From 5bf38945720bb7f1064312a38eaf1991bd355e43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: arpan Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 01:36:39 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] Regenerate against ctrlrun main: v0.10 items 1 to 5 ctrlrun main carries items 1 to 5 since 2026-09-14, and this repository's main did not, so the kernel's docs job has been red on main. main is checked against main, so the two must match at all times. Mechanical, every generator: 19 API pages (line numbers, plus Control gaining upstream and protect, execute, evaluate, Receipt and AuthorityResult gaining hop), cli.mdx for inspect --hop, the capabilities and badge copies, the cookbook, and the readiness block pasted fresh into docs.mdx and docs/production/index.mdx, which is the hand-pasted part. CLAIMS.md repointed: 97 references moved, 0 unresolved. snippets, lint and links all clean. No page was added or removed. narrowed_dimensions and unmatched_shape are in ctrlrun.authority.__all__ and not ctrlrun.__all__, which is where render_api.py takes its names from, and contained_dimension and DIMENSIONS sit in exactly that position with no pages either. Control.hop is a method and renders inside Control.mdx. The readiness block still says version 0.9.0 and 27 guarantees, which is what the tree says: the version bump is the release pass's, and these pages describe the code as it is rather than as it will be. Held back for the release pass, because each states released behaviour: docs/verify.md's rows for G25 to G27, the ASI04 and ASI07 rows in docs/OWASP-AGENTIC-TOP10.md, the upstream: key in docs/reference/policy-yaml.mdx, and the ROADMAP reconciliation. Signed-off-by: arpan --- docs.mdx | 4 +- docs/CLAIMS.md | 114 +++++++++---------- docs/production/index.mdx | 4 +- docs/reference/api/Authority.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/AuthorityResult.mdx | 4 +- docs/reference/api/Condition.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/Control.mdx | 4 +- docs/reference/api/Decision.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/Delegation.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/Event.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/EventSink.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/Grant.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/JSONLEventSink.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/Policy.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/Receipt.mdx | 4 +- docs/reference/api/Subject.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/authority-Budget.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/context.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/idempotency_token.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/parse_conditions.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/api/protect.mdx | 4 +- docs/reference/api/with_approval.mdx | 2 +- docs/reference/cli.mdx | 2 + docs/reference/receipt-and-event-schemas.mdx | 3 +- generated/readiness.full.mdx | 4 +- generated/readiness.json | 4 +- generated/readiness.mdx | 4 +- generated/readiness.readme.md | 4 +- 28 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs.mdx b/docs.mdx index 319b539..1249bb4 100644 --- a/docs.mdx +++ b/docs.mdx @@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ the framework's own interrupt, and a framework with no such primitive does not n {/* generated from the suite, pyproject and the soak (mdx) — run the generator */} - **Version 0.9.0**, on [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/ctrlrun/), Python 3.11 and later. -- **5,975 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. -- **24 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. +- **6,033 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. +- **27 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. - **One host: a file.** SQLite, no server, no ops. **Many hosts: Postgres**, the same guarantees, graded by the same suite. - **Soaked for 20m 0s on postgres**: 889,735 actions, 0 unattributed ambiguous outcomes, positive control fired. Nothing here establishes what only accumulates over days. [What it does not establish](https://ctrlrun.dev/docs/production/soak). - **Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it**, so an alteration is detected and named. diff --git a/docs/CLAIMS.md b/docs/CLAIMS.md index 263e8b5..1d919fd 100644 --- a/docs/CLAIMS.md +++ b/docs/CLAIMS.md @@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ by its quoted claim, and `tests/test_docs_audit.py` fails if a named row is not | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| -| "The last check before an AI agent does something it can't undo." | `Control.execute` — `control.py:1127` — resolves the principal, evaluates authority and policy, consumes the approval and reserves the effect key **before** the executor runs; nothing in the wrapper calls the function first | `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote`, `test_T3_the_fake_remote_is_called_exactly_once` | -| "Autonomy belongs to the action, not the agent." | `Policy.evaluate(action)` — `policy.py:596` — passes only the action's **name and arguments** to `_ActionPolicy.evaluate` (`policy.py:596`), whose signature has no principal in it. A rule cannot read who is acting even by accident. `agent_eq` and `user_eq` are refused at load by `RESERVED_ARGUMENTS` (`policy.py:224`) rather than silently matching nothing. | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_a_condition_naming_an_action_field_is_refused_at_load` | -| "A consequential action happens at most once, exactly as approved, and leaves a receipt — and when the outcome is unknown, CTRLRun says so instead of guessing." | At most once: `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248`. Exactly as approved: the approval is bound to `action_hash` and consumed with the reservation — `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1196`. Or not at all: a refusal raises before the executor — `Control.execute` — `control.py:1127`. Says so instead of guessing: only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:1960` — and everything else is `AMBIGUOUS`. A receipt: `Receipt` — `receipt.py:242`. **This sentence read *happens once … or not at all* until 0.6**, a two-way disjunction that excluded the third outcome the product exists for: a lost reply is neither, and the README's own first section says so. | `test_T3_exactly_one_agent_reserves_and_seven_are_blocked`, `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch`, `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous`, `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_carries_every_field_in_the_spec` | +| "The last check before an AI agent does something it can't undo." | `Control.execute` — `control.py:1294` — resolves the principal, evaluates authority and policy, consumes the approval and reserves the effect key **before** the executor runs; nothing in the wrapper calls the function first | `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote`, `test_T3_the_fake_remote_is_called_exactly_once` | +| "Autonomy belongs to the action, not the agent." | `Policy.evaluate(action)` — `policy.py:655` — passes only the action's **name and arguments** to `_ActionPolicy.evaluate` (`policy.py:655`), whose signature has no principal in it. A rule cannot read who is acting even by accident. `agent_eq` and `user_eq` are refused at load by `RESERVED_ARGUMENTS` (`policy.py:251`) rather than silently matching nothing. | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_a_condition_naming_an_action_field_is_refused_at_load` | +| "A consequential action happens at most once, exactly as approved, and leaves a receipt — and when the outcome is unknown, CTRLRun says so instead of guessing." | At most once: `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248`. Exactly as approved: the approval is bound to `action_hash` and consumed with the reservation — `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1196`. Or not at all: a refusal raises before the executor — `Control.execute` — `control.py:1294`. Says so instead of guessing: only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:2172` — and everything else is `AMBIGUOUS`. A receipt: `Receipt` — `receipt.py:250`. **This sentence read *happens once … or not at all* until 0.6**, a two-way disjunction that excluded the third outcome the product exists for: a lost reply is neither, and the README's own first section says so. | `test_T3_exactly_one_agent_reserves_and_seven_are_blocked`, `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch`, `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous`, `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_carries_every_field_in_the_spec` | | "A Python library that sits between the decision to act and the call that acts." | `@protect` — `control.py` — wraps the callable that acts, and `Control.execute` runs every check before invoking it. The category noun was on `docs.mdx` and in `pyproject.toml`'s `description` and nowhere in the README until 0.6, so a reader had to infer what CTRLRun **is** from three slogans. | `test_the_header_carries_the_fixed_copy_and_the_five_badges`, `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote` | | "Runs in production on a single file, or on Postgres across hosts" | SQLite: `SQLiteStateStore` reserves inside the `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` of `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1476` — which is a write lock on the file and holds across OS processes. Postgres: `PostgresStateStore` over `UNIQUE(effect_key)` with `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` and checked row counts (SPEC-v0.6 §4.2), the same `StateStore` protocol, extended by nothing | `test_T3_exactly_one_agent_reserves_and_seven_are_blocked` (8 OS processes, both backends), `test_T141_the_shipped_backends_pass`, `test_T154_postgres_passes_the_store_conformance_suite` | @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ by its quoted claim, and `tests/test_docs_audit.py` fails if a named row is not | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| -| "A lost reply is `AMBIGUOUS`, never `FAILED`, and a retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` effect is refused — until a human, or a `reconcile` hook, says what happened." | Only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:1134`; a retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` key is refused by `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248`; the two things permitted to move the record on and nothing else — `resolve` — `cli/main.py:587` — and `Control._reconciled` — `control.py:2595` | `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous`, `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote`, `test_T160_there_is_no_reaper`, `test_T13_a_hook_answering_not_executed_moves_the_record_to_failed` | +| "A lost reply is `AMBIGUOUS`, never `FAILED`, and a retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` effect is refused — until a human, or a `reconcile` hook, says what happened." | Only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:1301`; a retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` key is refused by `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248`; the two things