (ask); never decided by an auto rule |
| the SSH session’s first use | a connect ticket; the first of each console run is yours | connect (ask) |
| the SSH session’s first use | a connect ticket; the first of each console run is yours under the default ask | connect (ask) |
:unmask: switch clear output on, so the agent may ask for it on a ticket.:quit: stop the console.The console serves until logout, :quit, the idle timeout (20 minutes by default) or the maximum session (4 hours).
The console serves until logout, :quit, the idle timeout (20 minutes by default) or the maximum session (4 hours by default).
v0.2A Lock of the Lock Family · open source · Apache 2.0
+v0.3A Lock of the Lock Family · open source · Apache 2.0
Any AI agent can run commands on your servers over SSH without ever holding the key. Allow-listed commands run at once, the rest waits for you, and the output comes back masked.
+Any AI agent, run confined, can run commands on your servers over SSH without ever holding the key. Allow-listed commands run at once, the rest waits for you, and the output comes back masked.
lox init
lox add lockssh
lox run
- lockssh takes lockhub’s lox v0.11.0 or later: an older one does not know it. Docker on Linux or macOS; brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamily installs both, or the launcher of the install guide.
lockssh v0.3 takes lockhub’s lox v0.12.0 or later: an older one does not know it or its confined agents. Docker on Linux or macOS; brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamily installs both, or the launcher of the install guide.
The key or password lives in the console’s account (mode 0600). A passphrase is asked at start or read from Vault. Never in the agent’s account, a result, an error or the audit.
systemctl status *, journalctl -u * -n * --no-pager: a command an approved rule matches runs at once. The program is always literal.
Anything else is refused or, with exec = true, becomes a signed ticket you decide in lox run. It runs once, for that agent, that argv, that policy.
Every argument is quoted: ;, |, $(...) stay literal. Globs never match an option or climb out with ...
Every argument is quoted: ;, |, $(...) stay literal. Globs never match an option you did not write or climb out with ...
stdout and stderr are capped, then masked: emails, public IPs, cards, IBANs, phones, secrets. Clear output needs your switch and a ticket.
A host key the console has never seen is trusted only on your answer; a changed key is always refused.
One SSH session per command: no PTY, no stdin, no forwarding. A timeout (30 s by default) and an output cap per stream.
Install the lockssh launcher and lockhub’s lox v0.11.0 or later, or both with brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamily (install guide). Docker must be running.
Install the lockssh launcher and lockhub’s lox v0.12.0 or later, or both with brew install davidgodefroid/tap/lockfamily (install guide). Docker must be running.
In your project, write a lockfamily.yaml with the hub alone (once):
lox initAdd an SSH host: host, port, login, key file in the lock’s home, allow rules. Never a secret.
diff --git a/site/install/index.html b/site/install/index.html index dcf3fb4..9467243 100644 --- a/site/install/index.html +++ b/site/install/index.html @@ -63,8 +63,8 @@lockssh v0.3.0 is the latest release. lox add lockssh and lox run serving it ship in lockhub v0.11.0 (lockhub#133); an older lox does not know lockssh and cannot start its console. lox add lockssh pins lockssh v0.2.0.
lockssh has a Homebrew formula, on Linux and macOS. The lockfamily meta formula installs the whole family, lockssh and lockhub’s lox v0.11.0 included; or install lockssh by name.
lockssh v0.3.0 is the latest release. lox add lockssh and lox run serving it ship in lockhub v0.11.0 (lockhub#133), and lockssh v0.3.0’s confined agents in v0.12.0; an older lox does not know lockssh and cannot start its console. lox add lockssh pins the latest signed lockssh release.
lockssh has a Homebrew formula, on Linux and macOS. The lockfamily meta formula installs the whole family, lockssh and lockhub’s lox included; or install lockssh by name.
