diff --git a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/sensitive-env-guard.ts b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/sensitive-env-guard.ts
index 145e41f065e9..88b999957de0 100644
--- a/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/sensitive-env-guard.ts
+++ b/packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes/src/sensitive-env-guard.ts
@@ -7,9 +7,39 @@
 //
 // This guard is fail-closed and runs on every manifest we build, so a future
 // literal credential breaks the build and the test suite rather than silently
-// shipping. It mirrors the same protection in the external claude_k8s adapter
-// (paperclip-adapter-claude-k8s `job-manifest.ts`), which renders the
-// production agent-job pods.
+// shipping.
+//
+// It does NOT mirror any protection in the external claude_k8s adapter, which
+// is the code that actually renders production agent-job pods. As of the SHA
+// pinned by `Dockerfile` (`CLAUDE_K8S_REF=3ad3370`), that adapter applies no
+// security allowlist, denylist, or sensitivity-based filter on the pod-env
+// path.
+// `getSelfPodInfo()` (`k8s-client.ts:111-197`) selects one container off the
+// server pod — the one named `paperclip`, else the first — and extracts that
+// container's credential-bearing channels: literal `env[].value`s, `valueFrom`
+// entries (`secretKeyRef` included), `envFrom` sources, and the secret volumes
+// mounted on it. `job-manifest.ts` forwards all four onto every agent pod
+// (`:491`, `:562`, `:1144`, `:879`), subject only to ordinary environment
+// precedence and never to a security decision.
+//
+// Entries are dropped or replaced at several points along that path, so do not
+// read any single one as the only such point: extraction skips unnamed and
+// empty-string values (`k8s-client.ts:167`, `:173`); the merge layers that run
+// after the inherited env overwrite or extend same-name inherited literals
+// (`job-manifest.ts:490-550` — generated Paperclip values, `adapterConfig.env`
+// overrides, generated `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS`, `HOME`, and isolation and
+// cache paths); and the `valueFrom` replay skips names a literal already set
+// (`:563`). Every one of those is name precedence or an emptiness check, so
+// none of them withholds a credential on the grounds that it is sensitive.
+//
+// The adapter's only env-related guard, `env-guard.ts`, is a Claude Code
+// `PreToolUse` hook blocking shell environment dumps (`env`, `printenv`,
+// `/proc/*/environ`) at agent runtime. It never inspects a manifest, so it does
+// not constrain anything described above.
+//
+// So this guard covers only manifests built by this repo's Kubernetes
+// sandbox-provider path, and provides zero coverage for that adapter. See
+// BLO-22514 for the gap and BLO-22506 for the related k8s-ro read exposure.
 //
 // POLICY: allowlist, not denylist.
 //