permitted to move the record on and nothing else — `resolve` — `cli/main.py:589` — and `Control._reconciled` — `control.py:2826` | `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous`, `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote`, `test_T160_there_is_no_reaper`, `test_T13_a_hook_answering_not_executed_moves_the_record_to_failed` | | "The customer is refunded twice, and nothing in the stack noticed." — said of a stack without CTRLRun; the demo runs the same sequence with it, and counts the calls the remote received | `ctrlrun demo` scenario 1, which retries against a fake remote that counts its calls and prints the count | `test_T3_the_fake_remote_is_called_exactly_once`, `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote` | ## Protect your first action @@ -50,31 +50,31 @@ by its quoted claim, and `tests/test_docs_audit.py` fails if a named row is not | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| -| "A lost reply is `AMBIGUOUS`, never `FAILED`, and a retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` effect is refused." | Only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:1960`; `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248` | `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous`, `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote` | +| "A lost reply is `AMBIGUOUS`, never `FAILED`, and a retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` effect is refused." | Only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:2172`; `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248` | `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous`, `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote` | | "reserved atomically across processes and hosts; one worker wins" | `reserve_effect` — `state.py:637`; `PostgresStateStore.reserve_effect` — `postgres.py:740` | `test_T3_exactly_one_agent_reserves_and_seven_are_blocked`, `test_T154_postgres_passes_the_store_conformance_suite` | | "bound to the hash of the exact action a human saw, used once, and refused for anything else" | `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1196` | `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch`, `test_T4_replaying_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch_with_reason_consumed` | -| "An action the policy does not list is denied" | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:596` | `test_T6_unknown_action_is_denied_with_reason_unknown_action` | -| "Authority first ... then policy" / "authority first" | `Control.execute` evaluates authority before policy and a denial appends `AUTHORITY_DENIED` and never `POLICY_EVALUATED` — `control.py:1127` | `test_T74_a_denial_leaves_no_pending_approval_request` | -| "Neither axis reads the agent's instructions" | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:596` — sees the action's name and arguments; `Authority.evaluate` — `authority.py:1199` — sees the action and the principal; neither is handed a prompt, a message or a tool result | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied` | +| "An action the policy does not list is denied" | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:655` | `test_T6_unknown_action_is_denied_with_reason_unknown_action` | +| "Authority first ... then policy" / "authority first" | `Control.execute` evaluates authority before policy and a denial appends `AUTHORITY_DENIED` and never `POLICY_EVALUATED` — `control.py:1294` | `test_T74_a_denial_leaves_no_pending_approval_request` | +| "Neither axis reads the agent's instructions" | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:655` — sees the action's name and arguments; `Authority.evaluate` — `authority.py:1294` — sees the action and the principal; neither is handed a prompt, a message or a tool result | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied` | | "canonical arguments (sorted keys, no floats) ... Its SHA-256 is the action hash" | `canonicalize` / `action_hash` — `action.py`; `float` refused at any depth — `action.py:79` | `test_T7_canonical_form_is_exactly_the_specified_serialization`, `test_T7_nested_dicts_are_sorted_recursively` | | "The approval is single-use, expires, and matches nothing but that exact action." | `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1196` — checks expiry at consumption | `test_T5_expiry_is_checked_at_consumption_not_only_at_grant`, `test_T4_replaying_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch_with_reason_consumed` | -| "Only `NotExecuted`, raised by you, means `FAILED`." | `_outcome` — `control.py:1960`; `NotExecuted` — `errors.py:157` | `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous` | -| "the hash of the policy that decided it, chained to the receipt before it" | `Policy.policy_hash` — `policy.py:734`; `prev_hash`, `GENESIS_HASH` for the first — `receipt.py:117` | `test_T172_every_receipt_carries_the_hash_and_the_declared_version`, `test_T164_an_altered_receipt_is_content_altered_at_its_seq` | +| "Only `NotExecuted`, raised by you, means `FAILED`." | `_outcome` — `control.py:2172`; `NotExecuted` — `errors.py:157` | `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous` | +| "the hash of the policy that decided it, chained to the receipt before it" | `Policy.policy_hash` — `policy.py:793`; `prev_hash`, `GENESIS_HASH` for the first — `receipt.py:125` | `test_T172_every_receipt_carries_the_hash_and_the_declared_version`, `test_T164_an_altered_receipt_is_content_altered_at_its_seq` | ## Three ways to use it | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| -| "You probably do not need an adapter" | Three ways in, and `@protect` (`control.py:4576`) covers this process while the gateway covers MCP — an adapter buys only the interrupt | `test_T139_the_adapter_section_says_when_you_do_not_need_one_up_front` | -| "`ctrlrun init` writes a starter" | `init` — `cli/main.py:353` | CI's `package` job runs `ctrlrun init` from the wheel and asserts `ctrlrun.yaml` exists | -| "The human runs `ctrlrun approve ` and the agent calls again inside `ctrlrun.with_approval(request_id)`" | `approve` — `cli/main.py:377`; `with_approval` — `control.py:346`; `ApprovalRequired` (`errors.py:88`) carries `request_id` | `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch` (the granted path first), `test_T4_replaying_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch_with_reason_consumed` | +| "You probably do not need an adapter" | Three ways in, and `@protect` (`control.py:4902`) covers this process while the gateway covers MCP — an adapter buys only the interrupt | `test_T139_the_adapter_section_says_when_you_do_not_need_one_up_front` | +| "`ctrlrun init` writes a starter" | `init` — `cli/main.py:355` | CI's `package` job runs `ctrlrun init` from the wheel and asserts `ctrlrun.yaml` exists | +| "The human runs `ctrlrun approve ` and the agent calls again inside `ctrlrun.with_approval(request_id)`" | `approve` — `cli/main.py:377`; `with_approval` — `control.py:392`; `ApprovalRequired` (`errors.py:88`) carries `request_id` | `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch` (the granted path first), `test_T4_replaying_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch_with_reason_consumed` | | "No agent changes" | `INTERCEPTED_METHOD` is `tools/call` and every other method is relayed unchanged — `gateway/mcp.py:40` | `test_a_non_intercepted_method_is_relayed_with_no_ctrlrun_outcome` | -| "Point the MCP client at the gateway instead of at the tool server" | `Gateway.handle` — `gateway/server.py:388`; `serve` — `gateway/__init__.py:41` | `test_T19_the_upstream_receives_the_canonical_arguments` | +| "Point the MCP client at the gateway instead of at the tool server" | `Gateway.handle` — `gateway/server.py:397`; `serve` — `gateway/__init__.py:41` | `test_T19_the_upstream_receives_the_canonical_arguments` | | "Tools become actions named `mcp..`" | `Gateway._intercept` — `gateway/server.py:442` | `test_T19_the_action_is_named_for_the_alias_and_the_tool` | -| "they are declared in the policy" (effect and resource templates for a tool call) | `Policy.effect_template` / `resource_template` — `policy.py:901`; `McpOptions` — `policy.py:543` | `test_T16_a_v2_document_loads_and_exposes_its_templates`, `test_T16_a_decorator_and_a_policy_template_produce_the_same_action_hash` | -| "Everything but `tools/call` is relayed untouched" | `parse_request(...).intercept` — `gateway/mcp.py:84` | `test_every_other_method_is_relayed_not_intercepted` | +| "they are declared in the policy" (effect and resource templates for a tool call) | `Policy.effect_template` / `resource_template` — `policy.py:979`; `McpOptions` — `policy.py:600` | `test_T16_a_v2_document_loads_and_exposes_its_templates`, `test_T16_a_decorator_and_a_policy_template_produce_the_same_action_hash` | +| "Everything but `tools/call` is relayed untouched" | `parse_request(...).intercept` — `gateway/mcp.py:93` | `test_every_other_method_is_relayed_not_intercepted` | | "A lost response over the wire blocks the retry exactly as it does in process" | `classify` — `gateway/outcome.py:129`, translated into v0.1 §5.5's own vocabulary by the gateway's executor | `test_T23_the_identical_call_sent_again_is_refused_and_the_upstream_called_once` | -| "the gateway prints, on the line that starts it, every action in your policy that has no `effect:` template" | `_announce` — `gateway/__init__.py:146` | `test_the_startup_block_names_the_environment_identity_and_authority`, `test_the_startup_block_says_so_when_there_is_no_authority_section` | +| "the gateway prints, on the line that starts it, every action in your policy that has no `effect:` template" | `_announce` — `gateway/__init__.py:150` | `test_the_startup_block_names_the_environment_identity_and_authority`, `test_the_startup_block_says_so_when_there_is_no_authority_section` | | "route an `approve` decision through **the framework's own interrupt**" | `FrameworkInterrupt` — `adapter.py:180` — is a Protocol with one method returning a value; it holds no state and writes nothing | `test_T135b_the_adapter_reuses_the_sdks_primitive_and_reimplements_nothing` | | "one core provider writes the grant through the same calls `ctrlrun approve` makes" / "There is never a second place to say yes" | `InterruptApprovalProvider.wait` — `adapter.py:254` — calls `grant_approval` / `deny_approval`, and an adapter calls neither | `test_T130_each_broken_fixture_fails_the_suite_named_for_it` | | "an adapter never constructs one and never supplies a principal" | `needs_approval` — `adapter.py:428` — resolves the principal from the `Control` so no adapter builds an `Action` | `test_T129_no_public_callable_takes_a_principal`, `test_T129_the_module_exposes_no_way_to_construct_a_control` | @@ -85,30 +85,30 @@ by its quoted claim, and `tests/test_docs_audit.py` fails if a named row is not | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| -| "cheap to undo is autonomous, anything that leaves the building needs a human, money is by amount with both ends bound" | `Decision` — `policy.py:308` — is exactly `allow`, `approve`, `deny`; rules match first-wins over `Condition` (`policy.py:372`) with the operators `eq`, `neq`, `in`, `lt`, `lte`, `gt`, `gte` — `_OPERATORS` — `policy.py:119` | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_T176_the_operators_behave_as_they_do_everywhere_else` | -| "Unknown