In your project, with lockhub’s lox v0.11.0 or later:
In your project, with lockhub’s lox v0.12.0 or later:
lox init # a lockfamily.yaml with the hub alone (once)
lox add lockssh # host, port, login, key file, allow rules; never a secret
lox run # in a terminal of its own: starts the console, serves the decisions
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ lockssh init codex # or claude, cursor, gemini; this project
lockssh doctor --fix # the config, the consoles, .lockssh, the agent wiring
lockssh init writes the MCP command, lockssh mcp, which runs through the launcher in a throwaway container. Any MCP client works; init wires Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Gemini CLI.
lockssh init writes the MCP command, lockssh mcp, which runs through the launcher in a throwaway container. Any MCP client works, run confined (as lea runs agents); init wires Claude Code, Codex, Cursor and Gemini CLI.
Keep the client’s tool timeouts: the console waits up to 5 minutes for an approval. Start the agent at the project root, or below it.
The promise is narrow: the agent never holds the SSH key or password, never opens an SSH connection, and runs only what you allowed, with the output masked before it leaves the console.
-You approve the policy and decide every ticket in lox run, outside the agent. The console runs in an account and a container the agent cannot read or drive.
You approve the policy and decide every ticket your auto rules leave to you in lox run, outside the agent. The console runs in an account and a container the agent cannot read or drive.
Skills, rules and MCP tool descriptions only guide the agent; the console’s checks are the guarantee. This page summarises the full security model.
lox run)lockssh account, own container)lockssh-clients, or an --allowed-uids uid)lockssh-clients, or an --allowed-uids uid), run confinedexec, so argv[0] is always a program on the host’s PATH, never a builtin, keyword, alias or function; control and invisible characters refusedexec = true waits for a signed ticket bound to the argv, the agent and the policy fingerprint, and runs onceexec, so argv[0] is always a program (looked up on the host’s PATH unless it holds a /), never a builtin, keyword, alias or function; control and invisible characters refusedexec = true waits for a signed ticket bound to the argv, the agent and the policy fingerprint, and runs once; you decide it, or lox run does when a non-production profile sets auto.exec = "auto" (refused on production)unconfined = true serves one anyway (a loosening you approve, a red banner, audited); a production profile with it does not start.lockssh/config.toml waits for your :review; the agent can only queue a change requestknown_hosts file the profile names, it is refused; a changed key is always refusedThe remote line is exec followed by the quoted argv: exec 'systemctl' 'status' 'nginx'. Nothing after it in the line can run, and an argv[0] that starts with - or + is refused.
In an allow rule, a glob never matches an argument that starts with - or +, so it cannot choose an option you never wrote: git log * does not allow git log --output=/home/u/.bashrc. A glob never covers a . or .. segment, so cat /var/log/* does not reach /etc/shadow.
In an allow rule, a glob never matches an argument that starts with - or +, unless the glob itself starts with that character (-*, +%*) or follows a literal --; the policy review warns on both. So it cannot choose an option you never wrote: git log * does not allow git log --output=/home/u/.bashrc. A glob never covers a . or .. segment, so cat /var/log/* does not reach /etc/shadow.
The SSH account’s login shell must be a POSIX shell (sh, dash, bash, ksh, zsh): another one may read the quoted arguments differently.
The agent’s container holds no key, has no SSH connection and reaches the console only through the socket. A process that is neither the console account nor in lockssh-clients (nor an allowed uid) is refused.
Your own account is another matter: whoever can run docker commands can attach to the console, exec into it or open its home volume. An agent that runs shell commands as you usually can. For that boundary, run the agent in a container of its own without the Docker socket, as lea does. Details.
The agent’s container holds no key, has no SSH connection and reaches the console only through the socket. A process that is neither the console account nor in lockssh-clients (nor an allowed uid) is refused, and so is an agent that does not report running confined.
Your own account is another matter: whoever can run docker commands can attach to the console, exec into it or open its home volume. An agent that runs shell commands as you usually can. The console refuses an agent that does not report running confined (in a container of its own without the Docker socket, as lea runs it), but the report is the client’s own: a process of your account can lie in it. Details.