actions are denied; there is no default-allow." | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:596` | `test_T6_unknown_action_is_denied_with_reason_unknown_action` | +| "cheap to undo is autonomous, anything that leaves the building needs a human, money is by amount with both ends bound" | `Decision` — `policy.py:308` — is exactly `allow`, `approve`, `deny`; rules match first-wins over `Condition` (`policy.py:399`) with the operators `eq`, `neq`, `in`, `lt`, `lte`, `gt`, `gte` — `_OPERATORS` — `policy.py:119` | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_T176_the_operators_behave_as_they_do_everywhere_else` | +| "Unknown actions are denied; there is no default-allow." | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:655` | `test_T6_unknown_action_is_denied_with_reason_unknown_action` | | "Amounts are integer minor units; floats are rejected outright" | `float` refused at any depth — `action.py:79` | `test_T7_canonical_form_is_exactly_the_specified_serialization` | -| "The policy cannot see who is asking — deliberately, since v0.1" | `Policy.evaluate` still takes only the action's name and arguments; `RESERVED_ARGUMENTS` — `policy.py:596` — refuses `agent_eq` and every other principal-addressing condition at load, in a document of **every** schema version | `test_T74b_a_reserved_name_in_a_policy_rule_is_a_load_error`, `test_T74b_a_reserved_name_in_a_grant_constraint_is_a_load_error` | -| "the second axis, `authority:`" | `Authority.evaluate` — `authority.py:1191`; `Control._authority_result` — `control.py:962` | `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied` | +| "The policy cannot see who is asking — deliberately, since v0.1" | `Policy.evaluate` still takes only the action's name and arguments; `RESERVED_ARGUMENTS` — `policy.py:655` — refuses `agent_eq` and every other principal-addressing condition at load, in a document of **every** schema version | `test_T74b_a_reserved_name_in_a_policy_rule_is_a_load_error`, `test_T74b_a_reserved_name_in_a_grant_constraint_is_a_load_error` | +| "the second axis, `authority:`" | `Authority.evaluate` — `authority.py:1286`; `Control._authority_result` — `control.py:1117` | `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied` | | "opt-in, and then fail-closed" | `_optional_authority` returns `None` for a document with no section — `control.py`; `Control.authority is None` is v0.2 behaviour exactly | `test_T66_a_document_with_no_authority_section_leaves_control_authority_none`, `test_T66_no_authority_event_is_appended_without_a_section`, and T66's session-wide guard in `tests/conftest.py` | -| "every principal needs a grant and no grant means denied" | `NO_AUTHORITY` — the fail-closed default of `Authority.evaluate` (`authority.py:77`), reached for reads and for actions with no effect key alike | `test_T67_an_action_the_policy_allows_outright_still_needs_a_grant` | +| "every principal needs a grant and no grant means denied" | `NO_AUTHORITY` — the fail-closed default of `Authority.evaluate` (`authority.py:84`), reached for reads and for actions with no effect key alike | `test_T67_an_action_the_policy_allows_outright_still_needs_a_grant` | | "A grant carries no `decision:`" | `_GRANT_KEYS` — `authority.py` — is a closed set that does not contain `decision` | `test_T73b_grant_refuses_what_the_loader_refuses` | | "combine as the **stricter of the two**" | `Control.evaluate` returns the combined result — `control.py`; a denial on either axis is a denial | `test_T70_the_stricter_of_the_two_wins` | -| "narrow it at runtime with `ctrlrun delegate`" | `Control.delegate` — `control.py:3849`; `Authority.plan_delegation` — `authority.py:1430`; `ctrlrun delegate` — `cli/main.py:1045` | `test_t75_the_delegation_authorizes_an_action_within_its_limits` | -| "provably a subset of its parent on every dimension, at creation and again at every evaluation" | `contained_dimension` — `authority.py:889` — runs from `plan_delegation` (`authority.py:1430`) **and** from the chain walk in `Authority.evaluate` (`authority.py:1199`) | `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone`, `test_t77b_a_narrowed_parent_narrows_its_children` | -| "provably a subset of its parent on every dimension, at creation and again at every evaluation; a consequence budget is consumed inside the reservation's own transaction, and a rolling window bounds what may start rather than recalling what already did" | Containment as in the row above. The budget: `check_charges` — `state.py:569` — is evaluated inside `reserve_effect`'s own transaction on all three backends, and `_charges_for` — `authority.py:1285` — charges every ancestor in the chain. The window is rolling and bounds the next reserve only: `_spent` sums `[now - window, now]` and nothing reads it again after a reservation is taken | `test_T408_a_charge_and_its_reservation_are_one_transaction`, `test_T409_N_processes_racing_one_budget_spend_at_most_the_limit`, `test_T412b_every_ancestor_is_charged_through_a_real_chain`, `test_T408c_the_rolling_window_forgets` | -| "omitting a dimension the parent constrains is rejected rather than inherited" | `contained_dimension` treats an absent child dimension as unconstrained and therefore wider — `authority.py:889`; the subject half is `_subject_contained` (`authority.py:968`) | `test_t81_omission_is_not_unlimited`, `test_T73b_a_subject_addressed_to_every_principal_is_refused`, `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone` | -| "`ctrlrun revoke` cuts a chain of any depth with one write" | `Control.revoke` — `control.py:4148` — writes one row — `revoke_delegation` — `state.py:835` and visits no children; every evaluation walks to the root | `test_t78_a_revoked_parent_denies_its_grandchild`, `test_put_delegation_is_never_an_upsert` | -| "`mode: observe` … records what *would* have been blocked, without blocking anything" | `_parse_mode` — `policy.py:719`; `Control._observed` — `control.py:1503`; `_WouldHave` — `receipt.py:336`; `ReceiptResult.OBSERVED` — `receipt.py:248` | `test_T82_observe_executes_what_enforce_would_deny`, `test_T83_a_duplicate_is_recorded_and_still_runs` | -| "One top-level line" | `mode:` is refused anywhere but the top level — `reject_nested_mode`, `policy.py:719` | `test_T84_mode_is_refused_anywhere_but_the_top_level` | -| "`ctrlrun stats` gives you the numbers" | `stats` — `cli/main.py:866`; counted from `would_have.blocked_reason` and nothing else | `test_T86_stats_counts_what_observe_mode_recorded`, `test_T86_stats_reaches_no_network` | -| "It is not a dry run: it executes" | `_observed` runs the executor on every path, including the ones enforce mode would have refused — `control.py:1503` | `test_T82_observe_executes_what_enforce_would_deny`, `test_T83_an_executor_that_fails_on_a_held_key_still_writes_the_record` | +| "narrow it at runtime with `ctrlrun delegate`" | `Control.delegate` — `control.py:4114`; `Authority.plan_delegation` — `authority.py:1538`; `ctrlrun delegate` — `cli/main.py:1045` | `test_t75_the_delegation_authorizes_an_action_within_its_limits` | +| "provably a subset of its parent on every dimension, at creation and again at every evaluation" | `contained_dimension` — `authority.py:984` — runs from `plan_delegation` (`authority.py:1538`) **and** from the chain walk in `Authority.evaluate` (`authority.py:1294`) | `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone`, `test_t77b_a_narrowed_parent_narrows_its_children` | +| "provably a subset of its parent on every dimension, at creation and again at every evaluation; a consequence budget is consumed inside the reservation's own transaction, and a rolling window bounds what may start rather than recalling what already did" | Containment as in the row above. The budget: `check_charges` — `state.py:569` — is evaluated inside `reserve_effect`'s own transaction on all three backends, and `_charges_for` — `authority.py:1393` — charges every ancestor in the chain. The window is rolling and bounds the next reserve only: `_spent` sums `[now - window, now]` and nothing reads it again after a reservation is taken | `test_T408_a_charge_and_its_reservation_are_one_transaction`, `test_T409_N_processes_racing_one_budget_spend_at_most_the_limit`, `test_T412b_every_ancestor_is_charged_through_a_real_chain`, `test_T408c_the_rolling_window_forgets` | +| "omitting a dimension the parent constrains is rejected rather than inherited" | `contained_dimension` treats an absent child dimension as unconstrained and therefore wider — `authority.py:984`; the subject half is `_subject_contained` (`authority.py:1063`) | `test_t81_omission_is_not_unlimited`, `test_T73b_a_subject_addressed_to_every_principal_is_refused`, `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone` | +| "`ctrlrun revoke` cuts a chain of any depth with one write" | `Control.revoke` — `control.py:4451` — writes one row — `revoke_delegation` — `state.py:835` and visits no children; every evaluation walks to the root | `test_t78_a_revoked_parent_denies_its_grandchild`, `test_put_delegation_is_never_an_upsert` | +| "`mode: observe` … records what *would* have been blocked, without blocking anything" | `_parse_mode` — `policy.py:778`; `Control._observed` — `control.py:1678`; `_WouldHave` — `receipt.py:344`; `ReceiptResult.OBSERVED` — `receipt.py:256` | `test_T82_observe_executes_what_enforce_would_deny`, `test_T83_a_duplicate_is_recorded_and_still_runs` | +| "One top-level line" | `mode:` is refused anywhere but the top level — `reject_nested_mode`, `policy.py:778` | `test_T84_mode_is_refused_anywhere_but_the_top_level` | +| "`ctrlrun stats` gives you the numbers" | `stats` — `cli/main.py:915`; counted from `would_have.blocked_reason` and nothing else | `test_T86_stats_counts_what_observe_mode_recorded`, `test_T86_stats_reaches_no_network` | +| "It is not a dry run: it executes" | `_observed` runs the executor on every path, including the ones enforce mode would have refused — `control.py:1678` | `test_T82_observe_executes_what_enforce_would_deny`, `test_T83_an_executor_that_fails_on_a_held_key_still_writes_the_record` | ## Prove it holds in your setup | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| -| "runs the kernel's own failure scenarios against the configuration in front of it" | `ctrlrun.verify.run` — `verify/__init__.py:154`; the eleven guarantees — `GUARANTEES` — `verify/guarantees.py:47`; the scenarios — `verify/scenarios.py` | `test_T100_the_authority_example_passes_every_non_authority_guarantee` (11/11), `test_T100_a_v1_document_with_no_templates_and_no_grants` | +| "runs the kernel's own failure scenarios against the configuration in front of it" | `ctrlrun.verify.run` — `verify/__init__.py:154`; the eleven guarantees — `GUARANTEES` — `verify/guarantees.py:49`; the scenarios — `verify/scenarios.py` | `test_T100_the_authority_example_passes_every_non_authority_guarantee` (11/11), `test_T100_a_v1_document_with_no_templates_and_no_grants` | | "in a scratch store, with fake executors, and no network" | One scratch store per guarantee under a temporary directory — `verify/scenarios.py`, `Engine.control`; `state_path()` is never called and `Control.from_file()` is never used | `test_T103_the_operators_store_is_byte_identical_before_and_after`, `test_T103_a_store_that_does_not_exist_is_not_created`, `test_T107_a_full_run_completes_with_no_network` | | "Your `.ctrlrun/state.db` is byte-identical before and after" | The scratch path is a `tempfile.mkdtemp` removed in a `finally` — `verify/__init__.py` | `test_T103_the_operators_store_is_byte_identical_before_and_after` (SHA-256 and `st_mtime_ns`), `test_T103_CTRLRUN_STATE_is_not_read_and_not_created` | | "Not applicable is not a pass" | `Report.applicable` is passes plus failures — `verify/report.py`; every N/A reason is a statement about the document — `verify/guarantees.py` | `test_T101_a_policy_with_no_approve_rule_makes_G1_and_G2_not_applicable`, `test_T102_a_policy_with_no_effect_templates_makes_G3_G4_and_G5_not_applicable` | @@ -133,16 +133,16 @@ keeps it honest: ## The capability matrix Rendered from `capabilities.yaml`; the six rows are the six groups of the verify -catalogue, `GUARANTEES` (`verify/guarantees.py:47`). +catalogue, `GUARANTEES` (`verify/guarantees.py:49`). | Claim | Code | Proof | |---|---|---| | "An approval is bound to the exact action; a mutated or replayed one is refused." | `action_hash` — `action.py`; the approval record stores it and `_authorize_and_reserve` compares it — `state.py:665`; single use is the `granted → consumed` transition in the same `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` | `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch`, `test_T4_replaying_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch_with_reason_consumed`, `test_T5_expiry_is_checked_at_consumption_not_only_at_grant` | | "One logical effect happens at most once, across threads, processes and hosts." | `reserve_effect` — `state.py:637`, decided inside the `BEGIN IMMEDIATE` of `_authorize_and_reserve` (`state.py:1196`) against `effect_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY` (`migrations.py:107`; `COLLATE "C"` on Postgres, §4.4) | `test_T3_exactly_one_agent_reserves_and_seven_are_blocked` (8 OS processes, both backends), `test_T3_the_fake_remote_is_called_exactly_once` | -| "An unknown outcome is AMBIGUOUS, never FAILED, and blocks a blind retry." | Only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:1960`. Every other exception, timeouts included, yields `AMBIGUOUS`. A retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` key is refused — `effect.py:172`, the one place `plan_reservation` decides it for every store | `test_T1_a_blind_retry_writes_a_blocked_receipt`, `test_T1_the_ambiguous_record_survives_the_blocked_retry`, `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous` | -| "An unknown action, a missing policy or a missing principal is denied." | Unknown action: `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:596` — answers `deny` for a name the document does not list. Missing or malformed policy: `Policy.from_file` — `policy.py:753` — raises `PolicyError`, and there is no `Control` without a policy. Missing principal: `_refuse_no_principal` — `control.py:4458` | `test_T6_unknown_action_raises_ActionDenied_with_reason_unknown_action`, `test_missing_policy_file_is_a_policy_error`, `test_malformed_policy_document_is_a_policy_error`, `test_T62_a_declining_provider_with_no_context_is_no_principal` | -| "With authority on, every principal needs a grant, and delegation cannot widen one." | `NO_AUTHORITY` — the fail-closed default of `Authority.evaluate` (`authority.py:77`); `contained_dimension` — `authority.py:889` — runs from `plan_delegation` (`authority.py:1430`) and from the chain walk in `Authority.evaluate` | `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied`, `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone` | -| "Every executed action leaves a portable JSON receipt" | `ReceiptResult` — `receipt.py:232`; `Event` — `receipt.py:298`; the store is authoritative — `append_event` — `state.py:846`; the JSONL export — `JSONLEventSink` — `receipt.py:792` | `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_carries_every_field_in_the_spec`, `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_parses_back_into_a_Receipt` | +| "An unknown outcome is AMBIGUOUS, never FAILED, and blocks a blind retry." | Only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:2172`. Every other exception, timeouts included, yields `AMBIGUOUS`. A retry against an `AMBIGUOUS` key is refused — `effect.py:172`, the one place `plan_reservation` decides it for every store | `test_T1_a_blind_retry_writes_a_blocked_receipt`, `test_T1_the_ambiguous_record_survives_the_blocked_retry`, `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous` | +| "An unknown action, a missing policy or a missing principal is denied." | Unknown action: `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:655` — answers `deny` for a name the document does not list. Missing or malformed policy: `Policy.from_file` — `policy.py:812` — raises `PolicyError`, and there is no `Control` without a policy. Missing principal: `_refuse_no_principal` — `control.py:4784` | `test_T6_unknown_action_raises_ActionDenied_with_reason_unknown_action`, `test_missing_policy_file_is_a_policy_error`, `test_malformed_policy_document_is_a_policy_error`, `test_T62_a_declining_provider_with_no_context_is_no_principal` | +| "With authority on, every principal needs a grant, and delegation cannot widen one." | `NO_AUTHORITY` — the fail-closed default of `Authority.evaluate` (`authority.py:84`); `contained_dimension` — `authority.py:984` — runs from `plan_delegation` (`authority.py:1538`) and from the chain walk in `Authority.evaluate` | `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied`, `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone` | +| "Every executed action leaves a portable JSON receipt" | `ReceiptResult` — `receipt.py:240`; `Event` — `receipt.py:306`; the store is authoritative — `append_event` — `state.py:846`; the JSONL export — `JSONLEventSink` — `receipt.py:817` | `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_carries_every_field_in_the_spec`, `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_parses_back_into_a_Receipt` | ## What it guarantees @@ -152,33 +152,33 @@ catalogue, `GUARANTEES` (`verify/guarantees.py:47`). | "a unique index on the effect key and compare-and-set updates whose row counts are checked" | `reserve_effect` — `postgres.py:740` — `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` against `effect_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY COLLATE "C"` (`migrations.py:107`) | `test_T3_exactly_one_agent_reserves_and_seven_are_blocked` (8 OS processes, both backends) | | "Same `StateStore` protocol, extended by nothing" | `PostgresStateStore.reserve_effect` — `postgres.py:740` — and every other method implement `v0.1 §5.3`'s frozen protocol; the decisions stay in `plan_reservation` (`effect.py:248`) | `test_T154_postgres_passes_the_store_conformance_suite` | | "graded by the suite written for SQLite" | `ctrlrun.conformance.store.run` — `conformance/store/__init__.py:53` | `test_T140_every_fixture_fails_the_suite_named_for_it` | -| "It will not *knowingly* execute the same logical effect twice, and will never treat an unknown outcome as a failure." | `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248` (refuse retry on `AMBIGUOUS`) and `_outcome` — `control.py:1960` (only `NotExecuted` → `FAILED`) | `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote`, `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous` | -| "a lost connection during `COMMIT` ... are `AMBIGUOUS`" | `_resolve_lost_insert` — `postgres.py:931`; `_resolve_lost_update` — `postgres.py:1557`; only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:1960` | `test_T155_a_connection_killed_during_commit_is_resolved_by_the_re_read`, `test_T155_no_effect_is_ever_recorded_failed_by_a_lost_commit` | +| "It will not *knowingly* execute the same logical effect twice, and will never treat an unknown outcome as a failure." | `plan_reservation` — `effect.py:248` (refuse retry on `AMBIGUOUS`) and `_outcome` — `control.py:2172` (only `NotExecuted` → `FAILED`) | `test_T1_a_blind_retry_is_refused_and_never_reaches_the_remote`, `test_T1_a_lost_response_leaves_the_effect_ambiguous` | +| "a lost connection during `COMMIT` ... are `AMBIGUOUS`" | `_resolve_lost_insert` — `postgres.py:931`; `_resolve_lost_update` — `postgres.py:1557`; only `NotExecuted` maps to `FAILED` — `_outcome` — `control.py:2172` | `test_T155_a_connection_killed_during_commit_is_resolved_by_the_re_read`, `test_T155_no_effect_is_ever_recorded_failed_by_a_lost_commit` | | "the store re-reads the row to find out which" | The six branches, named and logged — `A2_LANDED` — `postgres.py:140` | `test_T155b_a_landed_commit_on_a_transition_is_seen_as_landed`, `test_T155d_a_commit_the_server_never_received_retries_the_insert` | -| "A crashed worker's effect stays `AMBIGUOUS` until a human runs `ctrlrun resolve` or a `reconcile` hook asks the remote what happened" | An expired lease is `AMBIGUOUS` and nothing sweeps it — `LEASE_EXPIRED` — `effect.py:172`; who resolved it — `resolved_by` — `effect.py:208`; `resolve` — `cli/main.py:587` | `test_T159_ambiguous_survives_a_restart_and_still_refuses_a_blind_retry`, `test_T160_there_is_no_reaper`, `test_T161_a_human_resolution_records_who` | -| "the only thing besides a human permitted to move a record out of `AMBIGUOUS`" | `Control._reconciled` — `control.py:2595`; `RECONCILED_STATES` — `effect.py` | `test_T13_a_hook_answering_not_executed_moves_the_record_to_failed`, `test_T14_a_hook_answering_committed_refuses_the_retry_as_a_duplicate` | +| "A crashed worker's effect stays `AMBIGUOUS` until a human runs `ctrlrun resolve` or a `reconcile` hook asks the remote what happened" | An expired lease is `AMBIGUOUS` and nothing sweeps it — `LEASE_EXPIRED` — `effect.py:172`; who resolved it — `resolved_by` — `effect.py:208`; `resolve` — `cli/main.py:589` | `test_T159_ambiguous_survives_a_restart_and_still_refuses_a_blind_retry`, `test_T160_there_is_no_reaper`, `test_T161_a_human_resolution_records_who` | +| "the only thing besides a human permitted to move a record out of `AMBIGUOUS`" | `Control._reconciled` — `control.py:2826`; `RECONCILED_STATES` — `effect.py` | `test_T13_a_hook_answering_not_executed_moves_the_record_to_failed`, `test_T14_a_hook_answering_committed_refuses_the_retry_as_a_duplicate` | | "and only in the direction its answer points" | `"unknown"` is absent from `RECONCILED_STATES` — `effect.py` | `test_T15_a_hook_that_cannot_answer_leaves_the_record_ambiguous` | -| "Unknown action, missing policy, malformed policy, missing principal, missing or mismatched approval and inconsistent state are all `deny`." | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:596`; `Policy.from_file` — `policy.py:753`; `_refuse_no_principal` — `control.py:4458`; `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1196` | `test_T6_unknown_action_raises_ActionDenied_with_reason_unknown_action`, `test_malformed_policy_document_is_a_policy_error`, `test_T62_a_declining_provider_with_no_context_is_no_principal`, `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch` | -| "No flag makes a consequential action permissive by default" | There is no such option on `Control`, on `@protect`, on the CLI or in the policy schema's closed key sets — `_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS` — `policy.py:123` | `test_T84_mode_is_refused_anywhere_but_the_top_level`, `test_T101b_zero_applicable_guarantees_is_not_a_pass` | -| "With `authority:` on, every principal needs a grant, delegation cannot widen one, and `ctrlrun revoke` cuts a chain with one write." | `Authority.evaluate` — `authority.py:1191`; `contained_dimension` — `authority.py:889`; `Control.revoke` — `control.py:4148` | `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied`, `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone`, `test_t78_a_revoked_parent_denies_its_grandchild` | +| "Unknown action, missing policy, malformed policy, missing principal, missing or mismatched approval and inconsistent state are all `deny`." | `Policy.evaluate` — `policy.py:655`; `Policy.from_file` — `policy.py:812`; `_refuse_no_principal` — `control.py:4784`; `_authorize_and_reserve` — `state.py:1196` | `test_T6_unknown_action_raises_ActionDenied_with_reason_unknown_action`, `test_malformed_policy_document_is_a_policy_error`, `test_T62_a_declining_provider_with_no_context_is_no_principal`, `test_T2_a_mutated_action_presenting_the_approval_raises_ApprovalMismatch` | +| "No flag makes a consequential action permissive by default" | There is no such option on `Control`, on `@protect`, on the CLI or in the policy schema's closed key sets — `_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS` — `policy.py:127` | `test_T84_mode_is_refused_anywhere_but_the_top_level`, `test_T101b_zero_applicable_guarantees_is_not_a_pass` | +| "With `authority:` on, every principal needs a grant, delegation cannot widen one, and `ctrlrun revoke` cuts a chain with one write." | `Authority.evaluate` — `authority.py:1286`; `contained_dimension` — `authority.py:984`; `Control.revoke` — `control.py:4451` | `test_T67_a_principal_with_no_grant_is_denied`, `test_t76_each_dimension_violated_alone`, `test_t78_a_revoked_parent_denies_its_grandchild` | | "verifies a bearer token against a JWKS or a pinned key" | `JWTIdentityProvider._verified` — `jwt_identity.py:208`; the algorithm comes from the configured list and never from the token | `test_T88_a_valid_token_becomes_a_principal`, `test_T89_every_invalid_token_is_refused_by_cause` | | "maps the verified claims onto a principal" | `_principal` — `jwt_identity.py` — copies only the claims named in `claim_names` | `test_T88_only_the_named_claims_reach_the_principal` | | "`pip install \"ctrlrun[identity]\"`" | `identity = ["pyjwt[crypto]>=2.8"]` in `pyproject.toml`; imported lazily by `_jwt()` — `jwt_identity.py` | `test_T92_constructing_without_the_extra_names_the_install_command`, `test_T92_importing_ctrlrun_pulls_in_no_jwt_module` | | "CTRLRun issues no credential and defines no identity format" | There is no minting, signing or issuing code path in the package: `jwt_identity.py` calls `decode` and never `encode` | `test_the_package_never_encodes_a_token` | -| "every receipt records which policy decided it" | `Policy.policy_hash` — `policy.py:734`, over `_canonical_policy` — `policy.py:963`; carried into the receipt by `_record` — `control.py:4353` | `test_T172_every_receipt_carries_the_hash_and_the_declared_version`, `test_T172_two_policies_sharing_a_version_string_are_told_apart_by_the_hash` | -| "the policy's declared `version:` and a hash of its canonical content" | `version:` is recorded and never authoritative; `policy_hash` is what tells two documents apart — `policy.py:724` | `test_T171_the_declared_version_alone_does_not_change_the_hash`, `test_T171_comments_key_order_and_whitespace_do_not_change_the_hash` | -| "the approval is re-checked against the policy in force at execution" | `Control.execute` — `control.py:1127`; `_spend_unneeded_approval` — `control.py:2535` | `test_T173_the_DENY_row_refuses_and_leaves_the_approval_granted`, `test_T173_the_ALLOW_row_invalidates_the_approval_it_did_not_need` | -| "Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it" | `Receipt.chain_hash` — `receipt.py:514`; `prev_hash` — `receipt.py:444`; `GENESIS_HASH` — `receipt.py:117`; `put_receipt` takes the head row's lock first — `postgres.py:2092` | `test_T164_an_altered_receipt_is_content_altered_at_its_seq`, `test_T164_reordering_two_receipts_is_detected_either_way` | -| "`ctrlrun receipts --verify-chain` reports it by `seq`" | `verify_chain` — `receipt.py:904`; the six names — `CHAIN_BREAKS` — `receipt.py:841` | `test_the_verify_chain_flag_reports_a_break_by_seq_and_by_name`, `test_verify_chain_reads_a_postgres_store_through_store_url` | +| "every receipt records which policy decided it" | `Policy.policy_hash` — `policy.py:793`, over `_canonical_policy` — `policy.py:1041`; carried into the receipt by `_record` — `control.py:4675` | `test_T172_every_receipt_carries_the_hash_and_the_declared_version`, `test_T172_two_policies_sharing_a_version_string_are_told_apart_by_the_hash` | +| "the policy's declared `version:` and a hash of its canonical content" | `version:` is recorded and never authoritative; `policy_hash` is what tells two documents apart — `policy.py:783` | `test_T171_the_declared_version_alone_does_not_change_the_hash`, `test_T171_comments_key_order_and_whitespace_do_not_change_the_hash` | +| "the approval is re-checked against the policy in force at execution" | `Control.execute` — `control.py:1294`; `_spend_unneeded_approval` — `control.py:2766` | `test_T173_the_DENY_row_refuses_and_leaves_the_approval_granted`, `test_T173_the_ALLOW_row_invalidates_the_approval_it_did_not_need` | +| "Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it" | `Receipt.chain_hash` — `receipt.py:533`; `prev_hash` — `receipt.py:452`; `GENESIS_HASH` — `receipt.py:125`; `put_receipt` takes the head row's lock first — `postgres.py:2092` | `test_T164_an_altered_receipt_is_content_altered_at_its_seq`, `test_T164_reordering_two_receipts_is_detected_either_way` | +| "`ctrlrun receipts --verify-chain` reports it by `seq`" | `verify_chain` — `receipt.py:935`; the six names — `CHAIN_BREAKS` — `receipt.py:872` | `test_the_verify_chain_flag_reports_a_break_by_seq_and_by_name`, `test_verify_chain_reads_a_postgres_store_through_store_url` | | "migrations are automatic at open, forward-only" | `migrate` — `migrations.py:633`, called from both stores' constructors; `HEAD` — `migrations.py:414` | `test_T147_a_v05_database_migrates_and_keeps_every_row`, `test_T150_reopening_does_not_rerun` | | "An older binary against a newer schema refuses immediately" | `_refuse` — `migrations.py:559`; `SchemaMismatch` — `errors.py` | `test_T148_an_older_binary_refuses_a_newer_database`, `test_T148_no_other_table_is_read_before_the_refusal` | | "Releases carry PyPI provenance attestations from GitHub Actions" | `.github/workflows/publish.yml` — `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish` pinned at v1.14.2, which generates and uploads PEP 740 attestations by default since v1.11.0 (its release notes, read 2026-09-06), with no `attestations: false`; the `pypi` job's only permission is `id-token: write` | `test_the_publish_workflow_attests_through_trusted_publishing`, `test_every_action_is_pinned_to_a_commit` | -| "`ctrlrun approve`, `deny`, `resolve`, `inspect`, `receipts` and `stats` work from the shell against any store" | `approve` — `cli/main.py:377`; `receipts` — `cli/main.py:455`; `effects` — `cli/main.py:529`; `resolve` — `cli/main.py:587`; `inspect` — `cli/main.py:626`; `stats` — `cli/main.py:866`; every one takes `--store-url` (SPEC-v0.6 §9.4) | `test_T10_resolve_failed_permits_a_retry`, `test_T18_inspect_json_emits_the_inspection_schema`, `test_T86_stats_counts_what_observe_mode_recorded`, `test_verify_chain_reads_a_postgres_store_through_store_url` | +| "`ctrlrun approve`, `deny`, `resolve`, `inspect`, `receipts` and `stats` work from the shell against any store" | `approve` — `cli/main.py:379`; `receipts` — `cli/main.py:457`; `effects` — `cli/main.py:531`; `resolve` — `cli/main.py:589`; `inspect` — `cli/main.py:633`; `stats` — `cli/main.py:915`; every one takes `--store-url` (SPEC-v0.6 §9.4) | `test_T10_resolve_failed_permits_a_retry`, `test_T18_inspect_json_emits_the_inspection_schema`, `test_T86_stats_counts_what_observe_mode_recorded`, `test_verify_chain_reads_a_postgres_store_through_store_url` | | "`WebhookApprovalProvider` sends an approval request to a webhook, such as Slack, and takes the answer back through the same grant calls" | `WebhookApprovalProvider` — `webhook.py:141` — one signed POST on `APPROVAL_REQUESTED`; the inbound answer lands through `grant_approval` / `deny_approval` like the CLI's | `test_T27_the_outbound_post_carries_a_signature_over_the_exact_bytes_sent`, `test_T27_the_payload_carries_what_the_spec_names` | | "one OpenTelemetry span per action, one span event per step" | `OTelEventSink` — `otel.py:45` | `test_T29_one_action_produces_one_span_named_for_the_action`, `test_T29_every_event_becomes_a_span_event_named_by_its_type` | | "argument values stay out of it unless you ask for them" | `OTelEventSink(arguments=...)` — `otel.py:45` | `test_T29_argument_values_are_not_attributes_by_default` | -| "Receipts in a `ctrlrun.policy/v4` document can cite the `controls:` an action satisfies" | `PolicyControl` — `policy.py:327`; `Receipt` — `receipt.py:373` — carries `controls`; attribution only, never a decision | `test_T175_the_receipt_carries_the_union_of_the_action_and_the_matched_rule`, `test_T175_a_control_is_attribution_and_changes_no_decision` | -| "a rule can condition on the `data:` labels present in an action's arguments" | `DataLabel` — `policy.py:568`; `Policy.data_scope` — `policy.py:588`; `data_scope_in` in `v0.1 §3.2`'s grammar with no new operator | `test_T176_the_derived_set_is_the_labels_of_the_arguments_actually_supplied`, `test_T176_the_derived_set_drives_a_decision` | +| "Receipts in a `ctrlrun.policy/v4` document can cite the `controls:` an action satisfies" | `PolicyControl` — `policy.py:360`; `Receipt` — `receipt.py:398` — carries `controls`; attribution only, never a decision | `test_T175_the_receipt_carries_the_union_of_the_action_and_the_matched_rule`, `test_T175_a_control_is_attribution_and_changes_no_decision` | +| "a rule can condition on the `data:` labels present in an action's arguments" | `DataLabel` — `policy.py:627`; `Policy.data_scope` — `policy.py:647`; `data_scope_in` in `v0.1 §3.2`'s grammar with no new operator | `test_T176_the_derived_set_is_the_labels_of_the_arguments_actually_supplied`, `test_T176_the_derived_set_drives_a_decision` | ## What it can't, stated as limits @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ The README also makes negative claims. They matter as much as the positive ones. | "CTRLRun is not a transaction manager: it rolls nothing back" | There is no compensation, saga or rollback code path in the package; an `AMBIGUOUS` effect is resolved by a human or a reconcile hook and never undone — `RECONCILED_STATES` — `effect.py` | | "The receipt chain detects alteration, and alteration is not authorship." | n/a — a disclaimer, and the scan that keeps it one: `test_T180_the_release_documents_do_not_blur_alteration_and_authorship` | | "erasing the end of the log costs two statements" | No code — this is what the chain does **not** cover, and it is asserted rather than argued: `test_erasing_a_suffix_and_rewinding_the_head_is_two_statements_and_undetected` | -| "CTRLRun does not detect prompt injection" | No code — and that is the point. Nothing in the package reads the agent's instructions: `Policy.evaluate` takes the action's name and arguments (`policy.py:596`) and `Authority` matches a grant against the action, so neither axis has the prompt to inspect. The README's problem table claims containment of the consequence, and this row is the sentence that stops it being read as detection. | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_a_condition_naming_an_action_field_is_refused_at_load` | +| "CTRLRun does not detect prompt injection" | No code — and that is the point. Nothing in the package reads the agent's instructions: `Policy.evaluate` takes the action's name and arguments (`policy.py:655`) and `Authority` matches a grant against the action, so neither axis has the prompt to inspect. The README's problem table claims containment of the consequence, and this row is the sentence that stops it being read as detection. | `test_T6_an_action_name_is_matched_exactly`, `test_a_condition_naming_an_action_field_is_refused_at_load` | | "`ctrlrun verify` cannot see your executors" | `docs/verify.md`, "What it does not mean"; `THREAT_MODEL.md`, "Known v0.4 limitations" | | "`ctrlrun scan` … reports the consequential call sites and policy entries CTRLRun is **not** covering" and "has no score, no percentage and no badge" | `ctrlrun/scan/` reads the tree with `ast` and never imports it, resolves no principal, evaluates no policy and opens no store (SPEC-scan §9.2); the limits sentence is emitted on every run including a clean one, and no percentage is computed anywhere | `test_T194_scan_never_imports_the_tree_it_reads`, `test_T205_scan_resolves_no_principal_evaluates_no_policy_and_opens_no_store`, `test_T203_the_limits_sentence_is_in_every_run_including_a_clean_one` | | "`ctrlrun mcp-operator` … It authenticates who answered and records it; it does not check that they were entitled to." | the write tools refuse without a principal and attribute the answer to the verified one; there is no entitlement check, and `docs/SPEC-mcp-operator.md` §10 says so | `test_T184_approve_refuses_without_a_principal`, `test_T184_approve_succeeds_with_one_and_is_attributed`, `test_T183_there_is_no_flag_that_permits_a_remote_bind` | @@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ The README also makes negative claims. They matter as much as the positive ones. |---|---|---| | "the same `StateStore` protocol, extended by nothing, graded by the suite written for SQLite rather than one written for it" | `PostgresStateStore` — `postgres.py` — satisfies `StateStore` and adds no method (SPEC-v0.6 §9.1); `ctrlrun.conformance.store.SUITES` is the SQLite suite, run against both | `test_T141_the_shipped_backends_pass`, `test_T154_postgres_passes_the_store_conformance_suite` | | "automatic at open and forward-only, with no flag that opens a database un-migrated. An older binary against a newer schema refuses immediately." | `migrate` — `migrations.py:633` — called from both stores' constructors; `_refuse` — `migrations.py:559` — raises `SchemaMismatch` on a newer `user_version` | `test_T147_a_v05_database_migrates_and_keeps_every_row`, `test_T148_an_older_binary_refuses_a_newer_database`, `test_T152b_no_flag_opens_a_database_without_migrating` | -| "an edit, a deletion from the middle or a reordering is detected and named by `seq`" | `verify_chain` — `receipt.py:442` — and the six break names in `CHAIN_BREAKS` | `test_T164_an_altered_receipt_is_content_altered_at_its_seq`, `test_T164_reordering_two_receipts_is_detected_either_way`, `test_the_verify_chain_flag_reports_a_break_by_seq_and_by_name` | +| "an edit, a deletion from the middle or a reordering is detected and named by `seq`" | `verify_chain` — `receipt.py:450` — and the six break names in `CHAIN_BREAKS` | `test_T164_an_altered_receipt_is_content_altered_at_its_seq`, `test_T164_reordering_two_receipts_is_detected_either_way`, `test_the_verify_chain_flag_reports_a_break_by_seq_and_by_name` | | "It detects **alteration**, which is not authorship: receipts are not signed." | No signing code, and a release scan keeps the vocabulary out | `test_T180_the_release_documents_do_not_blur_alteration_and_authorship` | -| "every receipt records the policy that decided it, so a receipt from six months ago says what the rules were" | `Policy.policy_hash` — `policy.py:734` — over the parsed decision inputs, recorded on the receipt | `test_T172_every_receipt_carries_the_hash_and_the_declared_version`, `test_T171_any_decision_input_changes_the_hash`, `test_T171_the_declared_version_alone_does_not_change_the_hash` | +| "every receipt records the policy that decided it, so a receipt from six months ago says what the rules were" | `Policy.policy_hash` — `policy.py:793` — over the parsed decision inputs, recorded on the receipt | `test_T172_every_receipt_carries_the_hash_and_the_declared_version`, `test_T171_any_decision_input_changes_the_hash`, `test_T171_the_declared_version_alone_does_not_change_the_hash` | ## The docs site: Home and Concepts @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ restating the code; the ones that are new to the site carry their own code and p | `concepts/outcomes-and-ambiguous` | the outcome table; only a human or a reconcile hook moves a record on, and only in the direction the answer points; nothing sweeps; a lost `COMMIT` on Postgres is `AMBIGUOUS` | the matrix row "An unknown outcome is AMBIGUOUS…", the reconciliation rows, "A crashed worker's effect stays `AMBIGUOUS`…" and the Postgres rows above; `test_T160_there_is_no_reaper` | | `concepts/receipts-and-evidence` | the receipt's fields, the JSONL sink, the policy hash and version, the chain and what it does not prove | the matrix row "Every executed action leaves a portable JSON receipt", the receipt-chain and policy-versioning rows above, and `test_T11_every_demo_receipt_carries_every_field_in_the_spec` | | `concepts/authority-and-delegation` | opt-in then fail-closed, no `decision:` on a grant, stricter of the two, containment at creation and at every evaluation, omission rejected, one-write revocation, identity consumed | the authority rows under "Write down what the agent may do" and "What it guarantees" above | -| `concepts/observe-mode` | executes, records `would_have`, one top-level line, counted by `ctrlrun stats`, never asks a human | the observe-mode rows above; `_observed` — `control.py:4401` | +| `concepts/observe-mode` | executes, records `would_have`, one top-level line, counted by `ctrlrun stats`, never asks a human | the observe-mode rows above; `_observed` — `control.py:4727` | | `concepts/fail-closed` | the refusal table, one exception per row | the matrix row "An unknown action, a missing policy or a missing principal is denied.", `ActionDenied` — `errors.py:29`, `DuplicateEffect` — `errors.py:126`, `AmbiguousEffect` — `errors.py:141`, and `test_a_policy_deny_is_denied_the_same_way_as_an_unknown_action` | ## The docs site: Production @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ sentence that rots quietly. | Page | Claim | Proved by | |---|---|---| -| `production/index` | the readiness block — version, test count, guarantee count, the two stores, the soak, the chain, the licence | rendered by `tools/docs_audit/render_readiness.py` from `pyproject.toml`, `pytest --collect-only`, the `GUARANTEES` catalogue — `verify/guarantees.py:47` — and `research/soak/results/`; `test_the_readiness_block_is_the_generators_in_every_place_it_appears` asserts the same block in the README, the docs home and this page, and `test_the_readiness_block_refuses_a_shrunken_suite_and_accepts_a_grown_one` makes the count a floor | +| `production/index` | the readiness block — version, test count, guarantee count, the two stores, the soak, the chain, the licence | rendered by `tools/docs_audit/render_readiness.py` from `pyproject.toml`, `pytest --collect-only`, the `GUARANTEES` catalogue — `verify/guarantees.py:49` — and `research/soak/results/`; `test_the_readiness_block_is_the_generators_in_every_place_it_appears` asserts the same block in the README, the docs home and this page, and `test_the_readiness_block_refuses_a_shrunken_suite_and_accepts_a_grown_one` makes the count a floor | | `production/index` | the **Not yet** list: no external security audit, no third-party review of the kernel, no sector packs | stated rather than measured, because nothing in a repository can measure an absence. A fourth line — *no soak of the length the roadmap asks for* — was **derived** from the published run until `SPEC-v0.6.md` §8.1 removed the duration from the criterion on 2026-09-07, which removed the thing being derived; the run's own duration is still printed on the soak line above the list. The list lives inside the generated block so it cannot be scrolled past. `test_the_not_yet_list_is_inside_the_block_and_not_below_it`, `test_the_not_yet_list_is_the_constant_and_derives_nothing_from_the_soak` and `test_the_readiness_block_does_not_report_the_soak_as_an_unmet_gate` assert all of it; removing a stated line is its own pull request with the row that makes the new sentence true | | `production/index` | "SQLite is the default and it is production-grade on one host… Postgres is for many hosts" | the header row above; `test_the_first_line_of_the_section_says_which_store_and_why` asserts the order, because Postgres first would tell a reader with one host something false | | `production/how-reservation-works` | the two rows: an exception before `COMMIT` is a failed write; one during it is unknown and is re-read | SPEC-v0.6 §4.3 Tables A, A1 and A2; `test_T155_a_connection_killed_during_commit_is_resolved_by_the_re_read`, `test_T155e_a_commit_the_server_never_received_re_issues_the_update`, `test_T155c_the_re_read_identity_check_is_not_an_action_id_match`, `test_T156_a_failed_re_read_refuses_to_proceed`; `test_the_two_rows_of_the_lost_commit_are_not_merged` asserts the page keeps them apart | diff --git a/docs/production/index.mdx b/docs/production/index.mdx index 6fb3d53..1e464aa 100644 --- a/docs/production/index.mdx +++ b/docs/production/index.mdx @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ need. `test_the_first_line_of_the_section_says_which_store_and_why` asserts the {/* generated from the suite, pyproject and the soak (full) — run the generator */} - **Version 0.9.0**, on [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/ctrlrun/), Python 3.11 and later. -- **5,975 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. [Read more](/docs/how-this-is-built). -- **24 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. [Read more](/docs/security/verify-guarantees). +- **6,033 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. [Read more](/docs/how-this-is-built). +- **27 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. [Read more](/docs/security/verify-guarantees). - **One host: a file.** SQLite, no server, no ops. **Many hosts: Postgres**, the same guarantees, graded by the same suite. [Read more](/docs/production/postgres). - **Soaked for 20m 0s on postgres**: 889,735 actions, 0 unattributed ambiguous outcomes, positive control fired. Nothing here establishes what only accumulates over days. [Read more](/docs/production/soak). - **Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it**, so an alteration is detected and named. [Read more](/docs/production/receipt-integrity). diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Authority.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Authority.mdx index 838591e..318a5db 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Authority.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Authority.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "The `authority:` section, loaded and evaluable (SPEC-v0.3 §4)." {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Authority` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:1134` +`ctrlrun.Authority` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:1229` ```python from ctrlrun import Authority diff --git a/docs/reference/api/AuthorityResult.mdx b/docs/reference/api/AuthorityResult.mdx index efe4e1d..e6aaee5 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/AuthorityResult.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/AuthorityResult.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "What the authority axis decided, and which grant it decided on (§ {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.AuthorityResult` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:619` +`ctrlrun.AuthorityResult` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:621` ```python from ctrlrun import AuthorityResult @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from ctrlrun import AuthorityResult ```python class AuthorityResult - def __init__(passed: bool, reason: str, grant_id: str | None = None, delegation_id: str | None = None, depth: int = 0, dimension: str | None = None, missing_parent_id: str | None = None, expired_parent_id: str | None = None, depth_exceeded: int | None = None, cycle_at: str | None = None) + def __init__(passed: bool, reason: str, grant_id: str | None = None, delegation_id: str | None = None, depth: int = 0, hop: str | None = None, dimension: str | None = None, missing_parent_id: str | None = None, expired_parent_id: str | None = None, depth_exceeded: int | None = None, cycle_at: str | None = None) ``` What the authority axis decided, and which grant it decided on (§4.8). diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Condition.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Condition.mdx index 78d1465..8d591f6 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Condition.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Condition.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "One `_: operand` test against an action's arguments {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Condition` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:371` +`ctrlrun.Condition` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:398` ```python from ctrlrun import Condition diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Control.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Control.mdx index 5a3c7f0..768bd22 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Control.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Control.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Policy, state and evidence composed around a single action (SPEC-v {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Control` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:677` +`ctrlrun.Control` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:825` ```python from ctrlrun import Control @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from ctrlrun import Control ```python class Control - def __init__(policy: Policy, store: StateStore, approvals: ApprovalProvider | None = None, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = _utc_now, approval_ttl: timedelta = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TTL, lease: timedelta = DEFAULT_LEASE, sinks: Sequence[EventSink] = (), suspend_timeout: timedelta = DEFAULT_SUSPEND_TIMEOUT, identity: IdentityProvider | None = None, authority: Authority | None = None, environment: str | None = None, approver_identity: ApproverIdentity | None = None, require_approved_policy: bool = False) + def __init__(policy: Policy, store: StateStore, approvals: ApprovalProvider | None = None, *, clock: Callable[[], datetime] = _utc_now, approval_ttl: timedelta = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_TTL, lease: timedelta = DEFAULT_LEASE, sinks: Sequence[EventSink] = (), suspend_timeout: timedelta = DEFAULT_SUSPEND_TIMEOUT, identity: IdentityProvider | None = None, authority: Authority | None = None, environment: str | None = None, approver_identity: ApproverIdentity | None = None, require_approved_policy: bool = False, upstream: str | None = None) ``` Policy, state and evidence composed around a single action (SPEC-v0.1 §8). diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Decision.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Decision.mdx index c3de473..758e88a 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Decision.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Decision.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "What may happen to an action: exactly three outcomes in v0.1 (SPEC {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Decision` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:308` +`ctrlrun.Decision` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:335` ```python from ctrlrun import Decision diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Delegation.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Delegation.mdx index dfce962..b7c5bd9 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Delegation.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Delegation.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "A grant created at runtime by a principal who already holds one (S {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Delegation` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:579` +`ctrlrun.Delegation` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:581` ```python from ctrlrun import Delegation diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Event.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Event.mdx index 993749b..8c16abb 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Event.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Event.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "One ordered step in the life of an action (SPEC-v0.1 §6.2)." {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Event` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:297` +`ctrlrun.Event` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:305` ```python from ctrlrun import Event diff --git a/docs/reference/api/EventSink.mdx b/docs/reference/api/EventSink.mdx index ea24ea4..709fced 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/EventSink.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/EventSink.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Somewhere a copy of every `Event` and `Receipt` goes (SPEC-v0.2 § {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.EventSink` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:773` +`ctrlrun.EventSink` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:798` ```python from ctrlrun import EventSink diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Grant.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Grant.mdx index ff85c8e..da0d436 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Grant.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Grant.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "One permission: this subject may propose these actions, under thes {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Grant` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:416` +`ctrlrun.Grant` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:431` ```python from ctrlrun import Grant diff --git a/docs/reference/api/JSONLEventSink.mdx b/docs/reference/api/JSONLEventSink.mdx index deda44e..39c7af6 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/JSONLEventSink.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/JSONLEventSink.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "The JSONL half of the evidence: two append-only files in one direc {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.JSONLEventSink` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:792` +`ctrlrun.JSONLEventSink` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:817` ```python from ctrlrun import JSONLEventSink diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Policy.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Policy.mdx index 8189ebd..1e5ea45 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Policy.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Policy.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Action-level autonomy policy: which actions may run, and under whi {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Policy` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:700` +`ctrlrun.Policy` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:759` ```python from ctrlrun import Policy diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Receipt.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Receipt.mdx index 115e1b2..713bdc6 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Receipt.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Receipt.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Portable evidence of one action that reached a terminal state (SPE {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Receipt` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:389` +`ctrlrun.Receipt` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/receipt.py:397` ```python from ctrlrun import Receipt @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from ctrlrun import Receipt ```python class Receipt - def __init__(receipt_id: str, action_id: str, action: str, action_hash: str, principal: Principal, resource: str | None, arguments: Mapping[str, Any], environment: str, decision: Decision, decision_reason: str, result: ReceiptResult, started_at: datetime, finished_at: datetime, approval_id: str | None = None, approver: str | None = None, effect_key: str | None = None, attempt: int = 1, error: str | None = None, execution: ReceiptResult | None = None, would_have: _WouldHave | None = None, seq: int | None = None, prev_hash: str | None = None, policy_hash: str | None = None, policy_version: str | None = None, controls: tuple[str, ...] = (), hash: str | None = None, precondition_at_request: str | None = None, precondition_at_recheck: str | None = None, approvers: tuple[VerifiedApprover, ...] = (), authority_grant_id: str | None = None, task: str | None = None, scope_hash: str | None = None, budget_charges: tuple[Mapping[str, Any], ...] = (), schema: str = RECEIPT_SCHEMA) + def __init__(receipt_id: str, action_id: str, action: str, action_hash: str, principal: Principal, resource: str | None, arguments: Mapping[str, Any], environment: str, decision: Decision, decision_reason: str, result: ReceiptResult, started_at: datetime, finished_at: datetime, approval_id: str | None = None, approver: str | None = None, effect_key: str | None = None, attempt: int = 1, error: str | None = None, execution: ReceiptResult | None = None, would_have: _WouldHave | None = None, seq: int | None = None, prev_hash: str | None = None, policy_hash: str | None = None, policy_version: str | None = None, controls: tuple[str, ...] = (), hash: str | None = None, precondition_at_request: str | None = None, precondition_at_recheck: str | None = None, approvers: tuple[VerifiedApprover, ...] = (), authority_grant_id: str | None = None, task: str | None = None, scope_hash: str | None = None, hop: str | None = None, budget_charges: tuple[Mapping[str, Any], ...] = (), schema: str = RECEIPT_SCHEMA) ``` Portable evidence of one action that reached a terminal state (SPEC-v0.1 §6.1). diff --git a/docs/reference/api/Subject.mdx b/docs/reference/api/Subject.mdx index b2c0968..00c07c1 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/Subject.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/Subject.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Who a grant is addressed to: an agent pattern, a user pattern, or {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.Subject` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:320` +`ctrlrun.Subject` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:335` ```python from ctrlrun import Subject diff --git a/docs/reference/api/authority-Budget.mdx b/docs/reference/api/authority-Budget.mdx index 9c41dbe..e28ed36 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/authority-Budget.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/authority-Budget.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "How much, over what, in how long (SPEC-v0.9 §2.2)." {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.authority.Budget` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:366` +`ctrlrun.authority.Budget` — class, defined at `src/ctrlrun/authority.py:381` ```python from ctrlrun.authority import Budget diff --git a/docs/reference/api/context.mdx b/docs/reference/api/context.mdx index ca76059..9cc2df7 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/context.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/context.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Bind the principal for calls made inside the block." {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.context` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:322` +`ctrlrun.context` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:368` ```python from ctrlrun import context diff --git a/docs/reference/api/idempotency_token.mdx b/docs/reference/api/idempotency_token.mdx index 1f7139f..c3dbb20 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/idempotency_token.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/idempotency_token.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "The provider idempotency token for the attempt this executor is ru {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.idempotency_token` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:290` +`ctrlrun.idempotency_token` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:336` ```python from ctrlrun import idempotency_token diff --git a/docs/reference/api/parse_conditions.mdx b/docs/reference/api/parse_conditions.mdx index ef816d6..c9eee51 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/parse_conditions.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/parse_conditions.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Parse a `when:`-shaped mapping into conditions, keyed by the raw c {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.parse_conditions` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:1248` +`ctrlrun.parse_conditions` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/policy.py:1326` ```python from ctrlrun import parse_conditions diff --git a/docs/reference/api/protect.mdx b/docs/reference/api/protect.mdx index 8e00624..653d65c 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/protect.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/protect.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Bind a function to an action name: every call becomes a decided, r {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.protect` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:4576` +`ctrlrun.protect` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:4902` ```python from ctrlrun import protect @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from ctrlrun import protect ```python -def protect(name: str, *, effect: str | None = None, resource: str | None = None, wait: bool = False, lease: timedelta | None = None, reconcile: Callable[[str], ReconcileOutcome] | None = None, reconcile_eagerly: bool = False, control: Control | None = None, preconditions: Callable[[Action], Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None, task: str | None = None, scope: Callable[[Action], Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None) -> Callable[[Callable[P, R]], Callable[P, R]] +def protect(name: str, *, effect: str | None = None, resource: str | None = None, wait: bool = False, lease: timedelta | None = None, reconcile: Callable[[str], ReconcileOutcome] | None = None, reconcile_eagerly: bool = False, control: Control | None = None, preconditions: Callable[[Action], Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None, task: str | None = None, hop: str | None = None, scope: Callable[[Action], Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None) -> Callable[[Callable[P, R]], Callable[P, R]] ``` Bind a function to an action name: every call becomes a decided, recorded Action. diff --git a/docs/reference/api/with_approval.mdx b/docs/reference/api/with_approval.mdx index de2b8cc..69bf752 100644 --- a/docs/reference/api/with_approval.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/api/with_approval.mdx @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: "Present a granted approval to the calls made inside the block (SPE {/* generated by tools/docs_audit/render_api.py from the docstrings — edit the docstring, never this page */} -`ctrlrun.with_approval` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:345` +`ctrlrun.with_approval` — function, defined at `src/ctrlrun/control.py:391` ```python from ctrlrun import with_approval diff --git a/docs/reference/cli.mdx b/docs/reference/cli.mdx index c9e7fba..8dfb504 100644 --- a/docs/reference/cli.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/cli.mdx @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ Usage: ctrlrun inspect [OPTIONS] [ACTION_ID] Options: --grant TEXT Show this grant's budgets instead: consumed, held, and what holds it. + --hop TEXT Show this hop or delegation instead: who issued it, and what + each link narrowed. --json Emit one JSON object instead. --store-url TEXT The store to open. Default: $CTRLRUN_STORE_URL, else the SQLite database beside the policy (.ctrlrun/state.db, or diff --git a/docs/reference/receipt-and-event-schemas.mdx b/docs/reference/receipt-and-event-schemas.mdx index 763e647..1536a7e 100644 --- a/docs/reference/receipt-and-event-schemas.mdx +++ b/docs/reference/receipt-and-event-schemas.mdx @@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ it. A reader checking a chain compares those two. | `authority_grant_id` | `str | None` | `None` | | `task` | `str | None` | `None` | | `scope_hash` | `str | None` | `None` | +| `hop` | `str | None` | `None` | | `budget_charges` | `tuple` | `()` | -| `schema` | `str` | `'ctrlrun.receipt/v6'` | +| `schema` | `str` | `'ctrlrun.receipt/v7'` | | `_stored_document` | `collections.abc.Mapping[str, Any] | None` | `None` | ### Result diff --git a/generated/readiness.full.mdx b/generated/readiness.full.mdx index 12b6d44..3d17b96 100644 --- a/generated/readiness.full.mdx +++ b/generated/readiness.full.mdx @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ {/* generated from the suite, pyproject and the soak (full) — run the generator */} - **Version 0.9.0**, on [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/ctrlrun/), Python 3.11 and later. -- **5,975 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. [Read more](/docs/how-this-is-built). -- **24 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. [Read more](/docs/security/verify-guarantees). +- **6,033 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. [Read more](/docs/how-this-is-built). +- **27 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. [Read more](/docs/security/verify-guarantees). - **One host: a file.** SQLite, no server, no ops. **Many hosts: Postgres**, the same guarantees, graded by the same suite. [Read more](/docs/production/postgres). - **Soaked for 20m 0s on postgres**: 889,735 actions, 0 unattributed ambiguous outcomes, positive control fired. Nothing here establishes what only accumulates over days. [Read more](/docs/production/soak). - **Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it**, so an alteration is detected and named. [Read more](/docs/production/receipt-integrity). diff --git a/generated/readiness.json b/generated/readiness.json index c819159..73f1b5f 100644 --- a/generated/readiness.json +++ b/generated/readiness.json @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ { - "guarantees": 24, + "guarantees": 27, "released": "0.9.0", "soak": { "actions": 889735, @@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ "positive_control": true, "unexplained": 0 }, - "tests": 5975, + "tests": 6033, "version": "0.9.0" } diff --git a/generated/readiness.mdx b/generated/readiness.mdx index 23741ee..b0fc065 100644 --- a/generated/readiness.mdx +++ b/generated/readiness.mdx @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ {/* generated from the suite, pyproject and the soak (mdx) — run the generator */} - **Version 0.9.0**, on [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/ctrlrun/), Python 3.11 and later. -- **5,975 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. -- **24 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. +- **6,033 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. +- **27 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. - **One host: a file.** SQLite, no server, no ops. **Many hosts: Postgres**, the same guarantees, graded by the same suite. - **Soaked for 20m 0s on postgres**: 889,735 actions, 0 unattributed ambiguous outcomes, positive control fired. Nothing here establishes what only accumulates over days. [What it does not establish](https://ctrlrun.dev/docs/production/soak). - **Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it**, so an alteration is detected and named. diff --git a/generated/readiness.readme.md b/generated/readiness.readme.md index 9428f97..0cc97cc 100644 --- a/generated/readiness.readme.md +++ b/generated/readiness.readme.md @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - **Version 0.9.0**, on [PyPI](https://pypi.org/project/ctrlrun/), Python 3.11 and later. -- **5,975 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. -- **24 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. +- **6,033 tests**, every version specified before it was written and every requirement mutation-tested. +- **27 guarantees you can check in your own setup**, with `ctrlrun verify` against your policy, on your store's backend, in a scratch store it creates. - **One host: a file.** SQLite, no server, no ops. **Many hosts: Postgres**, the same guarantees, graded by the same suite. - **Soaked for 20m 0s on postgres**: 889,735 actions, 0 unattributed ambiguous outcomes, positive control fired. Nothing here establishes what only accumulates over days. [What it does not establish](https://ctrlrun.dev/docs/production/soak). - **Each receipt carries the hash of the one before it**, so an alteration is detected and named.